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ABSTRACT
This thesis applies an international political economy perspective to explore the main 
factors and processes involved in the development of micro-regionalisation among the 
Guangdong province of China, Taiwan and Japan with specific reference to the electronics 
industry. The emphasis is on the inter-related dynamics of multi-level governance 
(involving in particular the increasingly important role of Chinese sub-national 
governments and their network relations with multinational corporations) and the spread of 
cross-border production networks and international commodity chains. This is the first 
study to integrate an analysis of economic and political-governmental factors in the 
development of this particular case of micro-regionalisation. The analysis focuses on three 
related research questions: (1) How should we define and characterise the key components 
of micro-regionalisation among Guangdong, Taiwan and Japan? (2) What kinds of policy 
environment and what actors in the host and home countries are needed to support 
cross-border economic relations? (3) How do networks of multi-level governance (MLG) 
operate to facilitate micro-regionalisation?
First, the phenomenon of micro-regionalisation among Guangdong, Taiwan and Japan is 
analysed in terms of three major components: the opening up of new political and 
economic spaces in Guangdong as a result of China’s domestic reform movement and the 
emergence of a fluid and flexible system of multi-level governance; the strategic decisions 
by Japanese firms, especially in electronics, to invest in southern China; and the expansion 
of cross-strait production networks between southern China and Taiwan.
Secondly, the development of cross-border relations is examined from the viewpoint of the 
inter-relationships between key strategic actors (the state, sub-national governments and 
multinational firms) and the impact of a number of organisational variables, including 
commodity chains, network linkages, production networks, guanxi networks and 
organisational learning and conventional social factors). The analysis highlights the impact 
on firms’ behaviour of both the home and host governance contexts.
Thirdly, the analysis shows that, with the dispersion of authoritative decision making in 
China, the multiple levels of local (sub-national) government have assumed more 
responsibility in responding directly to foreign investors. The case study of Dongguan and 
the electronics industry reveals the important roles of the provincial, city and 
sub-municipal governments in developing cross-border micro-regional network relations 
with multinational firms. It also highlights some of the major problems arising from an 
emergent, unplanned system of multi-level governance that lacks overall control and 
co-ordination.
TRANSLITERATION
Where there are references to Chinese names, in most cases, the system of Romanisation of 
Chinese characters used in this study is Mandarin (the pin-yin system). The only 
exceptions are proper names and places in Taiwan (e.g. ‘Taipei’) and the names of some 
famous people such as Lee Teng-hui. However, if the name is widely used in both versions 
in English publications, both versions are given in the text, as in the case of the Taiwanese 
Nationalist Party (Guomindang/Kuomintang). Following the Chinese convention, names in 
the text and notes are given with the family name first followed by the given name, e g. 
Deng Xiaoping. Also, in the case of Japanese names, traditionally the family name is first, 
followed by the given name. However, in writings of Japanese names in English, the given 
name is followed by the family name (e.g. Kaname Akamatsu). Long vowels in Japanese 
names are indicated by macrons (e.g. ‘Tsusansho’), except when referring to authors and 
works published in English and to the names of the big well-known cities and major firms 
such as Tokyo, Osaka and Toshiba. Thus a work written in English by a Japanese author 
named Omae appears as Ohmae in the text. A work written in Japanese by a Chinese 
author named Cho appears in the bibliography in the Japanese section with both versions, 
e.g. Cho (Zhao). In the bibliography, for all English, Japanese and Chinese authors, the 
family name is given first, followed by the given name after a comma (,).
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
During the 1990s, ‘globalisation’ and ‘régionalisation’ became fashionable terms in the 
study of international political economy (IPE). These phenomena cannot be explained by a 
single causal mechanism but must be seen as complex, uneven and contradictory trends 
that result from many different causal processes (Jessop, 2001: 27). In East Asia1 the 
nature and scope of these impacts on the emerging markets of less developed countries, 
especially China, is a particularly difficult issue, since it raises fundamental questions 
about the scale of economic activity (traditionally based on the Chinese national economy). 
Since economic reform, China has been the largest recipient of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) among all developing countries. The large injection of FD1, the transfer of 
technology, and the abundant supply of cheap labour have led to China’s success in the 
development of its foreign trade. Spatially, China’s distinctive pattern and processes of 
reintegration with the world economy are most clearly visible in the rapid development of 
industrial agglomeration in the Pearl River Delta in the Guangdong province.2
In the Pearl River Delta, labour-intensive, low-technology and low-value-added 
manufacturing started with the relocation of activity from Hong Kong in the 1980s and has 
since grown into a massive agglomeration in the electronics industry (especially in 
PC-related products), which now forms the world’s largest exporting base. Following 
investment by Hong Kong firms, Taiwanese, US and Japanese FDI has injected huge 
levels of foreign capital into this region. The emergence of cross-border economic 
dynamism has brought about a fundamental contradiction between 'pure economic space’ 
and the economy as a territorially and/or socially embedded system of both economic and 
extra-economic resources and competencies. While this emerging economic space has had 
a favourable effect on economic development as a whole, it has also served to further 
fragment the national economy and create alternative foci of identity and political 
legitimacy (Jessop, 2001: 28).
1
Thus far, most popular studies of the economic relations among China, Hong Kong and 
Taiwan have sought to explain those relations in terms of three distinct geographical 
layers: ‘Greater China’ or ‘the Chinese Economic Area’ (CEA) (mainland China, Hong 
Kong, Taiwan and Macau); ‘Greater South China’ or the ‘South China Economic Zone’ 
(Guangdong, Fujian, Hong Kong and Taiwan); and ‘Greater Hong Kong’ (the Hong 
Kong-Guangdong nexus) (Drover, Johnson and Tao, 2001; Sum, 1999; Sung, 1998; 
Rowley and Lewis, 1996; Hsiao and So, 1997; Shambaugh, 1995; Naughton, 1997; Taylor, 
1996, Khanna, 1995; Kwok and So, 1995; Jin 1995). There has been little interest in 
examining the processes and consequences of spatial restructuring across southern China 
from the perspective of the broader dynamics of East Asian régionalisation and 
sub-national involvement in cross-border governance.3 The three-layered pattern of 
China's economic relations is usually defined narrowly in terms of horizontal political and 
economic groupings of regions that benefit from their geographical proximity but lack 
formal institutional arrangements. However, the pattern of the economic 
interconnectedness of ‘the three Chinas’ is increasingly determined by a deep-rooted 
restructuring at the regional and firm levels as an expression of a new international, 
regional and hierarchical division of labour within and between regions. How can we 
explain the fact that a number of multinational corporations (MNCs) have selected 
Guangdong province (Pearl River Delta Region) as their manufacturing base in China? 
What are the theoretical implications o f this phenomenon for the study of IPE? These are 
key questions that will be addressed during the present analysis.
1.1 Research Aims
This study seeks to explore and explain the key components and charade. ..-.tics of the 
emergence of micro-regionalisation4 among the Guangdong province of China, Taiwan’ 
and Japan and the role of networks of governance6 linking Chinese sub-national 
governments (SNGs) and foreign firms. The focus is on the development of networks of 
SNGs in the context of the spread of industrial agglomeration in Guangdong with 
particular reference to the rescaling o f Chinese political economy, the role o f Japanese and 
Taiwanese FDI, the role of local government, and the governance o f cross-border 
production networks (CPNs) and international commodity chains (ICCs)7 in the 
electronics industry.
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The processes of economic globalisation exhibit a remarkable diversity at the regional 
scale. National governments remain the most important providers of responses to 
globalisation, but there are increasing interactions at the sub-national level between local 
governments and MNCs. This suggests the need to develop an in-depth undertstanding of 
the new mechanisms of multi-level governance (MLG) and the role of ICCs and CPNs. 
However, this is a complex task, since the forms of governance are continually evolving 
and changing.
It is especially important to understand the mismatch between political and economic space 
under the impact of globalisation. East Asian micro-regionalisation is a good example of 
this problem. Although this study considers only one industrial sector, the electronics 
sector, as a specific case study for analysis, it utilises this case study to demonstrate the 
broader significance of emergent networks of governance linking SNGs and MNCs, and 
evolving intra- and inter-firm relations through investment and production activities. The 
major driving forces behind the expansion of the electronics industry in Asia are pragmatic 
technological transfer strategies, FD1, the subsidiaries of MNCs, Japan’s role in building 
technology bases, and overseas Chinese firms (Das, 1998: 67). These networks are 
complex and require innovative methods -  both formal and informal -- of co-ordination 
and management in order to ensure the achievement of mutual benefits for the parties 
involved.
The three key research questions underlying this study are as follows:
How should we define and characterise the key components of micro-regionalisation 
among Guangdong, Taiwan and Japan?
What kinds of policy environment and what actors in the host and home countries are 
needed to support cross-border economic relations?
How do networks of multi-level governance (MLG) operate to facilitate 
m icro-regional i sation?
In empirical terms the research aims to furnish data concerning the structures, functions 
and operations of cross-border micro-regional networks of governance. More specifically, 
the intention is to contribute to an understanding of the implications of these developments 
for MLG in China and for the pattern of China’s integration with the East Asian regional
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economy. The thesis argues that the new regionalism in East Asia is a manifestation of the 
broader impact of economic globalisation, and involves a deep-rooted restructuring at the 
regional and firm levels as an expression of new international, regional and hierarchical 
networks of governance within and between regions. At the firm level it is the emergence 
of CPNs of various kinds, linked to the geographical extension of ICCs, which is of 
primary importance and poses the most fundamental challenges for the operation of SNGs. 
In theoretical terms, the aim of this study is to contribute to the development of theories of 
micro-regional network-building and to the understanding of emerging patterns of 
cross-border multi-level governance.
1.2 Definitions of Key Terms
Before outlining the parameters of the research area of multi-level governance and 
micro-regionalisation, it is important to clarify several definitional issues concerning types 
of FDI and foreign trade in cross-border economic relations among Guangdong, Taiwan 
and Japan.
FDI
Foreign direct investment is investment in the businesses of another country. This often 
takes the form of the setting up of local production facilities or the purchase of existing 
businesses. It must be distinguished from portfolio investment, which is the acquisition of 
securities (Rutherford, 1992: 178). In China, the forms of foreign-invested enterprises -  
sanzi qiye -  consist of four types: equity joint ventures (EJVs), contractual (or 
co-operative) joint ventures (CJVs), wholly foreign-owned ventures (WFVs), and joint 
exploration of resources. An EJV is a limited liability company jointly operated by Chinese 
and foreign investors in proportion to the size o f their respective investments. Any profit 
and loss is distributed according to the equity shares of its partners. Profit sharing in CJVs 
is designed by contract and not by equity proportion. A WFV is 100%-owned by foreign 
investors but the duration of the investment contracts requires government approval. The 
fourth type -- joint exploration of resources -  is used for the joint development of natural 
resources. According to official Chinese statistics, foreign investment incorporates three 
main categories: foreign loans, FDI and other foreign investment. This thesis does not 
discuss foreign loans and focuses on FDI (EJVs, CJVs and WFVs) and forms of sanlai 
yihu: processing and assembly (in other foreign investment) and compensation trade.
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Processing Trade Arrangements (PTAs)
Since the economic-reform process began in the late 1970s, the forms of China’s foreign 
trade have become diverse, and recently nearly half of China’s foreign trade has been 
undertaken by processing trade arrangements (PTAs).8 The forms of processing and 
assembling (P&A), and of compensation trade, are types of consignment trade between 
Chinese firms and foreign firms, called as sanlai yibu . In general, the Chinese government 
or its partner provides plant, labour, water, electricity and other basic facilities, and foreign 
investors supply the machinery, equipment, materials and design of products and take 
responsibility for marketing. Foreign firms pay a processing fee to the Chinese side (Sit, 
1998: 896). They enjoy exemption from tax on imported materials, and the finished 
products are then sold outside China. This is the major difference from other forms of joint 
venture in China. For China, as the forms of P&A, and of compensation trade do not 
require the introduction of high-tech machinery and the search for access to foreign 
markets, it is relatively easy to expand exports.
The three forms of P&A (sanlai) include those businesses engaged in processing with 
supplied materials (lailiao jiagong'. contract processing), manufacturing with supplied 
samples (laiyang jiagong: import processing), assembling with supplied parts and design 
by foreign partners (laijian zhuanpei). In contract processing, Chinese partners receive a 
net fee to process supplied raw materials into finished goods according to the foreign 
investors’ requests. This is a de facto form o f CJV (G. Yeung, 2001a: 6). Chinese official 
figures for inward investment, which distingush CJVs investment as a separate investment 
from processing and assembly and compensation trade, underestimate the effect of CJVs 
investment on China's foreign trade. In import processing, Chinese partners produce and 
export the finished products according to a sample supplied by foreign partners. In laijian 
zhuanpei, Chinese partners receive a net fee to assemble supplied components according to 
a design provided by foreign partners (ibid.: 6). Compensation trade (huchang maoyi) is 
similar to barter trade: Chinese partners import equipment and technology funded by a 
foreign investors’ loan and repay it with products. They compensate for the fee for the 
introduction of machinery facilities by producing goods. Chinese firms do not need to 
shoulder the burden of the introduction of high-tech machinery. Those firms intending to 
target the domestic markets are advised to convert P&A contracts into EJVs or CJVs (ibid.: 
6). However, given China's vast territory and loose management of P&A (it is allowed 
almost everywhere in China), it is difficult to capture the real statistical data on such
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processing arrangements. In the Chinese literature, the definition of consignment trade is 
even more diverse. For example, Shao Xianglin, Wang Yuliang and Ren Xiaowei (2001) 
categorise eight forms of processing trade. Therefore, in this thesis, in order to avoid 
confusion, it is important to pay attention to the real processes of transactions (trade data) 
rather than forms of investment. Processing trade arrangements (PTAs) in this thesis are 
seen to include transactions in which foreign investors bring parts into China as imports 
and take the processed products back as Chinese exports.
Utilised and Contracted FDI
In official Chinese statistics there are two types of FDI: 'utilised FDT (actual use) and 
'approved, agreed or contracted FDI’. Utilised FDI is the actual value of investment that 
has already materialised in China. It includes the re-investment of foreign firms in China. 
On the other hand, contracted FDI is the pledged value of investment. The gap between 
these two sets of statistics is indeed very wide.0 The contracted FDI often includes aborted 
projects and tends to overestimate the real extent of investment flows (G. Yeung, 2001a: 
7). Thus, the focus of this thesis is the actual use of FDI.
The Origins o f  FDI
In official Chinese statistics there is no identification of the origins of FDI. It is very 
difficult to capture the real amount of investment. Hong Kong is counted as a separate 
foreign territory. In terms of accumulated inward FDI, until 1999 (actual use) Hong Kong 
was the largest investor in China (50.1%), the US (8.4%) was second, Japan (8.1%) was 
third, and Taiwan (7.8%) was fourth (Koryu, No. 617, 2000). However, these figures do 
not necessarily reflect the origins of FDI accurately. For example, FDI from mainland 
China into Hong Kong is often reinvested into China in order to enjoy preferential 
treatment intended exclusively for foreign investors. In 1999, FDI from mainland China 
into Hong Kong accounted for 25.9% of Hong Kong’s total inward FDI, and 24.8% of 
Hong Kong’s outward FDI went to mainland China.10 This includes the reinvestment 
activities of foreign-financed firms in China. Also, much of the Taiwanese FDI in China is 
by small and medium firms which do not register officially with the Taiwanese authorities 
(since the latter still place restrictions on Taiwanese FDI in mainland China). In fact, 
Taiwanese FDI has recently used Central American islands as a tax haven for reinvestment 
to China (initially reinvestment was mainly through Hong Kong). In 1998, the Virgin 
Islands became the second largest source of China's inward FDI (8.87% of total inward
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FD1 based on actual use) and in 1999 they were the fourth largest supplier (6.60% of total 
inward FD1 based on actual use)(Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian : hereafter ZTN, 2000). A 
further complication is that some reinvestment is carried out through Hong Kong. In 1998, 
the Virgin Islands were the single largest investor in Hong Kong, exceeding even 
investment from mainland China (Xianggang Jingji Nianjian 2000). Furthermore, both 
Hong Kong and Taiwan are also used as conduits for reinvestment in mainland China by 
foreign firms (mainly US, European and Japanese). According to official Chinese statistics, 
all these investments originating outside Hong Kong have normally been counted as FDI 
from Hong Kong. Although Hong Kong’s investment in China is not always ‘pure’ Hong 
Kong capital, in this thesis, in order to avoid further confusion, China’s FDI is dealt with 
as foreign investment capital flow into China. However, we need to look behind the 
official statistics and explore the actual economic relations among Guangdong, Taiwan and 
Japan.
Foreign Trade
China’s foreign trade statistics also classify Hong Kong as a foreign territory. Due to the 
various forms of PTAs between Hong Kong and China, some trade statistical problems 
arise. The 1999 statistics for trade between China and the US are a good example. 
According to the Chinese accounts, China’s total trade with the US (in value) was $US 
61.47 billion and China enjoyed a trade surplus o f $US 22.41 billion. However, on the US 
side, the total trade with China was valued at $US 94.91 billion, and the US trade deficit 
against China was $US 68.67 billion (Jingji Ribao, 2 March 2000). By the same token, in 
1999 China announced a $US 1.4 billion trade deficit against Japan, while Japan 
announced a SUS 19.55 billion deficit against China. The gap between Chinese and 
Japanese trade statistics amounted to SUS 20.95 billion. One of the major reasons for this 
statistical gap is the impact of PTAs in China (Jingji Ribao, 2 March 2000). For example, 
in terms of US-China trade, China’s trade surplus, excluding the PTAs in 1999, was 
estimated as SUS 21 million (Kokusai Boeki, 16 May 2000). The transit trade through 
Hong Kong makes matters worse. Re-exported products from Hong Kong, which are not 
re-assembled in Hong Kong, are counted as China’s exports. Thus, China's trade surplus 
against Hong Kong exhibits the trade deficits o f the US and EU (European Union) against 
China (Kokusai Boeki, 16 May 2000). Thus, PTAs and Hong Kong’s status as a foreign 
territory make it more difficult to count real trade flow among the countries. In order to
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avoid further complications, this thesis employs the definition that Hong Kong is a foreign 
territory of China.
Mult mat tonal C 'orpora! ions
A multinational corporation (MNC) is defined as an international firm that produces goods 
or services in several countries, without being concentrated in a single country. By 
comparison, a transnational corporation (TNC) is a firm with substantial operations in 
many countries but which is controlled from its original home base (Rutherford, 1992). 
Thus strictly speaking, the difference between MNCs and TNCs can be seen in the 
difference between large Japanese MNCs (operating in several countries) and offshore 
production activities by SMEs (small and medium-sized enteprises, i.e. Japanese and 
Taiwanese firms controlled from their home country). However, this distinction does not 
necessarily identify the operational systems accurately due to the increasing complexity of 
cross-border production systems (product definition and design, supply of inputs, 
manufacturing, outsourcing, distribution, support services, research and development, etc.). 
Therefore, we use the term 'multinational corporation’ to refer to firms (including TNCs) 
with activities across several countries.
Industrial Agglomeration
Industrial agglomeration is the spatial clustering of similar or related industrial activities in 
a particular place, and the co-location of firms engaged in a given line o f business (Maskell 
et al., 1998: 9). In Japan, for example, the industrial agglomeration o f the electronics 
industry in Ota-ku (Tokyo), where more than 10,000 small electrical, metal and plastic 
processing factories agglomerate, supports the success of the Japanese electronics industry 
by responding to the demand for flexible processing (Itami, 1998). Industrial 
agglomeration can be seen as the result of the way in which key organisational variables 
(such as types of commodity chains, the structure of networks, organisational learning and 
conventions) significantly influence the performance of export-led growth.
The Electronics Industry
Throughout this thesis the consumer electronics industry receives special attention. The 
term ‘electronics industry’ here refers mainly to the production of consumer electronics 
goods including electronic products (especially radios, compact disc players, personal 
computers and televisions) and computer products as well as varieties of household
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appliances such as washing machines and refrigerators. More correctly, Guerrieri (2000) 
distinguishes between industrial electronics products, consumer electronics and electronic 
components. Each sector has its own types of production network. Although this thesis 
focuses mainly on the production of consumer electronics, it also recognises the 
importance of the other two categories in terms of the complementary links between them 
and consumer electronics.
1.3 The Existing Literature on Chinese SNGs' Foreign Economic Relations
The literature relating to régionalisation among China, Taiwan and Japan is enormous 
Accordingly, in the present study the literature on theoretical debates (Chapter 2), 
globalisation and régionalisation (Chapter 3), the reform of Chinese domestic governance 
and multi-level governance (Chapter 4), Japanese FDI and production networks (Chapter 
5), Taiwanese FDI and Taiwan Strait (Chapter 6), and local corporative networks (Chapter 
7) will be discussed separately in the appropriate analytical context. Here, we focus on a 
review o f the literature on Chinese SNGs’ foreign economic relations.
There is in fact only a small literature on local foreign economic relations with reference to 
Chinese SNGs at the sub-provincial level. Exceptionally, Vogel (1989) carried out 
extensive field work in Guangdong. He discusses the evolution of the open door policy and 
investigates reform at the provincial level (Guangdong and Hainan), in special economic 
zones (Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou), in the capital (Guangzhou), and at the county 
level. In an official publication, the Guangdong Province Planning Committee (1995) (in 
the references, Kantonshô Keikaku linkai) outlines the path of Guangdong's development 
with the aim of joining the developed world by 2010. This emphasises the importance of 
the provincial-level response in strengthening relations with Hong Kong and achieving a 
transformation of the industrial structure. In terms of the evolution of the open door policy 
at the provincial level, Goodman (1997) demonstrates how the provinces of Guanxi, 
Hainan, Liaoning, Shandong, Shanghai, Sichuan and Zhejiang have developed distinctive 
responses to the reform process, emphasising the dynamics of economic and social change 
within each province (e g. in terms of new class formations), and the changing nature of 
these provinces' relations with the centre Goodman's research group also publishes an 
academic journal focusing on the provinces (Provincial China). Hendrischke and Chongyi 
( 1999) examine the ways in which major decision-making powers have gradually shifted to
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the provincial level, and how the distinctive political and cultural identities of each 
province influence policy processes and outcomes. Their analysis includes studies of 
Guizhou, Shaanxi, Hubei, Tianjin and Jiangxi. Cheung, Chung and Lin (1998) focus on the 
role of provincial leadership in the initiation and implementation of economic reform. 
They offer four studies on resource allocation (Shanghai, Guangdong, Zhejiang, and 
Shaanxi) and four studies on foreign capital and investment (Shandong, Fujian, Hainan and 
Sichuan).
Although these four books make a significant contribution to a political economy 
perspective on China’s new regionalism, apart from Vogel’s work they all stress the role of 
the provinces and do not have much to say about the position of large cities and other 
sub-units within those provinces. Moreover, although they deal with foreign economic 
relations in some provinces, they do not focus on the international activities of provinces or 
cities -- which may be summed up in the term 'paradiplomacy’ (see Dyment, in Hocking, 
1993a). As Chung writes ( 1995):
As the de-ideologization of politics and economic interdependence are 
emphasized, sub-national governments have been empowered to deal directly with 
foreign business interests as well as, very often, with foreign government 
authorities. In some cases, local governments have gone so far as to bypass the 
central government in promoting their own parochial interests, thus introducing a 
thorny problem in central-local dynamics. In such cases, there are at least three 
different levels -  international, central, and local forces -  requiring more 
wide-ranging analysis of their conflicting views and interests (p.506).
Chung also notes the increasing tendency of provinces to form horizontal links among 
themselves, thereby creating regional blocs that present collective demands to the centre. 
At the same time, the various sub-provincial units (in particular, the special economic 
zones, coastal open cities, central economic cities) are also asserting their autonomy and in 
some respects are seeking to compete directly with the provinces (1995: 507). Chung 
(1999) demonstrates how different combinations of factors have contributed to both 
successes and failures in local economic development. His analysis includes studies of 
Guangzhou, Tianjin, Hangzhou, Wenzhou, Qingdao, Dalian, Xiamen, Fuzhou, Chengdu, 
Chongqing, Nantong, Zhangjiagang, Panyu and Nanhai. Chung's work makes a significant
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contribution to the understanding of the multi-layered structure of Chinese political 
economy and the importance of the entrepreneurial role of the large cities.
In terms of East Asian régionalisation below the level of the state, there are still few 
studies of the role o f the sub-provincial level (i.e major cities). Chung’s book is a notable 
exception but it focuses on bilateral economic relations, e.g. between Qingdao and South 
Korea. However, the relationship between economic integration and domestic politics 
cannot be fully understood through such a bilateral approach. In general, the literature has 
been dominated by a state-led framework based on a strict and unhelpful distinction 
between domestic and international politics. Thus, the interpenetration of the domestic and 
international spheres is not given sufficient attention. In the case of Chinese SNGs and 
their role in the development of the East Asian regional economic system, domestic and 
international factors are closely interwoven and cannot be dealt with separately. The 
bilateral perspective on SNGs can only be applied to limited cases (e.g. the study of fiscal 
decentralisation) and cannot be applied to the phenomena of multi-dimensional, 
multi-layered and complex régionalisation.
The lack of appropriate approaches to the analysis of SNGs has previously obstructed the 
understanding of the role of Chinese SNGs as economic actors in East Asian 
régionalisation. In particular, there has been a lack of network-based approaches and 
attention to issues o f governance. Consequently, there have been few systematic attempts 
to compare East Asian régionalisation with régionalisation processes in other areas. 
Researchers invariably comment on China's uniqueness. Henry Yeung’s study (2000) 
offers an analysis o f the relations between Singaporean FD1 and Chinese local government. 
It argues that as a result of economic reform, the activities of foreign firms in China are 
heavily dependent on local corporatism. Undoubtedly, the viewpoint of economic 
geography is helpful, and it is applied in this thesis to the study of networks of governance.
Godfrey Yeung’s study (2001a) of the city o f Dongguan (in Guangdong) contributes a 
valuable micro-geographical perspective. It gives special consideration to how the 
attractiveness of the region to foreign (especially Hong Kong investors) has been 
influenced by locational, economic, administrative and cultural factors. The analysis 
highlights the complex, mutual interaction between foreign firms (Hong Kong) and 
Dongguan’s local government. Unfortunately it does not much discuss East Asian
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régionalisation, especially the significant role of Japanese and Taiwanese firms in 
Dongguan.
The aim of this thesis is to fill the research gap that has now become apparent by taking 
into account the roles of SNGs in creating various networks of governance with foreign 
firms. In this way the present study seeks to contribute to the literature on comparative 
regional studies and to bridge the artificial distinction between the domestic and 
international levels of analysis that stems from the emphasis on the state-led perspective.
1.4 The Framework of Analysis and Research Methodology
Issues of spatiality and spatial complexity have now become important focal points of 
work in the social sciences. There is a formidable methodological challenge to link 
empirical studies and a theoretical understanding of the role of SNGs and private actors in 
cross-border economic relations. In this section we first present the framework of analysis 
for the current research, and we then explain the research methodology.
1.4.1 The Framework o f Analysis
The creation of definitions, concepts and categories is necessary in order to analyse the 
phenomenon of economic régionalisation. Although there is an enormous literature on 
régionalisation, most books and articles are concerned with the development of the EU. 
There has been a neglect of broader comparative studies, and our understanding of the 
development of cross-border economic relations, especially outside the EU, remains poor. 
What is needed is a categorisation of different forms of régionalisation and their distinctive 
charactenstics.
Higgott and Reich (1998) suggest that the concept of régionalisation embraces three 
distinct dimensions: (1) de facto processes of economic integration, firm-led and 
network-led processes, and de jure processes of state-led instutionalised governance; (2) 
emerging (vertical) meso-levels of authority between the state and the global order (trans- 
or supra-national régionalisation), and between the state and the local level (sub-national 
régionalisation); and (3) emerging (horizontal) authority across extant territorial 
jurisdictions. The major interest of this thesis is in the increasing interplay between de
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facto processes of economic integration and de jure processes of state-led institutionalised 
governance at the sub-national and micro-regional level.
This thesis therefore concentrates first of all on the importance of de facto processes of 
economic integration, the organisation of production and allied activities, and the 
clustering of industry through the expansion of international (cross-border) production 
networks. The case of the electronics industry, which has played a major role in the East 
Asian economy, is chosen to illustrate these changing geographical patterns. In particular, 
the locational strategies and production system of Japanese and Taiwanese electronics 
firms need to be highlighted. It is important to identify the strategic differences between 
Japanese and Taiwanese firms. While there are various elements causing differences, to a 
large extent, these are derived from the characteristics of the home country’s governance. 
The Taiwan Strait conflict remains a politically unresolved area, and thus we need to 
consider why Taiwanese firms have taken a risk by investing in mainland China. The 
desire to minimise transaction costs cannot be the only reason.
This thesis focuses on the increasing role of SNGs in co-ordinating the relations between 
economy and society in cross-border economic relations. In particular, it seeks to 
distinguish between two different de jure processes: vertical and horizontal régionalisation 
between the state and the local level. It also seeks to identify the emerging horizontal 
authority across extant territorial jurisdictions (i.e. national boundaries) at the sub-national 
level. A sub-national level of analysis in the régionalisation debate is essential in order to 
bridge the divide between the macro- and micro-regionalisation perspectives (see Chapter 
2). In East Asia, through the development of economic relations between cross-border 
regions, the sub-national level has changed both qualitatively and quantitatively. Behind 
the rapid development of urban areas in East Asia there are fundamental changes in 
industrial structure. Industrialisation based on export-led strategies, and the international, 
regional and hiearachical division of labour, mainly in the production system, has become 
the foundation of the continuous upgrading of industrial structure and rapid urbanisation. 
The resulting quantitative economic growth has in turn led to quantitative change at the 
sub-national level. One problem here, however, is that in China the discretion of the 
sub-national level has invariably been limited by the state. Accordingly, the vertical 
dimensions of régionalisation (decentralisation and recentralisation) within a country are
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extremely important. This restructuring leads the domestic governance structure towards 
multi-level in nature.
Why, then, does the rise of cross-border economic activities require new forms of 
governance? One of the reasons is that the state and sub-national levels have faced an 
increasing burden of new regulations. For example, when MNCs set up regional 
headquarters or local corporate bodies, they seek to establish interface functions and a new 
business infrastructure, e.g. in finance, telecommunications, transportation, legal services, 
research and development, and distribution, in selected areas. As a result, foreign and 
domestic business interests increasingly agglomerate at the sub-national level. A SNG 
seeking to attract foreign capital must ensure that the economic infrastructure is in good 
condition in order to support both domestic and international use. Therefore, international 
airports and ports, as part of the urban infrastructure, also assume the characteristics of 
international public goods (Imasato, 1999: 18-21). In this way, SNGs reinforce the 
development of firms’ regional relations and in turn promote their own internationalisation. 
Furthermore, the programme of economic build-up and foreign economic strategies 
quantitatively supports the activities of cross-border firms by reducing the problems 
caused by national boundaries. While the main economic actors in régionalisation are 
firms, as the production system is incorporated in a certain local area (localisation) the 
sub-national area can no longer escape the influence of the internationalisation of the 
production system. The relations between the state and firms cannot be examined at only 
the state or firm level of analysis, because the impact of MNCs on the regional economy 
occurs mainly through the localisation processes in the production system. Localisation 
stresses the importance of territoriality and local political space, and the embeddedness of 
firms in the specific social and cultural milieu in which they operate. The effective 
co-ordination of inter-firm networks can thus best be achieved by local government rather 
than central government. Consequently, SNGs are emerging as vitally important economic 
actors in both the domestic political economy and the international political economy.
In becoming major economic actors, SNGs need the continuing political protection of the 
modem sovereign state system. However, at the same time, in this situation the power 
dynamics come from two seemingly opposite directions. The state is seen to be under the 
influence of the power of both relativism and absolutism. The forces of relativism are seen 
as régionalisation brings in various rules about competitiveness and complementarity.
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norms, identity and organic regionness. This relativises state autonomy and monopolistic 
territoriality. This in turn can lead to growing political tensions within a country. On the 
other hand, the forces of state absolutism are seen in the way in which the state utilises 
régionalisation in order to strengthen its power, national interest and territoriality on the 
basis of rationality and nationalism. However, this study does not adopt a deterministic 
viewpoint, but instead seeks to reveal the empirical processes of the evolution and reform 
of governance taking place beneath the state level in the context of globalisation. Of 
crucial significance is the way in which international cross-border production networks are 
adjusted and institutionalised into the state system through localisation, and the way in 
which the internationalisation of SNGs is adjusted into the state or beyond the state’s 
capability. This requires an investigation of the evolution of governance in both the vertical 
(central and local government) and horizontal (local horizontal authority) regionalisatioin 
processes.
A particularly important question concerns the the interplay between the de facto and de 
jure régionalisation processes, and the respective roles of the central (vertical), local 
(horizontal) and external actors (state or firms). A related question is whether the size of 
the sub-national unit directly influences the unit’s role in régionalisation processes. This 
study focuses on two levels of SNG in China: the provincial level (sheng) and the 
sub-provincial level (sht). It argues that under the impact of globalisation, SNGs are 
playing an increasingly important co-ordinating role between MNCs and the state, and are 
becoming economic actors in their own right, defending their own economic interests and 
expanding their territoriality. The analysis therefore seeks to clarify the difference between 
two contrasting régionalisation processes in China: from above (the national process: 
vertical) and from below (the sub-national process: horizontal). Decentralisation and 
recentralisation are seen as the primary measures of Chinese régionalisation from above, 
and the sub-national responses to this movement can be seen as an expression of 
sub-national régionalisation from below. The study seeks to show that China needs a 
further restructuring of the domestic developmental system and centre-periphery relations 
in order to adjust to globalisation. In considering the power configuration through the 
effects of production networks on the state system, the aim is to give an account of the 
roles of different levels of SNG in providing MNCs with international public goods. Thus, 
the analytical viewpoint of this study is the role of Chinese SNGs as economic actors in
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bridging micro-regionalisation and IPE through emerging networks of cross-border 
governance.
The framework of analysis in this study employs concepts of network and governance as 
key characteristics o f the emergent cross-border networking between SNGs and firms, and 
intra- and inter-firms relations. (These will be elaborated in more detail in Chapter 2.) The 
first of these concepts, network, denotes a ‘complex of organizations connected to each 
other by resource dependencies and distinguished from other ... complexes by breaks in 
the structure of resource dependencies’ (Benson, 1982: 148). Put another way, it refers to 
regularised interactions among independent agents, nodes of activity and sites o f power 
(Castells, 1996). The concept of governance is used to indicate the ways in which networks 
are ordered, co-ordinated and regulated, both formally and informally. Governance is not 
the same as institutionalised government, although governments -  in this case SNGs play 
a major role in the conduct of governance. Governance suggests that a variety of actors and 
agencies -  both public and private -  are involved in order to create order. In one sense, 
therefore, governance denotes a complex and fragmented set of institutional and 
agency-based relationships in a particular field of activity. This gives rise to key issues 
concerning how such relationships are organised and how they function.
1.4.2 Research Methodology
The purpose of this section is to outline the research methodology employed in this study. 
The main challenge faced by the researcher is to link the empirical investigation of the 
cross-border networks of governance among Guangdong, Taiwan and Japan to the 
emerging theoretical understanding of the role of SNGs and private actors in cross-border 
economic relations, especially the growth of production networks.
Inevitably, the choice of research methodology is guided by a range of factors, including 
the researcher’s own previous experience, academic background, specialisation and 
capabilities; the nature, scope and complexity of the phenomena under investigation, the 
specific research questions being addressed, the practical possibilities for research access, 
and the limitations of resources (including time) (Burnham, 1997).
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1.4.2.1 Factors Influencing the Choice o f Research Methodology 
(a) The Nature. Scope and Complexity o f the Research Area
The subject under investigation in this dissertation -  micro-regionalisation and networks of 
multi-level governance among Guangdong (southern China), Taiwan and Japan — is 
exceedingly complex. It embraces a range of phenomena of an economic, social and 
political nature and requires an exploration of their inter-relationships and dynamics over 
time. In particular, the processes being investigated do not fit neatly into formal 
institutional frameworks. Rather they are innovative, fluid and involve both formal and 
informal elements. Moreover, they cut across the territorial boundaries between states and 
exhibit a high degree of fragmentation. In addition, they relate to both the domestic and 
international spheres of economic organisation and political management.
To make matters even more complex, the existing literature in this research area is limited, 
and the literature that does exist (both primary and secondary) is mainly in the Chinese and 
Japanese languages. Since the dissertation is written in English, the researcher frequently 
had to deal with problems of translation among three languages. These problems were 
exacerbated by the researcher’s need to undertake interviews in the three countries, which 
meant that in the cases of China (Guangdong) and Taiwan the researcher had to deal with 
the task of communicating in Chinese and translating the resulting information into 
English.
It is also not easy to arrange research interviews in China. In particular, there are still 
bureaucratic and cultural obstacles to foreign researchers exploring areas that are regarded 
by the political authorities as sensitive. This is certainly true at the level of Chinese SNGs. 
Often researchers in this situation have to develop contacts at a social level in order to 
‘open doors’. This is indeed one of the most important features of Chinese social networks, 
and social networks in turn often provide the basis for business and governmental 
networks.
For the researcher, the complexity of the area of investigation meant that he inevitably had 
to be selective in his research focus, and this led directly to the decision to select the 
electronics industry as a particular case study. One of the initial tasks, therefore, was to 
become familiar with how this particular sector operates from an economic and 
technological point of view through literature based study. Also, the researcher decided to
17
concentrate on one specific geographical location: Dongguan in the province of 
Guangdong. These deliberate choices made the research more manageable but also meant 
that limitations were posed on the extent of the study’s comprehensiveness and 
generalisability.
(b) The Key Research Questions
As already explained above, this study employs three main research questions:
How should we define and characterise key components of micro-regionalisation 
among Guangdong, Taiwan and Japan?
What kinds of policy environment and what actors in the host and home countries are 
needed to support cross-border economic relations?
How do networks of multi-level governance (MLG) operate to facilitate 
micro-regionalisation?
Each of these three questions raises methodological challenges. The first question involves 
an understanding of the nature of micro-regionalisation. The issue of régionalisation in 
East Asia is still dominated by three levels of analysis: macro, meso (sub-regional) and 
micro. This research question focuses on not only the level at which micro-regionalisation 
actually takes place but also interactions between different levels. The Chinese domestic 
context of micro-regionalisation involves the reform of governance through a range of 
measures implemented by the Chinese central government in recent years and their impact 
on central-local relations and the scope for local choice and autonomous decision-making. 
This issue has already been explored by several previous researchers (see Chapter 4). In 
the international and regional contexts, the empirical records o f the East Asian 
régionalisation process, which focus more on the economic dimension (i.e. firm-led 
régionalisation), are readily available (see Chapters 5 and 6), so the research task here is 
essentially to combine an analysis of the two different streams of micro-regionalisation, i.e. 
the domestic and the international. Therefore, the main research methods are: 
literature-based research (including primary and secondary sources) and the analysis, 
synthesis and assessment of existing sources, supplemented by interview data.
The second research question involves a focus on the policy environment, the underlying 
economic rationale, and the roles of the key actors, although, as Henry Yeung (1998)
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points out, political and institutional factors cannot be separated from the economic pull’ 
of the host country or region in attracting inward investment. On a theoretical level there is 
no shortage of discussion of the rationale behind inward investment decisions, but the main 
need in the present research is to gather empirical material from the electronics industry in 
order to gain a more in-depth understanding of what has motivated Taiwanese and 
Japanese investors. The policy environment in the home countries (in this case, Japan and 
Taiwan) cannot be separated from the economic ‘push’ factors for MNCs. Similarly, 
MNCs’ production networks abroad are to a great extent embedded in their country of 
origin’s distinctive business practices and managerial styles. There is a wide-ranging 
existing literature on the East Asian international division of labour, Japanese FDI, and 
Taiwanese FDI (see Chapters 5 and 6). In this regard, therefore, literature-based research 
and analysis are the primary research tools and some interview data are used for 
supplementation.
The third question concerns the operation and structure of networks of MLG among 
Guangdong, Taiwan and Japan This is a subject on which there is virtually no reliable 
literature at the present time. Some of the literature on Chinese SNGs is relevant in the 
sense that it explains their internal structures and links with central government and also 
considers SNG’s foreign economic relations (i.e. G. Yeung, 2001a). However, the focus of 
the present research is on the networking linkages between SNGs and foreign firms. This is 
explored here through the case of Dongguan with particular reference to the electronics 
industry. Some information has been gathered from documentary sources, but in addition it 
has been necessary to rely on interviews with key persons and observations in these 
processes. Thus, for the final case study, interviewing and observations are the primary 
research source, and are combined with literature-based research.
1.4.2.2 Resource ¡.imitations
The research for this project was completed within a limited time period: from October 
1997 to December 2001. This included a comprehensive literature search, the 
establishment of an appropriate framework of analysis, the design of a research strategy, 
and the writing of various drafts of Chapters 1 to 8. Research visits to Guangdong, Hong 
Kong, Taiwan and Japan took place in 1998 (July to August), 1999 (July to August), 2000 
(April and September to October), and 2001 (September and October).
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With more time, more finance and more opportunities for research visits and interviews, it 
would have been possible to broaden the research base for the dissertation. This is a 
problem for all researchers, especially those involved in international and cross-national 
investigations. Inevitably, therefore, the present thesis must be seen as an initial, limited 
study which needs to be expanded further in the future. The emphasis throughout is on 
achieving a balance between the depth and breadth of research. In general, however, the 
aim is to achieve an intensive rather than extensive analysis of the subject matter, and to 
employ a corresponding ‘fine-grained’ rather than ‘coarse-grained’ methodological 
approach (Harrigan, 1983).
1.4.23 Quantitative and Qualitative Research Methods
Quantitative research is concerned mainly with measurable, statistical indicators, usually 
linked to the testing of ‘models’ and hypotheses that are formulated in terms of 
quantifiable relationships, whereas qualitative research focuses on attitudes, beliefs and 
patterns of human behaviour, i.e. the actual practices that can be identified in a particular 
field of activity. Economics is an example of a field in which traditionally quantitative 
methods have been dominant, but it is interesting to note that even here there has been a 
growing interest in the social, institutional and behavioural context of economic activity 
(North, 1990). In the present research quantitative analysis has a role, for example in terms 
of data concerning patterns and levels of inward investment, the geographical dispersion of 
firms, and business performance; but the main focus is on examining interactions between 
SNGs and firms across national borders. Here qualitative methods are also relevant and are 
more likely to produce the answers to the key questions about structure and operation of 
networks of governance. One purpose of the interviews and observations was to obtain 
essential factual information about the development of cross-border relations among 
Chinese SNGs (in Guangdong), Taiwanese and Japanese firms, through various 
cooperative meetings and forums as well as local business associations.
Unlike most quantitative research, the present research is not primanly concerned with the 
establishment of causal relationships between two or more variables, with ‘proving’ any 
specific hypotheses, or with generalising the research findings to other areas of research. It 
seeks to offer an in-depth analysis of the particular networking relationship of 
micro-regionalisation in one specific geographical area (micro-region) of the world. For all 
these reasons, the quantitative approaches are adopted where the aim is to identify patterns
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of economic dynamism, and the main approach to the study of networks of multi-level 
governance is more qualitative.
1.4.2.4 The Four Research Studies
The dissertation’s four research studies are briefly outlined in the next section. The 
relationship among the three key research questions, the four studies, and the main 
research methodologies is summarised in Table 1.1 where the four research studies are 
referred to as (a), (b), (c), and (d).
Table 1.1 The Research Questions and Methodology
Research Question Research Studies Methodology
(1) How should we define 
and characterise the key 
components of 
micro-regionalisation among 
Guangdong, Taiwan and 
Japan?
(a) Chinese domestic context
(b) International (Japanese) context
(c) Regional (Taiwan Strait) context
(Primary)
Literature-based analysis 
(Secondary) Interviews
(2) What kinds of policy 
environment and what actors 
in the host and home 
countries are needed to 
support cross-border 
economic relations'’
(a) Chinese domestic context (host)
(b) International (Japanese) context
(home)
(c) Regional (Taiwan Strait) context 
(home)
(Primary)
Literature-based analysis 
(Secondary) Interviews
(3) How do networks of 
multi-level governance 
(MLG) operate to facilitate 
micro-regionalisation'7
(d) Development of cross-border 
sub-national governmental 
networks
(Primary)
Interviews and observations 
(Secondary)
Literature-based analysis
(a) The ( 'hoice o f China. Taiwan and.¡apart
Throughout the dissertation, the geographical focus is on three territories: China, Taiwan 
and Japan. By 1999, Japan had become China’s largest trading partner, and China had 
become Japan’s second largest trading partner (Guoji Shanghai), 14 January 2000 and 
Tsusansho, 2000). By 1999, Taiwan had become China’s seventh largest trading 
pamer(G'i/o// Shanghai), 14 January 2000), and China had become Taiwan's second largest 
exports destination (Higashi Ajia eno Shiten, spring special edition 2000). Japan had 
become Taiwan’s second largest trading partner by 1999, and Taiwan had become Japan’s 
third largest trading partner (Nittai Bijinesu Nyusu, No. 2 2000 and JETRO, www. 
Jetro.go.jp/ec/j/trade). Despite increasing economic interconnectedness among the three 
territories, the national economy-based statistics overlook the deep-rooted restructuring 
that is occurring at the regional and firm levels (see Chapter 3). In acknowledging the
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deficiencies of the existing approach to China’s foreign economic relations, this thesis 
seeks to develop a distinctive account of micro-regionalisation.
(b) The Choice o f the Electronics Industry
Throughout the research studies, the emphasis is on the particular case of the electronics 
industry in cross-border economic relations. This sector was chosen for a number of 
reasons. First, it is the main industrial sector in East Asian industrialisation The share of 
electronics goods in the total exports in each East Asian country is very high (see Table
1.2).
Table 1.2 The Share of Electronics Goods Exports in the Total Exports of East Asian 
Countries (Value)
Country (year) Share of electronics exports in 
total exports (%)
Taiwan (1999) 43.39
South Korea (1997) 34.63
Malaysia (1997) 50.88
Philippines (1997) 27.70
Singapore (1997) 27.76
Thailand (1997) 30.83
Indonesia (1997) 7.02
China (1999) 22.70
Source: Higashi Ajia eno Shiten (2000), spring special edition
Secondly, the electronics industry is forging increasing economic links among the three 
countries. The electronics goods exports from China operated by the PTAs accounted for 
90% of China’s total electronics goods exports in 1999 (Kokusai Boeki, 16 May 2000). 
Foreign firms dominate PTAs, and Japan and Taiwan are the two major contributors. For 
example, in 1999, exports in electronics goods and parts accounted for 25.5% of total 
Japanese exports to China and 14.6% of total imports to Japan from China (Tsusansho, 
2000: 176-8).11 In the same year, 23.7% of Taiwan’s total exports to mainland China and 
30.9% of total exports from the mainland to Taiwan consisted of electronics goods and 
parts (Koryu, No.618, 2000).12 Also, exports in the electronics industry accounted for 
24.5% of total Japanese exports to Taiwan, and 23.4% of total imports to Japan from 
Taiwan in 1999 (Tsusansho, 2000: 186-7).13 The electronics industry is already the 
leading industry in Japan and Taiwan and is emerging as China’s most important industry 
in terms o f imports and exports.
22
(c) The C twice of 'Guangdong and Dongguan
The choice of Guangdong and its one rapidly growing city, Dongguan, for special attention 
is related to the trade structure discussed above. Guangdong, especially the Pearl River 
Delta Area, is the largest site for PTAs in the electronics industry. Indeed China’s exports 
owe much to the coastal area, especially Guangdong province, which has been in the first 
rank in exports for the last 15 years. For example, in 1998, Guangdong’s share of trade was 
equivalent to 40.6% of China’s total imports and exports (ZTN, 1999). In 1999, 
Guangdong’s share of trade was 39.9% of China’s total imports and exports (Guoji 
Shanghai), 20 January 2000).
In Guangdong’s imports, Japan and Taiwan have been two major partners, accounting for 
more than 40% of the total. This relates to the trend of Guangdong’s inward FDI. 
Manufacturing investment accounts for a large part of total FDI in Guangdong: 86.3% in 
1990, 69% in 1995, 66% in 1997, and 55.7% in 1998 (Guangdong Tong/i Nianjian: 
hereafter (TIN, 1999). As far as the PTAs are concerned, in 1999 they accounted for 77.7% 
of the province’s total exports, which is equivalent to 54.5% of China’s total PTAs in 
exports. Thus, Guangdong is the central place for China’s PTAs, which are structually 
dependent on Japan and Taiwan for imports, and on the US and EU market for exports. 
Furthermore, electronics goods exports are the major sector; for example, half of 
Guangdong’s exports in 1999 were in electronics goods and machinery (Aogang Xinxi 
Ribao, 14 January 2000).
Secondly, when the analysis is brought down to the sub-provincial level, inward FDI is 
focused on the Pearl River Delta. In 1998, the total exports from the Shenzhen and 
Dongguan reached 52.1% of total exports from Guangdong (Maruya, 2000: 143).14 
Shenzhen has been the top city in the volume o f trade for seven consecutive years, and its 
average annual growth rate from 1980 to 1999 was a remarkable 31.2% (Kokusai Boeki, 6 
December 2000). Dongguan has also emerged as the site of the highest concentration of 
Taiwanese electronics firms (the number is almost 3,200) on the mainland (Sinoruma, 
February 2000). In particular, the role of foreign firms in the industrial output in both cities 
is remarkable. Their share of the total industrial output was 75.9% in Shenzhen and 86.1% 
in Dongguan in 1998 (Maruya, 2000: 143). Furthermore, the concentration on electronics 
and telecommunication equipment is especially remarkable. From 1991 to 1998, the value 
of the industrial output of electronics and telecommunication equipment grew from
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40.65% to 58.28% of the total value of Shenzhen’s industrial output (Lu, 2000: 64). In 
terms of Shenzhen’s trade relations, Japan is the largest source of imports and Taiwan is 
the second. Thus, Shenzhen and Dongguan clearly exhibit the new patterns of cooperation 
at the micro-regional level among China, Taiwan and Japan. Economic relations among 
China, Taiwan and Japan are becoming exceedingly complex at the micro-regional level, 
and this necessitates an investigation of the links between Japanese and Taiwanese FD1 
and their links to changes of industrial structure in the Pearl River Delta.
(d) Four Studies
In the Chinese domestic context, the first case study seeks to answer the first and second 
research questions: how should we define and characterise the key components o f 
micro-regional isat ion among Guangdong, Taiwan and Japan''' and what kinds o f policy 
environment and what actors in the host and home countries are needed to support 
cross-border economic relations? By using previous research findings, the first case study 
seeks to demonstrate the key features of Chinese domestic governance reform towards a 
multi-level structure and the emergence of SNGs as economic actors. Specific measures 
include the decentralisation of economic management, regional development policies, the 
establishment of special economic zones and open cities, the increasing role of cities in 
Chinese administration, and the relations between Guangdong and the centre. This thesis 
argues that the centre’s initiatives and strategies have induced a dramatic increase of local 
autonomy and helped to change the dynamics of economic scale. Micro-regionalisation in 
the Chinese domestic context is a state-led institutionalisation process but has created new 
forms of multi-level governance (MLG).
While the central government continues to exercise a decisive role in setting standards and 
formulating macro-organisational policies, it would be wrong to see Chinese domestic 
régionalisation as a purely linear process. Rather there are many variations of path 
development and complicated sets of interactions among actors and institutions. Therefore, 
the Chinese domestic context of MLG cannot be generalised. Despite the limitations of the 
capacity of SNGs, the increase of local autonomy in foreign economic management is a 
key factor in the creation of micro-regionalisation. This case study examines the increase 
of local power in Guangdong province and its changing relations with the centre.
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From the international perspective, the second case study also seeks to answer the first and 
second research questions. However, the second case study focuses more on de facto 
processes of micro-regionalisation based on firm-led economic régionalisation. Japanese 
direct and indirect (through Hong Kong and Taiwan) investment in the electronics industry 
is selected for special attention. After exploring the organisational features of Japanese 
firms (keiretsu), the size of firms, managerial structures, and systems of centralisation, we 
then analyse the empirical path of development of the international division of labour, 
international commodity chains (ICCs), and cross-border production networks (CPNs) 
through Japanese outward FDI. We need to understand, in particular, why Japanese 
electronics firms have shifted their production sites to ASEAN and China, how the 
governance of CPNs based on keiretsu has been transformed into a new form, the 
importance of the Japanese government’s role, and the significance of the major push 
factors in the policy environment for Japanese FDI. In this regard, Japanese official 
development assistance (ODA) and free trade agreement (FTA) policies are also examined.
The third case focuses more on the regional context of micro-regionalisation (the Taiwan 
Strait). It explores the development of networking linkages through the various strategic 
interactions between different levels of political and economic activity. Despite unresolved 
political conflicts, Taiwanese electronics firms have actively set up offshore production in 
China. The key questions here are: Why have Taiwanese electronics firms shifted their 
production sites to mainland China? What is the role of the Taiwanese government in the 
development of the electronics industry? What is the impact of the relocation of Taiwanese 
firms on Taiwan Strait relations? How have Taiwanese firms maintained cross-strait 
production networks?
The fourth case study explores the structure and operation of networks of MLG. Special 
consideration is given to the process of the development of networks of governance among 
Guangdong (Dongguan government), Japanese and Taiwanese firms. The key questions 
are: How are these networks constructed? How do they operate? How are they governed? 
The success or failure of SNGs is contingent on the extent to which they can capitalise on 
the policy environment and entrepreneurial leadership structure, and can effectively 
mobilise their resources. Although Dongguan is not a special economic zone, it has been 
one of the most successful Chinese cities. We need to find out why foreign firms have
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chosen to invest in Dongguan. This case study seeks to examine the patterns of horizontal 
networking arrangements linking SNGs to MNCs.
A key methodological issue is whether the experience of the electronics industry can be 
taken as an acceptable basis for generalising about processes of micro-regionalisation 
among Guangdong, Taiwan and Japan, or whether this study must be seen as an individual 
case with its own unique characteristics. Because there is no cross-sector comparison in the 
present study, we must be very careful about any generalisation to other industries. At the 
same time, the evidence that the present study furnishes about the behaviour of Chinese 
SNGs in relation to foreign firms does have a broader significance for cross-border 
micro-regionalisation and the operation of networks of governance. Moreover, this study 
seeks to illuminate the variations among CPNs according to the specific approach of 
different firms and the characteristics of home governance (i.e. size of firms, networking 
linkages with other companies, strategies of offshore production, types of alliances). There 
is a huge variation in the strategic focus of firms and in managerial styles. Where 
appropriate, the research endeavours to identify specific factors that apply to the particular 
example of the electronics industry and may not apply to other industries. However, further 
research into other industries is needed if the findings of the present study are to be 
extended to those sectors.
1.5 The Structure of the Dissertation
The dissertation consists of eight chapters. Chapter 2 elaborates the theoretical justification 
and analytical framework which underpins the research. It addresses the key theoretical 
debates on the emergence of micro-region. It also seeks to develop the concepts of network 
and governance, and to show how they can usefully be applied to analyse the fluid 
governance between SNGs and firms, and in intra- and inter-firm relations. Chapter 3 
presents an overview of the discussion of globalisation and régionalisation in East Asia and 
examines the patterns and processes of China’s micro-regional reintegration with the 
global economy on the basis of a synthesised statistical database. It gives special attention 
to the emergence of regional variations (i.e in terms of industrial agglomeration) in 
Guangdong (especially in the Pearl River Delta and Dongguan).
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Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 present case studies of the emergence of micro-regionnalisation 
among Guangdong, Taiwan and Japan. Chapter 4 investigates Je jure processes of China’s 
micro-regionalisation in the context o f domestic régionalisation (the rescaling of political 
economy), including economic reform, open door policies and regional development, all of 
which have been promoted in combination with vertical state-led institutionalisation. This 
chapter seeks to demonstrate that the features of Chinese domestic governance reform 
embrace a multi-level approach which has enabled the emergence of SNGs as economic 
actors. Although the political and economic foundations of SNGs are largely determined 
by the institutionalisation processes led from the centre, in addition decentralisation, 
regional discrimination policy, and de-ideologisation have impacted on the increasing 
economic autonomy of SNGs. In particular, as Guangdong has offered various types of 
preferential treatment to firms, it has become the most successful administration in terms 
of the increasing scope and scale of foreign economic relations. Therefore, 
institutionalisation from above has supported the policy environment and helped the SNGs 
to emerge as key economic actors in cross-border micro-economic relations.
Chapter 5 analyses key aspects of the international context o f  micro-regionalisation, the 
features of the production networks o f Japanese electronics firms (keiretsu), Japanese FD1 
in East Asia, and evolution of the Japanese production system. The chapter agues that the 
actual integration processes in East Asian régionalisation are developing below the state 
level according to the strategies of Japanese MNCs’ international, regional and 
hiererachical division of labour, which is in turn bound to CPNs and ICCs. Chapter 6 
focuses on the regional (Taiwan Strait) context of micro-regionalisation. There is a focus 
on the features of the Taiwanese production system in the electronics industry (small and 
medium firms, complementary inter-firm relations, government support of these relations, 
and relations with Japanese firms located in Taiwan). Chapter 7 considers the operation 
and structure of micro-regionalisation. The Hong Kong-Guangdong link offers a 
pioneering, basic model of cross-border production relations (originally these were PTAs). 
The discussion seeks to show how Chinese SNGs and firms have established networking 
arrangements through intermediary organisations, especially in the case of Dongguan. 
Finally, Chapter 8 summarises the major findings of the thesis and its contribution to the 
understanding of how micro-regionalisation among Guangdong, Taiwan and Japan through 
electronics investment and production activities has developed and how it operates in the
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context of globalisation It also aknowledges the limitations of the present research and 
stresses the need for further research in the future.
1 ‘East Asia’ in this thesis refers to Japan, the NIEs (Newly Industrialising Economies: South Korea, Taiwan, 
Hong Kong and Singapore), the ASEAN 4 (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Philippines) and China
2 The definition of the area of the Pearl River Delta varies For example, Wang Yueiu defines the Pearl River 
Delta as consisting of Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Foshan, Jiangmen, Zhongshan, Dongguan, Huizhou, 
Huiyang, Boluo, Zhaoqing, Sihui and Gaoyao See Wang (1997: 15). Johnston (1999) lists Guanzhou, Panyu, 
Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Huizhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Jiangmen, Foshan, Nanhai, and Shunde Dongguan 
Tongji Nianjian 2000 (hereafter D7iV) defines the area of the Pearl River Delta on the basis of data for 12 
cities: Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Foshan, Huizhou, Zhaoqing, Jiangmen. Dongguan, Zhongshan, 
Shunde, Nanhai and Panyu This dissertation refers to the phenomenon of industrial agglomeration, 
especially in Shenzhen and Dongguan Thus the variations of definitions of the area do not obstruct the 
purpose of the research However, because o f the limitations of the available data, the area is here taken to 
include the 12 cities (as listed in DTN 2000).
3 Wang (2001a) discusses the governance o f  cross-border economic linkages between Taiwan and China, 
focusing on the alliance between local bureaucrats and Taiwanese firms as well as the emerging industrial 
networks Kwok (1995) identifies regional transnational production networks in East Asia and Guangdong 
Sum (1999) points out the emergence of central-provincial-local entrepreneurial networks in China
4 The term ‘micro-regionalisation’ is used here to denote the scale of cross-border regional activity that 
depends primarily on inter-firm and intra-firm economic relations, and can be distinguished from the broader 
‘macro’ (East Asian) and meso’ (sub-East Asian) levels that depend more on overtly political initiatives (see 
Chapter 2).
5 ‘China’ refers to the People’s Republic o f China (PRC) Although the PRC claims that Taiwan is a part o f 
China, in this dissertation Taiwan refers to the territories governed by the Republic of China (ROC)
6 See Section I 4 in this chapter, and on the concept of governance’ and related theoretical arguments see 
Chapter 2
7 For further theoretical discussion of the concepts of cross-border production networks and commodity 
chains see Chapter 2
8 For further discussion of the processing trade, see Chapter 3
9 For example, in 1993 the amount of contracted FDI was $US 1114 billion but the utilised FD1 was only 
$US 27.5 billion See Mitsubishi (2001: 506).
10 Renun Ribao, http://j people ne jp/2001/04/03/jp20010403-4253 html
11 The figures are based on value
12 The figures are based on value
13 The figures are based on value 
"  The figure is based on value
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CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON MICRO-REGIONALISATION
This chapter reviews some key theoretical debates concerning the characteristics and role 
of regions and the dynamics of régionalisation in the contemporary international political 
economy. These debates form the necessary starting-point for the study of régionalisation 
in southern China and for the establishment of a model of micro-regionalisation that 
accommodates the broader context of changes that are occumng globally under the impact 
of the transformation of the spatial basis of political and economic organisation. Although 
different theoretical perspectives are evident in the literature, and there continues to be 
vigorous debate over the nature, scope, causes and consequences of ‘the new regionalism’, 
the literature reveals broad agreement that regions at various scales of operation (hence the 
use of such terms as ‘regions’, ‘sub-regions’ and ‘micro-regions’) are becoming 
increasingly important in today’s global economy, and that the challenges posed by 
régionalisation to the territorial organisation of nation-states and the cross-border relations 
between nation-states are especially significant in terms of the emergence of new networks 
of governance linking agencies of government, business enterprises and business 
associations of all kinds.
The key issues are presented schematically in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 as a model of the 
micro-regionalisation perspective proposed in the present study, based on the approach of 
Henry Yeung (2000: 813-14). Although Yeung does not distinguish between sub-national 
government and central government, according to his model the ‘institutional fit’ of MNCs 
into the needs and requirements of local and regional states is crucial for MNCs’ 
operational outcome However, these firms are embedded in the home country’s 
institutional environment, and are also influenced by the institutional setting and agenda of 
the host locality. These variables inevitably affect the behaviour of firms (H. Yeung, 2000: 
814-15).
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Figure 2.1 H. Yeung’s Theoretical Framework of Scale Politics in Governing 
International Investments
Note: Yeung uses the terms o f ‘TNCs’ in his model
Source: H Yeung (2000), 'Local Politics and foreign ventures in China's transitional economy: the political 
economy of Singaporean investments in China’, Political Geography, Vol 19, No 7, p 814
Figure 2.2 is an elaboration of H. Yeung’s model by the researcher in order to develop the 
theoretical framework of micro-regionalisation. Within certain environmental constraints, 
various actors pursue their own interests. In particular, FDI is a manifestation of the 
international operational networks of MNCs. The internationalisation of the production 
system is in turn embedded at the sub-national level within the host country. The host 
government and local governments provided the economic infrastructure, including the 
finance, telecommunications, transportation and legal system, etc., for attracting the 
investment of MNCs. MNCs need to adapt to the institutional setting and especially the 
host country's sub-national level of government-business networks. The outcome of the 
production system depends on the success of collaborative relations between different 
networks. If such relations are successful, then new economic spaces, in terms of industrial 
concentration or agglomeration, are likely to emerge. At the same time, the activities of 
those MNCs that pursue the internationalisation of production will promote the 
internationalisation of sub-national governments (SNGs). SNGs are themselves subject to 
the national governmental-institutional environment, but much will depend on the 
changing balance of power between central government and the SNGs. With 
decentralisation, the SNGs’ economic power increases. Subsequently, the SNGs become 
key economic actors, and the sub-national axis within a host country becomes the key 
spatial location in an attempt to create mutual gains between SNGs and firms. The SNGs’
foreign economic diplomacy is especially decisive in determining the success of these 
interactions.
figure 2.2 A Theoretical Model of Micro-Regionalisation: Cross-Border 
Sub-National Governance and the Network Dynamics of Multinational Corporations
Source: The researcher
This chapter therefore seeks to bring together the key issues and problems associated with 
this area of theorising as a basis for the application in subsequent chapters of regional 
analysis to the specific case of micro-regionalisation among Guangdong, Taiwan and Japan. 
The first matter to be dealt with (Section 2.1) is the precise meaning of region’,
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‘sub-region’, ‘micro-region’ and associated terms in the context of IPE. There is some 
variation in the use of these terms in the literature, and this partly reflects the varying 
customs and traditions of different academic disciplines. For the purpose of the present 
study, it is essential to clarify how these terms are to be used, and, more particularly, how 
‘regionalism’ as a concept applies to current developments in China and East Asia more 
generally. Here ‘micro-region’ is used to denote the inter- and intra-firm dimension across 
the national boundaries involving SNGs, and the reasons for this choice are explained in 
Section 2.1.
Section 2.2 turns to the phenomenon of ‘régionalisation’. The aim here is to clarify what 
exactly is meant by the idea that in the contemporary world there are certain processes 
which are leading to the economic and political resurgence of regions at different 
geographical scales. This discussion needs to be placed within the broader context of 
theories of global capitalist development, and the impact of this development on the 
territorial integrity of the nation-state. One of the key paradigms in this context is that of 
‘post-Fordism’, and this framework of analysis is discussed here because it is a useful 
starting-point for seeking to identify those key features of the contemporary international 
political economy which are associated with régionalisation.
Section 2.3 deals with three distinct approaches to régionalisation, all stemming from the 
post-Fordist paradigm (this typology is based on Storper, 1995 and 1997). First (2.3.1), 
there is a school of thought which stresses the institutional basis of regional change. 
Secondly (2.3.2), there are those who focus on industrial organisation and transactions. 
Thirdly (2.3.3), there are those who emphasise the role o f technological change and 
learning. The strengths and weaknesses of each of these approaches are then reviewed 
(2.3.4), and more recent efforts to formulate new explanations of régionalisation, including 
that of Storper himself in his theory of untraded interdependencies (ibid.), are examined.
Section 2 4 considers the application of models of economic change which emphasise the 
changing international division of labour, the emergence of distinct international 
commodity chains (ICCs), and the consequences for geographical patterns of industrial 
specialisation and agglomeration. These approaches help to illuminate the economic forces 
at work in particular industrial sectors as global capitalism creates complex networks of 
production which cross national borders. In this respect there has been considerable
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interest in the patterns of geographical-industrial change in Asia, but there have been 
relatively few sustained attempts to apply such an approach to the specific case of China's 
southern provinces and their cross-border relations.
In Section 2.5 the network analysis approach is taken further to the study of business 
organisations, with a particular focus on their trans-national networking arrangements in 
cross-border production networks (CPNs). Such arrangements vary according to the 
particular locational contexts in which firms are embedded, thus stressing that 
multinational corporations are not ‘placeless’ but are rooted in complex spatial networks at 
the intra- and inter-organisational levels (see H. Yeung, 1998). This is an especially 
important perspective in the case of Asian business networks, because they ‘have long 
been the fundamental nature of business structures and relationships’ in that area of the 
world (Dicken, in H. Yeung, 1998: xv).
The approaches discussed in Sections 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 tend to focus on the region as an 
economic space. In Section 2.6 the focus shifts to the more specifically political dimension 
of régionalisation. Here the emphasis is on the challenges which economic régionalisation 
poses to the territorial organisation of the nation-state. In particular, the focus is on the 
need to understand how economic régionalisation is leading to pressures of 
deterritorialisation, reterritorialisation and the emergence of new political spaces which do 
not fit neatly into traditional models of national sovereignty and statehood. The changing 
role of SNGs within the context of this emerging political spatiality is an issue of particular 
interest in relation to the focus of this dissertation. Increasingly, SNGs are becoming key 
cross-border actors in multi-level networks of governance which also include networking 
with foreign firms, and this involves them in assuming a much more determined external 
orientation towards the outside world beyond the borders of their own nation-state. 
Hitherto the concept of multi-level governance (MLG) has been applied mainly to the 
European Union, but it is presented here as an appropriate framework for the 
understanding of cross-border micro-regionalism among southern China, Taiwan and 
Japan.
Section 2.7 considers the emergence of regional blocs and regional organisations at the 
international level. This raises the issue of the relationship between large (macro-) regions 
(i.e. the European Union (EU), the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA), and
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micro-regions. A certain amount of confusion arises here because of the different usages of 
the term ‘region’ and the recognition of different regional scales in different scholarly 
disciplines (e g. economics, geography, political science, and international relations). It is 
important, therefore, to resolve this confusion before proceeding with the analysis in 
subsequent chapters.
The conclusion of this chapter draws out the main lessons, issues and problems relating to 
the analysis of regions, régionalisation and micro-regionalisation, and presents an overall 
international political economy framework with a focus on the dynamics of cross-border 
network relationships (involving intra- and inter-firm relations, SNGs, and other key 
actors), which will then be applied to the specific case of the new micro-regionalisation in 
southern China, including cross-border relations with Taiwan and Japan. The conclusion 
also stressed that any understanding of regionalism in southern China must accommodate 
both the domestic and international dimensions of regional change, and must in particular 
seek to understand the changing position of southern China within the Chinese economic 
and political system, within the emerging East Asian regional bloc, and within the global 
economy. There are thus several levels of analysis which need to be integrated if a full 
account of the dynamics of régionalisation in southern China is to be possible; but, we 
argue, the network analysis approach, situated within a framework o f MLG, offers a 
particularly fruitful perspective.
2.1 What is a Region?
The apparently simple question ‘What is a region?’ conceals a set of enormously complex 
issues relating to the significance of different scales of social, economic and political 
organisation and the distinctions among different types and levels of régionalisation. These 
issues are further complicated by the lack of an agreed, consistent terminology in the 
literature. Originally, the concept of a region emerged from geographical studies which 
emphasised the distinctive physical characteristics of a particular territorial area and, by 
implication, the boundaries between one such region and another. When the study of 
regions was extended from geography to economics (a trend which, in the Western world, 
began seriously in the 1950s), the emphasis was on seeking to identify, first of all, certain 
shared economic characteristics (e.g. rates and patterns of unemployment, population 
density, industrial structure) which a certain territorial area had in common, and, secondly,
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regions which were based on the economic centrality of a particular place, usually a large 
town or city. These two perceptions led to a distinction between, respectively, 
"homogeneous’ and ‘polarised’ or ‘nodal’ regions. (Hallett, 1973: 3-4). Regions can also 
be defined in cultural terms (for example, where the population of a particular area forms a 
distinctive ethnic or linguistic group), and as a unit of government and administration 
within a nation-state. Accordingly, in view of this diversity of use of ‘region’ in different 
contexts, it has to be acknowledged that there is no single, convenient, precise definition 
that can be applied universally. As Hallett states, “‘The region’’, both in theory and practice, 
is thus a concept of considerable ambiguity’ (ibid.: 5).
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that under the impact of historical change related 
to the effects of technological innovation, improvements in transportation, the movement 
of people, new modes of communication, the transformation of economic production and 
trade in goods and services, and political reorganisation, the characteristics of regions are 
not static but ebb and flow’ constantly and, often, unpredictably. In this respect, the 
historical impact of processes of industrialisation, capitalist development, and the 
geographical linkages between core and peripheral areas of the world has and continues 
to have -  far-reaching consequences for how we perceive regions. Currently, globalisation 
is the main focus of attention in studies of regions and regional change, since it is 
increasingly apparent that one of the consequences of globalisation is a distinct ‘time-space 
compression’ 1 that undermines traditional notions of territoriality, including regional 
territoriality (see, for example, Scott, 1998: 2), and that could even be said to mark ‘the end 
of geography’ in the conventional sense (O’Brien, 1992).
At the same time, however, there is evidence that globalisation is associated with the 
‘renaissance’ or revitalisation of regional economies as sites of global production. It is in 
this respect that regions have increasingly come under scrutiny in recent years within the 
field of international political economy. In political sense, a region can be perceived as a 
distinct geographical area with a clearly defined economic relationship to global 
production and trade. This characterisation is captured in Scott’s definition:
I will usually use the term [region] to designate a geographic area characterized by 
some minimal level of metropolitan development together with an associated tract 
of hinterland, i.e. an area that functions as the common spatial framework of daily
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life for a definite group of people, and that contains a dense mix of socio-economic 
activities subject to centripetal or polarization forces. This new socio-economic 
spatiality thus assumes in its most general form the contours of a mosaic of regions 
scattered across the globe. This mosaic can be mapped out in terms of a network of 
local economies forming an integrated or quasi-integrated world-wide system of 
production and trade (Scott, 1998: 1-2).
Scott’s emphasis on a region as a network of local economies is important, since it is 
always tempting to think of the region as a homogeneous unit and to disregard 
intra-regional differentiation. In fact, a typical region is bound to include within it distinct 
localities or sub-regions, and agglomerations o f units of production, that have their own 
dynamics. This can lead to confusion, since a clear distinction between the local and the 
regional is not always easy to make. Amin and Thrift (1994), for example, tend to use the 
broad term local’ to include the urban and regional dimensions of global economic 
activity. They base their analysis on the idea of the local in the global' and the 
global-local nexus’:
A world of transnational flows, a world of global interconnections, a world of 
global-scale capitalist imperatives from which there is no escape. And yet, global 
economy and global society continue to be constructed in and through territorially 
bound communities, which, more importantly, continue to represent much more 
than the situation requirements of global forces. At a concrete level, metaphors 
such as “global village” and “one world” are complicated, perhaps even 
contradicted, by the presence of villages, towns, districts, cities, and regions which 
continue to tell their own stories of economic development and cultural or political 
distinctiveness (Amin and Thrift, 1994: 5).
Of particular importance in the spatial dynamics of global capitalism are a fairly small 
number of world or global cities (e.g. ‘the big three’ of New York, London, Tokyo) which 
are the key nodes or ‘command centres’ of production, trade and service provision, and the 
main sites of activity of MNCs (see Brenner, 1998). It is not easy to make a firm 
distinction in this respect between a city and a region, since, increasingly, large cities 
occupy a regional scale geographically and economically. Sassen, for example, prefers to
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use the term ‘global city-region’ and to stress the role of each global city within its own 
particular national urban system (Sassen, 1991). Furthermore:
Each of Sassen’s global cities can be viewed not only as the apex of a rapidly 
changing state-scale urban hierarchy, but as the major articulation point for one 
among three super-regional blocs of the contemporary world economy -  North 
America, the European Union and East Asia (Brenner, 1998: 11).
A distinction between the ‘super-regional’ and the ‘regional’ is in some ways confusing, 
but it helps to avoid a problem which emerges in the study of international relations and 
international political economy, where often the concept of region is used to denote the 
emergence of regional blocs, such as the EU, NAFTA, and ASEAN, and less formal 
processes of economic integration and co-ordination (see, for example, Fawcett and 
Hurrell, 1995). However, if the term ‘region’ is used here to denote such large groupings of 
nation-states (e.g. the 15 member states of the EU), then it clearly raises the problem of 
how to designate the sub-regions within and between individual states.
In the present study the term ‘micro-region’ is preferred as a means of denoting the 
sub-national and cross-border scale of interactions, especially those based on intra- and 
inter-firm relations, and relations between firms and SNGs. Some of these micro-regions 
are the result of the actions of state elites but others are facilitated by the actions and 
decisions of non-state actors. Examples of such micro-regional co-operation include 
southern Califomia/north-westem Mexico, the south-western US/northem Mexico, 
Quebec/New York, America’s Atlantic provinces/New England, Michigan/Ontario, 
Alberta/the Rocky Mountain states, British Columbia/Pacific north-west states, 
north-western Germany/eastern Holland, the Italian and French Rivieras, and the French 
and Spanish Pyrenees (Holland, 1996). In East Asia, examples include the ‘Growth 
Triangle’ among Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia (Lee, 1991; Myo et al., 1994), 
southern China, Hong Kong and Taiwan (Khanna, 1995), the ‘Tumen River Project’ 
among China, North Korea and Russia (Lew, 1995; Pomfret, 1996), and the Japan Sea Rim 
Zone (Hook, 1997). ‘Micro-region’, in this thesis, thus refers to the two distinctive 
territorial elements ‘below the national level’ and ‘across national borders’/  Thus, in 
order to avoid any confusion between ‘sub-region’ and 'sub-national region’, in this thesis 
‘sub-region’ refers to regional groupings of small states or peripheries of the world
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economy and involves mainly political processes.' The term ‘sub-national’ is close to 
‘micro-region’ but is confined within the borders of a single nation state. Thus, though 
ASEAN is not small in territorial terms, it can be categorised as a ‘sub-region’ (Table 2.1).
Table 2.1 Regional Levels in East Asia
Political Space Regions Basic Unit Governance
Supra-Region
(Macro-Region)
APEC State (national economy) Inter-governmental
cooperation
Sub-Region
(Meso-Region)
ASEAN,
EAEC
State (national economy) Inter-govemmental
cooperation
Micro-Region Growth
Triangle,
Southern
China
State, sub-national governments 
and firms (national economy, 
regional economy, and intra- and 
inter-firm relations)
Inter- and intra- 
regional cooperation
Source: The researcher
2.2 The Dynamics of Régionalisation
It is a common theme of recent analyses of the global economy that there has been a 
resurgence of regions. Indeed, in some cases writers have concluded that regions are the 
primary focus of global economic activity and that this signals the demise, if not the end, 
of the nation-state (Ohmae, 1995). Without pre-judging the validity of this argument, the 
purpose of this section is to consider the broad case that régionalisation has 'taken off 
during the last quarter of a century or so.
‘Régionalisation’ must be distinguished from ‘regionalism’. As Gamble and Payne (1996: 
250) explain:
The concept of regionalism assumes that states and state actors are a key level of 
explanation in a theory o f the global political economy. The calculations that state 
actors make of their interests and the costs and benefits of alternative courses of 
action are the starting point for understanding the wider context of their behaviour 
This wider context is constituted by two kinds of structure the historical residues 
of past social interaction and the emergent patterns of current social interaction. 
Together these provide both constraints and opportunities. Agents do not act within 
structures; rather they cannot act without reproducing structures, confirming or
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modifying them through the intended and unintended consequences of their 
calculations and actions.
In this sense, regionalism is a state-led project to create formal regional structures. By 
contrast, régionalisation is promoted largely by FDl-driven processes that are dependent on 
the investment and locational decisions of non-state actors. (This is not the same as the 
view of many economists that régionalisation is a process of building a regional market 
without government-initiated regional trading arrangements.) The process of 
régionalisation emerges from the development of infrastructure and from various 
governmental policies such as the relaxation of barriers to trade and investment. It is 
characterised by a variety of participants who seek to increase economic interaction in 
order to minimise transaction costs, transportation costs, etc. and to gain benefits from the 
increased scales of economies, greater flexibility, and improved access to information, 
technology and know-how. This process is thus inevitably interconnected with changes in 
the structures of the world economy and capitalism.
There is, indeed, a general awareness that the structure and organisation of the world 
economy are changing. Contemporary capitalism is different in many important respects 
from the capitalism of the mid-twentieth century and the age of what has come to be 
known as Fordist mass production, which is generally seen to have reached its zenith in the 
1950s and 1960s (Amin, 1994: 9). Although there are different perceptions of the precise 
nature, extent, causes and consequences of this change, nevertheless there seems to be 
agreement that in spatial terms the new global capitalism is characterised by deep-rooted 
restructuring at the regional level, and this is related to what has been described as a new 
international division of labour (see Section 2.4 below for further discussion of this 
concept). The latter term refers specifically to the impact of locational decisions by MNCs 
to move to less developed countries (usually for reasons of cost savings in the production 
process), thereby promoting peripheral industrialisation and the emergence of 
’organisationally integrated circuits of production in different countries with each country 
partaking in a part of the production process but not producing the whole product' 
(Floogvelt, 1997: 47). This is an especially important phenomenon from the viewpoint of 
current changes in the political economy of East Asia, since the rise in that area of newly 
industrialising countries concentrating mainly on export-oriented production reveals one of
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the major shifts in the spatial distribution of production under advanced (post-Fordist) 
capitalism.
It is important to be clear about the main characteristics of the Fordist system of mass 
production, since the regional restructuring of contemporary capitalism has grown out of 
the decline of that system. Esser and Hirsch offer the following overview:
The Fordist phase of capitalism was marked by the imposition o f Taylorist labour 
processes in important sectors, associated with a considerable extension of wage 
labour ... whilst at the same time making labour conditions relatively similar 
("employee society”). The industrial mass production of consumer goods became 
the basis for an extensive capitalization of the sphere of reproduction, i.e. the 
reproduction of the work forces became the integral part of the reproduction of 
capital on the basis of a generalized consumer model. Great advances in 
productivity and the linking of mass incomes to productivity increases facilitated 
strong growth in the national product and the general standard of living (Esser and 
Hirsch, 1994: 75-6).
For Esser and Hirsch, these features amount to a distinctive process of capital 
accumulation. In turn, under Fordism, this process was subject to a distinctive form of 
regulation:
It consisted of a strong processes of concentration and the formation of new mass 
industries (in particular the car and electronics industries), the development of 
bureaucratised and centralized trade unions with a tendency for all workers to be 
included in the right to representation and thus to have the opportunity to conclude 
comprehensive pay agreements, and the expansion of the bureaucratized welfare 
state ... On this basis, a centralized corporatism was able to develop, based on 
social-contractual cooperation between commercial associations, trade unions, 
parties and state administrations, and a Keynesian state interventionism supported 
by it (ibid.: 76).
This particular analysis of Fordism, which is rooted in the approach of the regulation 
school4, is helpful in drawing our attention to the specific historical context in which
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capitalist mass production rose to a position of global supremacy in the mid-twentieth 
century. From the point of view of Fordism’s spatial foundations, the key point to stress is 
that the capital cities of the Western developed world were the major sites of capital 
accumulation and regulation, and formed the inner cores o f Fordist regions. On a global 
scale, the countries of the Third World were essentially peripheral sources of raw materials 
and simple manufactured goods (ibid.: 78-9).
The clearest signs of the disintegration of Fordism are to be seen in the characteristic 
stagnation o f the once dominant industrial cities and their surrounding regions in the 
Western world, and the rise of highly mobile MNCs which have shifted the locus of 
manufacturing to the less developed countries, including those of East Asia. These trends 
point to major spatial (urban and regional) transformations in the structure and organisation 
of global capitalism. Ironically, perhaps, formerly Fordist regions have in many situations 
been able to reassert themselves because they are no longer, as they were in the 1960s, ‘at 
most a derivative category of analysis and a secondary locus of economic activity’ (Sabel, 
1994: 102). At the time the needs of standardised mass production meant that there was 
little scope for regional innovation. Sub-national units of production were subordinated in 
a centralised, hierarchical system of regulation. This was reflected also in the weak 
position of local and regional governments in Western developed countries, since the 
essential role of such governments was to act as the agencies of central (i.e. national) 
governments in the implementation of Keynesian economic policies and welfare state 
provision.
A global crisis of Fordism in the 1970s (for reasons which will be discussed in Section 2.3) 
led to a situation in which the dominant modes of capital accumulation and regulation 
could no longer function as they had previously done. They were incapable of dealing with 
the fragmentation of world markets, intensified international competition, and the rise of 
highly mobile MNCs. The result was a dramatic fall in profitability in all the major 
industrial sectors of the developed world. Standardised mass production was increasingly 
replaced by flexible specialisation, designed to enable producers to respond more quickly 
and efficiently to changing market demand and cyclical recession. In this context regions 
were able to reassert themselves as sources o f economic dynamism. Debates continue as to 
whether a new post-Fordist mode of accumulation and method of regulation has fully 
emerged from the crisis that began in the 1970s, or whether there are still possibilities that
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Fordism can be restored (neo-Fordism), albeit in a revised form. In terms of regional 
restructuring, one view is that regions increasingly face choices about whether to move in a 
Fordist or post-Fordist direction; and indeed this is linked in turn to the choices made by 
national governments and international agencies. The spread of neo-liberal forms of 
globalisation since the 1970s (and the concomitant decline of Keynesianism and welfare 
state provision) and the development of super-regional groupings of nation-states suggest 
that, whether or not we call the changes 'post-Fordist’, we are indeed living through a 
major period of transition. For Piore and Sabel (1984), a ‘second industrial divide’ 
separates the age of mass production and the age of flexible specialisation. The regulation 
approach seeks to show how a new mode of capital accumulation and method of regulation 
are emerging, but it is hesitant to offer any firm predictions;
This is because it sees the present as a period of experimentation with various 
strategies to resolve the bottleknecks of Fordism, a period in which particular 
solutions -  more or less successful -  will emerge ... [T]he regulationists argue that 
the shape of post-Fordism will emerge from the dialectical confrontation between 
rival forms(Amin, 1994: 17-18).
Some commentators are more certain in their predictions. For example, Esser and Hirsch 
(1994), discussing the example of restructuring in Germany, identify five new tendencies 
in the mode of accumulation; (1) new technology-based work, with lay-offs, worker 
segmentation and social marginalisation; (2) a strengthened industrialisation of the service 
sector, including the rise of the white-collar strata and the erosion of collective solidarities 
and identities through the use of new technologies; (3) enforced mobility in labour markets, 
linked to new geographies of employment and the breakdown of family and communal 
ties; (4) growing social polarisation between high productivity/high consumption strata and 
low- or even no-wage strata; and (5) an individualisation and pluralisation of life styles. 
Each of these trends has potentially far-reaching consequences for the spatial organisation 
of production and, in particular, for the role of regional economies and regional 
government.
Similarly, Esser and Hirsch (1994) identify (again, taking Germany as an example) the key 
characteristics of a new post-Fordist mode of regulation: (1) new relationships integrating 
branch structure and industry on the basis of advanced production technology, with the
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emergence of new small firm networks and of processes o f international concentration and 
coordination in the hands of major firms and financial institutions; (2) a scaling down and 
orientation of welfare services towards the economically active groups in society; (3) a 
weakening of the regulatory role of trade unions; and (4) the rise of a new corporatism 
involving state and industry alliances in the high technology sector and select groups of 
privileged workers. Again, the implications of these changes for regional restructuring are 
profound.
It is also important to consider the impact of the crisis of Fordism and the rise of 
neo-liberal globalisation on the less developed countries, since there can be no doubt that 
current changes point to the need for what Hoogvelt (1997) calls a ‘new political economy 
of development’. There is a particular need to consider whether regions within the 
so-called Third World are now in a fundamentally different position as a result of the 
global crisis of Fordism and the emergence of a new international division of labour. One 
response of Western capitalists was initially to seek to export Fordist methods of 
production to less developed countries, where labour costs were much lower, in an effort to 
restore their profitability. This ‘global Fordism' solution had major spatial implications.
[[Industrial relocation to certain selected sites in the Third World, the so-called 
newly industrialising economies of south-east Asia, and Brazil and Mexico in Latin 
America, have been highlighted as a critical feature of this period of reconstruction 
in global capital accumulation.
... The unevenness of industrial progress as between Third World countries in this 
period, was succinctly put in the UNCTAD annual trade report 1982; “fewer than 
ten newly industrialising developing countries accounted in 1980 for nearly 30 per 
cent of developing countries’ GDP and nearly half of their manufacturing output, 
even though their share of the population of the underdeveloped countries was no 
more than 10 per cent” (Hoogvelt, 1997: 47).
In particular, the newly industrialising countries of East Asia (the so-called ‘tiger’ 
economies) benefited (in terms of key economic indicators) from the crisis of Fordism by 
taking the opportunity to develop their industrial base. At the same time, however, in Japan 
new methods of flexible, customised, lean production (exhibited most clearly in the Toyota
company) were emerging to challenge the supremacy of Fordist methods. If Japanese 
flexible production (replacing economies of scale by economies of scope) is seen as the 
archetype of a new post-Fordist system, then this raises the issue -  through the lens of the 
regulation school -  as to whether it relies for its success on a characteristically Japanese 
system of regulation, i.e. one based on typically Japanese social, economic and political 
structures -  including a uniquely Japanese tradition of industrial relations -- which are 
quite different from those in the Western world (Hoogvelt, 1997: 101-2). As Western 
companies have sought to emulate the Japanese approach and copy its flexible production 
techniques, it has become clear that it is not easy simply to transplant something distinctly 
Japanese (or Asian) to a completely different cultural context.
Similarly, discussions of the 'East Asian development model' have focused on the reasons 
why seven countries -  Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand 
and Indonesia — have achieved such remarkably high rates of economic growth: is it 
because of factors which are unique to East Asia, or can the model be reproduced in other 
parts of the world? (World Bank, 1993) More recently, attention has been focused on 
southern China, which seems to be establishing the foundations for impressive growth. 
Without entering into these debates at this point in our analysis, it needs to be stressed that 
an understanding of the specific role, structure and dynamics of East Asia as a whole and 
specific regions within each Asia calls for a broad view of the crisis of Fordism and efforts 
to resolve that crisis since the 1970s, and of the impact of new flexible production methods 
(especially those based on the Japanese system). This in turn points to the need to 
understand the problems of regulating (or governing) the particular production methods in 
question. For China, a country which was not previously closely integrated in the global 
capitalist system, the present period offers particularly difficult challenges in terms of 
deciding how to restructure its economy nationally, regionally and locally, and how to 
establish the foundations for cross-broader economic relations with neighbouring East 
Asian countries. The combination of recent market reforms and régionalisation in China 
suggests that there is a definite movement towards flexible and entrepreneurial 
restructuring, albeit within the framework of a broadly developmental state (Duckett, 
1996).
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2.3 Expla in ing the Resurgence o f Regions
The previous section sought to lay the foundations for an understanding o f the importance 
of régionalisation within the contemporary global economy. It introduced theories of 
Fordism/post-Fordism and the analysis of the crisis of global capitalism in order to show 
that regions occupy a particularly important, and in some ways uncertain and transitional, 
place in the structure of the contemporary world. In this section, the argument moves on to 
a more in-depth study of different perspectives on régionalisation (including those already 
mentioned in Section 2.2), since these perspectives raise a number of crucial issues about 
the complexity of regional change. The analysis follows Storper’s (1995, 1997) 
categorisation of three major schools o f thought on régionalisation, and also considers his 
own contribution to this debate and a possible fourth line of enquiry.
2.3.1 The Flexible Specialisation School: Institutions. Industrial Divides and Small 
Firms
We have already referred to Piore and Sabel’s (1984) analysis of the "second industrial 
divide’ and its emphasis on the emergence of particular forms of flexible specialisation to 
replace Fordist mass production. Storper (1997) acknowledges the value of Piore and 
Sabel’s analysis, but he is concerned that they rely rather too much on a universalisation of 
the experience of north-east Italy ("the third Italy’) and southern Germany. In both these 
cases, post-Fordist production is dominated by networks of small firms, but this, Storper 
argues, is an untypical situation. Furthermore, the Italian and German examples cover a 
fairly limited sectoral area (traditional non-durables, specialised supplier industries, and, in 
the German case, luxury versions of mass production); and Storper remains convinced that 
any generalisation from such a limited basis is risky. He also stresses the deep, specific 
historical conditions which have led to this particular type of flexible specialisation in 
these two cases. More fundamentally, he asks whether the niche market specialisation of 
small German and Italian firms can really be taken as a guide to the kind of specialisation 
we might expect in larger firms (such as Toyota, for example). Furthermore, the intensely 
local level of production in north-east Italy and southern Germany does not seem to extend 
to what we could realistically call a full regional scale. Finally, Storper is not convinced 
that Piore and Sabel adequately explain why some firms may appear to be flexible and 
specialised, but are still not successful: is there a ‘secret’ to the success of Italian and 
German firms which we do not fully understand? And if so, is this ‘secret’ so unique to
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these two examples that it cannot be generalised? Similarly, are there different forms of 
flexibility and specialisation? (Storper, 1995: 193-5).
Piore and Sabel (1984) observe that certain key regional and territorially embedded 
institutional factors have contributed to the success of the north-east Italian and south 
German cases. The key, they argue, is the existence of institutional networks of 
co-ordination. In the case of Italy, the roots of these networks are in strong family and 
communitarian ties, which, for Storper, are ‘almost unique in Europe’ (1997: 142). There 
are many other parts of Italy with local industrial clusters, but none is as successful as the 
third Italy’:
Numerous quantitative and qualitative analyses have shown that NEC Italy is 
different from the other areas in that the firms partake of a local, vertical division of 
labor, whereas in other areas there tend to be clusters of firms that carry out similar 
tasks. Also, in NEC Italy, the local production system is richly endowed with 
commercial agents who organize the production activities and market the local 
products as final outputs, with a local, independent brand name whereas in other 
areas, firms are frequently either subcontractors to larger external firms ... or they 
sell intermediate inputs on open markets (Storper, 1997: 137-8).
Following Storper’s analysis, it is clear that there are some dangers in assuming that the 
kind of flexible specialisation that has emerged in ‘the third Italy’ and southern Germany is 
indicative of a more general movement away from Fordist mass production. This is not to 
deny that the analysis of Piore and Sabel is useful, but merely to point out that the 
distinctive social, economic and political characteristics of a region and its localities are 
bound to have an effect on patterns of economic organisation. Within the ‘the third Italy’ 
there is a degree of specialisation -  down to individual communes and provinces -  which 
means that the whole region consists of a very large number of networked industrial 
districts with an average of ten or less workers in each firm. This is clearly not a typical 
situation in a modem industrial society. For these reasons, we need to acknowledge that the 
regional economics and politics of ‘the third Italy’ are not necessarily a guide, and the 
success of this region is to a large extent socially embedded in its specific social milieu.
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2.3.2 The California School: Industrial Organisation, Transactions, Agglomeration
The so-called California School approaches the emergence of flexible production and 
industrial agglomeration from the perspective of the factors that create a new division of 
labour and the transaction costs associated with inter-firm linkages. In essence, it offers an 
economic model of the agglomeration process, focusing on the way in which new market 
conditions give rise to increasing uncertainty, thereby prompting a deepening of the 
division of labour in order to (1) minimise the risks of overcapacity, and (2) maximise the 
benefits of specialisation and minimise the danger o f ‘technological lock-in’. At the same 
time, agglomeration develops because the transaction costs of traded interdependencies 
(input-output relations) tend to increase with the disintegration of production (since there 
are more transactions external to the firm and these rise with geographical distance). In 
other words, this approach concentrates on the economics of network forms of production 
(Storper, 1997: 9).
Storper himself contributed to the development of this model in the 1980s in company with 
many other authors such as Allen Scott. Specific industries studied included Hollywood’s 
film and television industries, the women's clothing industry in Los Angeles, and the 
phenomenon of ‘the Third Italy’ (discussed in Section 2.3.1). The emergence of new 
market conditions in a particular industry can result from a variety of factors, exogenous 
and endogenous, so the specific dynamics are not the same in each case. (For example, 
regulatory and technological change was crucial in the case of Hollywood.) More recently, 
this approach has been further elaborated to take account of the ways in which 
agglomeration itself can produce new industrial dynamics (e g. through the creation of new 
knowledge and technology), and the role of institutional environments in stimulating 
agglomeration -  a perspective which brings the California School back to some o f the key 
concerns of the flexible specialisation school.
Storper himself regards the California School ’s explanation of agglomeration as partial and 
concludes that the School’s emphasis on the localisation of traded interdependencies (via 
input-output relations) ‘is inadequate to the task of explaining the link between flexible 
production and the resurgence of regional economies in contemporary capitalism’ (1997: 
14). This is because in some cases, especially in technology-intensive sectors, 
‘technological agglomerations could be found without overwhelmingly dense local 1-0
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linkages and without the kinds of explicit institutional co-ordination found in many 
European industrial districts’ (1997: 14).
2.3.3 Innovation, High Technology and Regional Development
The last point in Section 2.3.2 raises the specific issue of innovation in high-tech industries. 
What requires explanation is the uneven regional distribution of such industries. Put more 
simply, why are some regions more high-tech than others? In answer to this question, the 
American School of high technology regional development studied the development of 
Silicon Valley and Route 128 in the Boston area (Markusen et al., 1986), and highlighted 
the vital role o f the university-spin off process. Other factors were also identified, a high 
quality of life, good infrastructure, even climate, etc. (Storper, 1997: 15). One problem 
here, however, is that this kind of explanation seems to be applicable mainly to those 
sectors of innovation which have a strong basis in formal science. Furthermore, it is not 
immediately clear why, given the large number of research universities, the number of 
dynamic high-tech regions is still fairly small.
In response, the ‘regional politics' analysis suggests that the key variable is the role of 
regional coalitions which successfully press for the transfer of high-tech resources. 
Alternatively, a group of Franco-ltalian-Swiss economists (the GREMi group) stress the 
milieu in which regional development takes place:
The milieu is essentially a context for development, which empowers and guides 
innovative agents to be able to innovate and to co-ordinate with other innovating 
agents ... [It is] a system of regional institutions, rules, and practices which lead to 
innovation. Many of the milieu theorists use the “networks” as their principal 
organizational metaphor. For some, the milieu is itself a network of actors: 
producers, researchers, politicians, and so on, in a region. For others, the network 
concerns the input-output system, and it is the network which is embedded in a 
milieu, and the milieu provides members of the network with what they need for 
co-ordination, adjustment, and successful innovation (Storper, 1997: 16-17).
In this model, however, it remains unclear how a distinctive milieu actually leads to 
innovation. This requires further exploration.
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2.3.4 The Perspective o f Evolutionary Economics: A Way Forward?
The theoretical contributions detailed above undoubtedly offer insights into the factors that 
lead to régionalisation; but they all seem to present only part of a complex picture. In the 
mid-1980s Storper began to apply the paradigm of evolutionary technological change, 
drawn from evolutionary economics, to fill these theoretical gaps. According to this 
paradigm, economic development is rooted in a process o f learning and the search for new, 
more efficient forms of technological production In this respect, what is significant about 
flexibility is its role in promoting such technological learning within the framework of the 
knowledge-based economy (Storper, 1995; 206). Increasingly, organisations cluster 
together in territorial space to travel along the same ‘technological trajectory’. In so doing, 
they have interdependencies which are untraded, e.g. labour markets and conventions for 
developing, communicating and interpreting knowledge. Thus, for Storper the region is ‘a 
nexus of untraded interdependencies’ (Storper, 1995: 207).
At the same time, the traded input-output relations (1-0 analysis) are, for Storper, still 
important. What he seeks to do is to combine an understanding of the role of traded and 
untraded interdependencies in stimulating regional agglomerations. On balance, however, 
he sees the resurgence of regional economies as being increasingly dependent on untraded 
interdependencies because of the growing importance o f the knowledge-based economy 
(the ‘learning economy’). This is a similar view to that of Borrus, Ernst and Haggard 
(2000: 10), who argue that transaction costs are only one part of the equation and that other 
factors, including economics of scale, flexibility, access to information, and the ability to 
focus on core competencies, are increasingly important in shaping the territorial extent and 
form of industrial organisation. For Storper, the emphasis is on regions as 
technological-economic spaces. At the same time, however, it is clear that politics is also 
important: politics ... may decide which regions grow’ (Storper, 1995: 211). Within the 
context of a political economy approach, a key task is to integrate an understanding of 
regions as political, as well as economic and technological, spaces. This is an issue to 
which we will return in Section 2.5.
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2.4 The New International Division of Labour and Commodity Chains 
2.4.1 National Economies in East Asia
It was only after the 1980s that the rapid industrialisation and regional development of East 
Asia attracted the world’s attention. There was a particular interest in how the East Asian 
NIEs (Newly Industrialising Economies: South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore), 
the ASEAN countries (especially Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia) and China were able 
to achieve such remarkably high rates o f economic growth. Explanations have often 
emphasised domestic political factors such as the combination of selective state 
intervention with neo-liberal orientations (free trade, division of labour, accumulation of 
capital and technologies, etc.) (World Bank 1993), institutional development (Aoki, Kim 
and Okuno-Fujiwara, 1997), and the role of the developmental state (on Japan see Johnson, 
1982; on South Korea see Amsden, 1989; on Taiwan see Wade, 1990).
While the above studies concentrate on each country’s individual economic base, there has 
also been a growing interest in the search for the causes of the region’s broader economic 
dynamism, as illustrated by the revision o f the so-called "flying geese" model/ In East 
Asia, industrial upgrading from labour-intensive to capital- and technology-intensive 
industries has occurred within Japan and the East Asian NIEs. The original ‘flying geese’ 
model suggests that there is a clear pattern of industrial development: (1) the diffusion of 
new products begins with importation from advanced countries into less industrial 
countries; (2) techniques and capital goods are imported and the less industrialised 
countries acquire their own capital goods industries; (3) there is a growth o f domestic 
production because of the increase of domestic demand; (4) the less industrialised 
countries develop export capability. These processes are metaphorically named according 
to the pattern of ‘flying geese’.
While this model focuses on the industrial development processes based on relations 
between national economies as the central unit, micro study (product cycle theory) 
suggests that productive innovation takes place in high-income countries, and that there are 
three stages in industrial upgrading: (1) the introductory or innovative stage; (2) the 
maturing or process development stage; (3) the standardised or mature stage. International 
production is important for firms seeking to maintain a monopolistic position and market 
access. This corporate strategy has become a central feature of the world economy.
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However, the above models may not be applicable to the experience of the NIEs. Both 
expect the maturity of domestic consumption, but in the case of East Asia the stage of 
production for domestic consumption has often been skipped, and the starting-point has 
been export-led industrialisation. The production and sales activity of MNCs through FDI 
has accelerated both intra-industrial and intra-firm trade in East Asia, and has contributed 
greatly to the emergence of dynamic sub-national and cross-border micro-regions.
2.4.2 The New International Division of Labour
In effect, the emergence of micro-regions reflects the patterns of what has been called the 
new international division of labour (NIDL). This concept was originally based on 
dependency theory, as applied, for example, to the study of trade relations between Latin 
America and the rest of the world.6 It was first suggested by German scholars 
investigating patterns of manufactured exports from the Third World in the 1970s. Rising 
production costs and the intensification of competition forces firms to invest in low-cost 
areas. In East Asia, the role of special economic zones (SEZs) and export processing zones 
(EPZs) is critical in that they have been able to attract FDI and to connect with capital and 
advanced technology. (This is a particularly important factor in the case of southern 
China.) The combination seems to be sufficient to explain East Asian economic growth. 
However, the East Asian NIDL is by nature more of a regional division of labour, as 
exemplified by the cases of Hong Kong and Singapore. Furthermore, the role of foreign 
firms is not the same in all the East Asian NIEs. For example, as Appelbaum and 
Henderson (1992) observe, the NIDL applies to Singapore, where foreign firms 
overwhelmingly dominate; in Taiwan, foreign firms are in a minority; in South Korea, 
indigenous chaebols (conglomerates) dominate, and Hong Kong’s economic growth was 
triggered by smaller local manufacturing firms. Nevertheless, the theory of the NIDL is 
useful in highlighting the role of FDI from advanced countries as well as the development 
of technology and the division of production processes.
2.4.3 International Commodity Chains
Any attempt to understand the changing patterns of the regional division of labour in the 
age of post-Fordism (see Section 2.2 above) requires a consideration of the organisation of 
production in the global manufacturing system. The concept of an international commodity 
chain (ICC) provides a useful insight for understanding both productive and spatial
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interdependencies, and helps to explain how peripheral countries are linked to the global 
market (GereHi and Korzeniewicz, 1994). The concept refers to a network of labour and 
production processes whose end result is a finished good (Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1994). 
The global commodity chains approach highlights the role of producer-driven and 
buyer-driven chains in creating overlapping and at times conflicting regional divisions of 
labour.7 Producer-driven and buyer-driven chains are founded on different types of 
production and trade networks, are driven by different kinds of lead firms, incorporate 
different sets of countries into their regional hierarchies, and have different consequences 
for industrial upgrading in East Asia’s sub-regions (including sub-national regions in 
China).* Thus, economic development through export-led industrialisation in Japan, the 
NIEs, the ASEAN countries and now China is part of the broader processes of 
globalisation The NIDL has been modified to a more regional and hierarchical division of 
labour within East Asia, a division of labour which in turn is characterised by the central 
role of certain key geographical micro-regions. Moreover, the commodity chains approach 
seeks to transcend 'the increasingly sterile debate about the role of states versus markets, 
and to come to grips with new trends in the organization of production on a world scale’ 
(Gereffi, 1996).
The role of exporting is very important in the commodity chains approach. According to 
Gereffi, there are five major export roles: (1) primary product exports, including processed 
‘industrial commodities’ and non-traditional agricultural exports; (2) the export-oriented 
assembly of traditional manufactured goods, such as clothing and electronics goods, using 
imported components; (3) the production of components for export in relatively advanced 
industries, such as automobiles and computers, using substantial local inputs; (4) original 
equipment manufacturing (OEM), whereby contractors make goods to be sold under 
another firm’s brandname; and (5) original brandname manufacturing (OBM), whereby 
manufacturers make products for export and sale under their own label. ’ The East Asian 
NIEs succeeded in upgrading their industrial base from the 1960s to the 1990s, and in the 
1990s they focused on components supply manufacturing, i.e. OEM and OBM.
In this context, it is important to understand the roles of NIEs in relation to the commodity 
chains, especially through their links with Japan. East Asian NIEs have undertaken the 
following roles: (1) a commodity-export role; (2) a commercial-subcontracting role, using 
imported components from Japan; (3) an exports-platform role, using Japanese FDI; (4) a
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components supplier role, acquiring OEM from Japanese manufacturers; and (5) an 
independent exporter role, using original brandnames.1" Industrialisation in East Asia, 
therefore, is the result of an integrated system of global production and trade, supported by 
new forms of investment and financing, and promoted by specific government policies. 
Thus, the processing trade arrangements (PTAs) between China and Japan are in the phase 
of the export-oriented assembly of manufactured goods, using imported components.
The spatial agglomeration of industry, which is a key characteristic of the NIDL, is linked 
to both groups of vertically related firms (i.e. a chain of suppliers) and horizontally related 
firms (i.e. similar firms competing within the same industry), and according to Marshall, it 
has three major dimensions: (1) it provides a pooled market for workers with specialised 
skills; (2) it facilitates the development of specialised inputs and services; and (3) it 
enables firms to benefit from knowledge spill-over '' For example, in the case of southern 
China, there are various ways in which patterns of industrial agglomeration in the province 
of Guangdong are linked to the development of commodity chains: for example, through 
the expansion of FDI from Japan and the NIEs, the development of intra-regional trade, the 
transformation of industrial location structures, export-oriented strategies, and the 
development of market access. In turn, all of these shifts are related to the need to promote 
industrial organisation in order to benefit from optimal supply and output. These trends are 
well illustrated by the case of the electronics industry from the developed countries to the 
peripheral areas, and this change has been the most significant cause of East Asia’s 
impressive regional economic development.
2.5 Cross-Border Production Networks
In recent years there has been a growing interest in the importance of network-based 
MNCs in the global economy. Borrus, Ernst and 1 laggard (2000a) discuss the significance 
of cross-border production networks (CPNs) as an engine of industrial integration of the 
Asia-Pacific region These networks encompass ‘the inter- and intra-firm relationships 
through which the firm organizes the entire range of its business activities: from research 
and development (R&D), product definition and design, to supply of inputs, manufacturing 
(or production of a service), distribution, and support services’ (Borrus, Ernst, and Haggard, 
2000a: 1). They argue that the heterogeneity of the region’s technological capabilities 
means that firms seek to exploit the specific advantage of particular locations. This is also
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a result of government industnal policies. Hence, the role of the state in fostering CPNs is 
vitally important.
Another key point is that CPNs vary according to the specific approach of each lead firm 
and also the characteristics of the home (i.e. national) system of production and innovation. 
Increasingly competitive success (especially in electronics) depends on the dynamics and 
flexibility of CPNs. This has been especially true since the Asian financial crisis. Firms in 
the old vertical (hierarchical) relationships are being replaced by vertically disintegrated 
networks of firms. Such networks often have high transaction costs, but these are 
compensated for by other advantages. In particular, networks can tap into locally 
developed technological capabilities. This is especially important in Asia because of the 
region’s diverse and tiered levels of development. The varying patterns of governance of 
CPNs are also significant. These highlight the different patterns of control of CPNs 
exercised by headquarters or the lead networks firm — patterns which vary according to the 
country of origin.
H. Yeung (1998) is particularly interested in the spatial and social embeddedness1" of 
these firms, highlighting the way in which they establish roots in 'spaces of networked 
relations' as opposed to the much simpler 'spaces of firms' of the past (p. 76). Although he 
does not use the actual term ‘cross-border production network’, in one study he builds an 
analysis of Hong Kong firms in the ASEAN region on the basis of a distinction among 
three major types of network: intra-firm, inter-firm and extra-firm. Each of these types is 
characterised by its own specific profile of socio-spatial features. What is particularly 
fascinating in all cases is the major contribution o f Chinese ethnic and family ties to the 
success of these various networks. In this sense, all Chinese enterprises may be regarded as 
'family businesses' of one kind or another. The Chinese word guanxi denotes the Chinese 
view of good, mutual 'relationships' as the necessary basis for successful business. Yeung 
shows how each of the three types of network builds upon guanxi in various ways. Thus, 
intra-firm networks are rooted in the imperatives of family and entrepreneurship; inter-firm 
networks are based an extended notion of friendship and partnership; and extra-firm 
networks stress the vital role of intermediaries and political connections.
Yeung warns against the simple generalisation o f the results of his analysis of Hong Kong 
TNCs to other overseas Chinese businesses. Yet his analysis is extremely suggestive in its
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capacity to show how different kinds of business networks emerge and take root in specific 
spatial contexts. In general, networking is a major feature of Asian (especially Chinese) 
business organisation, but it is also becoming a more prominent feature of global business 
all over the world. Moreover, Chinese business networks are at the same time influenced 
by globalising tendencies such as access to the financial resources that flow through the 
global financial system (Olds and Yeung, 1999). Action at the global level affects the 
capacity of listed Chinese firms to operate at different scales, and this has a major impact 
on the resources available to the many unlisted small firms. Following Yeung’s approach, 
we can see MNCs as ‘networks of governance structures’ (H. Yeung, 1998: Ch. 3); and, 
moreover, we can add the further observation that these production networks are 
increasingly linked to sub-national governments and policy networks of all kinds in the 
remarkably fluid multi-level governance arrangements that are now emerging. Intermediate 
associations, such as local business associations, also play a vitally important networking 
role in linking government actors and firms.
In this study we argue that the network approach to understanding business organisation, 
an approach which is now well developed in the literature (e.g. Borrus, Ernst and Haggard, 
2000b), needs to be extended to incorporate the role of government (especially 
sub-national government) actors. Increasingly territorial government in the old-fashioned, 
hierarchical sense is being replaced by horizontal relationships of cross-border governance. 
For example, in the case of Europe, such trans-national governance is seen in terms of two 
key dimensions: ‘below’ the state in cross-border co-operation and ‘above’ the state in the 
Euro-polity (Christiansen and Jorgensen, 2000). According to Morata, between the Spanish 
and French sub-national governments new forms of inter-regional and inter-local 
co-operation are developing. The North-West Mediterranean Euroregion is seen as a 
regional association of cross-border co-operation, established by the Presidents of 
Catalonia, Languedoc-Roussillon and Midi-Pyrenees. This co-operation is associated with 
the development of the process of European integration. But more importantly, SNGs need 
to redefine their traditional functions because the transfer of some fields of national 
sovereignty upwards to the EU and dismantling of national borders have contributed to the 
transformation of established territorial boundaries (Morata, 1997: 292-3). This network 
behaviour of SNGs has emerged as a model of the co-operative economic growth of the 
micro-region.
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2.6 The Political S patia lity  o f Regions
There is an obvious danger in ‘reducing’ the study of régionalisation to economic and 
technological factors. The role of government, political institutions, political processes, and 
political culture in shaping, limiting and encouraging new forms of regional activity is of 
vital importance. These relationships, however, are themselves becoming increasingly 
complex as government and politics lose their once firm territorial association with the 
nation-state as the primary unit of political organisation and sovereignty. No longer does 
the world consist simply of national economies governed by national political structures. 
Under the impact of globalisation and the movement towards a post-Fordist system of 
flexible production, the centrality of the nation-state has also declined and there has been a 
restructuring of political power in the direction of much greater territorial pluralism. This 
has involved the growing importance of regions as ‘networked’ political spaces within the 
global economy. No longer can regions (and localities within regions) simply be seen as 
the subordinate units of national political systems. Such a model corresponds to the old 
politics of Fordist mass production, but does not seem to fit the more flexible world of the 
politics of post-Fordism.
For example, global cities (see Section 2.1 above) now serve as the command centres of 
global economic networks. How these cities are governed and how they seek to resolve the 
political struggles and tensions that arise within them are vitally significant issues that 
cannot be reduced to economics and technology. Similarly, the regional spaces that 
surround global cities are spaces of political conflict and co-operation, both internally 
(within themselves) and externally in relation to other regional spaces (and their dominant 
urban centres) and their own national governments. For example, within any national 
territory, regions are competing with each other for scarce resources, financial support, 
economically supportive measures, and influence. This is at root a political process and 
involves the structuring of power relations at both the formal and informal levels. Most 
importantly, no longer are the Keynesian demand-management policies and redistributive 
welfare-state systems associated with Fordist mass production capable of providing a 
framework for the further development of capitalism (Brenner, 1998: 6). The territorial 
‘fixity’ of the nation-state has dissolved in a process of what we may call 
‘deterritorialisation’. At the present time complex processes of spatial restructuring 
(‘reterritorialisation’) are in progress.
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Globalisation and the increase of transnational interactions have eroded the division of 
responsibilities between states and SNGs (Keating 1999: 1). As a consequence of global 
economic dynamism, every major city is an important node in a global network of cities 
that is not subject to effective state regulation (Magnusson, 1996: 22). Territorial 
nation-states are no longer the key 'nodes’ of the global economy (Agnew and Corbridge, 
1995: 1989). Nor are they the unchallenged foundations of political identity as 
globalisation creates more fluid patterns of culture, religion, ethnicity and social formation. 
Traditional national political formations (parties, interest groups, movements, etc.) no 
longer command the commitment and loyalty that they used to enjoy. Increasingly, such 
formations are giving way to regional and local formations articulating demands for greater 
territorial autonomy, decentralisation, devolution and, in some cases, separation from the 
nation-state.
This does not mean that the territorial nation-state is unimportant. Rather, each nation-state 
has to decide how to adapt (restructure) if it is to increase its capacity to operate effectively 
in an age of globalisation, rapid technological change, and shifting political loyalties. This 
includes a need, at the international level, to overcome the rigidity of national boundaries, 
since these can often hinder the development of transnational economic, technological and 
social flows. Increasingly, for example, dynamic regions are emerging which actually cut 
across the boundaries between nation-states. Inevitably, new forms of governing these 
regions are required, since traditional notions of territorial state sovereignty do not allow 
for such a phenomenon.
New fluid patterns of MEG, based on networks of decision-making, are presently emerging 
throughout the world as an alternative to the rigidity of territorial state sovereignty. It is 
important in this situation to reconsider the concept of governance. This refers not only to 
formal governmental activities but also to informal, non-govemmental and transnational 
mechanisms. The concept has been widely used to explain the micro behaviour of business 
organisations, as in the concept of 'corporate governance’ (see OECD, 1998). In 
international studies, the growing interest in governance can be traced to the recognition of 
the shift from formal relations (state to state) to a more flexible and informal system. It 
also stems from dissatisfaction with the dominance of realist (anarchy) and liberal 
institutionalist (regime) theories in international relations. ‘Governance’, according to 
Rosenau (1992: 4-5), embraces governmental institutions but also subsumes informal,
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non-governmental mechanisms. It is in fact possible to conceive of 'governance’ without 
'government’, whereby regulatory mechanisms in a sphere of activity function effectively 
even though they are not endowed with formal authority. The Commission on Global 
Governance (1995: 2) defines ‘governance’ as ‘the sum of the many ways individuals and 
institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs’. In this continuing process, 
conflicting or diverse interests are accommodated so that co-operative action can be taken. 
Weiss (2000) points out that there is a tension between ‘governance’ as a complex set of 
structures and processes, both public and private, and as a synonym for ‘government’. 
Governance can be defined as a set of rules and regularised practices that together serve to 
bring order to the operation of a particular field of activity. The major issue of concern 
with governance is how the rules and practices can be coordinated effectively.
If we consider the present political economy of Europe, for example, it is possible to 
identify a combination of spatial relationships: supranationalism in some areas, the 
increasing importance of sub-national units and structures, and the spread o f transnational 
(networked) linkages of all kinds. Local and regional authorities and actors (for example, 
the German Länder, the French and Italian regions, and major cities across the EU), and 
transnational associations and organisations of many kinds (e g. pressure groups in a 
particular industry working together across national borders, associations of local 
authorities, and European-wide networks in health, education and other policy areas) all 
play a role in the new MLG. As Christiansen (1996: 14) observes, ‘The way in which the 
process of European integration has forged new alliances across territorial units, sectoral 
boundaries and the divide between public and private -  is novel and perhaps unique’. He 
does not deny the role of the state in policy making, but stresses the increasing links 
between regions, and between actors on the regional and European levels, which imply 
new problems for the processes of démocratisation and legitimation of governance. In the 
case of the EU, Rosamond (2000: 98-129) refers to the obsolescence of the traditional 
international relations approach to the EU and emphasises the role of institutionalism and 
policy networks at the sub-national level to give a firm conceptual underpinning to the 
analysis of multi-level governance. Thus, the concept of ‘governance’ is also used to refer 
to transnational governance both below and above the state (Christiansen and Jorgensen, 
2000).
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At the same time, the phenomenon of MLG is actually emerging in many parts of the 
world, including East Asia, although in varying forms. The common denominators are 
greater spatial fluidity, less institutional rigidity, and the growing importance of regions 
and localities. It must be stressed, however, that the emergence of MLG is itself a highly 
political process and is both stimulated and constrained by the power relations that prevail 
in the geographical area in question.
The MLG approach stresses that the distinction between the domestic and the international 
spheres is becoming blurred as political actors across multiple levels of governance 
increasingly interact in multi-level policy networks (Marks et al., 1996: 41). What is also 
needed, however, is an understanding of how political actors at different levels interact -  
both formally and informally — with private firms and other non-governmental 
organisations. So far, this perspective has tended to be neglected even in studies of the EU, 
where the MLG approach has been most extensively pursued, although there is a growing 
interest in the policy network approach. Studies of MLG suggest that different sectors of 
decision-making will exhibit their own unique characteristics in terms of patterns of 
governance and the interactions of governmental and non-governmental elites (Rosamond, 
2000: 110). Therefore, in the present study the task is to explore the specific dynamics of 
decision-making in the area of foreign direct investment into southern China. This is not 
just a matter of applying Western (especially European) concepts of MLG, since the 
southern China/East Asia region is clearly very different from the EU. The fact that the 
Chinese political system has traditionally been very centralised and lacking in sub-national 
autonomy means that there are particular challenges in moving towards a system of MLG. 
Indeed, part o f the purpose of the present study is to identify the difficulties involved in 
building a more pluralistic, multi-level system of governance in a political environment 
that has normally resisted such a transformation.
Weiss (1998) provides an interesting perspective on nation-state responses to globalisation 
by comparing the experience of East Asian countries (including Japan), Sweden and 
Germany to show that the choice of effective industrial upgrading policies is especially 
important in strengthening the nation-state’s adaptive capacity. There is an opportunity for 
each nation-state to express its own institutional resourcefulness and creativity as it faces 
the challenge of restructuring. Weiss draws attention in particular to the reasons why 
Germany and Japan have demonstrated a stronger transformative capacity than Sweden
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and the United States. Her answer is that the two successful cases have relied upon a strong 
combination of developmentalist and distributive policy orientations, while the two less 
successful cases have had weakly co-ordinated market economies and, in the case of 
Sweden, a dominant emphasis on distributive management rather than developmentalism. 
These examples underline the fact that not all nation-states will restructure their political 
economies in precisely the same way. There is a variability in state approaches to 
encouraging industrial development and technological innovation -  a fact that has obvious 
implications for patterns of régionalisation.
Thus, the political context of régionalisation is of vital significance. A political economy 
approach to the subject needs to integrate economic and political analysis, and to 
demonstrate the mutual interdependence between economic and political factors. In 
particular, the nature, scope and extent of state power, and the relationship between state 
and non-state actors in the process of régionalisation must be taken into account. Also, the 
external role of SNGs is increasingly important: they are being called upon to direct their 
efforts to the cultivation of cross-border linkages, and this means that in effect they are 
becoming key international actors in their own right. A recent study has begun to focus on 
the emerging city networks in which cities exploit scales of economies (Capello, 2000). As 
Hocking puts it, SNGs (or, as he calls them, non-central governments), ‘often acting as the 
mouthpiece of local economic interests, seek both to influence national external policies 
and, moreover, to operate in the international arena on their own behalf (Hocking, 1993a:
1 ). This, Hocking suggests, is part of a broader process towards the localisation of foreign 
policy in the contemporary world. The traditional distinction between domestic and foreign 
policy is becoming blurred, and even diplomacy can no longer be viewed as a purely 
external or foreign activity. Increasingly, state and non-state actors -  and the former 
include SNGs — have to pursue strategies of ‘multilayered diplomacy’ in a variety of 
political ‘theatres’ (ibid.: 2-3). This challenge raises the issue of the capacity of SNGs to 
perform these tasks effectively. Table 2.2 offers a useful starting-point for analysing the 
relationship between the aims of SNGs in multilayered diplomacy, the type of involvement, 
the structure and resources of SNGs, and the levels of participation.
Table 2.2 suggests that a range of factors shape the pattern of involvement of SNGs in the 
processes of what Hocking calls multilayered diplomacy. These factors vary from one 
situation to another and over time. In broad terms, the structural and situational factors of a
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►particular SNG must be understood if the localistic action of that SNG is to be explained 
(Cooper, in Hocking, 1993b: 59-61). For this reason, different SNGs within the same 
nation-state may very well behave differently. In order to explain this variation, as Cooper 
suggests, both the international context and domestic politics need to be examined:
In effect, then, what is increasingly needed is a series of two-level analyses in 
which the non-central actor’s interaction with the ipe and national politics in 
highlighted. By this time of exercise it seems possible to capture both the stability 
or the volatility of non-central foreign economic behaviour (Cooper, in Hocking, 
1993b: 63).
The last point is crucial, since the behaviour of SNGs undoubtedly changes over time as 
domestic and international factors also change. Any analysis of the behaviour of SNGs 
thus needs to take account of historical fluctuations and particular critical turning-points 
which lead to change and innovation (see the Involvement dimension in Table 2.2).
Table 2.2 The Characteristics of SNGs as Actors in Multilayered Diplomacy
Aims Promoting regional interests: interests related to 
powers and responsibilities, particularly in 
economic area
Involvement Continuous bill likely to fluctuate in intensity; 
concentrated on economic agenda
Structure and resources Sub-national government: bureaucratic and 
political resources; legitimacy among local 
population; links with national government 
structure
Levels o f participation (iovernmenta! and intergovernmental; closely 
linked to regionally based transnational actors
Source adapted from B Hocking (1993), localizing Foreign Policy: Non-Central Governments and 
Multilayered Diplomacy, New York: St Martin’s Press, p 47
2.7 Micro-Regionalism in the International Political Economy
The global economy is built upon the powerful role of major super-regional 
(macro-regional) blocs in Europe, North America and East Asia. In addition, similar 
schemes have emerged in other parts of the world. In the wake of the end of the Cold War 
and the decline of Fordist mass production, there is a new key role for such macro-regions 
in articulating the processes o f capitalist development. This phase of macro-regional 
growth may be designated as the ‘new regionalism’ to distinguish it from the ‘old
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regionalism’ of the period between the 1950s and 1970s. The ‘old regionalism’ can be 
understood only in the context of the bipolar Cold War structure of that period; whereas the 
'new regionalism’ has emerged out of the collapse of that structure and the impact of 
globalised flexible production (Marchand et al., 1999: 903).
ln response to these new trends, the so-called New Regionalism Approach/Theory 
(NRA/T), developed by Björn Hettke and colleagues at the World Institute for 
Development Economics Research (United Nations University, Helsinki) and the 
Department of Peace and Development Research (Göteborg), has sought to develop a 
three-level analysis examining (1) the structure of the world system as a whole; (2), the 
level of inter-regional relations; and (3) the internal pattern of the single region. This is 
therefore quite a different perspective from that used in the period of the old regionalism, 
when the emphasis was on theories of regional (e.g. European) integration, as illustrated by 
the widespread application of functionalism and neo-functionalism (Marchand et al., 1999: 
901-2).
To be more accurate, it may be better to refer to the ‘new regionalisms’ (in the plural), 
since the contemporary world exhibits a variety of patterns o f regionalism (including 
super-regionalism). These include key micro-regions, which are geographically smaller in 
scale and are based on inter- and intra-firm relations, but which have nonetheless come to 
play a key role in the dynamics of the global economy. Underpinning all these patterns is 
‘the regionalised accumulation of wealth through production and commodity chains and 
networks’, and the involvement of a wide range of formal and informal actors (Marchand 
et al., 1999: 905). The growth triangles of Southeast Asia, for example, are an important 
example of régionalisation, but they are not at the same formal, institutionalised level as, 
say, ASEAN. While some forms of régionalisation are clearly state-led (from above), as is 
the case with trade liberalisation, other forms of régionalisation proceed at the informal 
grassroots level, e.g. through small cross-border production networks. The importance of 
the informal ‘second economy’ in less developed countries means that régionalisation may 
very well be more significant in this context than at the formal level of state-led activity:
The informal second economy covers a whole range o f activities from street
vendors and small-scale informal cross-border trade to the warlordism of Sierra
Leone and Somalia and the large and intricate cross-border smuggling of gem
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stones from Angola and Senegal, and drugs from Columbia, Nigeria and Burma to 
products of child labour in myriad enterprises around parts of the South, including 
ubiquitous Special Economic Zones (SEZs) or Export Processing Zones (EPZs) 
(Boas et al., 1999: 1065).
This perspective is further developed by Hettne and Soderbaum (2000), who suggest that 
the concept of ‘regionness’ embraces five elements: regional area, regional complex, 
regional society, regional community and region-state. These five elements correspond to 
increasing levels of regionness. Thus, the regional area is a geographical unit defined by 
natural physical barriers and certain ecological characteristics. When we use such terms as 
Europe, North America or East Asia, we have in mind initially this sense of a distinct 
regional area. From a social point o f view, such an area is a potential region and begins to 
develop in that direction through increased social contacts and transactions among its 
constituent groups. Eventually, a regional complex emerges. Initially, however, the actual 
sense of regionness may be weak -  if, for example, the area concerned is dominated by 
nation-states claiming rights of sovereignty and a unique identity of their own. Thus, the 
regional order in nineteenth-century Europe was little more than a concert of nations.
A regional society emerges as non-state actors develop their relations across national 
boundaries and form the basis for a transnational regional economy and regional civil 
society. At the same time, there may be a formal level of regional unity, as in the 
establishment and development of the EU. But this formal level is not coterminous with 
the informal level.
Various dimensions of regionalism and regionalizations occur at different spatial 
levels of regions, which to a large extent are all related to one another (and 
therefore must be understood within the same framework). It is particularly 
important therefore to explicitly integrate ‘micro-regions' and micro-regional isms 
into the analytical framework.
Micro-regionalism is related to macro-regionalism in the way that the larger 
régionalisation (and globalisation) processes create possibilities for smaller 
economically dynamic sub-national and transnational regions to get a direct access 
to the larger economic system, often bypassing the nation-state and the national
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capital, and sometimes even as an alternative or opposition to the challenged state 
and to formal state-regional isms (Hettne and Soderbaum, 2000: 465).
The level of regionness increases further as a regional community emerges:
[T]he region increasingly turns into an active subject with a distinct identity, 
institutionalised or informal actor capability, legitimacy, and structure of 
decision-making in relation with a more or less responsive regional civil society, 
transcending the old state borders (Hettne and Soderbaum, 2000: 466).
A regional collective identity and the structure of a genuine security community emerge to 
challenge the primacy of the nation-state. The dividing line between different national 
communities becomes weaker. At the same time, micro-regions within the regional 
community still have the opportunity to flourish and actually contribute to the cross-border 
dynamism of the regional community. The EU is at the stage of developing a regional 
community.
Eventually, a regional community may become a region-state, with a new form of political 
association based on a pooling of sovereignty and a recognition of the multi-cultural 
foundations of the association (since, by definition, cultural homogeneity in such a large 
area will be impossible).
By distinguishing the global, inter-regional and intra-regional levels and recognising that 
there are different levels of regionness, the interconnectedness of the various new 
regionalisms in the contemporary world becomes easier to appreciate. This also reminds us 
that we cannot easily generalise from one particular example of regionalism (e g. in 
Europe) and extend the lessons of that example to other parts of the world (e.g. East Asia). 
Regionalism in all its forms depends very much on the specific historical and geographical 
contexts in which it takes place.
2.8 Conclusion
The theoretical analysis in this chapter sought to furnish an overall framework, rooted in a 
‘network’ perspective in international political economy, for the subsequent investigation
of the new regionalism in Southern China and East Asia. From each section of the analysis 
we can draw some important conclusions that will be taken forward in subsequent 
chapters.
First, as Section 2.1 makes clear, the term ‘region' has been used in many different ways in 
different academic disciplines and different professional fields In the present study our 
focus is on economic regions within the global economy, and in particular on sub-national, 
cross-border ‘micro-regions’. The latter term is preferred in order to make it clear that we 
are not concerned here with the larger 'macro-regions’ or regional blocs, or the grouping of 
small states or peripheries of the world economy based on the states, although o f course 
micro-regions do operate within these larger regions, so that, in the case of southern China 
we cannot ignore the broader context of the Eiast Asian region as a whole (macro-region). 
The concept of micro-region alerts us to the importance of localised production systems as 
a crucial source of dynamism within the global economy.
Section 2.2 sought to reveal some of the complexities of the régionalisation process in the 
context of post-Fordist flexible production. One of the key characteristics of post-Fordism 
is a wide-ranging restructuring of production at the regional -  including the micro-regional 
level. This involves, in particular, a constantly developing new international division of 
labour, with specialised locational sites and agglomerations emerging under the impact of 
the decisions of major MNCs to move their production bases, often to the peripheral areas 
of the world. This process is in turn facilitated by the policy innovations of national and 
sub-national governments, which increasingly recognise the need to restructure their own 
economies to respond to the increasing flexibility demanded by global economic processes.
There is, however, considerable disagreement about the precise origins and dynamics of 
contemporary régionalisation, as is illustrated in Section 2.3 by the examination of three 
different schools of thought identified by Storper (1995, 1997) and his own contribution to 
the debate. The differences between these schools centre on two main issues: (1) whether 
the specific experience of particular localities/micro-regions (such as ‘the third Italy’ and 
southern Germany), can be universalised, or whether they reflect the impact of distinctive 
local cultural and institutional milieux; and (2) the relative importance of various economic, 
political-institutional, technological and cultural factors in shaping local/micro-regional 
development in particular sectors of production in particular geographical areas. Storper's
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critique of these approaches and his own emphasis on technological trajectories and the 
role of trade and untraded interdependencies (and the cost of those interdependencies or 
linkages) in shaping regional industrial agglomeration is most helpful in drawing attention 
to the economic and technological basis of firms’ locational decisions, and the relationship 
of those decisions to the specific institutional contexts in which they operate: ‘both firms 
and territories are subject to temporal and spatial path dependencies that are intertwined 
with each other’ (Storper, 1997: 291). In other words, the inter-relationship between the 
economic needs of firms and the territorial orders in which firms locate deserves close 
attention. This point is also stressed by Masked et al. (1998: 50): ‘Firms interact in markets 
which, whether designed or self-grown, are undoubtedly social constructions, embedded in 
territorially specific institutions which define and secure property rights and enable 
economic transactions’. Yet Masked et al. also add that in empirical studies it has proved 
extremely difficult to demonstrate the costs and benefits of local transactions of goods and 
services (1998: 62). This thesis also aim to reveal the territorially specific factors in 
southern China that have an impact on the shaping of micro-regional networks.
Storper is especially interested in the role of agglomeration in facilitating the exchange of 
knowledge in today’s learning or knowledge economy. In this respect, it may also be noted 
that Porter (1990) sees geographical proximity as a basis for the enhanced exchange of 
information among clusters of industries, and this is why, for example, industrial rivals 
often congregate in the same geographical area. These observations further reinforce the 
need to identify the specific gains that firms derive from geographical proximity in a 
particular territorial area, and to explain why some firms derive greater benefits than others 
from such proximity. If, as Masked et al. (1998: 69) stress, ‘firms are dependent on their 
local environment in order to retain and increase their competitiveness’, then it is clearly 
essential to explore the nature and scope of that dependency in some depth.
Section 2.4 sought to add a more international dimension to the analysis by considering the 
applicability of the NIDL concept and models of commodity chains to the understanding of 
why and how industrial agglomerations emerge, especially in the East Asian context. This 
is an important issue, since on the face of it we might expect globalisation to be associated 
with the increased ‘footloose’ behaviour of firms rather than their localised ‘stickiness' 
(Masked et al., 1998: 69). As we have seen, there is a distinctive regional division of 
labour in East Asia, stimulated by processes of industrialisation, the economic power of
66
Japan, the geographical allocation of production for export, and the position of firms in the 
global network of producer- and buyer-driven commodity chains. This indicates that 
different industrial sectors are characterised by their own distinctive patterns of 
geographical specialisation, and that these patterns are constantly changing. As the 
micro-regions of southern China become more closely integrated with the global economy, 
it is increasingly important to identify their place in the NIDL and the commodity-chain 
patterns which shape the growth of industrial agglomerations.
Section 2.5 drew on the insights offered by CPNs approaches to the study of cross-border, 
trans-national organisation, as illustrated by the recent contributions of Borrus, Ernst and 
Haggard’s edition (2000b) to the study of Asia-Pacific business and by H. Yeung’s study of 
Asian firms to the study o f Asian business (H. Yeung, 1998, 2000; Olds and Yeung, 1999). 
Borrus, Ernst and Haggard (2000b) emphasise the varying strategies of lead firms and the 
impact of national home environments. This is particularly important in the case of 
Japanese and Taiwanese electronics firms. Yeung’s categorisation of three types of network 
(intra-firm, inter-firm and extra-firm) is useful in helping us to understand the variable 
forms of transnational business organisation. Moreover, it is important to appreciate how 
these variable forms are related to the specific social milieu in which they are embedded. 
Recently, H. Yeung (2000) has sought to extend his analysis to the networking relations 
between firms and government, and the dynamic inter-relationships between local politics 
and foreign ventures. He shows that ‘(T)he successful establishment of international 
business ventures in China is highly contingent upon an appropriate understanding and 
leveraging of local politics and the collusion/rivalry tendencies of local governments’ 
(ibid.; 835). The present study seeks to develop further this perspective by focusing on 
Japanese direct and indirect foreign investments in southern China and the associated 
emergence of new cross-border network relations within an innovative process of 
sub-national governance.
Section 2.6 considered the political dimension of micro-regionalism. This aspect has 
generally been neglected in the literature, and one main purpose of the present study is to 
remedy this neglect. Major changes in the political organisation of nation-states, stimulated 
partly by the impact o f global economic processes, have resulted in the increasing 
assertiveness of SNGs, both domestically and internationally. The old hierarchical, 
bureaucratic model of state decision-making is increasingly giving way to a more flexible,
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network-based model in which SNGs have more responsibility for direct linkages with 
other regional actors, including firms. The paradigm of MLG seems to be especially 
appropriate as a basis for exploring the new pluralism of variegated policy networks, 
although care needs to be taken not to simply extend Western (European) analysis to the 
case of southern China, since there are clearly fundamental differences between the 
economic and political backgrounds of the two regions. In the case of southern China 
major domestic transformations in the political relationship between the central state and 
the provincial/sub-provincial governments have been a key part of the broader process of 
the emergence of cross-border micro-regionalism, but the central Chinese state has 
remained cautious in extending autonomy to sub-national units. Close attention will be 
given to these political changes and relationships in the present study.
Finally, Section 2.7 discussed the implications of the three-level New Regionalism 
Approach/Theory (NRA/T) in the study of international political economy. The suggestion 
that the global, inter-regional and intra-regional levels of change need to be considered 
together is reflected in the present study. Moreover, this approach recognises the 
importance of the micro-regional (sub-national and transnational) dimension as part of the 
third (intra-regional) level of analysis, and stresses the need to relate this dimension to the 
impact of global commodity chains and production networks. In this respect, the present 
study may be seen as a contribution to the NRA/T debates, and an attempt to extend the 
analysis to a geographical area (southern China/East Asia) which has previously been 
neglected in the literature.
The overall framework developed in the present study may be described as a network 
analysis of cross-border governance. Its aim is to reveal the fluidity and complexity of 
organisational linkages between governmental and non-governmental actors (especially 
linkages between SNGs and MNCs, and in intra- and inter-firm relations) in southern 
China and across the territorial borders among Southern China, Taiwan and Japan. The 
focus is on the emergent horizontal linkages between these actors and their embeddedness 
in a specific micro-regional spatial context.
1 The term ‘time-space compression’ is used to capture the process of transformation of society, which is 
caused by the degree of interactions of goods, services and ideas globally See further Dodgshon ( 1999)
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2 Keating and Loughlin (1997: 2).
3 For example. Hook and Kearns (1999) define ‘sub-regionalism’ as the middle level of regionalism between 
micro-regionalism and higher levels of regionalism, promoted by the weaker states in the global economy 
such as exemplified in the cases of ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations), BSEC (Black Sea 
Economic Cooperation Schem), ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), ACS 
(Association of Carribbean States), CEFTA (Central European Free Trade Agreement), EAEC (East Asian 
Economic Caucus and ‘Greater China’
I This school of thought includes a group of French economic thinkers, for example Aglietta and Lipietz It 
developed as a critique of both orthodox economies and structuralism Its central concern is the ‘regime of 
accumulation' and the ‘mode of regulation’ The former refers to the arrangements through which the 
accumulation of capital occurs, which involve the articulation of a system of production and consumption, 
and the integration of the capitalist mode with coexisting modes The latter refers to a social framework of 
rules and institutions that orchestrate relations between the systems of production and consumption to ensure 
that they are conductive to orderly capital accumulation See Collinge (1999:558) and Rutherford (1992)
5 The ‘flying geese' model, which was developed by Kaname Akamatsu in the 1930s, is an attempt to 
describe the interactive development of a group of countries at different levels o f industrialisation See 
Blomquist (1996: 215-31) and Shinohara (1996: 411-19).
6 Frank (1967).
7 Gereffi (1996).
s More precisely, according to Gereffi, producer-driven commodity chains are those in which large, usually 
multinational, manufacturers co-ordinate production networks (including their backward and forward 
linkages) This is characteristic of capital- and technology-intensive industries such as automobiles, aircraft, 
computers, semiconductors and heavy industries For example, according to Hill’s study (1989), the average 
Japanese auto manufacturers' production system has 170 first-tier, 4,700 second-tier, and 31,600 third-tier 
sub-contractors On the other hand, buyer-driven chains are those industries in which large retailers, 
designers and trading companies play the vital role in setting up decentralised production networks in a 
variety of exporting countries See Gereffi (1996) There are commodity chains perspectives on other East 
Asian industries, for example Snyder (1999) on the toys industry and Gereffi (1999) on the clothing industry
9 Gereffi (1996).
10 Gereffi (1992: 106).
II A Marshall, quoted in Maskell et al (1998 9).
1 ’ The relations between society and the market have been a primary concern of economic sociology The 
classical tradition of economic sociology is found in the works of Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Schumpeter and 
Polanyi Economic sociology offers a sociological perspective on personal interaction, groups, social 
structures (institutions), and social controls (among which sanctions, norms and values are central) See 
Smelser (1994) Polanyi defines a market economy as a self-regulating system of markets directed by market 
prices (Polanyi, 1946: 50). He also argues that the term economic’ is a compound of two meanings, one 
substantive and one formal The substantive meaning of ‘economic’ originates from man's dependence for 
his living on nature and his fellows It relates to the interchange with his natural and social environment The 
formal meaning o f economic' implies a set o f rules referring to choice and derives from logic For Polanyi, 
human economy is embedded and enmeshed in institutions, both economic and non-economic See Polanyi 
(1957)
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CHAPTER 3
THE PROCESSES OF CHINA’S MICRO-REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
WITH THE WORLD ECONOMY
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part (Sections 3.1 and 3.2) begins with a 
discussion of the conceptual debate on globalisation and régionalisation with particular 
reference to the East Asian economy (Section 3.1 ). It draws attention to the complexity of 
processes, the unevenness of forms, and the huge diversity of practices involved in 
globalisation and régionalisation. In particular, patterns o f regional development are 
shaped by deepening interdependence among various actors including states, localities, 
foreign firms. Section 3.2 examines these actors and their roles in the processes of East 
Asian régionalisation, referring in particular to the emerging form of multi-level 
governance (MLG).
The second part of the chapter (Sections 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5) seeks to identify China’s distinct 
pattern of integration with the world economy. Of particular importance in this respect is 
the ‘micro-regional integration’ 1 manifested by the uneven geographic spread of 
international economic relations in Guangdong. This illustrates the way in which China’s 
gradual transition from relative isolationism has developed asymmetrical levels of 
development between different sub-national spaces. Section 3.3 focuses on China's inward 
FDI and the form of processing trade arrangements (PTAs). Section 3.4 focuses on the 
phenomenon of industrial agglomeration and the associated increase of cross-border capital 
movements in Guangdong. The case of industrial agglomeration in Guangdong is 
particulary important, as China’s distinct integration processes, emphasising processing 
and assembly production on the basis of export-oriented strategies, have played a crucial 
role in the formation of new cross-border international economic relations.
The analysis of China’s micro-regional integration suggests the importance of detailed 
disaggregate analysis. An investigation down to the sub-provincial (city) and
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tsub-municipal (township) levels demonstrates the huge regional differentiation in the 
degree of involvement of local economies in globalisation (Section 3.5). The international 
production system is embedded at the sub-national level within the host country (China). In 
the case of China’s micro-regional integration with the world economy, globalisation and 
régionalisation come together, but the emerging new transnational economic space needs 
to be adapted within national political space. In this uneven impact of globalisation and 
régionalisation on China, Chinese SNGs, especially cities and townships, and MNCs, are 
directly involved in creating cross-border economic dynamism
3.1 Globalisation and Régionalisation
3.1.1 What is Globalisation?
Globalisation and régionalisation are highly controversial issues. In the study o f IPE, 
several different interpretations of economic globalisation and its relationship with new 
patterns of regionalism have been put forward. These debates are a necessary starting point 
for an examination of the current changes in East Asian economic relations.
Initially, globalisation can be seen as the widening, deepening and speeding up of 
world-wide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life, from the cultural 
to the criminal, the financial to the spiritual (Held et al., 1999: 2). It can be both integrative 
across national borders and distintegrative within these borders, while having a 
transforming effect on national and world society (Morrison, 2000). According to Higgott 
and Reich (1998: 4-11), current debates articulate four major definitions of globalisation: 
(a) globalisation as an historical epoch; (b) globalisation as the confluence of economic 
phenomena; (c) globalisation as the triumph of American values; and (d) globalisation as a 
sociological and technological revolution.2 The movement from definition (a) to (d) 
represents a less state-centric and an increasingly radical understanding of the effects of 
globalisation on economic and social relations. In particular, Higgott and Reich point out 
that definition (d) corresponds to an emphasis on technological and structural determinism 
and does not have any sense of serious political theory.2 Although this categorisation does 
not provide an analytical framework for the study of globalisation and régionalisation, it is 
interesting to note that all of the four definitions stress the significance o f the
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multi-nationalisation of production and trade across borders, and the integration of capital 
markets.
Referring to the main characteristics of economic globalisation, Snyder (1999: 335-6) 
offers the following list:
the development of international production networks (IPNs), the dispersion of 
production facilities among different countries, the technical and functional 
fragmentation of production, the fragmentation of ownership, the flexibility of the 
production process, world wide sourcing, and increase in intra-firm trade, the 
interpenetration of international financial markets, the possibility of virtually 
instantaneous worldwide flows of information, changes in the nature of 
employment, and the emergence of new forms of work.
Of particular importance in terms of the present study are the changing role of the state in 
the global economy and the rise of new patterns of cross-border economic activities 
centred on the role of sub-state or sub-national activity in enhancing relations with external 
actors. Economic globalisation promotes more intense industrial competition among firms, 
and this competition is most visible at the regional scale, where specific industrial 
infrastructures and economic conditions shape patterns of cross-border interaction. This is 
illustrated by the new regionalism of East Asia, which has been greatly influenced by 
changes of manufacturing and trade patterns, and the emergence of cross-border 
production networks (CPNs). In the economic success of Japan, the East Asian NIEs 
(South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore), the ASEAN 4 (Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Thailand) and China, the electronics industry has played a major role and 
will be taken as a case study for detailed analysis in the present investigation.
3.1.2 Rethinking Globalisation
Held et al. (1999) summarise three dominant tendencies (hyperglobalist, sceptical and 
transformationalist) in the globalisation debate They argue that five principal issues 
constitute the major sources of contention among these approaches to globalisation 
conceptualisation (singularity or differentiation?), causation (what is the driving force?),
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périodisation (when?), impacts (on national economies and communities), and the 
trajectories o f globalisation (Held et al., 1999: 10-14).
According to Held et al., the concept of globalisation implies four dimensions: extensity, 
intensity, velocity and impact (Held et al., 1999: 15-16):
(T)he concept of globalization implies, first and foremost, a stretching of social, 
political and economic activities across frontiers such that events, decisions and 
activities in one region of the world can come to have significance for individuals
and communities in distant regions of the globe.....it embodies transregional
interconnectedness, the widening reach of networks of social activity and power, 
and the possibility of action at a distance. . .connections across frontiers are not 
just occasional or random, but rather are regularized such that there is a detectable 
intensification, or growing magnitude, of interconnectedness, pattern of 
interaction and flows which transcend the constituent societies and states of the 
world order... .growing extensity and intensity of global interconnectedness may 
also imply a speeding up of global interactions and processes as the development 
of worldwide systems of transport and communication increases the potential 
velocity of the global diffusion of ideas, goods, information, capital and 
people. . .the growing extensity, intensity and velocity of global interactions may 
also be associated with a deepening enmeshment of the local and global such that 
the impact of distant events is magnified while even the most local developments 
may come to have enormous global consequences.
The authors define the concept of globalisation as a process (or set of processes) which 
embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions -  
assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact -  generating 
transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the 
exercise of power’ (Held et al., 1999: 16). Therefore, globalisation must be understood as a 
process (or set of processes) rather than a singular condition or a simple linear pattern. The 
spatial reach and density of global and cross-border interconnectedness weave complex 
webs and networks of relations among societies, states, international institutions,
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non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and MNCs. Together these linkages require new 
forms of governance based on networks.
3.1.3 Globalisation and Régionalisation
Held et al. (1999: 16) argue that their formulation helps to address the failure of existing 
attempts to differentiate globalisation from more spatially delimited processes such as 
régionalisation’. The latter is defined as a clustering of transactions, flows, networks and 
interactions between functional geographical groupings of states or societies. Globalisation 
and régionalisation are not necessarily a dychotomic movement; rather the process of 
régionalisation may create the necessary kinds of economic, social and physical 
infrastructures which facilitate and complement the deepening of globalisation.
Hitherto, the régionalisation debates in 1PE have focused on certain levels of political 
institutionalisation. In particular, the emphasis has been on horizontal supra-state and 
institutionalised processes of economic integration in the cases of the EL), the NAFTA, 
MERCOSUR (El Mercado Comun del Sur) in South America, and Asia Pacific Economic 
Co-operation (APEC), etc. All of these groupings take the nation-state as their basic 
building block. Undoubtedly, states continue to play a critical co-ordinating role in 
international political and economic relations. As ideological conflicts have been mitigated 
with the end of the Cold War, the sharp expansion of cross-border economic relations has 
increased tension between economic actors and the state in matters of economic 
co-operation and economic confrontation. In the post-Cold War international order, 
inter-state co-operation on forms of regional association and regional economic integration 
have continued to be pursued for the purpose of reducing conflict, creating regional order, 
and managing regional economic exchanges. These trends are often referred to collectively 
as the ‘new regionalism' or ‘the second wave’4. By 2000, the number of regional economic 
organisations, as reported to the World Trade Organisation (WTO), was 214/ This 
indicates that the attitude of the developing countries and the former socialist countries, all 
of which were originally suspicious of economic liberalism, has changed dramatically. The 
régionalisation project is now under way all over the world. At the same time, the role of 
the state in régionalisation is not only in the international sphere. Increasingly, vertical 
régionalisation processes -  i.e. decentralisation and recentralisation -- in the domestic
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sphere have also been promoted by the state. The contemporary wave of political 
régionalisation (both internationally and domestically) also involves globalisation. All 
these developments highlight a shift away from state-centric politics to a more complex 
form of MLG worldwide.
All of these debates take for granted the primacy of sovereign states and their territoriality. 
They also tend to focus on a singular and linear pattern of development. If we turn to the 
micro level of régionalisation, then it is clear that this primacy is being challenged from 
below. At the micro level, as people, goods, money and information have started to move 
beyond borders, a study o f the structure and operation of macro- and meso-regional 
institutions on the basis o f the state is often inadequate to capture the new reality. In 
practice, economic interconectedness involves economic scales beneath the state, as 
expressed in the international, regional and hiearachical division of labour, intra-industry 
trade, intra-and inter-firm production and trade, capital accumulation in large cities, 
industrial concentration, etc. With this increased stretching across boundaries, there are 
growing pressures on the forms of socio-economic and political spatiality.
The operations of MNCs are central to processes of economic globalisation and 
régionalisation. In 1999, there were 63,459 MNCs with 689,520 foreign subsidiaries 
(UNCTAD, 2000)/' MNCs play a major role in the generation and international diffusion 
of technology, accounting for around 80 per cent of world trade in technology and the 
majority of private R&D (Held et al., 1999: 236-7). The activities of MNCs involve the 
extension of production networks across the world’s major economic regions. The new 
scientific technologies have made it possible to increase production quality, and 
telecommunication and computer technologies have allowed firms to integrate and 
decentralise their production, distribution and management systems (Castells, 1986) as 
well as specific allied activities such as research and development, and product definition 
and design (Borrus, Ernst and Haggard, 2000a). However, MNCs are not ‘placeless’. They 
have identifiable home countries, which ensures that every MNC is essentially embedded 
within its domestic environment (Dicken, 1998: 193). There are, moreover, key differences 
between the structure and operation of cross-border production networks according to the 
country of origin of the MNC in question, e g. in terms of the degree of organisational
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centralisation/decentralisation. (Bonus, Ernst and Haggard, 2000a). MNCs have grown 
from national firms to global concerns by using FDI to exploit their competitive 
advantages and engaging in a wide range of joint ventures and strategic alliances. The rise 
of international commodity chains (ICCs) is especially important in this respect (see 
Chapter 2). The ICCs approach highlights the role of producer-driven and buyer-driven 
chains in creating overlapping and at times conflicting regional divisions of labour 
(Gereffi, 1996). The MNCs attempt to outsource production to SMEs abroad to achieve 
cheap high-quality production. The development of régionalisation is therefore also 
promoted by SMEs. In terms of long-term stability, FDI is usually bundled with various 
advantages for domestic society such as the transfer of technology, management skill, and 
the enhancement of local workers’ knowledge and skill. MNCs and global production 
networks have thus become increasingly critical to the organisation, location and 
distribution of productive power, and this in turn has induced the restructuring of 
socio-economic and political space
The processes of globalisation are differentiated spatially in terms of extensity, intensity, 
velocity and impact (Held et al., 1999: 15-16). Globalisation and régionalisation both 
induce the development of new forms of governance. As the MNCs (including SMEs) have 
become more critical to the processes of globalisation and régionalisation, the diversity of 
these processes has become more visibly embodied at the regional level. The actual 
régionalisation processes take place through the interpenetration of different levels of 
régionalisation, including the supra-state, national and sub-national levels, the firm and 
civil society. Multi-level global and regional governance incorporates the supra-national, 
national and sub-national levels of government, NGOs, MNCs and cultural contexts. Thus, 
micro-regionalisation can be seen as an expression of the impact of globalisation on a 
certain regional area and as a set of processes which respond to globalisation through the 
restructuring of forms of governance. This in effect blurs the distinctions between political 
and economic régionalisation. The main actors involved in creating the new forms of 
governance at the micro-regional scale are firms and SNGs, and their inter-relationships 
can be seen in terms of cross-cutting networks that require new processes of governance if 
they are to be co-ordinated and made effective.
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3.2 East Asian Régionalisation and M u lti-L e ve l Governance
3.2.1 The State as a Unit
Undoubtedly, as a supra-state regional project, East Asian régionalisation has not yet 
achieved levels of integration comparable to those of the EU. There are various reasons for 
this. To begin with, East Asian regionalism is still rooted in the Pacific security framework 
that was established by the United States and its allies during the Cold War Regional 
territorial disputes, such as those concerning the Spratly Islands and the Senkaku (Diaoyu) 
Islands, remain unresolved. As state-building in East Asia is still a fairly new process, 
there remains the possibility of military conflict as economic development proceeds. 
Moreover, the pace of development of regional stability and confidence-building measures 
is slow. As far as economic co-operation is concerned, the financial crisis of 1997 
suggested that there was little capacity for a coherent regional response. Regional 
organisations such as APEC and ASEAN have no capability without the approval of the 
United States. This suggests that in East Asia there are so many variations of culture, 
religion, history, ideology, language, level of development, and political system that the 
emergence of a coherent regional identity above the state level in the foreseeable future is 
not very likely.
Debates on economic development in East Asia also emphasise the crucial role of state-led 
intervention. Thus, explanations have usually stressed domestic political factors such as the 
combination of selective state intervention with neo-liberal perspectives (free trade, the 
division of labour, the accumulation of capital and technologies, etc.) (World Bank, 1993), 
institutional development (Aoki, Kim and Okuno-Fujiwara, 1997), and the role of the 
developmental state (on Japan see Johnson, 1982; on South Korea see Amsden, 1989; on 
Taiwan see Wade, 1990). From the institutionalist perspective, the establishment of 
export-processing zones (EPZs) is seen as a kind of institutionalisation from above on the 
basis of an export-led strategy. In this sense, the state has attempted to secure domestic 
governance reform, and in so doing has often promoted domestic régionalisation (through 
the rescaling of political economy), usually on the basis of nationalism and the national 
interest. The state thus remains a major co-ordinator of the response to globalisation and 
régionalisation.
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While most studies concentrate on each country’s individual economic base, there has 
recently been a growing interest in the search for the cause of the region’s broader 
economic dynamism, as illustrated by the revision of the so-called ‘flying geese’ model. 
According to the institutional perspective, in the 1990s East Asia began rapidly to promote 
the enlargement and institutionalisation of its regional organisations. For example, in the 
1990s the number of member countries of ASEAN increased from six to ten with the entry 
of Vietnam, Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos. Furthermore, the establishment of the 
framework of ASEAN + 3 (China, South Korea and Japan) speeded up institutionalisation 
by regularising the ministerial meetings. In November 2000, a decision was taken to 
extend the free trade agreement and have regular summit meetings (Nihon Kei:ai Shinbun 
hereafter NKS, 25 November 2000).
In the development and deeepening of East Asian regional cooperation, the change of 
attitude o f the two major powers (Japan and China) is critical Japan's attitude, which 
originally supported a bilateral relationship with ASEAN, changed in the 1990s. The East 
Asian financial crisis in 1997 deepened Japan’s involvement with ASEAN in terms of 
economic co-operation. The framework of ASEAN + 3 has provided an opportunity for 
regular summit meetings among China, South Korea and Japan.7 In this way, ASEAN has 
increased the mediating role of the Northeast Asian countries. In November 2000, China, 
South Korea and Japan agreed to hold regular summit meetings (Toa, January 2001: 65). 
Also, there has been mounting enthusiasm for the development of free trade. Although 
Japan was suspicious of the EAEC (East Asian Economic Caucus) in the early 1990s, it 
began to move toward the creation of a free trade area with South Korea and Singapore in 
the latter part of the decade. While the levels of institutionalisation and direction of these 
regional organisations remain weak and uncertain, the supra-state regional project is now 
gathering support in East Asia.
China's international relations also improved throughout the 1990s. Since economic 
reform, China has committed itself to various international regimes (e.g. membership of 
the World Bank and IMF in 1980). In 1986, China became a member of the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB). China also started to join the United Nations PKO 
(peace-keeping operation) activities in Namibia in 1989. In 1992, China became a member
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of APEC. In 1994, China joined the ARF (ASEAN regional forum), which sought to 
improve the transparency of defence and armaments policy. China also joined the first 
ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting) in Bangkok in 1996. In 2001, China was accepted as a 
member of the WTO. In parallel with its improvement of the international environment, in 
the last decade China has also strengthened relations with neighbouring countries by 
diplomatic normalisation (with Indonesia and Singapore in 1990, with South Korea and 
Vietnam in 1992). In November 2001, China proposed to establish a free trade agreement 
(FTA) with ASEAN. Thus, participation in multilateral organisations and the establishment 
of friendly relations with neighbouring countries as well as the promotion of economic 
cooperation have offered China important opportunities to develop economic relations with 
the East Asian economy.
3.2.2 The Firm and the City as Units
Corporate strategy in the production system has become a central feature of the world 
economy. In East Asia, the movement to MLG below the state level has also attracted 
attention. For example, Ohmae (1995) views East Asian régionalisation as the result of 
economic liberalism and stresses the key role of non-state actors, especially firms. In this 
context Japanese FDI has been the main vehicle of firm-led régionalisation. As far as the 
electronics industry is concerned, the number of overseas production sites of Japanese 
electronics firms increased rapidly in the 1990s. In 1999, the accumulated number of such 
overseas sites was 287, and the ASEAN (92 sites) and China (62) were especially 
important (Noda, 2000).
The process of rapid industrialisation in East Asia has been accompanied by the 
international movement of factors of production. However, this movement is 
geographically uneven, involving mainly the urban areas. This can be seen in the 
emergence of economic corridors or zones (e.g. the Southern China economic zone among 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, Guangdong and Fujian; the Growth Triangle among Singapore, Johor 
in Malaysia and Batan in Indonesia; the Yellow Sea Rim zone among north-east China, 
Korea and Japan). Thus, a region in one country has begun to promote economic 
co-operation with regions in foreign countries. More precisely, urban areas with shared 
economic interests have started to engage in direct economic co-operation. The
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municipality was a part of the state’s local administrative apparatus, but at the same time, 
every major city was an important node in a global network of cities that was not subject to 
effective state regulation (Magnusson, 1996: 22). For example, in Februrary 2001, 
Fukuoka city (Japan’s eighth largest city, located in the southern part of the country) and 
Singapore reached an agreement on the promotion of economic exchanges (Asahi Shinbun, 
10 February 2001). Singapore aims to use Fukuoka as a step to expand economic ties with 
the northeast Asian area. Thus, globalisation is likely to increase the role of the city as an 
agent of cross-national cooperation based on economic linkages.
Although economic development involves a whole range of factors such as geographical 
relations, national policy, entrepreneurs, factories, labour, capital investment, networks and 
technologies, etc., the processes of East Asian régionalisation below the state show strong 
evidence of industrial agglomeration in urban areas, which has deepened inter-urban 
economic ties. As a result, the degree of industrial agglomeration in large cities is highly 
uneven. For example, in 1990, although the size of Japan’s central economic area was only
0.18 per cent of East Asia (NIEs ASEAN, Japan and China), this area accounted for 29 per 
cent of total East Asian GDP (Fujita and Hisatake, 1999: 44-5). This agglomeration 
economy has a tendency further to widen the regional gaps within each state, especially 
between rural and urban areas. Industrial agglomerations are being created in large cities, 
and production relations connect cities across borders. Therefore, the role of SNGs in the 
provision of international public goods for production and in co-ordinating the economy 
and society is becoming vitally important. East Asian régionalisation is also being 
promoted below the state level, where new forms of MLG are emerging.
3.2.3 Towards Multi-Level Governance
An understanding of the different existing levels of horizontal régionalisation is only a 
starting-point. There is no single level which is more important than the others. Rather, 
there is a continuous diffusion of authority and a complex interpenetration of each level, 
which leads to the creation of a tloating, ambiguous socio-economic and political space 
across borders through horizontal networks. Thus, the interpenetration processes of this 
multi-dimensional and multi-layered régionalisation cannot be understood only through 
one level of analysis. On the one hand, the supra-state (macro) perspective focuses on the
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highest level of political régionalisation and dismisses the economic reality beneath the 
level of the state. At the meso level, the sub-state actors (local government) or small states 
participate in the promotion of regional arrangements. On the other hand, the firm-based 
(micro) perspective studies localised space but overlooks the effect on the state system and 
changes in international political and economic relations. While private actors have 
become more influential in policy decisions in the 1990s, their overall significance remains 
fairly limited.
In East Asia, we see the emergence of two different forms of cross-border governance 
below the state level which contribute to the development of regional governance. One is 
the so-called ‘track 2’ or ‘second track’, which aims to facilitate intellectual exchanges 
among member countries. Track 1 is regarded as the sphere of intergovernmental relations 
and track 2 provides more informal and intellectual networks including participants from 
government, academics and business elites. For example, the PECC (Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Conference established in 1980)s has contributed much to the development of 
cross-border intellectual solidarity, and has led to the establishment of an 
intergovernmental forum (APEC, in 1989).y It is expected that elite government officials 
who take part in intellectual exchanges will reflect in their contributions the discussion of 
policy making in their home countries. In turn this may lead to the convergence of legal 
systems and compensate for the immaturity of state institutions and the lack of officials’ 
managerial capablity. Thus, the existence of track 2 networks, which have some access to 
policy making, has supported the development of the supra-state regional project from 
below.
Another form of cross-border governance reflects more directly the economic interests 
among the parties involved. In the debates on MLG in the EU, the role of business actors is 
downgraded while policy networks and institutional perspective are stressed (Rosamond, 
2000; Christiansen, 1996). By constrast, in East Asia, business actors have become crucial 
in the emergence of MLG. For example, Japanese business delegations regularly visit 
Beijing to exchange opinions with the Chinese central government. While the track 2 
approach involves some central government initiatives in the building of the supra-state 
project, economic motivation is often induced by more direct interests. As discussed
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above, the speeding up of economic dynamism in East Asia does not always match the 
processes of inter-governmental institutionalisation. In the case of China, with its inherited 
imperial territory, the reform of the governance structure has led to the creation of a space 
for MLG below the state level, and it is noteworthy that this approach has been adopted by 
leaders since economic reform for national economic purposes. The Chinese SNGs have 
been allowed to govern regional cross-border economic relations below the state. The 
various forms of preferential treatment offered by SNGs have played a key role in 
attracting inward FD1. The direct interactions between the MNCs and SNGs have become 
crucial for the development of MLG in East Asian régionalisation.
Cross-border economic relations beneath the state level are blurring the frontiers between 
the domestic socio-economic political space and the international sphere. In other words, 
politics, as the distribution of authority, and economics, as the distribution of wealth and 
resources, are both challenging the concept of stateness and its association with 
exclusiveness, territoriality and uniformity This process involves the diffusion of state 
authority, leading ultimately to the retreat of the state (Strange, 1996). In today’s world of 
fierce global economic competition, the state faces the challenge of deciding how best to 
compete in order to increase wealth and how to achieve justice. The role of the state has 
therefore expanded from that of conventional diplomacy and defence policy to the 
management of economic efficiency, regional development and social justice. The state is 
not always the appropriate scale for economic operations, but cannot survive as a totally 
self-enclosed entity. With the rapid development of cross-border economic relations, the 
expansion of economic space has gone far beyond political boundaries, and has 
consequently revitalised ecological, historical, cultural and technological communities. 
This points to the need for new approaches to the analysis of state-to-state relations While 
the track 2 approach reinforces stateness, cooperation between SNGs and MNCs supports 
the development of MLG by blurring frontiers and diffusing authority
East Asian régionalisation is continually evolving and its forms of governance are 
increasingly multi-level in nature. The development of various forms o f MLG reflects the 
trend away from a purely state-centred approach to governing in today’s complex 
globalising world. Compared to the analysis of MLG above the state, MLG below the
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state, especially the role of business actors, is still neglected. This approach requires an 
emphasis on the interrelations between the actors constituting the multi-layered structures. 
Under the state system, the forms of MLG need to be adjusted and legitimised or at least be 
allowed to co-exist with the domestic political system. Thus, the present study seeks to 
demonstrate the emergence of innovative forms of MLG comprising the central 
government, the SNGs and foreign firms in cross-border micro-regionalisation among 
Guangdong, Taiwan and Japan. It seeks to discover how conflicting or diverse interests 
among participants are accommodated, and to identify the complementary relations among 
actors.
3.3 China's FDI and Foreign Trade
By the late 1990s, on the national scale the Chinese economy had become highly engaged 
with the world economy. In 2000 China became the seventh largest trading country in the 
world (Zhongguo Duiwai Jinyji Maoyi Niunjuin 2001). The first part of this section 
discusses the pattern and process of China’s integration with the world economy, and the 
second section focuses on micro-regional integration with reference to Guangdong and its 
cities (Shenzhen and Dongguan).
3.3.I Different Types o f Enterprise
First, we will consider the changing balance among different kinds of firms in China. In 
China, there are four different categories of firms: state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
collective-owned enterprises (COEs), foreign firms, and other types of ownership 
(individually owned enterprises; private enterprises). SOEs are enterprises owned by the 
state, and these are distinguished according to levels of jurisdiction: the nation, the 
province, the city, the prefecture. As a consequence of economic reform and the 
development of marketisation, the share of SOEs in industrial output has steadily 
decreased. In 1999, the industrial output of the SOEs, including enterprises with a 
controlling share held by the state, accounted for only 28.1% of China’s total industrial 
o u t p u t C O E s  are collectively owned firms and include public firms owned by local 
governments. The largest type is the township and village enterprise (xiang:hen qiye:
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TVEs). Many TVEs were originally based on the people’s commune (renmm gongs he). 
COEs now employ nearly 70% of China’s industrial workers.11 Foreign firms are 
enterprises owned by foreigners.12 The other firms, according to Chinese categorisation, 
are enterprises owned by individuals. These firms can be called ‘private firms’, but 
according to Chinese socialist ideology, they were once illegal. In 1999, these ‘private 
firms’ contributed to 20.7% of China’s total industrial output.13 In the same year, the 
private firm’ was constitutionally adopted as an important part of the socialist market 
economy. It can be seen, then, that non state-owned firms have significantly increased their 
presence in the Chinese economy.
3.3.2 China's Inward FDI
China’s impressive economic performance, especially in the coastal provinces, is 
coincident with the growth of inward FDI. China has been the largest recipient of FDI 
among all developing countries. The UNCTAD (2000) estimates that at $US 40.4 billion in 
1999, inward FDI to China accounted for 19.4% of total inward FDI to the developing 
countries ($US 207.6 billion). Between 1979 and the end of 1999, China absorbed a total 
of SUS 307.77 billion of inward FDI (actual use). Between 1985 and 1995, China’s annual 
average inward FDI accounted for 23.4% of total inward FDI to the developing countries 
and 6.4% of total global FDI (UNCTAD, 2000). By 1999, there were 235,681 foreign 
affiliates in China, which accounted for 34% o f the total number of foreign affiliates of 
MNCs (UNCTAD, 2000).14
Hitherto, the primary motivations for FDI in China have been: the location advantage of 
low-cost-labour and land, preferential government policies, and access to the rapidly 
growing internal market (Zhang, 2000). In addition, for Hong Kong and Taiwanese firms, 
there are also advantages arising from geographical, cultural and linguistic proximity, 
which help to reduce transaction costs. From a Chinese viewpoint, there are five 
advantageous factors for foreign investors: (1) political and social stability; (2) continuous 
economic growth; (3) the maintenance of a stable exchange rate; (4) a high level of foreign 
exchange reserves and a favourable balance o f payments; (5) further deepening economic 
reform and improvement of the legal system (Hu, 1999: 38). However, of equal importance 
is the role of inter-organisational linkages in exploiting the scale of advantages and
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flexibility. For offshore manufacturing activities based on an export-oriented strategy, 
low-cost factors of production are especially important. Foreign investors have been 
attracted by China’s official adoption of an export-oriented strategy based on the principle 
of comparative advantage in production through the international division of labour. The 
proliferation of coastal special economic zones (SEZs), open cities and open areas, all of 
which are allowed to give preferential treatment to foreign firms, has acted as a magnet to 
attract FD1. Inter-organisational linkages (i.e. sub-contracting, outsourcing and production 
networks) are not confined to regional clusters or to the nation state but cut across national 
boundaries.
3.3.3 China's Regional Differentiation
In the 1990s, inward FDI in China was concentrated mainly in the coastal areas (see Table 
3.1). These areas are very attractive to investors because they have better infrastructure (e.g. 
ports) and a better quality of labour. Among China’s coastal provinces, Guangdong’s 
dominant position is clear, but with the spread of a new open area towards the north, the 
gap with other coastal provinces is decreasing. For example, Jiangsu province has a 
steadily increasing share of inward FDI. By the end of 1998, Guangdong had the largest 
number of registered foreign firms (57,665) followed by Jiangsu (21,403), Fujian ( 18,071) 
and Shanghai (17,622) (Mitsubishi Sogo Kenkyusho: hereafter Mitsubishi, 2000: 506). But 
the growth of inward FDI does not tell the whole story of the process of the reintegration 
of China with the world economy. Equally important are the growth and pattern of 
development of contacts with foreign economies, especially through foreign trade. 
According to the rate of foreign trade, foreign loans, and rate of foreign investment, there 
is a huge inter-provincial differentiation, and the economies of the coastal provinces have 
become more open, with Guangdong now being ranked as the most open economy (.Jing/i 
Rihao, 17 May 2001). Manufacturing exports through inward FDI are one of the key 
factors. Foreign firms now play a very important role in the Chinese economy, accounting 
for 16% of China’s industrial output and nearly half of China’s foreign trade.IS They 
employ more than 17.5 million people, equivalent to about 10% of the country’s non-rural 
labour force (Li, 2000: 112).
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Table 3.1 The Geographical Distribution of FDI in China in the National Total, 
1987-2000 (Actual Use, SUS billion) (%)
\Year and 
\otal 
Rcgion\
1987
2.314
1991
4.366
1993
27.515
1995
37.521
1997
45.26
1999
40.32
2000
40.71
Beijing 4.1 5.61 2.42 2.88 3.52 4.90 4 1
Tianjin 5.49 3.02 1.97 4.05 5.55 4.38 29
Shanghai 9.25 3.32 11.48 7.71 9.34 7.03 78
Guangdong 26.06 41.75 27.62 27.13 25.88 28.91 27.7
Fujian 2.20 10.67 1042 1076 9.27 9.98 8.4
Jiangsu 2.03 486 10.34 13.83 12.01 15.07 15.8
Coastal
Provinces
(Total)
55.92 89.75 86.10 86.53 85.29 85.35 86.98
Central and
Western
Province
6.74 5.4 12.34 11.91 14.01 13.70 12.09
Central
Department
37.38 5 51 1.56 1.57 0.7 0.95 0.93
Note: There are no clear definitions of the geographical divisions Here the coastal provinces are Beijing, 
Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangxi, Jiangsu, Guangdong, Hainan and Shandong 
Figures are based on the rsearcher's calculations
Sources: Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian (ZTN) 1999 and 2000 editions, Zhongguo Duiwai Jingji Maoyi Nianjian 
2001, Mitsubishi (1996 and 2001 editions) Chugoku Joho Handobukku (Information on China), Tokyo 
Sososha; and Kaku, Shishi (1999) Nihon no lai Chugoku ( ’hokuxetsu Toshi (Japanese FDI in China), Tokyo 
Meitoku Shuppansha
3.3.4 China’s Processing Trade
It is important to note that nearly half of China’s total trade is carried out in the form of 
processing trade arrangements (PTAs): the Chinese government or partner provides plant, 
labour, water, electricity and other basic facilities, and foreign investors supply the 
machinery, equipment, materials and design of products and take responsibility for 
marketing. They also pay the processing fee for the Chinese side (Sit, 1998: 896). In terms 
of transactions, foreign investors bring parts into China as imports and take the processed 
products back as Chinese exports.16 The key for PTAs is China’s abundant supply of low- 
cost labour. Table 3.2 confirms that processing trade has increased its proportion in China’s 
foreign trade. In exports, the processing trade accounted for 55.2% of total exports and 
41.1% of total imports in 2000.17 In terms of division by industrial sectors, in 1999 
machinery and electrical equipment exports accounted for about 40% of China's total
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exports. Foreign firms contributed 67% of total processing-trade arrangements exports 
(Kokusai Boeki, 8 February 2000). In terms of bilateral trade relations, China has trade 
surpluses with the US ($US 22.5 billion in 1999) and the EU ($US 4.7 billion 1999), and a 
trade deficit with Taiwan ($US 15.5 billion in 1999).'* This trend relates directly to the 
structure of China's PTAs. For example, in 2000, the trade surplus by the processing trade 
was $US 45.1 billion but in total trade the surplus was only SUS 24.1 billion Thus, the 
processing trade contributes greatly to China's trade surplus and without it China is likely 
to fall into a huge trade deficit.
fable 3.2 The Share of Processing Trade in China's Foreign Trade, 1986-2000 (SUS 
100 million, %)
Y e a r
C h in a 's  T o ta l E x p o rts  an d  
I m p o r t s  (A )
C h in a 's  T o ta l P ro c e ss in g  T ra d e  
(B )
S h are
(B /A )
1986 7 3 8 .4 123 .22 16.6
1988 1028 2 8 8 .5 1 2 8
199 0 1 ,1 5 4 .4 44 1  91 3 8 .2
1992 1 ,6 5 5 .3 7 1 1 .5 6 4 2 .9
199 4 2 ,3 6 7 .3 1 ,045 .5 4 4 .2
1996 2 ,8 9 9 .0 1 ,4 6 5 .0 5 0 .6
1998 3 ,2 3 9 .3 1 ,7 3 0 .4 5 3 .4
1999 3 ,6 0 6 .5 1 ,8 4 4 .6 51.1
2 0 0 0 4 ,7 4 3 .0 2 ,3 0 2 .1 4 8 .5
Sources: Shao Xianglin. Wang Yuliang, and Ren Xiaowei (2001 ) Jiagong Maoyi: Weirai Guoji Maoyi Je 
/.huhu (Processing Trade: Future Mainstream of International Trade), Beijing: Duiwai Jingji Maoyi Daxue 
Chubanshe, pp 20-21 and Mitsubishi (2001) Chügoku Jöhö HanJohukku (Information on China), Tokyo 
Sösösha pp 496-7.
In 1999, 25.1% of the materials and components for the processing trade were imported 
from Japan.19 If we add imports from Taiwan (19.4%) and South Korea (13.5%), then a 
total of 58% of the materials and components for the processing trade were imported from 
these three countries. Furthermore, 26.9% of processing-trade exports went to the US, 
14.9% went to the EU, and 21.6% went to Hong Kong, from where most of it was 
re-exported to the US and the EU. In total, therefore, exports of processed products from 
China to the US and the EU accounted for more than 60% of total exports through the 
processing trade. If we add exports to Japan (17%), more than 80% of exports of processed 
products from China were exported to the US, EU and Japan In terms of China’s 
integration into the world economy, the role of Japan and Taiwan is extremely important.
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The pattern of China’s processing trade is indeed complex, and very uneven and is 
structurally dependent on Japan, South Korea and Taiwan for imports, and on the US, the 
EU and Japan for exports. The major products in the processing trade are electrical and 
electronics products. In this sector exports by the processing trade arrangement accounted 
for 53.7% of total exports of this sector in 1999 (Shao, Wang and Ren 2001: 76). In 
particular, it is reported that electronics exports from China through the PTAs accounted 
for 90% of China’s total electronics exports in 1999 (Kokusai Boeki, 16 May 2000). This 
reflects the sectoral composition of inward FDI: FD1 in China is mainly in the 
manufacturing sector, accounting for 62.1% of total FDI in 1997 and 56.1% in 1998 (Z'/TV, 
1999: 600). In 2000, the share of electronics and telecommunication manufacturing FDI in 
China accounted for 11.3% of total inward FDI in China (Zhongguo Duiwui Jingji Maoyi 
Niunjicm 2001). Thus, China’s PTA is largely dominated by a few major partners (Japan, 
US, Hong Kong, Taiwan South Korea and the EU), and in particular electronics production 
has played a central role.
3.4 Industrial Agglomeration in Guangdong
3.4.1 Guangdong in the Chinese Economy
Before 1978, Guangdong province was a backward economic area in which agricultural 
production predominated. In 1978, Guangdong’s per capita GDP was 367 RMB, which 
was smaller than that of Qinghai (428 RMB), Tibet (375 RMB), and Ningxia (370 RMB), 
and was only almost one seventh of Shanghai (2,498 RMB).20 The industrialisation of 
Guangdong started when China’s open door policy effectively transformed Guangdong 
into a hinterland for Hong Kong manufacturers. Guangdong’s new importance gave the 
province increased autonomy in economic planning, fiscal policy, foreign trade and foreign 
inward investment. Three o f China’s four SEZs were established in Guangdong nearly two 
decades ago. As Hong Kong manufacturing firms faced increasing wage levels and higher 
real estate costs ( ‘push’ factors), they were attracted by the opportunity for low 
cost-production in Guangdong (the pull’ factor). For similar reasons, Taiwanese, Japanese 
and US manufacturers also began to invest in the province.
Table 3.3 presents indicators of Guangdong’s present economic position in China The
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province occupies just 1.9% of China's total land area and ranks 15th among all provinces. 
Its population (72.7 million in 1999) is 5.7% of the country’s total population The rate of 
growth of Guangdong’s population in the last ten years is, however, the highest among 
China’s provinces (37.5%), a trend which made Guangdong the third most populated 
province by 2000 (Asahi Shinbun, 4 April 2001). The main reason for this growth is the 
rapid pace of economic development. Guangdong’s GDP was 10.3% of China’s total GDP 
in 1999 and ranked as first among all provinces. Guangdong’s foreign trade accounted for 
40.6% of China’s total foreign trade in 1998 and 39.9% in 1999 (ZTN, 1999: 577, GTN, 
1999: 499, Guoji Shangbao, 20 January 2000). Guangdong is the largest recipient of FDI 
among China’s provinces, and in 1998 its FDI accounted for 25.9% of total FDI in China 
(ZTN, 1999). In 2000, this proportion rose to 27.7%. The province has contributed almost 
one-seventh of all industrial and commercial taxes in China, and since 1992 it has 
remained the top contributor of industrial and commercial tax revenue 21 Guangdong’s 
prosperity derives directly from the development of its external linkages This is most 
apparent in its trade structure. In 2000, processing trade imports and exports were valued at 
$US 121.15 billion, accounting 71.2% of Guangdong’s total imports and exports and 
58.6% of China’s total exports through the processing trade (Jingji Daobaozong, No.2733, 
2001). The province’s trade relies heavily on the processing trade.
Table 3.3 Guangdong's Economic Position in the Chinese Economy, 2000 (% and 
Rank)
Item C h in a S h a re  (% ) a n d  R a n k  in  C h in a
G D P  in  2 0 0 0  (1 0 0  m il l io n  Y uan) 9 5 0 6 .4 1 0 .6 (1 )
E x p o r ts  in  2()0() ($ U S  1 0 0  m illio n ) 9 1 9 .2 4 0 .4 5  (1 )
Im p o rts  an d  e x p o rts  in  2 0 0 0  ($ U S  100 m illio n ) 1701 3 5 .8 6 ( 1 )
P ro c e s s in g  tra d e  im p o r ts  a n d  e x p o r ts  in  2 0 0 0  ($ U S  10 0  m illio n ) 1,211 5 5 8 .6 ( 1 )
U til is e d  F D I in  2 0 0 0  ($ U S  1 0 0 0 0  d o lla r) 1 .1 2 8 ,0 9 1 2 7 .7 (1 )
Sources Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC),
http //www2 moftec gov cn/ofTicial/html; Mitsubishi (2000 and 2001 editions) Chugoku Joho Handobukku 
(Information on China), Tokyo: Sososha; Xianggang Wenhtnbao (5 May 2001), Jingji Daobaozong 
(No 2733, 2001), and Daiichi Kangyo Bank (DK.B), www dkb.co jp/houjin/report/china.
3.4.2 Guangdong’s Foreign Relations
From the viewpoint of processing trade arrangements (PTAs), Guangdong is undoubtedly 
the key area for China’s integration with the world economy. Half of Guangdong’s exports
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are electronics products. The share of FDI (actual use) from Hong Kong (67.47% in 1990; 
78.31% in 1995; 72% in 1997; 67.63% in 1998; 60.14% in 1999) far exceeds that from 
other countries, but FDI from Taiwan, Macau, Japan, Singapore and the US is also very 
significant (GTN, 1999 and 2000). Although inward FDI from Hong Kong includes various 
countries of origin, e.g. the US, the EU, Japan, Taiwan as well as mainland China, Hong 
Kong is a key base for creating PTAs with Guangdong. Manufacturing investments 
account for a large part of total FDI in Guangdong: 86.3% in 1990, 69% in 1995, 66% in 
1997, and 55.7% in 1998 (GTN, 1999). In 1998, the Virgin Islands became the second 
largest source of investment in Guangdong (11.87% of total inward FDI based on actual 
use in 1998: GTN 1999). In 1999, they were again the second largest supplier of inward 
FDI (10.77% of total inward FDI: GTN 2000). The ranking of Guangdong’s main trading 
partners reflects China’s distinct pattern of PTAs. Japan is the largest source of imports 
followed by Taiwan (see Table 3.4). More than 40% of Guangdong’s imports come from 
Japan and Taiwan. The US and the EU are the major export destinations. A large 
proportion of exports to Hong Kong is re-exported to the EU and the US. As a result, more 
than 70% of Guangdong’s exports go to the US and EU markets. Guangdong has thus 
materialised China's export-oriented strategy.
Table 3.4 Guangdong's Trade Relations by Country and Region, 1995-1999 (Value, 
SIJS 100 million, and %)
 ^ ^  Year and Total Trade 
Country and 
Region
¡995 
565 92 
Exports
1995 
473 80 
Imports
1998
756.18
Exports
¡998 
541 80 
Imports
¡999
777.05
Exports
¡999
626.63
Imports
Hong Kong and Macau 39.3% 12.8% 35.9% 7.8% 34.6% 6.6%
Taiwan 2.5% 19.0% 2.3% 19 8% 2.1% 19.7%
Japan 11.5% 24.7% 92% 21.4% 8.7% 21.3%
ASEAN 3.8% 8.7% 4.1% 10.8% 4.1% 10.3%
United States 22.6% 7.4% 25.1% 8.3% 26 0% 8.6%
EU 11.4% 8.1% 13.2% 7.7% 14 0% 8 7%
Others 8.9% 19.3% 10.2% 24.2% 10.5% 24 8%
Total 100.0% 100 0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source Guangdong Tongji Nianjian (GTN, 2000 edition)
3.4.3 Industrial Agglomeration in Guangdong
Foreign investment has played a major role in the development of industrial agglomeration 
in Guangdong. The agglomeration of foreign firms and their assembling production
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activities, as well as pre-given factors (geographical proximity with Hong Kong), have 
encouraged further agglomeration and have resulted in Guangdong’s dominant economic 
position in China. Guangdong’s share in telephone and stereo sets production exceeded 
80% of China’s total production in 1998 and 1999.22 Photocopying machines and camera 
production also exceeded more than 70% of China’s total production in 1999.23 The 
agglomeration of the electronics industry in Guangdong has affected not only the 
agglomeration of local firms but also the locational behaviour of foreign firms. For 
example, the latest information on the electronics industry (prospects for demand and 
supply, outsourcing and alliances) shows that Japanese electronics firms need to establish 
foreign branches in order to respond to international competition (Kuroda, 2001: 92).
The industrial concentration in this province has caused a regional gap in both Guangdong 
and China as a whole. The total GDP of Shenzhen in 2000 was $US 20.11 billion, which 
exceeded the GDP of provinces such as Guizhou (SUS 11.99 billion), Tibet ($US 1 42 
billion), Hainan (SUS 6.26 billion), Gansu (SUS 11.87 billion), Qinghai (SUS 3.18 billion), 
Ningxia (SUS 3.2 billion) and Xingjiang (SUS 16.48 billion).“4 Per capita GDP in 
Shenzhen in 2000 reached SUS 2,870 and that of Shanghai was SUS 4,180, which far 
exceeded Guizhou’s per capita GDP (SUS 340 in 2000).23 According to a study by Hu 
(2001), based on a purchasing power parity (PPP),2il in 1999 the level of development of 
China’s provinces varied from a world ranking of 45th (Shanghai) to 177th (Guizhou). 
China’s uneven development has created four different economic worlds in one nation (a 
high income area, a middle income area, a low income area and a very low income area) 
(ibid.: 6-7). Furthermore, there is also a wide gap of per capita income between urban and 
rural areas. The average per capita annual income in urban areas in Guangdong was SUS 
1,102 in 1999. In rural areas it was SUS 438.4.27 In the same year, the average income of 
farmers in Tibet was only SUS 70.4.2X
More importantly, the number of migrants seeking higher incomes has continued to 
increase. For example, according to Mitsubishi (2001: 76-9), by 2000 the immigrant 
population in Guangdong province reached 11.69 million. Furthermore, by the same year, 
migrant population within Guangdong reached 14.60 million. In addition, there are a large 
number of short-term workers in Guangdong. It is estimated that the floating population
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was over 30 million in 2000, which was equivalent to 35% of the total population in 
Guangdong. Thus, industrial agglomeration in Guangdong has greatly contributed to the 
increase of the floating population.
3.5 FDI and Economic Development in the Pearl River Delta
3.5. /  FDI in the Pearl River Delta
Table 3.5 Guangdong's Inward FDI by Region, and the Share of Foreign Firms in 
Industrial Output and Exports, 1998 (%)
R e g is te r e d  F D I b y  the e n d  o f  1998 In d u s tr ia l  O u tp u t A m o u n t o f  E x p o r ts
Area a n d  C ity
N u m b e r  of 
R eg is te red  
K n terp rises
T o ta l
In v e s tm e n t
R eg istered
C ap ita l
C a p ita l In v ested  
b y  F o re ig n  
P a rtn e r
In d u stria l 
( )utput
S h are  of 
F o re ig n  
F irm s
• S h a re  o f  H o n g  
K o n g , M a ca u  a n d  
Taiw an
A m o u n t
of
E x p o rta
S h a re  of 
F o re ig n  
F irm s
Eastern Pearl 
R h e r  Delta
33  8 2 7 .3 31 .8 79.1 29 .4 8 3 .0 55 .9 56 .5 53.1
S h en zh en 19.1 14 .5 16 1 73 .3 1 8 3 7 5 9 42 .7 34 9 4 9  1
D o ngguan 9 .6 7 .9 10.7 8 5 .5 5.3 8 6  1 59 .9 17.2 4 5 0
1 lu izh o u 5.1 4 .9 5.0 7 8 4 5 .8 8 7 0 65 .2 4 .4 6 5 .3
Central Pearl 
R iser Delta
2 5 8 3 5 8 32.0 71.1 3 8 7 4 9 4 31 .7 2 0 7 4 9  5
G u angzhou 1 4 6 2 2 .3 1 8 4 77 .8 20 .3 58  1 35 .0 13.7 5 1 .8
F oshan 6 .3 8 .0 8.3 6 3 5 14.0 5 0 9 31 .6 5 .8 6 5 .3
Z haoqm g 3.3 3 .4 3 4 7 1 .3 3 .7 3 8 4 3 4 .6 0 .7 5 6 9
Q tngyuan 1.5 2 .1 1.9 7 1 .8 0 .7 5 0 3 2 5 .6 0 .5 2 4 .0
Western Pearl 
R h  e r Delta
1 4 8 1 2 .9 14.0 6 8 .7 19.3 57 .5 4 1 .9 10.9 5 4 8
/.h u h a i 7 .4 5 .7 6 .0 6 9 .3 5 .7 6 6 6 42 .5 4 .0 5 7 8
¿ h o n g sh an 2 .6 2 .7 3.0 7 3 .7 4  9 6 1 .7 5 4 9 3.6 5 7 .7
h a n g m e n 4  8 4 .3 5 .0 6 3 .0 8 .7 44  2 2 8 4 3 .3 4 8 8
Total IV arl 
R iver Delta
74 .3 7 6 .0 77 .8 73  0 8 7 4 63 .3 43.2 88  1 5 2 5
( Xher A rea 2 5 .7 2 4 .0 22.2 2 7 0 12.6 2 9  5 17.2 1 1 9 4 7 5
Total in  
G uangdong
5 7 ,6 6 5  
(n u m b e r  o f  
firm s)
2 ,2 1 7  
( tJ S $  100 
m illio n ;
1,344 
(U SS  100 
m illio n )
9 9 2  (1JS$ 100 
m illio n )
9 ,0 6 4  
(Y uan  100 
m illion^
5 2 1 9
(Y uan
100
m illio n ;
3481 (Y uan 1(K 
m illio n )
Sources Maruya, Toyojirö ed (2000) A/m Kokusai hungyö Saihen to Gaikoku Chokusetsu Töshi no
Yakuwari (Rearrangement o f the Asian International Division of Labour and the Role of FDI), Chiba: Ajia 
Keizai Kenkyusho, p 143 and Guangdong Tongji Nianjian ((i '/'N, 1999 edition) ‘ Share of industrial output
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FDI in Guangdong is focused on the Pearl River Delta (Zhujiartg Sanjiaozhou)2' Table 3.5 
shows the geographical dispersion of FDI in Guangdong and its relationship to the shares 
of foreign firms in industrial output and exports. In 1998, the Delta’s industrial output 
value was equivalent to 87.4% of the total value of Guangdong’s industrial output, and the 
Delta’s exports value accounted for 88.1% of the total value of Guangdong’s exports 
(Maruya, 2000: 143). In 1999, the total GDP in the 21 cities of the Pearl River Delta 
amounted to 54.3% of the total GDP of Guangdong as a whole (GTN, 2000: 612). The 
diffusion of FDI within the Delta has accelerated since 1990 owing to a surge of inward 
FDI, further decentralisation, and the improvement of infrastructure across the whole Delta 
(Shen et al., 2000). In terms of regional dispersion, the value of Shenzhen’s and 
Dongguan's exports is very high. Foreign firms occupy a dominant position in the eastern 
area (the east side of the Pearl River Delta, Shenzhen, Dongguan and Huizhou) and the 
central area (Guangzhou, Foshan, Zhaoqing and Qingyuan). They accounted for over 80% 
of the total value of industrial output in the eastern delta in 1998 On the other hand, the 
dominant role of Guangzhou (the capital of Guangdong) in the pre-reform period has 
significantly declined due to the rise of cities such as Shenzhen and Dongguan. Within the 
Delta, regional polarisation is now emerging (Gu, et al., 2001). It is therefore important to 
conduct further disaggregate analysis, focusing on smaller units below the provincial level 
in China.
From 1991 to 1998, the value o f the industrial output of electronics and telecommunication 
equipment jumped from 10.43% to 22.17% of the total value of Guangdong’s industrial 
output.1" Shenzhen’s concentration of electronics and telecommunication equipment is 
especially remarkable. In the same period, the value of the industrial output of electronics 
and telecommunication equipment grew from 40.65% to 58.24% of the total value of 
Shenzhen’s industrial output. Industrial agglomeration also inevitably causes rapid 
urbanisation.11 According to Sit (1998: 897), at the end of 1995, foreign firms in the Delta 
employed 2.738 million workers, and village collectives engaged primarily in 
processing-trade arrangements employed 2.462 million. Thus, the total number of 
employees of foreign firms in the Delta had reached nearly 5.2 million. Until the late 1970s, 
the regional economy of the Pearl River Delta was primarily agricultural, with over 75% of 
the total population engaged in agricultural production In 1949, the urban population of
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Guangdong was just 3.701 million, which accounted for only 13.3% of the total population 
(27.8 million). By 1978, the growth rate of the urban population was only 2% per annum, 
and in that year the urban population reached 6.25 million, accounting for 12.3% of the 
total population (50.64 million). The annual growth rate of the population between 1990 
and 2000 was 37.55%, which far exceeded the national average of 11.66% (Mitsubishi, 
2001: 267).
3.5.2 Shenzhen and Dongguan
Shenzhen and Dongguan have been successfully transformed into export-oriented 
manufacturing-based economies through processing- and assembling-induced 
industrialisation. Table 3.6 shows the share of Shenzhen and Dongguan in Guangdong’s 
economy. In 1999, the total exports of Shenzhen and Dongguan exceeded 55% of 
Guangdong’s total exports. Shenzhen contributed 35.9% of Guangdong’s total imports and 
exports in 1999 (MOFTEC). Almost 70% of Shenzhen’s imports and exports were under 
PTAs (Guoji Shanghai), 15 January 2000). In 2000, 83.7% of its exports (valued at SUS 
28.96 billion) came from PTAs (Xianggang Dagongbao, 2 April 2001). In Shenzhen, by 
the end of 1999, 12,000 foreign firms had set up subsidiaries (Jinrong Zaobao, 17 January 
2000), and accumulated inward FDI (actual use) had risen to SUS 20,045 million, which 
was equivalent to 6.5% of China’s total inward FD1.,: The number of firms that had 
invested more than SUS 10 million (measured by the value of contracts) had risen to 547 
by 1998.”  In 1998, foreign firms’ share in Shenzhen’s total industrial output was 75.9%, 
and foreign firms also dominated Shenzhen's exports, accounting for 49.1% of the total (in 
value; see Table 3.5). In the same year, the electronics industry accounted for more than 
58.24% of total industrial output in Shenzhen (Shenzhen Tongji Xinxi Niunjian 1999). 
Underlying these trends are not only economic factors but also regional policies targeting 
high-technology enterprises. Shenzhen’s high-technology zone, which was established in 
1996, has contributed to the concentration of high-tech industry. In 1999, IBM established 
a parts supply centre in Shenzhen, and many MNCs have chosen Shenzhen for their 
components supply centres. Because of Shenzhen’s proximity to Hong Kong, 
transportation costs are relatively low, and the developed infrastructure of Hong Kong 
induces further agglomeration. One o f the strong advantages of Shenzhen is the use of 
migrant workers (temporary population). In 1999, they amounted to 70% of the total
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population in Shenzhen (Table 3.6).
Table 3.6 Shenzhen and Dongguan in Guangdong’s Economy, 1999 (%)
Item Shenzhen Dongguan
GDP in 1999 ( 100 million Yuan) 1289.0(15.2) 355.5(4.2)
Exports in 1999 (US$ 100 million) 264.0(34.0) 152(19.56)
Imports in 1999 (US$ 100 million) 188.8(30.1) 133(21.21)
Utilised FDI in 1999 (US$ 10000 dollar) 275422(19.0) 145732(10.1)
Area (square kilometers) 1948.7(1.1) 2465.0(1.4)
Registered Population in 1999 (10(K)) 1,198.5(1.6) 1.508.2(2.1)
Temporary Population in 1999 ( 1000) 2,852.9 2,448.1
Sources. Guangdong Tongji Nianjian (GTN, 2000 edition), and Dongguan Tongji Nianjian (DTN, 2000 
edition)
Table 3.7 Shenzhen's Trade Relations by Main Country and Region, 1997-1999 (SUS 
billion, %)
1997 1998 1999 1997 1998 1999
Balance o f Trade 
in 1999
Total Exports 25.62 26.40 28.21
Total
Imports
19.39 18.88 22.22 5.99
Hong Kong 28.2 28 30.5 6.4 6.2 5.5 7.38
Japan 12.7 11.7 9.6 28 25.8 23.8 -2.59
us 28.3 29 29.0 8.7 10.2 9.4 6.10
Taiwan 2.8 2.7 2.5 18 3 18.9 18 0.3
Singapore 2.7 3.5 3.7 6.3 6 4.1 0.1
South Korea 0.9 0.7 0.7 6.9 6.5 7.1 -1.39
UK 3.5 3.7 3.6 i i 1 1.2 0.75
Germany 4 4 4.3 2.1 18 1.9 0.81
France 1.7 1.7 1.6 0.6 1.6 2.2 -0.05
Note: The figures are calculated by the researcher
Sources Shenzhen Tongji Xinxi Nianjian (1999 and 2000 editions)
Shenzhen represents the pattern of China's integration with the world economy. The high 
rate of Japanese FDI is especially noteworthy. Between 1986 and 1999, the average share 
of Japanese FDI was 17.5% in Shenzhen’s total inward FDI.34 Table 3.7 also shows the 
pattern of Shenzhen’s trade relations. It reveals that Japan has been the largest source of 
Shenzhen’s imports (23.8% of total imports in 1999). Taiwan was the second largest source 
of imports in 1997 and 1998. However, in 1999 Taiwan’s share in Shenzhen’s imports 
dropped dramatically. This was due partly to the shift of Taiwanese production and partly 
to Taiwanese firms’ local procurement activities in mainland China. In exports, the US and
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Hong Kong are the largest destinations for exports. Most exports to Hong Kong are 
re-exported to the US and EU markets. Shenzhen’s trade structure clearly follows the 
characteristics of the East Asian trade structure: trade deficits with Japan, South Korea and 
Taiwan, and a trade surplus with the US and the EU.
Dongguan is now the second largest trading city in Guangdong after Shenzhen. By 2000, 
the average annual growth rate of Dongguan’s GDP since economic reform had reached 
22%.’3 Its success owes much to export-oriented manufacturing. By the middle of 1999, 
12,356 foreign firms had established subsidiaries in Dongguan M' On a national scale, in 
1998, Dongguan became the third largest exporting city after Shanghai and Shenzhen. In 
1998, Dongguan’s total imports and exports ($US 23.27 billion) accounted for 17.9% of 
Guandong’s total imports and exports (DTN, 1999). In 1999, Dongguan’s imports and 
exports were valued at $US 28.46 billion, which was equivalent to 20.3% of Guangdong’s 
total imports and exports37 and 7.9% of China’s total imports and exports (DTN, 2000). In 
2000, Dongguan’s exports of informational products accounted for 44% of total exports 
(Xianggang Dagongbao, 6 February 2001) and the city’s trade surplus ($US 2.27 billion) 
contributed to 9.4% of China’s trade balance as a whole.!x Assembling production in the 
electronics industry has played a central role. Trade in assembling production accounted 
for 94% o f the city’s total imports and exports in 1999.30 In the same year, the share of 
electronics products in imports ($US 6,120 million) was 46% of Dongguan’s total imports. 
In exports, the share of electronics products ($US 8,850 million) was 58.4% of Dongguan's 
total exports. In terms of regional relations, in 1999, 87.7% of Dongguan's imports came 
from Asia and 54.8% of exports (excluding Hong Kong) went to the US and EU markets 
(Guoji Jingji Xinxi, 24 January 2000).
By 1998, the value of FDI (actual use) reached $US 9.63 billion, which was equivalent to 
3.63% of the cumulative utilised FDI in China between 1979 and 1998 ($US 265.6 
billion).40 In 1999, Dongguan’s inward FDI of $US 1.8 billion accounted for 12.41% of 
Guangdong’s total inward FDI and for 3 42 % of China’s total inward FDI (DTN, 2000) 
About 30% of Dongguan’s inward FDI is in the electronics industry.4'
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Table 3.8 Dongguan's Inward FDI by Country and Region, 1995-1999 (Actual
llse, %)
D ata  fro m  the  S ta tistica l Bureau D a ta  fr o m  the F oreign  
Trade a n d  Econom ic  
C ooperation  Bureau
Region 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Hong Kong 86.7 83.7 76.1 63.5 58 8 60
Taiwan 4.5 4.6 3.5 5.7 8.4 23
Japan 0.6 4.2 1.7 1.9 1.2 8
Singapore 1.2 1.1 1.9 2.5 3.8 -
South Korea - - 0.1 1.7 1.0 1.5
United States 48 0.1 7.9 19 2.4 2
Germany - - - 0.5 1.7 -
UK 0.1 1.3 4.4 1.1 0.1 -
Others 2.0 3.7 4.4 21.3 22.4 5.5
Total 1000 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note The figures from the Statistical Bureau are calculated by the researcher
Sources: Dongguan Tongji Nianjian (DTN, 2000 edition) and Dongguan Guide by the Dongguan Foreign 
Trade and Economic Bureau ‘Though Dongguan Guide is the latest issue (in 2001), it does not indicate the 
particular year
Table 3.9 Numbers of Foreign Investments in Dongguan by Type, 1978-1996 
(Contract)
Type
Year
EJV CJV WFV
Processing and 
Assembling (a)
Total
1980 0 0 0 415 415
1982 2 - - 468 470
1984 43 - - 508 551
1986 59 - - 559 618
1988 209 - - 1839 2048
1990 93 72 27 1075 1267
1992 524 204 130 1374 2232
1994 532 255 370 1521 2678
1996 115 56 164 1343 1678
Note: (a) In his categorisation of forms of investment, G Yeung uses the term ‘processing and assembling’ 
Between 1982 and 1988, the EJV category included CJV and WFV
Source: Yeung, Godfrey (2001 ) Foreign Investment and Socio-Economic Development in China: The Case o f 
Dongguan, Houndmills, Basingstoke and New York: Paigrave, p 246
Table 3.8 shows the source of Dongguan’s inward FDI by country and region. It reveals 
that there are significant differences between the statistics provided by Dongguan's 
Statistical Bureau and the Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Bureau. These are due 
largely to the increase of Taiwanese ’roundabout' investment through central American 
island countries. For example, one of the leading Taiwanese electronics firms, Kinpo
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Electronics, uses the Virgin Islands as a base for roundabout investment in Dongguan. This 
is officially categorised as FDI from the Virgin Islands.42 Also, the data for firms include 
many foreign firms which are not yet identified by their home countries. Most of these 
unidentified firms are categorised as ‘others’ in the Statistical Bureau’s data. The data from 
the Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Bureau is a better reflection of reality.43 
Table 3.9 confirms that the form of PTAs has been a major source of inward FDI in 
Dongguan.
3.5.3 Dongguan's Sub-Municipal Districts
Focusing on smaller units below the city-government level in China tells us more about the 
correlative relationship between local economic growth and foreign investment. Table 3.10 
shows the inter-township differentiation of economic growth in Dongguan. Changan is a 
leading sub-municipal district in terms of the number of foreign firms, accumulated FDI, 
GDP and the value o f exports. In terms of GDP, the combined GDP of Changan, Tangxia, 
Qingxi and Humen accounted for 33.8% of Dongguan's total GDP in 1999. The 
accumulated FDI in these four sub-municipal districts was equivalent to 32% of the total 
accumulated FDI in Dongguan. Also, in terms of the number of firms, these four 
sub-municipal districts accounted for 31.7% in 1999. Changan’s GDP was almost 22 times 
that of Hongmei Town. In terms of exports, Changan’s export value was 28 times that of 
Hongmei. Hongmei is ranked lowest in terms of exports, accumulated FDI and the number 
of foreign firms (Table 3.10). Thus, the pattern of export value at sub-municipal level is 
similar to the foreign investment pattern. The aggregate analysis on smaller units beneath 
the sub-provincial level reveals a strong pattern of micro-regionalisation, which highlights 
the impact of foreign investment on economic growth through export-oriented strategies.
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Table 3.10 Foreign Firms, GDP and Exports in Dongguan's Sub-Municipal Districts. 
1999
No of 
foreign firms 
in 1999
Accumulated FDI
by 1999 ($US 
million)
GDP in 1998 
(10,000 RMB)
Value of Export 
($US million) 
in 1998
Changan 1,389 1,121.8 1,118,873 1,992.1
Changping 613 531.8 515,342 765.1
Chashan 274 349,8 102,698 190.0
Dalang 439 311 8 163,746 2894
Dalingshan 280 410.5 252,240 471.2
Daohao 155 180.7 116,357 172.2
Dongkeng 186 196.8 210,399 240.7
Fenggang 954 657.6 299,665 699.1
Fucheng 489 408 5 396,795 729 8
Gaobu 111 96 3 67,246 208.7
Guangcheng 78 183 3 121,932 112.8
Hengli 236 119 5 83,326 144.3
Hongmei 38 68.3 50,962 71 0
Houjie 662 601.0 510,618 1,354.8
Huangcun 197 369.3 255,576 4798
Humen 1,118 1,056.5 758,587 1,202.0
Liaobu 341 252.5 362,701 687 64
Mayong 67 102 7 75,844 209.5
Qiaotou 330 242.7 127,660 265.6
Qingxi 653 788 1 757,665 1,332.7
Qishi 205 1196 61,488 141.3
Shatian 126 169 8 132,439 266 0
Shijie 403 361.2 499,310 809 5
Shilong 88 102.3 129,224 359.0
Shipai 315 118.4 83,295 156.9
Tangxia 757 854.9 903,676 1,193.5
Wangniudun 84 116 9 59,647 92.5
Wangjiang 144 81.7 49,204 171.3
Xiegang 190 112 8 60,364 83 6
Zhangmutou 317 278 3 269,415 286.2
Zhongtang 104 184.0 76,742 100.1
Huangjiang 408 226 2 134,435 219.5
City Total 12,356 11,899.05 10,480,208 147,744
Note: Data on the number of foreign firms and accumulated FDI relate to the end of June 1999 
Source IJongguanshi Waishang louzi Qiye j i  Ouanbu Gongye ZHiao Huibicm 2000.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter has sought to demonstrate the contested debates over globalisation and 
régionalisation, and has examined the pattern of China’s micro-regional integration with
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the world economy. The dual processes of globalisation and régionalisation are complex, 
uneven and contradictory. In various domains we see the development of strategic 
horizontal actions (mostly taken by the state). At the same time, at the sub-national and 
firm levels, the significance of extensive cross-border capital movement is evident. The 
states, SNGs and MNCs have become facilitators for promoting régionalisation. East Asian 
régionalisation is continually evolving and its forms of governance are increasingly 
multi-level in nature. The development of various forms of MLG in East Asia (Section 3.2) 
reflects the trend away from a purely state-centred approach to governing a complex, 
globalising world.
China’s micro-regional integration with the world economy has not been spread evenly 
across the entire economy. Consequently no single approach can offer a sufficient 
explanation. Though the state is still the key actor in the process of régionalisation in many 
respects, the sub-units of the state and firms have emerged as critically important actors in 
their own right. The huge inflow of foreign investment since economic reform has played a 
substantial role in China’s rapid economic growth. It has greatly assisted China’s reform 
process and also developed a distinct pattern of China’s foreign economic relations on the 
basis of the East Asian regional economic structure. One of the most notable results is the 
development of PTAs in Guangdong, which is contingent on wider processes of 
globalisation and régionalisation. China’s abudant supply of low-cost labour comprises the 
core part of the structure of PTAs. The combinations of regional and global processes of 
production are most clearly visible in the case of industrial agglomeration in the Pearl 
River Delta in Guangdong (especially in Shenzhen and Dongguan), particularly in the 
electronics industry. The structure of the East Asian regional economy, in particular the 
role of Taiwan and Japan as major sources of imports, is of great importance. At the same 
time, the US and the EU are major destinations for exports of finished products. The 
emerging transnational economic space of Shenzhen and Dongguan is built upon the wider 
processes of East Asian régionalisation.
The organisation of production in China and the regional division of labour between China 
and the world economy have resulted in de facto processes of micro-regionalisation linked 
to the globalisation of CPNs. With the rise of global competition, firms have revised their
100
production systems and relocated to achieve more efficient production and procurement. 
An international division of labour based largely on national economies is partly being 
replaced by a division of labour rooted in regional intra- and inter-firm networks which 
induce the industrial transformation of particular areas. Firms have become more important 
actors in deciding the location of production and leading the pattern of development of 
micro-regionalisation. The in-depth investigation of Shenzhen’s and Dongguan's patterns 
of inward FD1 and foreign trade reveals that both cities are heavily integrated with the 
world economy through PTAs practices and export-oriented strategies.
Although this micro-regionalisation has undoubtedly accelerated China's integration 
processes, it is also associated with increasing regional differentiation among regions. 
Further disaggregate analysis beneath the provincial level (i.e. at the sub-provincial and 
sub-municipal levels) illustrates the considerable differentiation of economic development 
and correlates with the direct impact of FDI on the local economy. The best example is the 
huge gap of GDP (22:1 in 1998) between a successful sub-municipality (Changan) and a 
less developed sub-municipality (Hongmei) in Dongguan. The success and/or failure of 
economic development at local level is largely due to the degree of engagement of foreign 
firms. China's pattern of micro-regionalisation thus highlights the uneven engagement of 
sub-national territories with the world economy. The challenge for the government is to 
build new frameworks for effective cross-border economic governance. In the processes of 
China’s micro-regionalsiation, the relationships between SNGs and MNCs at the local 
levels provide China’s national politics with further complex multi-layered economic 
dynamism. It is thus important to understand the relationship between emerging 
cross-border economic space and the restructuring of China’s domestic governance.
1 The term ‘micro-regional integration' is used by Breslin (2000) to apply to China He stresses the role of 
local government and the structure of the East Asian regional economy in micro-regional integration in the 
cases of north East Asian integration and Southern China-Hong Kong links
2 (A) regards globalisation as a specific period of history rather than as a sociological phenomenon or a 
theoretical framework (B) characterises globalisation more functionally and considers related series of 
economic phenomena including the liberalisation and deregulation of markets, the privatisation of assets, the 
retreat of state (unctions, the diffusion of technology, the cross-national distribution of manufacturing 
production (foreign direct investment), and the integration of capital markets (C) sees globalisation as the 
hegemony of American values characterised by the triumph of modernisation and democracy. (D) views
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globalisation as a new form of activity in which a decisive shift from industrial capitalism to a post-industrial 
conception of economic relations is taking place See Higgott and Reich (1998)
3 Higgot and Reich (1998: 11)
4 Palmer (1991) distinguishes two waves of regionalism by lime: ‘old regionalism' in the 1950s and 1960s, 
and 'new regionalism' from the late 1970s Bhagwati (1993) uses second wave’ in order to distinguish later 
period from the regional integration movement in the 1950s and 1960s in Europe, and to stress its spread to 
Latin America and Africa. According to Hettne and Soderbaum (2000), the 'new regionalism’ began to rise 
in the mid-1980s in the context of the comprehensive structural transformation of the global system
6 Yamazawa (2001: 3).
6 There is no clear distinction between MNCs and TNCs in this figure
7 On the transformation of Japan’s ASEAN policy, see Yamakage (2001).
8 By 2000, the number of member countries was 24 See JI1A Newsletter (No. 102 December 2000).
9 On the processes of the institutional development of the PECC and the APEC, see Kikuchi (1995).
10 The figure is taken from Kuroda (2001: 21).
11 The figure is taken from Kuroda (2001: 21).
13 ‘Foreign firms in China’ refers to sanzi firms including equity joint ventures, contractual joint ventures 
and wholly foreign owned firms
13 The figure is taken from Kuroda (2001:21).
14 According to the latest Chinese sources, by 2000 there were 364,345 foreign firms in China and the 
accumulated inward FD1 (utilised base) was US$ 34 8624 billion. See 
http://j-people nejp/2001/01/18/jp20010118-1660.html.
15 The figure is taken from Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank (DKB), www dkb co jp/houjin/report/china/200007/
16 See Yabuki and Hamer (1999).
17 The figure is calculated by the researcher using Mitsubishi (2001 496-7).
18 The figures are based on Chinese data (Guoji Shanghai), 14 January 2000)
19 The figures (%) for Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, EU and the United States are based on 
Chugoku Tosha (July 2000)
20 The figure is taken from Hu (2001: 324).
21 In 1999, Guangdong’s industrial and commercial tax was 1,480 yi yuan (100 million yuan) DKB 
http://www dkb co jp/houjin/report/china/200002/
22 The figures are taken from Kuroda (2001: 91).
23 Guangdong’s share of photocopying machine production in China was 59.3% in 1998, and the share of 
camera production in 1998 was 83 9% in China See Kuroda (2001: 91).
24 The figure is calculated by the researcher by using Mitsubishi (2001) The exchange rate of RMB per US 
dollar in 1999 was 8 2783 RMB per dollar
25 The figure is taken from Mitsubishi (2001).
28 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) compares international living standards by the prices of goods and service 
rather than by market exchanges rates
27 The figure is the researcher’s calculation based on Mitsubishi (2001) The exchange rate of RMB per US 
dollar in 1999 was 8 2783 RMB per dollar
28 The figure is the researcher's calculation using Hu (2001: 292) The exchange rate of RMB per US dollar 
in 1999 was 8.2783 RMB per dollar
29 The definition of the area of the Pearl River Delta varies Here it refers to Guangzhou, Foshan, Zhaoqing, 
Qingyuan, Shenzhen, Dongguan, Huizhou, Zhuhai, Zhongshan and Jingmen
30 The figures are from Lu (2000)
31 The figures are from Lu (2000)
32 China’s total inward FDI between 1979 and 2000 was $US 346.63 billion Based on Mitsubishi (2001)
33 Shenzhen Tongji Xinxi Nianjian 1999
102
34 The figure is the researcher’s calculation based on Shenzhen Tongji Xinxi Nianjian ( 1999 and 2000)
35 Dongguan Guide by DFTEC
36 The figure is taken from Dongguan shi Waishang Z'ouzi Qiye Ji Quanhu Gongye Ziliao Huihian 2000.
37 DK.B, http://www.dkb co.jp/houjin/report/china/200003/200003-2.html
:18 The figure is the researcher's calculation using Mitsubishi (2001) and Dongguan Guide by DFTEC
39 The figures are from DKB, www.dkb.co.jp/houjin/report/china/200003/
40 The researcher’s calculation is based on DTN, (1999) and Mitsubishi (1999)
4> DFTEC
42 Dongguan shi Waishang Touzi Q iye.// Quanhu Gongye Ziliao Huihian 2000.
43 These problems are largely due to the lack of inter-departmental communication in the Dongguan City 
Government. (The researcher’s interview with officials at DFTEC, 12 October 2001)
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CHAPTER 4
GUANGDONG AND CHINESE MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE
The present chapter and the following two chapters (5 and 6) investigate the relationships 
between changes in China’s domestic political economy and the changing structure of East 
Asian regional economy in order to answer the first two research questions: ( 1 ) how should 
we define and characterise the key components o f micro-regional ¡sat ion among 
Guangdong, Taiwan and Japan' and (2) what kinds o f  policy environment and what actors 
in the host and home countries are needed to support cross-border economic relations?
This chapter starts with the analysis of de jure processes of China’s micro-regionalisation 
in the context of domestic régionalisation. One of the crucial features of the reform process 
is that formal authority has been dispersed from central government down to sub-national 
governments (SNGs). While economic reform may be seen as the expression of a struggle 
to overcome the inefficiency of centrally planned economic management, the increasing 
role of SNGs in decision-making and the implementation of economic policy has major 
implications for the broader process of radical change in political and economic regulation. 
China’s decentralisation does not simply mean the expansion of local autonomy based on 
the relative independence of the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, as is the case 
in Western countries. Given China’s concentration of political authority in the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP or Party), the devolution o f power to SNGs is of much more 
fundamental political significance. The divergence and contradictions between 
administrative (political) regions and economic regions have become more and more acute, 
and this has undermined the integration of the national economy (Zhou, 1998). Guangdong 
province is the undisputed leading economic region within the Chinese economy, 
especially in foreign economic relations. In this respect, in Guangdong both the provincial 
and sub-provincial levels of government have been given increased opportunity to exploit 
their locational advantages
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This chapter applies the concept of multi-level governance (MLG) to the case of China in 
order to explain the processes and patterns of change of China’s domestic governance. 
Although the term ‘multi-level governance’ has hitherto been applied mainly to the study 
of changing patterns of governance in the European Union to denote a system of 
‘overlapping competencies among multiple levels of governments and the interaction of 
political actors across those levels’ (Marks et al., 1996: 41), it has recently started to gain 
currency in other non-European contexts.1 It is applied here to describe the emerging 
system of economic governance in China with particular reference to the reallocation of 
authority in regional economic management and planning. Thus it focuses particularly on 
the so-called Open Door policy and the processes of decentralisation of economic 
management, both of which have had a huge impact on the behaviour of SNGs. The result 
is an enormous diversity in the forms of governance, reflecting the variation of local 
political factors and the changing national constitutional and political context. 
Guangdong’s innovative governance structure provides an opportunity to explore the 
factors shaping the changing role of SNGs in managing regional economic development.
Section 4 1 considers in general terms the applicability of the MLG approach to the case of 
China. It argues the need to extend the analysis from different levels of formal government 
to the various components of economic governance. Following a brief theoretical 
discussion, Section 4.2 focuses on the background of China’s reform of domestic 
governance in terms of administrative (state) reorganisation. Against the background of the 
CCP’s organisational structure, Section 4.3 argues that the networks of the Communist 
Party still constrain the actual practice of authority in many respects, but the recent 
restructuring of the Party has resulted in a greater diffusion of authority. Section 4.4 
considers the Open Door policy and its impact on Guangdong’s governance structure in 
terms of the new patterns of central-local relationships. In Section 4.5 the discussion of 
institutional innovations focuses in particular on fiscal relations, enterprise reform, and 
legislative decentralisation. The consequence of reform raises the question of Beijing’s 
capacity to control the localities, and the ability of Guangdong to circumvent that control. 
In Section 4 6 the case of the GITIC (Guangdong International Trust and Investment 
Corporation) and the significance of IPR (intellectual property rights) issues are taken as 
examples of this tension. Section 4.7 summarises the main arguments and offers an overall
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perspective on the innovative form of China's MLG system.
4.1 Multi-Level Governance in China
Hitherto, the paradigm of MLG has been applied mainly to the analysis of European Union 
governance. As Rosamond (2000: 110) explains, 'MLG analysis amounts to the claim that 
the EU has become a polity where there are significant sectoral variations in governance 
patterns’. Christiansen (1996: 13) stresses that MLG involves a shift from a hierarchical 
(vertical) to a non-hierarchical (horizontal) system of political negotiation, with 
sub-national regions within the EU -  and the horizontal links among these regions -  
becoming particularly important in this negotiation process. The multi-level governance of 
EU policy-making involves complex 'interweavings' among the supranational, national 
and sub-national levels, and close links between governmental and non-governmental 
agencies, a picture which is represented by the image of a 'networked polity’ (Ansell, 
2000). This image draws heavily on the developing theory of policy networks and policy 
communities as a basis for understanding the intricacies of contemporary governance. For 
Ansell, the networked polity is characterised by functional and territorial disaggregation, 
and also by strong inter-organisational and inter-governmental network relationships 
(Ansell, 2000: 303). Moreover, these network relationships are underpinned by strong 
inter-personal social networks (Ansell, 2000: 318). These new patterns are stronger in 
some sectoral areas of EU policy than others, and are especially prominent in EU cohesion 
policy and regional policy (see, for example, Hooghe, 1996; Regional and Federal Studies, 
2000). Put another way, the EU’s policy networks are 'o f varying density and depth' 
(Risse-Kappen, 1996: 74).
Although the MLG paradigm has not been applied to China, many authors have recognised 
the emerging spatial complexity of the new market economy in China and the increasingly 
important role within that economy of other actors besides the central government and 
Party institutions. There is widespread agreement that a focus on formal 'government’ 
needs to be replaced by a focus on the various components of economic 'governance’, 
which must include a consideration of the role of states, hierarchies, clans or networks, and 
associations (Wang, 2001a: 113). Francis (2001) stresses four key features of China’s
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market economy: (1 ) the proliferation of paragovernmental organisations (as the state takes 
on new regulatory functions but does so by delegating authority to private and 
quasi-govemmental agencies; (2) the integration of non-govemmental entities into state 
structures (so that the boundaries between the public and private sectors become blurred); 
(3) corporatist trends; and (4) the commercialisation of the state (as state entities -  
including those at the sub-national levels -  become market entrepreneurs). Although she 
does not use the specific term, it would appear that Francis is putting forward a model 
which is remarkably close to that of multi-level governance. However, she wishes to stress 
that the Chinese case involves some unique features, especially the combination of 
quasi-public and quasi-private responsibilities. If MLG means the spreading of authority 
and policy-making influence across multiple levels of government and across the 
private/public boundary, then there is clear evidence of the emergence of such a system in 
China, although undoubtedly the Chinese state and party remain crucial gatekeepers' of 
the process (just as national governments still do in many areas of EU policy).
Zheng (1997) suggests that the old hierarchical Party-state in China is gradually being 
replaced by a segmented state’, characterised by the emergence of multiple centres o f  
power among the state legislative, judicial and administrative institutions vis-à-vis the 
Party organisation (Zheng, 1997: 264) This is very close to the idea of MLG, although the 
author does not use this exact term. Zheng observes: ‘China has today become more 
decentralized than it used to be. On many occasions, the center pretends to command 
provinces whereas provinces don't even recognize the center. In reality, many regions and 
provinces are on their own ... If economic modernization continues to be the top priority 
for the post-Deng regime, we are going to see more divergent interests between the center 
and localities and among various regions’ (ibid : 264). Zheng therefore predicts that 
increasingly China will move towards a federal model of decision-making. However, this 
conclusion ignores the possibility of a more flexible model of MLG, which would in many 
ways be more capable of meeting the needs of China’s future modernisation.
In the case of China the unique characteristics of business networks and their roots in close 
social networks, including those across the public/private divide, add a particularly 
important dimension to the nature and scope of MLG. Thus, Castells (1996: 188)
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emphasises the importance of ‘linkage between supportive government and family-based 
business networks . .. in the process of export-oriented industrialization in Southern China 
in the 1990s’. He then describes how, for example, manufacturers in Hong Kong and 
Taiwan take advantage of the regional networks based in their villages of origin in 
Guangdong and Fujian to create subsidiaries and establish subcontracting relationships ‘in 
order to offshore the low end of their manufacturing production (for example, in shoes, 
plastics, or consumer electronics)’ (ibid.: 188). At the same time, as Castells stresses, these 
production networks can only emerge because they are supported by provincial and local 
(especially city) governments. Thus, Chinese MLG has its own unique features, and these 
become especially evident in the cross-border relations which constitute the so-called 
‘Greater South China Economic Region' among Southern China (Guangdong and Fujian), 
Taiwan and Hong Kong (Chen, 1994). Most importantly, the combination of strong social 
networks and supportive governance arrangements makes the Southern Chinese form of 
micro-regionalisation worthy of attention as a particular case of MLG which is different in 
key respects from the European ‘model’.
It is important to understand the distinction between the processes of formal 
intergovernmental relations and the emergence of overlapping jurisdictions in the case of 
China’s MLG. The administrative (state) system is mutually exclusive in terms of 
territoriality and is bound to a limited number of jurisdictions. The Party networks are 
extended along with the levels of formal government On the other hand, the ‘overlapping 
competencies among multiple levels of governments and the interaction of political actors 
across those levels’ (Marks et al., 1996: 41) suggests the lack of any limitation on the 
number of jurisdictional levels. The number of actors in the latter case is unlimited and 
relations among them are more flexible than in the formal and intergovernmental type of 
MLG. This facilitates the coordination of the spatial economy and thereby involves 
economic governance by firms (see the discussion in Chapters 5 and 6).
4.2 The State System and Its Reform
With the increase of local autonomy through economic reform, the presence of local 
authorities in China’s system of economic governance has also become important. The
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country is divided into four kinds of provincial-level administrative regions (22 provinces; 
five autonomous regions; four municipalities; and two special administrative regions, 
excluding Taiwan).2 These divisions are designed to accommodate the differentiation of 
China historically, politically, economically, racially and culturally. Vertically, each 
administrative region has three tiers (the provincial, sub-provincial and local levels). The 
provincial and sub-provincial units are especially important actors among China’s 
administrative divisions. The average size of population of Chinese provinces, including 
municipalities and autonomous regions, is about 40 million, and the average land area is
300,000 square kilometres. For example, in 2000 the population of Henan province was 
92.56 million, that of Shandong province was 90.79 million, and that of Sichuan province 
was 83.29 million (Mitsubishi, 2001). In terms of land area, four provinces (Xinjiang, 
Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Qinghai) are larger than France (551,500 square kilometres), and 
eight provinces (the above four plus Heilongjiang, Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu) are larger than 
Germany (356,733 square kilometres). Furthermore, the cities (as sub-provincial units) 
also have large populations. For example, Shanghai had 16.74 million people and Beijing 
13.82 million in 2000.1 Given China's enormous size, for ordinary residents regional 
identity is linked to the county (xian) or middle-size cities (local level), with populations of 
about 0.8 million (Nakai, 1999).
Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), many changes of 
administrative structure have taken place through mergers, division and abolition4. These 
have been undertaken for the purpose of national defence, ethnic minority management, 
regional projects, and the promotion of economic reform. After 1979, for example, Hainan 
Island was separated from Guangdong province and became a province with the status of a 
special economic zone (SEZ). In 1997, Chongqing, which had a crucial role in the Three 
Gorges Dam Project, was upgraded to a fourth municipality. In 1997, Hong Kong reverted 
to China and was given a new status as a Special Administrative Region (SAR). In 
December 1999, Macau followed the same pattern and also became a SAR. Thus reform 
processes have added further complications to China's administrative divisions by 
establishing a variety of special zones.
Among sub-provincial units, economic reform has greatly increased the status of cities in
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China s administration. In the pre-reform period, the province was the highest sub-national 
unit of administration that supervised sub-provincial units. Reform processes have 
stimulated the creation of new cities. The status of cities has become more flexible than 
that of other divisions in China’s hierarchical administrative system. Setting up new special 
zones is a new regulatory function. By 1999, there were 5 SEZs, 14 coastal open cities, 5 
coastal open areas, 39 economic and technology zones, 15 coastal bonded zones, and 14 
border economic areas. Some cities, given the status of SEZs, coastal open cities and Cities 
with Separate Plans (CSPs)5, were elevated by reform to almost the semi-provincial level. 
As a result, the total number of cities increased from 194 to 667 between 1979 and 1997 
(Tang and Hao, 1997: 17).
Since 1999, 39 coastal cities have been given the status of economic and technological 
development zones’ (jing/i jishu kaifa qu) and have received similar preferential treatment 
to that given to the SEZs. They differ from SEZs in that they originally had economic 
foundations as ports or coastal industrial cities. In 1991, the centre approved the 
establishment of 27 ‘high-technology development zones’, where cooperative relations 
with universities and research institutes are emphasised By 1997, the number of such 
zones had increased to 58. Finally, in order to promote processing trade and entrepot trade 
in priority areas, the centre adopted the establishment of bonded zones in 1990.*’ By 1999, 
15 bonded zones had been established in China. Following the establishment of special 
zones, the further expansion of such zones in terms of scale was carried out through the 
designation of 'open economic areas' (jin^ji kaifangqu). In 1985, the counties and cities 
located in the Yangtze Delta, Pearl River Delta and southern Fujian triangle were given this 
new status. By 1999, China had established five coastal open economic areas (the Yangtze 
Delta, the Pearl River Delta, the southern Fujian triangle, the Liaodong peninsula, and the 
Shandong peninsula).
Thus, sub-provincial units, especially cities, have functionally increased their economic 
role and have been able to engage in direct communication with the centre, by-passing the 
provinces. This is a particularly important example of the dynamics of MLG in the state 
system. At the same time, the centre has also increased its territorial domain without the 
interference of the provincial governments. However, China’s regional administrative
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divisions embrace both the remaining old structures and the birth of new administrations 
with their enhanced economic and entrepreneurial status. The diversification of 
administrative divisions and the mixture of the new and old vertical divisions continue, and 
the situation is further complicated by the dominant role of the CCP. Finally, 
decentralisation in China has produced a variety of responses at the local (provincial and 
sub-provincial) levels. Some local governments have been more assertive and less 
compliant than others in their behaviour vis-à-vis the centre, and this variation reflects the 
influence of a number of factors, both internal to the local unit and external (in terms of 
central-local relations). (See Chung, 2000 for a detailed study of local variation.) This is 
another reason for suggesting that the model of MLG is applicable to the current stage of 
governance reform in China As Solinger (1996: 33) observes, decentralisation in China is 
not a uniform national policy but has affected localities in different ways: the ‘enhanced 
comparative differentials horizontally -  among localities -  have had a profound impact on 
the shape of the overall, national vert ical balance of power’.
4.3 Party Governance and Its Reform
4.3.1 Party Governance
The CCP is the highest political authority in China and its position is monopolistic. The 
function of the state system is mediated through the Party’s networks. The organisational 
principles of the Party are based on the idea of democratic centralism, but in fact 
democratic decision-making from below has never been achieved in practice. The Party 
has sought to extend its hierarchical authority into almost all aspects of life, including 
education, industry, commerce and the military (Hunter and Sexton, 1999: 101). The state 
institutions, such as legislative bodies, courts of justice, prosecutors’ offices, and various 
levels of government, have been used to materialise the Party’s dominant leadership.7
The Party’s governance structure was originally based on the CCP’s organisational system 
at the revolutionary base and was combined with the Soviet administrative systems. The 
legitimacy of the CCP’s rule is expressed in its leading role (lingdao), which is based on 
two preconditions: (1 ) the CCP’s leading role over all parties; (2) the absolute control over 
military power (Wang, 1995: 314). Thus, China’s authoritative structure gives the CCP the 
leading role as the highest authority, the military power (subordinate to the CCP) as the
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second highest authority, and the state system as the third highest authority. ' The CCP was 
established in 1921 with some 50 members, but by 1999 it had about 63 million members 
and was the world’s largest political party (Yabuki, 2000). The CCP is declared to be 
China’s only ruling party in the preface to the Chinese Constitution. The leadership role 
has three elements: leadership over the activities of state politics; leadership over the state 
organisations through the CCP’s grasp of the leading position of the state institutions; and 
leadership over the fundamental idea for state activities through education and guidance 
(Xie, Yang and Yan, 1999: 183). The CCP seeks to exercise political leadership and state 
authority by itself, reflecting the principle of the inseparable relation’ between Party and 
Government (dang-zheng bufert) (To, 1997: 1).
The Party Committee System (dangyveiyuanhuizhi) exists in parallel with the hierarchy of 
administrative levels from the centre down to the basic unit. This system is intended to 
guarantee the leadership of the CCP over the authority of state institutions and society 
(Wang, 1995: 330). The Party’s command system has two features. One is the horizontal 
concentration on the Party Committee at each level (horizontal unified leadership). There 
is a vertical command system between the centre and local Party organisations (vertical 
unified leadership). The Party 's leadership role in terms of its command system is based on 
horizontal concentration at the same level and vertical concentration between the different 
levels. Thus, in contrast to the former Soviet system, in the Chinese system authority is 
horizontally centralised to the Party Committee at each level (Cho, 1998: 211). The 
concentration of local power is evident in the fact that provincial Party leaders are 
concurrently provincial governors as well as members of the People’s Congress and the 
Central Party Committee. The local Party leaders at all levels have absolute authority in 
local politics. Thus, if they manage the regional economy well, this guarantees them 
promotion in the Party ’s hierarchy.
4.3.2 The Restructuring o f Party Governance
The formal system of CCP authority has been subject to frequent modification. Zheng 
contrasts the earlier decentralisation of 1958-60, when power was transferred from central 
to provincial Party committees, with the decentralisation of the 1980s and 1990s, when 
power was transferred from the Party committees to the provincial governments 'As a 
result, provincial Party committees no longer have as much power to control the local
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economy’ (Zheng, 1997: 220). In 1980, at a Politburo meeting, Deng Xiaoping complained 
that the excessive concentration of power in the hands of Party committees was the main 
obstacle to the creation of a modem leadership system (Chang, 1995: 75). Yet at the same 
time the Party leaders in Beijing continue to influence the composition of provincial and 
sub-provincial governments through the so-called nomenklatura system. There are, for 
example, frequent transfers of Party and government officials across regions and between 
Beijing and the provinces (Zheng, 1997: 221). Yabuki (2000) points out that provincial 
First Party Secretaries are transferred across provinces more often than the Governors.1" 
The Party Secretaries are expected to exercise a leading role in line with the decisions of 
the centre (vertical unified leadership), while Governors are expected to carry out policies 
while taking into account local needs (local initiative) (Yabuki, 2000: 135).
The process of economic reform has exacerbated the diffusion of authority, since it has 
given various economic powers to the localities. The integrated Party-state has promoted 
the commercialisation of the Party organisation. The relationship between the central and 
sub-central levels can no longer be seen simply in terms of the old "command and control’ 
model typical of traditional state socialism. Indeed, Song (2000: 122-3) argues that the old 
hierarchical system has been "undermined’: ‘China is gradually but inexorably becoming a 
state where there is considerable diffusion of power’. As the market economy has 
developed, it has required the centre to allow lower’ levels to assume more autonomy and, 
in many cases, to assume functions of an entrepreneurial nature which are beyond the 
administrative capacity of the centre. Since a strong entrepreneurial class in the private 
sector has been slow to develop in mainland China, and since the authorities have sought to 
regulate the transition to a market economy as much as possible, then the entrepreneurial 
(quasi-public/quasi-private) role of the lower levels of administration has been of crucial 
importance. In this respect, a key issue is how far the growing autonomy of the lower 
levels of government in China has been matched by the growing autonomy of local cadres, 
and whether the increasing entrepreneurial role of provincial and sub-provincial 
governments has involved the growing influence of non-Party personnel. Furthermore, 
some local Party cadres have lost interest in promotion within the hierarchical Party system. 
As they are involved directly in efforts to maximise economic incentives, it is natural that 
some will be more interested in economic profit than personal promotion.
113
The reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has further accelerated the diffusion of 
authority. Until 1992, the reform of SOEs mainly involved the expansion of the 
decision-making capacity of enterprises. The contracted management responsibility system 
was implemented between 1987 and 1991, but this did not diminish the interference of the 
government in the management of firms. Since 1992, the further reform of SOEs has 
focused on the transformation of enterprises into stock companies. In 1995, there were 
about 120,000 state-owned enterprises in China, each of which was under the control of the 
governments (at the central, provincial and sub-provincial levels). The sharp growth of 
township and village enterprises (TVEs), which are owned by local governments (towns 
and villages), exacerbated the difficulties of small and medium SOEs. The privatisation of 
the latter then began in 1995. In 1998, private firms were constitutionally admitted as an 
important part of the socialist market economy. By 1999, private firms, including 
individual small firms, already employed about 80 million workers (NKS., 5 July 2000). 
Between 1990 and 1999, the total number of absorptive takeovers by private firms of 
state-owned firms was 5,600 (NKS, 5 July 2000). Accordingly, there has been a steady 
transfer of Party cadres into private firms since the late 1990s, and this is expected to 
promote the further diffusion of authority and accelerate the blurring of the public/private 
distinction. Thus, the attraction of promotion within the Party’s hierarchical system is now 
subject to more economic incentives.
The overheating of regional self-interest has raised some serious problems for the future 
system of Chinese governance. One negative feature of the processes of reform is that 
China has had to face a serious problem of corruption. It is estimated that almost 90% of 
all collected levies are either unauthorised or illegal (Pei, 1999: 101). Another investigation 
in 1998 uncovered more than 3,400 different fees illegally levied by local governments and 
their agencies (ibid.: 101). In April 1995, the Deputy Mayor of Beijing (Wang Baosen) 
committed suicide as he was about to be charged with embezzling the equivalent of 37 
million dollars, and the Beijing Party boss (and CCP Politburo member) -  Chen Xitong -  
was also forced to resign (Zheng, 1997: 209). This is just one example of a growing trend 
of corruption within the CCP, suggesting that the Party has lost the capacity to control its 
members. Accordingly, there is a growing recognition that effective economic 
development requires the talents of non-Party entrepreneurs and skilled business personnel
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who are not associated with Party corruption. As, gradually, China’s entrepreneurial middle 
class grows in size, it will undoubtedly seek more influence in the process of 
policy-making, and this will almost certainly further undermine the role of Party cadres.11
4.4 Guangdong Province and the Open Door Policy
The Open Door policy, implemented in 1979, granted special treatment and flexible 
measures to Guangdong and Fujian provinces. The policy itself aimed to expand 
international contacts by connecting selected domestic markets with foreign markets. The 
primary direction of economic reform was the expansion of the economic autonomy of 
firms and SNGs, and the introduction of a market mechanism. By using this market 
mechanism and foreign resources (foreign capital and technology), China sought to speed 
up the modernisation of its economy. Guangdong was assigned the role of pioneer It was 
granted greater autonomy over economic policies, including budgeting, planning, material 
allocation, pricing, investment, labour management and foreign economic relations 
including the establishment of SEZs. The primary aim of the SEZs is to promote the 
acquisition of inward FDI and, by using FDI and advanced technology, to expand foreign 
trade. This is thought to compensate for the shortcomings of capital, technology, and 
managerial know-how, and to contribute to employment, exports and the increase of tax 
revenue. The SEZs are thus regarded as an experimental site for an export-oriented strategy. 
Since then, Guangdong has been a primary vehicle for leading China's economic 
development. In 1999, more than one seventh of China’s national commercial tax revenue 
came from Guangdong 12
4.4.1 The Open Door Policy and the Change o f Central Leaders
In the pre-reform period, there was little space for SNGs to participate directly in foreign 
trade under the mandatory planning system. The third Plenary Session of the Eleventh 
Central Committee of the CCP, held in December 1978, was a critical turning point. Deng 
Xiaoping successfully achieved dominance in the Working Conference of the CCP in 
November 1978, which was held prior to the Eleventh Central Committee. Under Deng's 
leadership, the third Plenary Session of this Committee announced the rejection of the 
previous Maoist definition of economic modernisation through class struggle, and declared
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its intentions to reform the central planning system for the purpose of economic 
development. Deng Xiaoping and the new leaders (Hu Yaobang and Zhao Zhiyang) then 
successfully deprived Mao’s successor, Hua Guofeng, of his power. Hu replaced Hua as 
Chairman of the CCPCC (Chinese Communist Party Central Committee) in 1981 Deng, 
Hu and Zhao were reformists and proposed the introduction of a new economic policy 
using foreign capital and technology. However, this new policy, especially in its emphasis 
on the introduction of the SEZs, was faced with criticism within the Party. Chen Yun, a 
representative o f the conservative camp, often criticised the rapid introduction of economic 
reform in the early 1980s. The reformists needed to defend the Open Door policy. Thus, 
Hu Yaobang visited Shenzhen in February 1983, and Deng Xiaoping visited Shenzhen, 
Zhuhai and Xiamen in order to get across the positive experience of the SEZs.
4.4.2 Leadership in Guangdong
The introduction of SEZs in Guangdong and its success owes much to the effort of 
Guangdong’s leaders The most crucial actors were Party Secretaries and Governors (see 
Table 4.1). Cheung (1998a: 93) describes how, in the pre-reform period, several provincial 
leaders already thought of developing economic links with Hong Kong in order to gain 
foreign exchange, but none of these proposals was enacted because of the dominance of 
the centre in decision making The basis of economic reform in Guangdong was introduced 
by Zhao Ziyang (Guangdong's First Party Secretary in 1974, later General Secretary of the 
CCP, 1987-1989), but his wide-ranging reform strategies were actually carried out in 
Sichuan, to where he was transferred in 1975. The next leader, Wei Guoqing (Guangdong's 
first Party Secretary, 1975-1979) was an elite soldier and did not have a pioneering spirit. 
Xu Zhongxun, a veteran Party cadre, did not have enough experience in the management 
of local government. Then, Ren Zhongyi, who had spent his entire career in the northeast, 
became Guangdong’s first Party Secretary in 1980. His reformist credentials and strong 
leadership in Liaoning province were the key consideration for his appointment. In order to 
promote innovative reform, it was important for leaders in Guangdong to cultivate the 
confidence of the centre. Guangdong’s long distance from Beijing (more than 2,300 
kilometres) and its southern culture, dialects and lifestyle inevitably aroused doubts about 
its capacity for compliance.
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Table 4.1 G uangdong’s Party  Secretaries and G overnors since 1978
Provincial Party Secretaries Governors
X i Z h o n g x u n  ( 1 9 7 8 .1 2 - 1 9 8 0 .1 1 )  
R e n  Z h o n g y i  ( 1 9 8 0 .1 1 - 1 9 8 5 .7 )  
L i n  R u o  ( 1 9 8 5 .7 - 1 9 9 1 .1 )
X ie  F e i  ( 1 9 9 1 .1 - 1 9 9 8 .2 )
L i  C h a n g c h u n  ( 1 9 9 8 .3 -
X i Z h o n g x u n  ( 1 9 7 8 .1 2 - 1 9 8 1 .2 )  
L i u  T i a n f i i  ( 1 9 8 1  3 - 1 9 8 3  4 )
L i a n g  L i n g g u a n g  ( 1 9 8 3 .5 - 1 9 8 5 .7 )  
Y e  X u a n p i n g  ( 1 9 8 5  8 - 1 9 9 1 .5 )
Z h u  S e n l i n  ( 1 9 9 1 .5 - 1 9 9 6  2 )
L u i  R u i h u a  ( 1 9 9 6  2 - )
S o u r c e s :  C h e u n g  ( 1 9 9 8 a :  9 4 )  a n d  T ô a  N o  3 7 3  ( J u ly  1 9 9 8 )
The political roles of provincial leaders are especially important in negotiating with the 
centre for special treatment, encouraging local reform by the sub-provincial units, and 
defending against conservative critics of reform. First, in Guangdong’s case, the skill to 
negotiate with the centre was critical. The special policies granted to Guangdong were 
indeed pioneering, because they enabled the province to enjoy a great deal of autonomy 
over a wide range of economic policies (Cheung, 1998a: 101). The provincial leaders thus 
needed to articulate local demands and to persuade the central leaders by lobbying. By 
taking advantage of their close relationship, Xi Zhongxun and Yang Shangkun were able to 
lobby Deng Xiaoping directly and secure his personal approval of Guangdong’s special 
policies (Cheung, 1998a: 102). Ren was also able to exploit his close relationship with one 
of the key reformist leaders at the centre, Hu Yaobang (General Secretary of the CCP: 
February 1980 to January 1987) (Nakai, 2000: 106). During Lin’s tenure, he managed to 
make a bold request to the centre and this resulted in Zhao Ziyang’s coastal development 
strategy. Indeed, Lin and Ye personally met Zhao Ziyang in October 1987, and Zhao 
proposed to turn Guangdong into a ‘comprehensive reform experimental area' (Cheung, 
1998a: 102).
Secondly, the political role of provincial leaders was to encourage reform within the 
provinces. This was seen as a decisive factor for the success of Guangdong’s economy. 
Ren Zhongyi’s role was particularly important in emphasising the decentralisation of 
provincial economic authority to sub-provincial units, thereby encouraging the 
spontaneous behaviour of local officials. Ren explained the central policy toward 
Guangdong with a flexible interpretation. According to Cheung (1998a: 103),
(C)adres should first look for whatever policies that could be applied to a particular
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situation rather than do nothing; second, if there was a certain latitude within 
central policy, cadres should implement the policy flexibly in order to stimulate 
economic production; third, should there be some reforms that were conducive to 
the interests of the people and the nation, test sites for such reforms should be 
allowed even if no provisions could be found in existing policy documents and 
such test sites might go beyond the limits of existing policies.
Ren succeeded in earning popularity among local cadres. In addition, when the centre 
raised the levels of direct appointment of local officials in 1984, Ren’s power to appoint in 
Guangdong was strengthened. Finally, the political role of provincial leaders was to defend 
reform against criticism, mainly from the conservative groups. For example, Governor Ye 
Xuanping allegedly confronted Premier Li Peng over economic policy at a meeting of 
Governors held in the autumn o f 1990 (Cheung, 1998b: 48) If the leaders had not 
defended reform in the province, this would have caused the retreat of local cadres from 
supporting the reform strategies.
4.4.3 The Emergence of New Economic Governance
The establishment of the SEZs as an innovative administrative unit is of great significance 
in the change of economic governance at sub-provincial levels. The SEZs themselves are 
under the formal authority of the State Council and not the provincial government. They 
offer various kinds of benefits to foreign investors through relaxed entry and exit 
regulations, business regulations, labour and wage regulations, land regulations, and 
preferential tax treatment. In 1979, the centre allowed Guangdong to establish the two 
export processing zones of Zhuhai and Shenzhen, and in 1980 Shantou (Guangdong) and 
Xiamen (Fujian) were added. These SEZs were expected to serve as the testing grounds for 
bold, experimental economic and social reform. In the case of China, the original four 
SEZs also serve as a window for national reunification by strengthening the economic 
relations with overseas Chinese, especially in Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. Shenzhen is 
next to Hong Kong, Zhuhai is next to Macau, Xiamen is opposite Taiwan, and Shantou 
links with southeast Asian Chinese communities. Through economic cooperation, the SEZs 
were expected to deepen the links between mainland China and overseas Chinese.
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Shenzhen, adjacent to Hong Kong, is economically the most important and the largest SEZ 
in geographical terms: its area of 327.5 square kilometers is about one-third of that of 
Hong Kong. When the SEZ was established in Shenzhen in 1979, it was only a small town 
with a population of about 20,000 surrounded by agricultural land. The introduction of the 
Open Door policy profoundly transformed Shenzhen Its remarkable economic growth 
(31.2% per annum from 1980 to 1999) is due not only to the impact o f foreign economic 
relations but also to political factors. Shenzhen’s development is very experimental. There 
has been an effort to design an innovative administrative system that meets its specific 
requirements. Though the executive is elected by the local People’s Congress and approved 
by the centre, the local Shenzhen officials have lobbied regularly for greater autonomy for 
the SEZ and have achieved considerable success (Roberts and Ng, 1996: 41). In July 1991, 
the Shenzhen securities market was opened following the opening of the market in 
Shanghai. Shenzhen still leads the innovative, experimental path o f China’s economic 
reform.
The establishment of 'coastal open cities' (yanhai kaifung chengshi) in 1984 extended the 
concept of SEZ to 14 coastal cities including two cities in Guangdong (Guangzhou and 
Zhanjiang). These cities also established economic and technological zones' (jingji jishu 
kaifu qu) with a similar status to that of the original SEZs. They were selected because they 
originally had strong economic foundations such as ports or coastal industrial areas For 
example, Zhanjiang has good natural ports and 23 berths for ship« o f 10,000 tons. Huizhou 
and Panyu are also designed as 'economic and technological zones'. Guangzhou was 
selected as one of the cities listed independently in the state plan (jihuu danlie chengshi) in 
the 1980s, which granted the provincial level new powers in economic planning. In 
Guangdong, by 1999, there were six-high technology zones (Zhongshan, Guangzhou and 
Shenzhen were approved in 1991, and Foshan, Huizhou and Zhuhai were approved in
1992). By 1999, six bonded zones had been established in Guangdong (three in Shenzhen, 
one in each of Guanzhou, Zhuhai and Shantou). In 1985, the 16 counties and cities located 
in the Pearl River Delta were designed as ‘open economic areas’ (with a total land area of 
21,500 square kilometers). In the Pearl River Delta, Dongguan, Jiangmen, Zhongshan and 
Foshan were included. In 1988 and 1992, the open coastal areas in the Pearl River Delta 
were extended to include Huizhou and Meizhou, etc. They now extend to the southern part
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of Guangdong province and occupy a total area of more than half of the province.
Following the devolution of economic authority to the Guangdong provincial government, 
the sub-provincial and local governments also enjoyed a devolution of power from 
Guangdong. Since reform the Guangdong provincial government has approved the creation 
of 56 economic and developmental experimental zones’. The government has played the 
same role in relation to the sub-provincial levels as that of the central government toward 
the provincial government. The local governments in the Pearl River Delta have 
undertaken decentralisation and reform, and have made an effort to establish a simplified 
administrative structure. In the 1980s, Dongguan, which is located between Shenzhen and 
Guangzhou, adopted a radical developmental strategy to create an export-oriented 
manufacturing economy through processing and assembly industrialisation and 
outward-oriented commercial agriculture (G. Yeung, 2001a: 93). In the 1990s, it sought to 
attract foreign investment in high-value added and high-technology sectors and to improve 
the efficiency and competitiveness of locally-financed industry (ibid.: 95). With the 
success of economic development, the administrative position of Dongguan was upgraded. 
In 1985, it became a county-level city, and in 1988 it became a prefecture-level city under 
the Guangdong provincial government. In Guangdong province as a whole, the number of 
cities rapidly increased during the reform period: from 16 in 1984 to 54 in 1998. Thus, the 
sharp economic growth initiated by the Open Door policy in Guangdong has been of vital 
significance for changes in Guangdong’s governance structure.
4.5 Changes in Inter-Governmental Relations
When considering the forms of China’s MLG, inter-governmental relations in the field of 
economic policy are especially important Some studies of central-local relations in China 
focus on historical continuity and the centrifugal tendencies arising from decentralisation 
(Chang, 1992; Waldron, 1990; Montinola, Qian and Weingast 1995). Others focus on the 
effect of fiscal and planning arrangements on central-local relations (Donnithome, 1976; 
Lardy, 1975 and 1976; Wang, 1994; D. Yang, 1994; Wong, 1991; Oksenberg and Tong, 
1991; Y. Yang, 1996). Most authors stress the growing importance of SNGs in 
decision-making and the implementation of economic policy. The process of change was
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initiated by the adoption of Central Document No.50 (July 1979), which redefined the 
relations of the centre and Guangdong through a number of ad hoc contracts and by 
decentralising economic powers, rather than by granting new funds or resources (Cheung, 
1998b: 30). Since then, Guangdong has been a leading site for the evolution o f China’s 
MLG. In particular, its economic power and close relations with Hong Kong have been 
especially significant. This section focuses on the interaction between the centre and 
Guangdong in economic policy since 1979 and assesses Guangdong’s economic authority.
4.5.1 The Fiscal Dimension
Fiscal decentralisation is one of the fundamental factors that have affected central-local 
economic power relations. Under the mandatory planned economic system, the centre 
exercised predominant control over the various fiscal management systems, adopted a 
unified budget, and presided over the budgetary system, including the budgets of the 
central government, the provinces and the sub-provincial units. The centre held four sets of 
controls over provincial revenues and expenditure (Oksenberg and Tong, 1991: 3): it (1) 
assigned revenue sources to provinces and stipulated the revenue-sharing rate; (2) 
stipulated the level of local expenditure by issuing targets; (3) regulated provincial receipts 
and spending through revenue collection and spending schedules, financial operations and 
accounting procedures; and (4) enacted fiscal measures such as requisitioning provincial 
surpluses by forced borrowing and the purchase of treasury bonds, and freezing local bank 
accounts.
In 1980, under the slogan of ‘cooking in separate kitchens’ (fenzao chifari), the centre 
attempted to increase the incentives of SNGs in fiscal management It introduced a new 
institutional environment and expanded the fiscal power of Guangdong and Fujian 
provinces.n The provinces were allowed to retain a certain amount of revenue to use for 
their expenditure and acquired the authority to determine their fiscal arrangements with the 
sub-provincial levels. For example, the introduction of a five-year fiscal contract for 
Guangdong set the province’s obligation to transfer a lump sum of RMB 1.2 billion (later 
reduced to 1 billion) of revenue to the central government. Tax laws and tax policy were 
set by the central government, but the collection of tax was carried out by local 
governments, and revenues were shared upward with the central government according to
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the revenue-sharing agreement or contract. This became the foundation of Guangdong’s 
reform in the 1980s, because it enabled the province to gain more resources in subsidising 
reform and enjoy greater autonomy in setting its own surplus or shortfall after remitting the 
lump sum (Cheung, 1998b: 31).
However, the problem with such a contract system between the centre and the provinces is 
that it relies on ad hoc measures and bargaining power According to Takaya (1996), 
provincial governments have lobbied to obtain the concession of lower contributions to 
central finance and to gain approval for extra revenue for local finance. Secondly, the tax 
system linking the centre and the provinces has given the provinces dominance over 
taxation. Thirdly, the decline of central finance became obvious in the early 1990s. The 
share of central government in total revenue remained low until 1990. Until then, the 
contribution of local governments to state finance was more than 65% of total revenue.
In the early 1990s, the centre began to emphasise central co-ordination and management 
rather than local initiative and experimentation. For example, Premier Li Peng attempted to 
abolish the lump-sum transfer in order to raise central revenue in late 1990. Behind this 
initiative was the fact that the central government faced considerable economic hardship 
unless it could increase its income. Thus, it asked Guangdong to issue several billion 
RMBs worth of state bonds in the 1980s, and the extra contribution from Guangdong 
amounted to 1 billion RMB in 1990 (Cheung, 1998b: 46). The centre thus needed to 
introduce new measures to acquire central revenue without the intervention of the 
provinces. In 1994, the new taxation system, using a new classification of channels for the 
collection of tax revenue (fenshuizhi) (it classified central and local tax revenue by tax 
items), was implemented. In the 1990s, the central government’s share of revenue steadily 
increased, but at the same time local governments’ share of expenditure also increased, 
accounting for more than 70% of total expenditure in the 1990s (ZTN, 1999). Thus, despite 
the centre’s increasing power over tax collection, it made concessions to the spending 
power of local government.
Under the provincial level, local governments undertake the management of local firms 
usually through the establishment of a corporate body. For local governments under the
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county level, the revenue from local collective firms constitutes the mam source of local 
finance. For example, almost 30% of provincial, city and county levels of local 
government finance depend on budgetary compensation from central finance. On the other 
hand, township and village finance contributes directly to the upper levels of 
governments.'5 In turn, this finance depends on the revenue of local firms, especially 
TVEs, and the revenue of the provincial, city and county levels of government depends on 
the SOEs. Thus, local governments tend to have incentives to support local firms in order 
to increase revenue. Such budgetary restraint inevitably affects local developmental 
strategies and encourages governments to focus on local interests.
4.5.2 Enterprise Reform
Firms were allowed to retain a part of their profits if they adopted economic reform 
measures. In 1980, 6,600 SOEs were selected for an experimental scheme for profit 
retention. The bonus system was introduced to provide incentives for workers. In 
Guangdong, enterprise reform began in 1979 by giving more autonomy to management in 
decision making, and by paying a bonus scheme from retained excessive profits in 179 
large and medium-sized enterprises. In 1981, the contracted management responsibility 
system was widely adopted in the province. This meant that profits in excess of the 
remitted profit target were to be distributed among the enterprise, the government and the 
control unit. Taking into account Guangdong’s success, the centre introduced this system 
more widely from 1987 to 1991. However, the contracted management responsibility 
system was not able to exclude the intervention of the administrative organs because the 
target profit was agreed through negotiations with the government and control unit. In 
1992, the Regulations on the Shift of the Management Mechanism for the State-Owned 
Enterprises’ were issued to expand managerial authority in order to emphasise the 
separation of ownership and management. Furthermore, in the 1990s, a stock company 
system was introduced The abolition of price controls on industrial reform was also 
facilitated, and most controls have now been removed."’
In rural areas, the promotion of TVEs was the main focus of enterprise reform. The 
introduction of the contracted responsibility system, which allowed enterprises to retain 
surplus profit, encouraged the growth of TVEs and also helped to absorb surplus labour in
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rural areas. By 1998, Guangdong had 1,333,600 TVEs (Nihon Kokusai Boeki Sokushin 
Kyokai, 1999). As township and village finance depends on the revenue of TVEs, the 
situation of local finance is subject to the achievement of those enterprises. Guangdong’s 
TVEs enjoy a number of locational advantages: in particular, they are close to Hong Kong 
and many of them undertake production for foreign markets. In 1998, 31,436 TVEs were 
export-oriented and their total earnings of foreign exchange accounted for $US 17,300 
million (ibid ). Thus, by making it possible to gain resources for profit independently, 
enterprise reform has strengthened the fiscal autonomy of SNGs.
4.5.3 Legislative Decentralisation
The third policy component involves the decentralisation of legislative power to protect the 
economic management role of local governments. In the pre-reform period, as China’s 
Constitution was designed after the model of the Soviet Union, the localities were not 
given legislative power even on regional matters. In 1979, the second session of the Fifth 
National People’s Congress (NPC) issued two important laws. These introduced two-level 
legislation (hangji Ufa) in place of one-level legislation (at the centre) by granting the 
provincial People’s Congresses legislative power as long as their status did not contravene 
the Constitution, laws, policies, and orders of the state (Gong and Chen, 1994: 77). Later 
these new measures were incorporated in the 1982 Constitution, which contains the 
additional stipulation that provincial governments are permitted to formulate their own 
rules and regulations in line with state laws and the administrative regulations of the State 
Council These changes in the structure and functions of provincial governments and local 
People’s Congresses have given more autonomy to localities. In 1992, the Shenzhen’s 
People’s Congress was granted legislative power, a privileged treatment usually reserved 
for the provincial level (Cheung, 1994: 222). Legislative decentralisation is a process that 
aims to establish a multi-layered legislative authority including the central, provincial and 
sub-provincial levels. It has helped greatly to guarantee local autonomy from a legal point 
of view.
4.6 Beijing’s Control and Its Circumvention by Guangdong
Provincial leaders are appointed by the centre and are required to keep in line with the
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centre. However, at the same time, they have their own responsibility for economic 
development. Thus, it is natural to expect that when a common goal is pursued by the 
centre and the localities, conflicts will be less likely to occur than when each side pursues 
its own interests. This section considers whether the centre effectively controls Guangdong 
or whether the province is able to circumvent such control. In particular, it refers to the 
examples of GITIC (the Guangdong International Trust and Investment Corporation) and 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) issues.
4.6.1 Beijing's Control over Guangdong
Constitutionally China is a centralised state system and Guangdong is only a province, 
subordinate to central policies. However, Guangdong’s distinctive sub-culture, its history 
as a trading centre, its distance from Beijing and its proximity to Hong Kong and Macau 
have aroused suspicion among the central leaders. Traditionally, the centre’s interest has 
focused on the way in which localities maintain their own culture and languages, and 
regionalism has been seen as an expression of local egoism or separatism, and therefore as 
a potential threat to the centre. The centre has been very cautious about separatism and 
regionalism. Following the establishment of the PRC, during the next three decades 
Beijing sent leaders to control Guangdong. Except for Ye Jianying (Guangdong Party 
Secretary from August 1949 to May 1955) and Chen Yu (Guangdong Governor from 
August 1957 to the Cultural Revolution), none of Guangdong’s Party Secretaries and 
Governors were Cantonese. Even after Deng Xiaoping came to power in the late 1970s, 
Guangdong natives were not appointed to these top positions until 1985 when Ye 
Xuanping became Guangdong Governor. However, Guangdong is also seen as a power 
base for leaders. In the 1950s, Tao Zhu, provincial Party Leader (Guangdong Party 
Secretary from June 1955 to February 1965, bom in Hunan province, later Vice Premier), 
used the province as a springboard to establish himself as a powerful regional leader by 
closely following central policies (Cheung, 1998b: 25). Following Tao Zhu, Zhao Zhiyang 
(Guangdong Party Secretary: from February 1965 to the Cultural Revolution, later Prime 
Minister), who was Tao’s close associate, was put in charge of Guangdong. However, after 
Ye Xuanping, Guangdong held back from appointing native Cantonese as leaders. Xie Fei, 
bom in Guangdong and a close associate of Ye Xuanping, became Guangdong Party 
Secretary (1991-98). Zhu Senlin (a Shanghainese who built his career in Guangdong and a
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former mayor of Guangzhou), was nominated as Guangdong Governor (May 1991 to 
February 1996). Following him, Lui Ruihua, bom in Guangdong and a former Guangdong 
Vice Governor, was promoted to become Guangdong Governor (February 1996 - present). 
In the late 1990s, the centre reasserted its power of appointment by sending Li Changchun 
(former Henan Party Secretary, bom in Dalian) to become Guangdong Party Secretary in 
1998. At the same time, Huang Liman was transferred from the post of Jiang Zemin’s 
Secretary to the Vice Party Secretary, and the Vice Governor (Wang Qishan) was 
transferred from the post of chief executive of the Construction Bank of China (Zhongguo 
Jianshe Ymhung).
4.6.2 Guangdong in the Politics o f the Centre
According to the Constitution, the National People’s Congress (quanguo renmin daihiao 
dahui, NPC) is the highest authority in China (Article 2). In the case of the ninth People’s 
Congress (1998-2003), 2,979 representatives of provincial-level administrations and the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have been selected. The NPC is constitutionally allocated 
legislative power, decision-making power, the right to select government personnel, and 
the right to supervise the administrative and juridical organs. The composition of the NPC 
indicates how regional interests are represented at the centre. Despite the superiority of 
minority regions in terms of voting power per person, Guangdong province sends 166 
representatives to the ninth NPC (1998-2003), which accounts for 5.6% of the total number 
of NPC members. The provinces with large populations send a large number of delegates. 
Shandong province (population 88.83 million in 1999) sends 185 representatives and 
Henan province (population 93.87 million in 1999) sends 163. Among the leaders of the 
State Council, the leaders (Ministers or Chiefs) of departments and committees from 
Guangdong province are very few in number. In the ninth tenure period (1998-2003), only 
one person comes from Guangdong among 37 major positions. Jiangsu province sends 
nine persons to leading positions in the State Council, which is more than Beijing (2), 
Tianjin ( 1 ) and Shanghai (2) (Takahashi, 2001 ).
Politically, Guangdong is subject to the CCP’s ideological and organisational discipline. 
The CCP’s power is concentrated in the Political Bureau and the Central Committee, which 
are the highest authorities. Among the members of the 15th CCP Political Bureau
126
(1997-2002: 22 members and 2 candidate members), almost half are selected from the 
most powerful provinces.17 From Guangdong, Party Secretary Li Changchun was selected 
as a member of the 15th CCP Political Bureau.11* However, for the Standing Committee of 
the Political Bureau, no leader from Guangdong has been selected since Ye Jianying (10th, 
11th and 12th CCP Political Bureaux). Jiangsu province sends Jiang Zemin (General 
Secretary, President of the PRC) and Li Liangqing (Vice Premier) to the Standing 
Committee of the 15th Political Bureau, and Shandong province sends five members Thus, 
Guangdong’s presence in central political space is not very significant compared with that 
of other powerful provinces. Guangdong’s political power owes much to its economic 
power.
4.6.3 Guangdong and the Bankruptcy of GITIC
In October 1998, Guangdong’s largest non-bank financial institution, GITIC (the 
Guangdong International Trust and Investment Corporation), was suddenly declared 
bankrupt by the order of the People’s Bank of China (Zhongguo Renmin Ymhung. PBOC). 
GITIC was established in December 1980 and expanded its operations with the strong 
support of the Guangdong provincial government until 1998. In 1999, GITIC’s liabilities 
exceeding assets amounted to $US 1.8 billion, and the major loan providers and levels of 
debt were publicised: Japan ($US 443.17 million), South Korea ($US 206.75 million), 
Hong Kong ($US 169.02 million), France (SUS 144.77 million), Germany ($US 124.84 
million) and China ($US 103.65 million) (Mitsubishi, 1999: 166). The bankruptcy of 
GITIC soon gave rise to widespread international concern about China’s creditworthiness
In the first stage, the PBOC announced repayments to foreign-loan providers, and the 
Chairman of the PBOC, Dai Xianglong, confirmed this plan in November 1998. He was 
clearly concerned about the impact of the bankruptcy on foreign-loan providers and on 
inward FDI in China. However, in January 1999, Dai Xianglong withdrew his previous 
promise and stated that the bankrupt GITIC would be dealt with according to the 1986 law 
of bankruptcy. At the same time, he announced that the central government had no 
responsibility for debts to foreign-loan providers. This shift of policy revealed that the 
centre had finally decided to deal with this problem as one of financial structure, and to 
emphasise the importance of law and the market mechanism at the cost of foreign credit
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for China. The centre was concerned that Guangdong’s economic management was too 
flexible and had undesirable side effects such as corruption and smuggling. For example, in 
November 1998, the Supreme Court of Justice announced that RMB 440 million worth of 
smuggling had been undertaken by conspiracy among the Party Secretary at county level, 
the Chief of Public Security, the Chief of the Industrial and Commercial Bureau, and the 
Chief of the Crackdown on Smuggling Bureau in Huidong county in Guangdong 
(Mitsubishi, 1999: 200). In addition, in November 1998, the Guangdong provincial 
government revealed a case of smuggling in Zhanjiang, centred on the Chief Customs 
House. Thus, the centre began seriously to concern itself with the damage caused by illegal 
trading activities to state finance and the country’s development. The processes of dealing 
with the bankruptcy of G1T1C can be seen as a determined effort by the centre to hold back 
its control capability over Guangdong.
4.6.4 Intellectual Property Rights and Guangdong
The issue of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) has given rise to conflict between China 
and the United States (US) since the late 1980s. Despite the adoption of several laws on 
trademarks (1983, amended in 1993), copyright (1991) and patents (1985, amended in
1993), the US has criticised the practical effects of IPRs in China and has identified 
Guangdong province as the worst violator of IPRs in China (Isobe, 2000: 129). According 
to Isobe (2000), Guangdong province finally began to tackle the problem of violation of 
IPRs in the province in September 1995 The Guangdong Party Vice Secretary (Huang 
Huahua) was selected to head a leading taskforce to expose the level and scope of violation 
Despite evidence of large-scale production of pirated versions of CDs, LDs and computer 
soft-wares, Huang acknowledged the possibility that production of pirated versions could 
be repeated and criticised the local support given in some areas to illegal production. 
Guangdong province also began to introduce laws to prevent pirated versions. However, 
finding the pirate production sites was extremely difficult because they frequently moved 
to underground factories. In addition, at the level of local governments (county, township 
and basic units), local leaders offered protection to the production and sales of pirated 
copies, and hence the behaviour of these leaders towards the exposure of violation was 
negative.
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This example shows that decisions at the centre cannot always be carried out properly in 
localities. One of the main problems in this case is that of local protectionism, especially at 
the sub-provincial levels. As the local governments (under the county level) manage local 
firms (i.e. TVEs) and depend on the revenue of those firms, they are unlikely to accuse the 
producers of pirated versions who contribute to local finance. Moreover, producers of 
pirated goods are likely to offer bribes in order to gain tacit permission for the production 
and sales of pirated versions. As the public security sector belongs to local government, 
central orders cannot be carried out immediately. More fundamentally, China’s unique 
residence register system (hukou), restricting the movement of people between rural and 
urban areas, tends to encourage local leaders to act in the interests of localities (Hang,
1994). Thus, at the basic level, these factors create major obstacles to the resolution of the 
problem of IPRs. The centre’s control can reach the provincial-level government, but the 
centre does not have direct measures to control leaders at the basic level. The excessive 
concentration of power to local Party committees also makes it impossible for the state 
authorities (prosecutors) to intervene in local protectionism. Thus, at the level of local 
government (under the county level), the overwhelming dependence on the CCP’s political 
leadership cannot itself help to enforce IPRs, and local protectionism often results in 
efforts to circumvent central control.
4.7 Conclusion
The reform of China’s domestic governance along multi-level lines is the key mechanism 
through which the centre and SNGs have struggled to regain enforcement capacity and 
institutional legitimacy. The movement over the last two decades towards new forms of 
MLG in China has created a complex system of governance. From the state regulatory 
viewpoint, the establishment of various special zones has made it more difficult to identify 
intergovernmental relationships. In addition, there is now a much greater understanding 
and recognition of the political constraints on the reform of the constitutional state system. 
The CCP networks are extended along with the state institutions and still heavily constrain 
the functions of those institutions. This is very different from the way in which 
decentralisation is used to enhance local autonomy within a democratic state system. 
Stemming from China’s traditional Party-state integration, and developed through
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marketisation, the CCP itself is under pressure to commercialise, and the Party has already 
lost its constraining power over local cadres. Although the centre is the initial promoter 
and provider of reform processes, the forms of governance are being continuously 
reproduced and reshaped according to the practices of the key participant actors (the centre 
and localities in both state and Party organisations).
Perspectives drawn from the Open Door Policy and the changing structure and role of 
Guangdong province help us to understand the political dynamics of the emergence of new 
patterns of economic governance. The centre’s adoption of the Open Door policy towards 
Guangdong was based on ad hoc measures without adequate funds and resources. The role 
of Guangdong’s leadership (Party Secretaries and Governors) is thus vital in lobbying and 
gaining further concessions from the centre and representing Guangdong’s economic 
interests. Through the implementation of the Open Door Policy, central-local relations 
have been greatly influenced by the rapid increase of economic power of Guangdong, 
especially in bargaining with the centre. Guangdong’s growing fiscal power vis-a-vis the 
centre is remarkable, and enterprise reform and legal decentralisation also help to create a 
legitimate environment for the autonomous activities of SNGs. Guangdong succeeded in 
sending Cantonese leaders to the top ranks of provincial political authorities between the 
mid-1980s and late 1990s.
However, at the level of sub-provincial and sub-municipal-levels of governments, the 
influence of local factors has been more apparent than that o f national constitutional 
factors. Indeed, the establishment of SEZs and open economic areas, and decentralisation 
within Guangdong have further accelerated the deepening of the Open Door Policy down 
to local governments. The result is the increasing assertiveness and often circumventing 
behaviour of localities. The two exemplary cases (GIT1C and IPRs) examined above tell 
different stories of central control and the circumventing behaviour of localities in 
Guangdong In the case of GITIC, the centre succeeded in taking back its control capability 
over the Guangdong provincial-level government, but in the case of IPRs the centre is 
faced with the difficulty of controlling local governments (especially under the county 
level). In terms of economic governance, the Party is functionally almost redundant at the 
basic levels of government. This reveals that the sub-provincial and sub-municipal
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governments are less constrained by central control than by the control of the Guangdong 
provincial government. Another challenge to the central control capability over localities 
comes from the increasing gap between economic reality and national planning.
There is particular concern that ‘the institutional foundation underpinning a secure market 
system in China is far from rationalized and secure’ (Montinola, Yingyi Qian and Weingast, 
1995: 81). Thus, the transition to MLG involves both problems and opportunities for 
further development. As long as the ultimate aim of Chinese leaders has been development, 
diverse forms of MLG as political processes have been able to evolve. However, full-scale 
marketisation is not yet a reality and local protectionism remains a major obstacle. Thus, 
the main need is to co-ordinate the political and economic dimensions of MLG, and to 
thoroughly settle the relationships between the state and enterprises and between the 
central and local governments’ (Zhao and Zhang, 1999: 277). This is proving to be a 
difficult and complex process. No one can be certain what the future will bring. There are 
interesting debates concerning the possibility of a federal China emerging in the future and 
even suggestions that China already exhibits federalism in practice (Montinola, Qian and 
Weingast, 1995), but from the perspective of the present study a formal federal system 
might not be capable of accommodating the fluid and asymmetrical nature of MLG, and, 
moreover, even in a federal system (based perhaps on territorial provinces) there would 
have to be scope for the crucial role of cities and provincial sub-units. What makes it even 
more complicated is that the actors constituting China’s MLG now include foreign firms, 
which are not restricted by territorial governmental jurisdictions and levels of government. 
These firms, especially in Guangdong, have emerged as key actors in breaking down 
territorial jurisdictions through the creation of CPNs. The result is an increasing fluidity, 
complexity and diffusion of authority that does not fit neatly into the formal territorial 
patterns of China’s ‘official’ political and administrative structure. The overall impact of 
China’s new forms of MLG on micro-regionalisation across Guangdong, Taiwan and Japan, 
will emerge out of the continuous interactions of Guangdong's political context, national 
constitutional circumstances and changing external economic forces.
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1 For example, the Multilevel Governance Conference at the University of Sheffield, June 2001, discussed 
the wider applicability of the MLG concept
2 Prybyla (1996) schematically presents China’s administrative and hierarchical relations
3 The figures are based on China’s Fifth Census (October 2000). See Mitsubishi (2001).
4 At the end of 1949, there were 50 provincial-level units In 1959, the provinces were reduced to 29 in
number In 1967, provincial units numbered 30 See Hu, Shao, and Li (1989)
5 After 1983, 14 cities were designated central economic cities (jihuadanlie chengshi). Chongqing, Wuhan, 
Shenyang, Harbin, Ningbo, Dalian, Guangzhou, Xian, Qingdao, Shenzhen, Chendu, Changchun, Nanjing, 
Xiamen In 1999, Shenzhen, Qingdao, Ningbo, Dalian and Xiamen became CSPs However, other cities and 
capital cities have retained most of their administrative authority
6 This provides exemption from tariffs on imports in order to encourage production by foreign firms
7 For example, Cho (1998: 69) schematically explains how the Party’s leading role extends into the state
institutions and how vertical and horizontal state institutions interact
8 The main characteristics of the Soviet administrative system were: (1) the number of levels varied from 
region to region, (2) local governments were subordinate to the organ of power at the same level and also to 
the level of government immediately above them; and (3) the local governments had many departments 
dealing with different kinds of work See Chang (1995).
9 For example, under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership, the presidents of the PRC (Li Xiannian 1983-88, Yang 
Shangkun 1988-93) were not even ranked in the top three CCP's hierarchical authorities Deng Xiaoping held 
the top rank only at the military level and not at the level of the Party or state system
10 According to the lists of provincial Party Secretaries and Governors in 2000, almost 60% of provincial 
First Party Secretaries were transferred from other provinces and 60% of Governors were promoted from 
local elites See Yabuki (2000: 130-32).
11 Jiang Zemin stressed the need to establish the Party's leading system among private firms in May 2000 
(NKS, 5 July 2000).
12 Since 1992, Guangdong has been the top-ranking province in China See DKB, 
http /Avww dkb co.jp/houjin/report/china/200002/
13 Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin were allowed more restrictive variation in sharing total revenue’
14 The figure is from (ZTN, 1999).
15 For example, the rate of self-reliance of local finance at the provincial, city and county levels of 
government in 1999 was 72.3% Central government finance transferred RMB 213 8 billion to local 
government finance (provincial, city and county levels). The rate of township and village finance was 
1018% and these levels transferred RMB 2 6 billion to the provincial, city and county levels o f government 
See lmai Kenichi (2000)
16 In terms of the proportion of price controls in total sales between 1978 and 1992, production goods 
declined from 100% to 18%, consumption goods declined from 97% to 6%; and agricultural goods declined 
from 94% to 13%. See Amako et al (1999 109)
17 The Party Secretaries in Shanghai, Beijing, Shandong and Guangdong were selected as members of the 
Political Bureau
18 Xie Fei, a former Guangdong Party Governor, was selected as a member of the CCP Political Bureau but 
died in 1999
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CHAPTER 5
JAPANESE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND EAST ASIAN 
MICRO-REGIONALISATION
This chapter and the following chapter examine the international context of 
micro-regionalisation among Guangdong, Taiwan and Japan. The focus of this chapter is 
on the pattern and strategies of the Japanese manufacturing sector with particular reference 
to the electronics industry. In the world consumer electronics industry, the presence of 
Japanese firms is very strong. For example, Japanese firms dominate the following 
products (where the Japanese share of world production is more than 50%): VTRs, 
portable MDs, DVD players, car audios, fax machines, digital cameras, and many 
PC-related products (DVD-ROMs, etc.) (Jetoro Sensa, July 2001). Hitherto there has been 
little interest in examining the processes and consequences of spatial restructunng across 
southern China centred on the electronics industry from the perspective of the evolution of 
Japanese production networks in East Asia. In fact, Japanese firms have been the major 
contributors to the formation of innovative mechanisms and coordination among economic 
actors across boundaries.'
This chapter offers a micro-level focus on the organisation of production across national 
boundaries and employs the analytical concept of ‘cross-border production network" 
(CPN) to refer to ‘the inter- and intra-firm relationships through which the firm organizes 
the entire range of its business activities, from research and development (R&D) and 
product definition and design, to the supply of inputs, manufacturing (or production of a 
service), distribution and support services’ (Borrus, Ernst and Haggard, 2000a: 1). Section
5.1 discusses the role of the government in Japanese FDI, and the characteristics of home 
economic governance are discussed, especially in relation to Japanese ODA (official 
development assistance) and FTA (free trade agreement) policy. Section 5.2 offers an 
historical perspective on Japanese outward FDI. Japanese FDI in East Asia has continued 
to grow since the late 1980s, and, despite Japan's recession in the 1990s, this trend
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continues to accelerate. Section 5.3 presents the key characteristics of Japanese 
manufacturing FDI. The present analysis seeks to show that the expansion of Japanese FDI, 
especially manufacturing FDI, has had a huge impact on the development of a new 
hierarchical international and regional division of labour. Section 5.4 examines the 
processes of Japanese FDI in Hong Kong and China. Section 5.5 analyses the evolving 
governance of the CPNs led by Japanese electronics firms. Finally, Section 5.6 summarises 
the main arguments of this chapter.
5.1 The Political Economy of Japan's East Asian Policy
The relations between business and government are a crucial variable beanng upon 
economic performance (MacIntyre, 1994:1). Japan’s foreign economic policy has 
contributed to Japan's re-entry into East Asia. However, despite the sharp increase of 
Japanese FDI in East Asia since the late 1980s, until the late 1990s the Japanese 
government did not give official support for regional preferential trade arrangements. Less 
formally, Japanese ODA has been focused particularly on East Asia (see Table 5.1). 
Moreover, Japanese ODA has been the largest national source of overseas aid in the world 
since 1989 Japan has sought to use ODA to deepen political and economic links with the 
East Asian region and to support its overall political strategy.
Table 5.1 Destination of Japanese Bilateral ODA, 1980-1999 (%)
Region and Year 1980 1990 1997 1998 1999
Total ($US million) 1,961 6.941 6,613 8,606 10,498
Asia 70.5% 59.3% 46.5% 62.4% 63.2%
Middle East 10.4% 10.2% 7.»% 4.6% 5.2%
Africa 11.4% 114% 12.1% 11.0% 9.5%
Central and Southern America 6.0% 8 1% 10.8% 6.4% 7 8%
Oceania 0.6% 16% 24% 1.7% 1.3%
Europe - 2.3% 2.0% 1.7% 1.4%
Other (a) 1.2% 7.1% 18.3% 12.2% 11.7%
Note (a) includes items that cannot be categorised by region 
Source: 1MOFA) http://www mofa go jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/
5. /. I The Implementation o f Japanese ODA
While Japanese ODA is still the largest national source of overseas aid in the world, the
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specific characteristics of Japanese ÜDA are not well known. This is mainly because of the 
fragmentary implementation system of Japanese ODA and the ambiguous processes of 
ODA decision-making. Despite the lack of coordination across ministries (the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and 
many economic agencies), it can be said that the provision of Japanese ODA has a clear 
strategic, political and economic purpose based on the shared belief in the ‘flying geese’ 
model of development (Hook, G., 1996: 176). Japanese ODA has thus supported the 
expansion of Japanese firms in East Asia (Sôderberg, 1996). This is especially the case 
with M1T1 (the Ministry of International Trade and Industry became METI, the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry in January 2001), which seeks to enhance the vertical 
integration of the region’s economies into Japan’s own economic system on the basis of a 
regional division of labour (Shiraishi, 1997: 189-90). Nester (1989) argues that Japan gave 
its manufacturers a tremendous export subsidy which enabled them to capture markets 
from their foreign competitors. In the case of the electronics industry, in the 1980s MITI 
stressed the need for a shift to a knowledge-intensive industrial structure and used various 
measures to assist the Japanese computer firms to become global leaders (Matthews and 
Ravenhill, 1994: 50-58). Thus, Japanese ODA has a complicated purpose and various 
implementation institutions are involved.
Table 5.2 The Share of Japanese ODA in Total Aid to East Asian Countries, 
1988-1998 (%)
Country 1988 1 990 1992 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
C h in a 5 6 .3 5 1 .0 5 0 .6 61 8 5 4 .5 5 1 .6 4 7 .0 6 6 .0
In d o n e s ia 6 5  8 5 7 .2 6 8  8 5 6 9 6 8 .5 9 0 9 6 2  9 6 6 .6
P h ilip p in e 6 7  7 5 3 .3 6 7 0 6 2 8 5 5 .6 5 5  4 5 6  2 5 6 4
T h a ila n d 7 0 .2 5 7 .2 5 9 .5 7 0 4 8 0 7 8 2  7 7 7 9 6 2 .6
M ala y sia - 8 1 .3 8 0 .6 - 6 0 .7 - - 9 0  4
S in g a p o re 5 4 .3 - 83 .1 9 1 .0 97.1 - -
S o u th  K o re a - 92 .1 - - - - - -
Note blank does not necessarily mean zero
Sources: Gaimusho (1994) Wagakuni no Seifu Kaihatsu Knjo (Japan's ODA White Paper), Tokyo: Kokusai 
Kyoryoku Suishin linkai, and MOFA, http://www mofa go jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/
With the increase of Japanese ODA, the recipient countries have also enjoyed significant 
benefits. Indonesia has been the primary destination of Japanese ODA because of its 
natural resources and strategic location for shipping routes. China has emerged as another
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primary recipient of Japanese ODA since the 1980s. In 1998, all the top ten recipient 
countries were in Asia (MOFA). Thus, in these countries, the share of Japanese ODA in 
total aid is very high (see Table 5.2). However, as East Asian countries have large 
populations, the level of per capita assistance is small. For example, in Indonesia, the per 
capita level of Japanese ODA in 1994 was US$5, and in the case of China the figure was 
much smaller, only US$1 2
Japanese development assistance is now undertaken not only by the national government 
and ministries but also by NGOs and SNGs. While Japanese ODA led by the national 
government is seen to be inseparable from the country's economic interests, the idea of 
ODA as an international contribution has gradually gained acceptance among Japanese 
citizens. Japanese NGOs and SNGs have emerged as key actors to supplement the role of 
the national government. The number of Japanese NGOs undertaking foreign assistance 
projects reached 351 in 1995 (Saotome, 1997). The activities o f NGOs target grass-roots 
social and development projects such as the improvement of the medical environment, job 
training, and environmental protection. Moreover, the foreign relations of Japanese SNGs 
are often developed through ‘sister city’ relations. By 1998, 26.6% of Japanese local 
governments had entered into such links (Ichioka, 2000: 4). For example, Japanese 
prefectures -- the largest unit of local government had been involved in 30 ‘sister city’ 
programmes with China's provincial governments by 2000. ’ Despite the absence of formal 
diplomatic relations between Japan and Taiwan, nine Japanese local governments (cities, 
towns and villages) had such relations with Taiwan.4 Also, with the rise of Japan's 
conception of aid as an international contribution, the activities of Japanese SNGs in 
development assistance projects have increased. For example, Kitakyushu city has entered 
into environmental cooperation with its ‘sister city’, Dalian (China) (Saotome, 1997: 43). 
Thus, Japanese ODA has become diversified in terms of forms and processes, and has 
begun to contribute to the building of links with East Asia at various levels.
Japanese ODA has come under the pressure of budgetary restraint and domestic concern 
over the inefficiency of aid In 1998, it actually declined for the first time, due partly to the 
impact of the Japanese economic recession since the early 1990s, and partly to the 
emergence of a more inward-looking outlook among the Japanese population. There is
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anxiety, for example, that Japanese ODA does not necessarily lead to the development of 
friendly relations. The uncertainty over the role of Japanese ODA has raised the question 
of the effectiveness of aid to China. Despite the relinquishment of China’s war reparations 
claims in the Japan-China Joint Communique of 1972, Chinese officials often claim that 
Japanese ODA (reaching a total o f 6,000 billion yen -- including yen loans, donations and 
other types of assistance — between 1979 and 1999) has still not compensated for the 
damage in China caused by Japan’s invasion during the w ar Japanese ODA toward China 
is clearly not intended as war reparations, but the negative attitude towards ODA on both 
sides has cast doubts on future relations between the two countries (Watanabe, 2001). 
Moreover, according to MOFA’s plan for Japanese ODA in 2002 (NKS, 29 July 2001), as a 
result of a sharp increase of inward FDI in China, (especially in manufacturing), MOFA 
insists that China is now able to collect capital from the private sector and no longer suffers 
from a shortage of capital inflow compared with other developing countries like 
Indonesia/' It also stresses the need for better inter-ministerial communication and the 
avoidance of duplicated aid programmes. Furthermore, in the summer of 2001 MOFA 
began a series of town meetings to enable public debate over the efficient use of Japanese 
ODA. Now there is a need for much greater transparency of ODA. The decision-making 
processes through informal communication among business leaders, politicians and 
officials, which have been able to promote Japanese offshore businesses, need to be 
changed.
5.1.2 Japan’s Developmental Norms
Japan’s developmental state model, originally offered as an explanation of Japan's own 
economic success, was subsequently applied to explain the pattern of development of East 
Asia under the name of the flying geese' model (see Chapter 2). The argument is that 
under Japan’s leading role as a supplier of high technology, the East Asian countries are 
following in second- and third-tier positions. Japan itself has made constant progress in the 
shift of industrial production, moving from textiles, shipbuilding, steel and chemicals in 
the late 1950s and 1960s to consumer electronics and automobiles in the 1970s and 1980s, 
and then to high technology and computer and information industries in the 1990s (Hook et 
al., 2001: 199). The geographical shift from low-tech manufacture to more sophisticated 
products has continued in East Asia, as is illustrated by the cases of the shipping industry
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and electronics industry in South Korea. In the case of the electronics industry, portable 
cassettes, CD players, FDDs, and CD-ROMs were once produced in Japan, but during the 
1980s and 1990s they were produced increasingly in Taiwan and ASEAN. In ASEAN, the 
first production site was in Singapore and new sites such as Malaysia and Thailand were 
added (Kuroda, 2001: 192). In the technology-transfer processes, leading Japanese firms 
have played a major role. For example, when Samsung (one of the largest electrical goods 
firms in South Korea) shifted its primary products from textiles to electronics in the 1970s, 
the establishment of joint ventures with leading Japanese firms (Samsung-Sanyo in 1969 
and Samsung-NEC in 1970) was helpful in acquiring a number of different technologies in 
the production of electrical goods. These partners provided essential training for 
Samsung’s employees (Kim, 2000: 144-5).
The apparent success of the developmental state model in the 1980s influenced the 
Japanese policy-makers such as MITI and other economic ministries. The close 
cooperative relations between government and the private sector in Japan have been called 
the "developmental state’ (Johnson, 1982). According to Moon and Prasada (1994), the 
developmental state is ‘a state structure characterized by executive dominance, 
bureaucratic unity, and the technical competence of bureaucrats; a large pool of policy 
instruments, selective and strategic use of resources and instruments; and the political 
capability to insulate economic decision-making and implementation from contending 
political and social interest’. Bello (1998: 437) describes the East Asian model as an 
activist, interventionist state with strong government discipline of the market and the 
private sector, preferential access by domestic companies to the local market, and 
industrial targeting. In the case of the Japanese model of state intervention, MITI (or 
METI) has played a vital role, for example through government-business 
consensus-building, tax incentives, credit allocation through the Bank o f Japan, financial 
intermediation, import and foreign investment controls, the licensing of foreign-technology 
imports, and direct subsidies to research and development projects (Kuznets, 2000: 50). 
Japan’s developmental model has since been transferred to East Asia because of its 
effectiveness in bringing the state and the private sector together to achieve economic 
growth.7
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However, Porter and Takeuchi (2000) conclude that the Japanese ministerial elite model 
has resulted in excessive intervention in industry, thereby hindering productivity and 
prosperity. They identify 12 interventionist policy factors in this model.8 Successful cases 
of state intervention include the electronics industry (IC, VTR, facsimile machines, home 
audio visuals, car-audios, type-writers, and satellite communication machines). However, 
the authors point out that this model is more applicable to cases of unsuccessful industries 
such as securities, aircraft, chemicals, software, detergents, clothing, and the chocolate 
industry (Porter and Takeuchi, 2000: 61). MITI’s intervention has often failed. When 
Honda (one of the leading Japanese automobile makers) sought to participate in the 
automobile industry in the 1960s, MITI obstructed Honda’s entry because it had a reform 
plan to reduce the number of car producers into two or three major groups (ibid.: 59).
While the Japanese ‘developmental state' model and its ODA strategies have traditionally 
been closely associated with the concept of Japan as a leader in East Asia, its conceptual 
foundation was increasingly challenged in the 1990s. With the collapse of the bubble 
economy and an ensuing long-term recession, Japan became an example of confusion and 
paralysis (Funabashi, 2000-2001: 77). Japan’s ‘developmental state’ model has not 
promoted a new leading exporting industry after the electronics industry. Its leading role 
has also been challenged by the emergence of new economic realities, including China’s 
remarkable economic growth and the rapid development of information and 
communication technologies in East Asian countries (Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan). 
The rise o f global competition has had a fundamental impact on the traditional role of the 
government. Japan's conventional governmental-Ied projects are now being replaced by 
private-sector initiatives, especially in FDI.
5.1.3 Japan and East Asian Regionalism
Though Japanese ODA has been linked to the norm of Japan as a leader in East Asia, the 
actual strategies of Japan’s formal foreign trade policy have not necessarily been consistent 
with this norm. Japan has followed the line with the GATT and WTO system as a pillar of 
trade liberalisation. While Japan acknowledges the positive effects of FTAs (free trade 
agreements) and RTA (regional trade agreements), it has been more concerned with the 
potential risk of protectionism. Thus Japan exhibited a negative attitude towards FTAs until
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the late 1990s except for its engagement with APEC, which stressed openness toward 
outsiders.
By 2000, the number of FTAs reported to the WTO reached 214.9 However, Japan, China, 
South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan -- all Hast Asian countries — are major economies 
that do not participate in FTAs. The Asian Financial Crisis revealed the defects of existing 
regional institutions (especially APEC) as a defense against the recurrence of economic 
crisis. Also, in the enforcement plan for liberalisation, APEC has not yet had any visible 
effect (Yamazawa, 2001: 12). Thus, FTAs are increasingly seen to be a more pragmatic 
means of promoting liberalisation. MITI’s While Paper in 1999 acknowledged the 
importance of FTAs as a step toward the development of a multilateral trading system. It 
highlighted the positive effects of regional agreements on the expansion of trade and 
investment, the harmonisation of the domestic institutional environment, and the 
strengthening of the system of multilateral trading functions FTAs can be seen as a 
supplementary, pragmatic approach that can contribute to the development of a multilateral 
trading system. The While Paper 1999 proposed that Japan actively needed to offer a 
model of regional cooperation and integration (Ehashi, 2001). While the major strategies 
still stress the role of a multilateral trading system, Japan has started to act more positively 
toward FTAs and RTAs as key strategies for promoting foreign trade
In June 1998, Japan received an offer from Mexico to form a new FTA, and co-research 
began in February 1999. Similar offers followed from South Korea in December 1998, 
Chile in November 1999, and Singapore in March 2000, following the agreement between 
the two prime ministers in December 1999."' Among them, the most advanced project is 
that with Singapore, and there is hope for a formal FTA agreement in early 2002.11 
Because Singapore does not have an agricultural sector, there are fewer obstacles. However, 
the proposed FTA will have only a limited effect on the two economies, since Singapore’s 
customs duty rate is almost zero and Japan’s customs duty on industrial products is only 
1.5% (Ehashi, 2001). What is important is that Japan and Singapore see the FTA as a 
useful measure against China (Kikuchi, 2001).
Secondly, Japan’s foreign policy toward RTAs in terms of relations with the ASEAN+3 has
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revealed internal inconsistency, ministerial confusion and lack of strategy. In 1990, 
Malaysia’s Prime Minister proposed the establishment o f an EAEG (East Asian Economic 
Group). The US and Japan opposed this idea because it might damage the position of the 
US in Hast Asia. In 1991, the EAEG proposal was adopted by ASEAN under a new name 
— EAEC (East Asian Economic Caucus) — as a sub-organisation of APEC under US 
pressure. In 1994, MOFA decided that Japan’s participation in EAEC needed the support of 
Australia and the US. Japan was asked by Australia to accept Australia’s participation in 
EAEC. This was rejected by ASEAN. In March 1996, Japan announced its 
non-participation in EAEC at an ASEM meeting in Bangkok. Japan’s invitation to the 
Mekon Development Ministerial Meeting (June 1996), organised by the ASEAN, was then 
cancelled. That meeting was held between ASEAN and China. Japan then announced its 
participation in the ASEAN+3 meeting (July 1996). At the first ASEAN+3 Summit 
(December 1997), the Japanese Prime Minister, Hashimoto, opposed the proposal to 
establish this summit as a regular event. At the second ASEAN+3 Summit (December, 
1998), the Japanese Prime Minister, Obuchi, was more positive than Hashimoto about 
getting involved in EAEC. However, as far as the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers Meeting 
was concerned, Japan was requested to oppose it by the US (through MOFA), and thus 
Obuchi had no choice but to do so. At the same time, MOF was a strong supporter of the 
Finance Ministers Meeting. When the Asian Financial Crisis (1997) occurred, regional 
organisations, such as APEC, were not able to respond This time MOF’s plan for setting 
up an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) was opposed by the US, but MOF continued to insist 
on the need to achieve close financial cooperation in East Asia. As a result, the Finance 
Ministers Meeting was held in April 1999 and in May 2000 it agreed to financial 
cooperation among the ASEAN+3. Thus, Japan’s RTA policy is now hindered by 
ministerial fragmentation, external intervention and the lack of a consolidated strategy.
5.2 An Historical Perspective on Japanese FDI
Section 5.1 demonstrated how Japanese ODA policy has remained an important supportive 
tool for the expansion of Japanese FDI in East Asia In Section 5.2 we look in more detail 
at the changing geographical patterns of that investment since the end of the Second World 
War. First of all, it is essential to place those patterns in a broader regional and global
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context. At the regional level, a new international division of labour based on national 
economies is partly being replaced by a division of labour rooted in regional and inter-firm 
networks. Of particular significance in terms of the present study is the declining role of 
the state in the global economy and the rise of new patterns of cross-border economic 
activities centred on the role of sub-state or sub-national activity in enhancing relations 
with external actors. Economic globalisation promotes more intense industrial competition 
among firms, and this competition is most visible at the regional scale, where specific 
industrial infrastructures and economic conditions shape patterns of cross-border 
interaction. Thus far, the Japanese economic presence in East Asia has been explained in 
terms of trade and investment links (e g. the ‘flying geese’ model) and product cycle 
models, and by emphasising the importance of political and economic structural 
dependency (Cumings, 1987).12 With the rise of global competition, firms have revised 
their production systems and moved towards more efficient production and procurement. 
An international division of labour based on national economies is being replaced by a 
division of labour rooted in regional, intra- and inter-firm networks.
Japanese FDI has contributed greatly to the rebuilding of economic links between Japan 
and East Asia at the micro level. In the late 1980s, Japan emerged as one of the largest 
sources of FDI after the United States Japanese outward FDI accounted for between 11% 
and 13% of the world total outward FDI between 1989 and 1995.11 East Asia (NIEs, 
ASEAN 4 and China) is the major destination of Japanese FDI after the US and Europe 
(see Table 5.3). The development of interdependence between Japan and East Asia owes 
much to the shift of Japanese manufacturing industry from an export-led strategy (with 
production in Japan) to offshore production that followed the appreciation of the Japanese 
yen in the late 1980s In particular, the establishment of offshore production in the 
Japanese electronics industry has done much to create a new international division of 
labour and system of production networks.
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Table 5.3 The Dispersion of Japanese FDI by Country and Region, 1979-2000 (% of 
Total)
C o u n t r y  a n d  
R e g io n
¡979-83
average
1984-90
average
1991-93
average
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
N o r th  A m e r i c a 3 2 .4 4 7 4 4 3 .6 4 3 .3 4 5 .2 4 7 9 3 9 6 2 6 .9 37.1 2 5 .3
U n ite d  S ta te s 3 0 .4 4 5 .7 4 1 .7 4 2  1 4 4  1 4 5 .8 3 8 .5 2 5 .3 3 3 .4 2 5 .0
M id d le  a n d  S o u th  
A m e r ic a
18 4 11.9 8 .4 1 2 8 7.5 9 .3 11 .7 15 9 11.2 1 0 8
A sia 2 5 .3 12.5 17 .0 2 3 .6 2 4 .0 2 4 .2 2 2 .6 16 .0 10.7 12.2
C h in a 0 .2 I I 3 .0 6 .3 8 .7 5 .2 3 .7 2 .6 11 2 .0
N IE s 10.4 6 .9 5  9 7 .7 6 .3 7 .4 6 3 4 .3 4 .8 5 .5
T a iw an - - - 0 .7 0 9 I I 0 8 0 .5 0 4 1.0
H o n g  K o n g - - - 2 .8 2 .2 3 .1 1.3 1.5 1.5 1 .9
S o u th  K o re a - - - 1.0 0 9 0 9 0 8 0  7 1.5 1 7
S in g a p o re - - - 2 .6 2 .3 2 .3 3 .4 1.6 1.4 0 .9
•A S E A N  4 1 4 4 4 .3 7 .8 9 .3 8 .0 1 0 3 10 .7 8 .2 4 3 4 .2
E u r o p e 1 0 8 2 0 .9 2 1 .8 15 2 16.7 15.3 2 0  8 3 4 4 3 8 .7 5 0 2
O th e r  A r e a s 13.1 7 .3 9 .2 5.1 6 .6 3 .3 5 .3 6 .8 2 .3 1.5
T o ta l 10 0  0 100 0 10 0  0 100 0 100 0 100 0 10 0  0 10 0  0 100 0 1 0 0 .0
Note According to the categorisation of the MOF (Ministry of Finance), North America comprises the US 
and Canada; Europe comprises all European countries; ‘other areas’ refers to Africa and Oceania ASEAN 4 
includes Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and Philippines Kaku's data after 1994 are miscalculated, so the data 
from the MOF are used instead
Sources Kaku, Shishi (Guo Sizhi) (1999) Nihon no lai Chugoku Chokusel.su Tiishi (Japanese FDI in China), 
Tokyo: Meitoku Shuppansha, p 84 and MOF, http //www mof go jp/fdi/k008h2 htm/
5.2. ! Post-war Japanese Outward FDI
Japanese outward FDI in the early post-war period was shaped by the emergence of a new 
political and economic order, and the requirements of Japan's war reparations. Cumings 
(1987) stresses that the régionalisation of production in East Asia can be traced back to the 
Japanese colonial period. However, post-war Japanese outward FDI did not focus on 
Japan’s former imperial territories (Korea, Taiwan and Manchuria). Rather, it started up in 
south Asia (India and Pakistan) and southeast Asia (the Philippines and Indonesia) in the 
early 1950s. One reason for this is that there was severe anti-Japanese feeling in Northeast 
Asia. While the outbreak of the Korean War (June 1950) brought about an economic boom 
in Japan because of the need for special procurement, the start of fighting between the US 
and China resulted in heavy restrictions on Japan’s trade with China.
The first country to which Japan agreed to pay war reparations was Burma (now Myanmar)
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in 1954. Hitachi, one of the leading Japanese electronics firms, won a contract for three 
water hydraulic motors for power plants to supply 80% of the capital’s electricity. In 
Burma, war reparations focused on transportation machinery and contributed especially to 
the exports of the Japanese shipping industry (Kobayashi, 2000: 64). This combination of 
war reparations and economic aid (along with the purchase of Japanese goods) became the 
initial model for Japan’s war reparations strategy. The visit of the Prime Minister, Kishi 
Nobusuke, to southeast Asia in February 1957 was a turning-point for Japanese firms’ 
advance in southeast Asia. He proposed the establishment of an Asian Development Fund 
(ADF) to support social and economic development in Asia.14 However, until 1972, 
because of the existence of exchange controls and the restrictions on outward FD1, 
Japanese FDI remained limited in scale. The Nixon Shock (August 1971) and the end of 
the fixed exchange rate resulted in the appreciation of the Japanese currency (yen duka) ' \  
and the first oil shock of 1973 increased energy and production costs for corporations 
inside Japan. These factors inevitably raised the pressure on Japanese industries and 
encouraged Japanese manufacturing firms utilising an export-oriented strategy to move 
their production sites abroad.
5.2.2 The Plaza Agreement and Japanese T'DI
The significant expansion of Japanese outward FDI began in the late 1980s, greatly 
assisted by the 1985 Plaza Agreement16, which stemmed from the trade tension between 
the US and major trading partners (European countries and Japan), and from the rise of 
protectionism in the US. The agreement established a coordinated strategy to push down 
the dollar vis-à-vis the currencies of America’s major partners. This resulted in the 
appreciation of the Japanese yen against the US dollar and, to a lesser extent, against the 
major European currencies. The cost effectiveness of production for exports sharply 
decreased, and the loss of international competitiveness encouraged Japanese firms to 
move to the East Asian NIEs, ASEAN, the US, Europe and central and south America. The 
original tensions between Japan and the US were quickly extended to South Korea and 
Taiwan, which enhanced their competitiveness vis-à-vis Japanese firms. The Reagan 
administration and the US Congress were then faced with pressure for currency 
appreciation and the liberalisation of access to these countries’ markets because of a sharp 
increase of imports from these countries. The increase of voluntary export restraints and
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non-tariff barriers by the US restricted access to the US market. Furthermore, the 
currencies of South Korea and Taiwan were revalued.17 In addition, South Korea and 
Taiwan brought the generalised system of preference (GSP)18 to an end in 1989. The 
currencies of ASEAN and China depreciated after the Plaza Agreement, and these 
countries became more attractive as export platforms for Japanese FDI.19 Japanese FD1 
subsequently expanded in quantitative terms: its average level between 1979 and 1983 was 
$US 2.2 billion per year, and this jumped to $US 16.9 billion between 1984 and 1990 ‘" In 
the four-year period 1986-89 Japanese FDI increased at an average annual rate in excess of 
50%.
In terms of the destination of Japanese outward FDI, Table 5.3 shows that the US was the 
largest single destination until it was overtaken by European countries in 1998."' Japanese 
outward FDI in East Asia accounted for more than 20% of the total until the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997. In 2000, Japanese outward FDI in Asia did not fully recover. In 
that year, Europe was the major destination of Japanese outward FDI, accounting for more 
than 50% of the total. In particular, the UK was the single largest destination — far ahead of 
other countries.22 The NIEs and the ASEAN 4 were the largest destinations of Japanese 
FDI in the 1980s. China has steadily gained in importance as a destination of Japanese FDI, 
and in 1995 ranked above the NIEs and the ASEAN 4. However, since 1996, Japanese FDI 
to the NIEs and the ASEAN 4 has exceeded FDI to China. It should be stressed, though, 
that this does not reflect the real flow of FDI. One reason is that it overlooks the 
reinvestment activities of Japanese subsidiaries. Another reason is the increase of 
reinvestment or ‘roundabout’ FDI through Central American island countries such as the 
Cayman Islands. For example, Japanese FDI to the Cayman Islands accounted for 11% of 
total Japanese outward FDI in 1998, 3.4% in 1999 and 5.6% in 2 0 0 0 . Thus, it is 
important not to heavily rely on the official statistics for the patterns and contents of 
Japanese production networks.
From the perspective of the recipient countries, Japanese FDI has been an undisputed 
major source of inward FDI. For example, according to Chinese statistics, the average 
share of Japanese FDI in total inward FDI in China between 1986 and 1999 was 9.53%."4 
In the case of Taiwan, the average share of Japanese FDI in Taiwan’s total inward
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investment between 1952 and 1999 was 22.9%, and in the late 1990s it was slightly lower: 
at an average of 17.6% between 1995 and 1999.:> In the case of South Korea, the share of 
Japanese FD1 was 11.26% in 1999 and 15.6% in 2 0 0 0 . In Hong Kong, although there are 
no official data on inward FD1, in 2000 the number of Japanese regional headquarters in 
Hong Kong accounted for 14.7% of total foreign regional headquarters in Hong Kong."7
5.3 The Main Characteristics of Japanese FDI
Japan is a manufacturing country. In 1997, manufacturing industry’s share of Japan’s GDP 
was 24.23%.2x But the share of manufactures in Japan’s exports in 1999 was 94% (World 
Development Indicators). The leading top ten manufacturing firms (Toyota, Honda, Sony, 
etc.) account for almost 30% of Japan’s total exports (NKS, 28 July 2001). The electronics 
industry is Japan’s largest single exporting sector. In 1998, exports of electronics products 
accounted for 30.41% of total exports. The increase of Japanese manufacturing FDI has 
transformed Japanese manufacturing industry from an export-oriented industry (with 
production in Japan) to an industry based on offshore production. The amount of offshore 
production by Japanese firms already exceeds domestic production (NKS, 28 July 2001). 
The shift of offshore production in lEast Asia has dramatically increased intra- and 
inter-firm trade between Japan and East Asia.
5.3.1 Manufacturing FDI and Trade
According to data of MOF (the Japanese Ministry of Finance), although 
non-manufacturing FDI (finance, insurance and services, etc.) was also a major source of 
Japanese FDI in the 1990s, electronics FDI was the largest sector in Japanese 
manufacturing FDI. In Asia, manufacturing FDI was dominant in the 1990s. In Asia the 
average share o f Japanese manufacturing FDI between 1990 and 2000 achieved 55.6% of 
total Japanese FDI in Asia.29 This indicates that Japanese electronics FDI in East Asia was 
high compared with the world share of Japanese electronics FDI. According to Kaku 
(1999: 100-103), from 1987 to 1996, 63% of Japanese FDI in ASEAN was in 
manufacturing. In the case of China, until the 1980s, the proportion of Japanese 
manufacturing FDI was low, but from 1991 to 1996 it jumped to 74%. Corresponding to 
the shift of manufacturing bases in East Asia, the NIEs were the largest recipients of
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Japanese FDI from 1985 to 1987. Then ASEAN took over the leading position as a 
recipient of Japanese outward FDI in East Asia. By 1995, the numbers of Japanese 
subsidiaries among manufacturing firms in ASEAN were: 385 in the electronics industry; 
230 in the chemical industry, 163 in the automobile industry (including components); and 
128 in the textile industry (Nakagawa, 1997: 15).
The increase of Japanese manufacturing FDI has produced a distinctive pattern of trade 
relations between Japan and East Asia. According to the data based on Hook et al. (2001) 
and Tsusansho (2000), while the US has continued to be Japan's single largest trading 
partner, its share has varied, and the EU and East Asia have steadily increased their shares 
of Japan’s trade. In 1999, Taiwan was the second largest destination of Japan's exports. In 
the same year, China ranked third and South Korea fourth. In imports, China has sharply 
increased its presence in the late 1990s. It was the second largest destination for Japan's 
imports in 1999 and South Korea was ranked third. By 1998, Japan had become the largest 
national individual trade partner for China and Indonesia, the second largest for South 
Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines, and the third largest for Singapore 
and Hong Kong (Hook, et al., 2001: 197).
Except for China and Indonesia, other East Asian countries have had huge trade deficits 
with Japan. China has enjoyed a huge trade surplus ($US 24.77 billion in 2000 according 
to Japanese figures: Keizai Sangyo Sho: hereafter Keisansho, 2001), especially in textiles, 
and Indonesia has been a main supplier of natural resources for Japan. This indicates that 
East Asian countries have been less successful in penetrating the Japanese market. The 
East Asian NIEs have constantly had the largest trade deficits with Japan — at around $US 
68.19 billion in 2000 (Keisansho, 2001). Malaysia and the Philippines, which enjoyed 
trade surpluses with Japan in the 1970s and 1980s, now display the same patterns as those 
of the NIEs. ASEAN has had trade deficits with Japan -- at around SUS 8.92 billion in 
2000 (Keisansho, 2001). Thus, the ASEAN countries have followed the same pattern as the 
NIEs in terms of trade with Japan.
The trade deficits of East Asian countries are due mainly to the performance of 
manufacturing imports and exports such as electronics, transport and precision machinery.
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Table 5.4 shows the manufactured goods trade between Japan and East Asia. In the NIEs, 
the trade deficit in manufactured goods is a main contribution to the trade deficit with 
Japan as a whole. In 1998, Japan was the largest single source of imports for Taiwan 
(25.8% of its total imports), China (20.4%), Thailand (25.7%), Singapore (17.7%), 
Malaysia (22.0%), the Philippines (25.1%) and Indonesia (19.9%), and the second largest 
source of imports for Hong Kong (13.7% of total imports) and South Korea (18.1%).10 It 
is apparent that Japan has been dominant in many manufacturing sectors in East Asia. On 
the other hand, the US has continued to be the single largest trading partner for many East 
Asian countries. In 1998, the US was the largest source of exports for South Korea (17.2% 
of total exports), Taiwan (26.6%), Thailand (22.3%), Malaysia (21.6%), the Philippines 
(21.6%) and Singapore (19.9%). Japan also relies heavily on the US market (29.7% of its 
total exports in 2000)", and manufacturing exports contribute significantly to Japan’s trade 
surplus. In the 1990s, a triangular trade pattern emerged. According to Tsusansho (2000: 
126), Japan enjoys a trade surplus with both East Asia and the US, but East Asia 
compensates for its trade deficit with Japan by a trade surplus with the US. Both Japanese 
and East Asian exports depend on the US market.
Table 5.4 Japan's Manufacturing Trade with East Asia, 1999 ($(JS million)
C o u n t r y  a n d  
R e g io n
J a p a n 's
M a n u fa c tu rin g
E x p o rt
J a p a n 's
M a n u fa c tu r in g
Im p o rts
J a p a n 's  T ra d e  B a la n c e
M a n u fa c tu r in g  T ra d e T o ta l T ra d e
C h in a 2 2 ,7 7 7 3 5 ,2 0 2 -1 2 ,4 2 5 -1 9 .6 5 3
H o n g  K o n g 2 1 ,5 8 1 1.689 19.891 2 0 ,3 5 9
T aiw an 2 8 .1 7 0 1 1 .499 16,671 1 6 ,145
S o u th  K o rea 2 2 .2 7 9 1 1 ,966 1 0 .3 1 3 6 .9 0 7
S in g ap o re 16 ,177 4 .8 0 5 1 1 .372 1 0 ,902
M ala y sia 11.072 7 ,6 7 0 3 .4 0 2 199
T ha ilan d 11,175 6 .1 3 2 5 ,0 4 3 2 .4 6 6
P h ilip p in es 8 ,7 4 2 4 ,2 3 3 4 ,5 0 9 3 ,4 5 6
In d o n es ia 4 ,7 4 9 4 .491 2 5 8 -7 ,7 2 6
US 127,771 4 8 ,8 5 6 7 8 ,9 1 5 6 1 ,4 6 0
Source The figures are the researcher's calculations using data from Tsusansho (2000) Tsusho Hakusho 2000 
(White Paper on Commerce and Trade). Tokyo Okurasho Insatsukyoku
The share of East Asia (NIEs, ASEAN and China) in Japan’s foreign trade has grown 
significantly. In 1980, the share of these countries in Japan’s exports was 25.7%, the share 
of the US was 24.46%, and that of European developed countries was 16.27%. ’2 The share
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of East Asia in Japan’s foreign trade increased to 29.61% in 1990, corresponding to the 
increase of manufacturing FDI. In 1998, East Asia accounted for 33.16% of Japan’s total 
exports (compared with the US 30.86%, and European developed countries33 19.4%). 
Japan’s imports from the NIEs, the ASEAN and China have also increased. In 1980, the 
share of East Asia in Japan s imports was 22.36% and this increased to 34.85% in 1998.34 
In other East Asian countries, there is a similar trend. The share of the East Asian countries 
(including Japan) in Taiwan’s exports was 25.63% in 1980 and this increased to 41.9% in 
1998. The share of East Asian countries in Taiwan’s imports was 33.78% in 1980 and this 
increased to 47.12% in 1998. The share of East Asian countries in China’s exports was 
52.44% (compared with Japan 22.07% and Hong Kong 23.83%) in 1980, and this 
decreased to 47.88% (compared with Japan 16.17% and Hong Kong 21.11%) in 1998. In 
1980, the share of East Asian countries in China’s imports was 32.71% (Japan dominated 
the share with 26.44%) and this increased to 56.31% (Japan 20.18%) in 1998.35
5.3.2 Intra- and Inter-Firm Trade
The growth of intra-and inter-firm trade is a major cause of the expansion of foreign trade 
between Japan and East Asia. In the case of Japan-China trade, almost 60% of China’s 
exports to Japan are undertaken by Japanese subsidiaries or joint ventures in China (Sho, 
2001: 30). In the case of the Japanese electronics industry in China, the finished products 
have often been exported to Japan, the US and the EU. For example, in 1992, the trade of 
the affiliates of Japanese electronics firms in Asia was largely dominated by intra-firm 
trade: 85% of the affiliates’ purchases and almost 90% of sales were intra-firm trade (Ernst, 
2000a: 83). Thus, East Asian economic interdependence has reflected the growth of 
Japan-centred production networks through the procurement activities of manufacturing 
firms.
The increase of intra-firm trade in the electronics industry has also had a distinctive impact 
on the triangular trade among Japan, East Asia and the US. East Asia has rapidly gained 
importance as a PC-related production site. According to Tsusansho (2000: 126), while the 
share of Japanese PC-related exports in total Japanese exports to the US declined between 
1990 and 1998 (4.5% to 4.0%), the share of East Asian PC-related exports to Japan and the 
US increased rapidly (0.8% to 3.1% to Japan, 2.7% to 6.6% to the US). Thus, Japanese
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manufacturing trade, especially electronics FD1, has contributed to the development of a 
distinctive pattern of international trade The triangular trade has also changed with the 
shift of production sites from Japan to East Asia.
Figure 5.1 The Cross-Border Production Networks for Electric Fans, Matsushita 
Electric Industrial in ASEAN
Products
Source Horaguchi, Haruo (2000) ‘Takokuseki kigvo no kokusai bungyo taisei to AFTA Nikkei denshi, 
denki sangyo no d5ko o chushin ni' (International division of labour of multinational corporations and 
AFTA: The trend of Japanese electronics and electrical industry), in T Maruya ed (2000) Ajia Kokusai 
Bungyo Saihen to (iaikoku Chokusetsu Toshi no Yakuwari (Rearrangement of Asian International Division of 
Labour and the Role of FD1), Chiba (Japan) Ajia Keizai Kenkyusho, p 121
Another important impact of Japanese FDI is its outstanding role in promoting industrial 
integration and liberalisation in East Asia. In ASEAN, for example, under the ASEAN 
Industrial Cooperation Scheme (AICO), which was started in 1996 and was regarded as a 
direct predecessor of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), Japanese manufacturers are the 
most important players among all the multinational firms in terms of not only their 
contribution to deeper industrial integration in the ASEAN region but also their role as the 
most powerful pressure group for liberalisation (Legewie, 2000). AICO plans to exempt 
customs on imports and exports of components and products within the ASEAN region. 
Matsushita Electric Industrial and Sony were approved to use the AICO scheme by 2000. 
For example, Matsushita uses a mutual supply system for components and products by 
using the AICO scheme. Figure 5.1 shows Matsushita’s production networks in the electric 
fan industry across the ASEAN. Matsushita’s subsidiaries in the ASEAN undertake 
export-oriented production. A production base in the ASEAN is very important for
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Japanese manufacturers, because they do not have any other cheap production base outside 
Asia. Japanese manufacturers need to pursue the rationalisation of the production system in 
their key production locations.
5.3.3 The Location and Local Sourcing of Japanese h'DI
Locational decisions are of vital importance for manufacturing firms, since such firms are 
not very mobile. ASEAN is seen primarily as an export base.36 China is selected for a 
variety of reasons, including better access to the domestic market, the expectation of high 
growth rates, cheap labour, low-cost materials, as well as its suitability as an export base. 
One of the main purposes of offshore production in China is to bring the products back to 
Japan. These production sites are established in the Yangtze River Delta, Tianjin, Dalian 
and Qingdao, all of which are relatively close to Japan (Kuroda, 2001: 232). In terms of 
opportunities for preferential treatment, the advantages of ASEAN are placed higher than 
those of China.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, compared with the subsidiaries of other MNCs, the 
subsidiaries of Japanese firms depended much more on imported capital goods and 
components from Japan (Ernst and Ravenhill, 2000: 231). According to the study by 
Kaburagi, Noda and Ikehara (2000), in the electronics industry in ASEAN the local 
procurement rate by Japanese firms is higher than in other industries. In 1998, Japanese 
electronics firms in the ASEAN 4 exported 61.3% of their production, and by 1999 the 
figure had increased to 70.3%. The electronics industry is keen to expand the proportion of 
local procurement. For example, NEC and Fujitsu sell low-price personal computers, 
which use 96%-100% Asian components (Ishii, 1996: 24). This example highlights the 
impact of globalisation on the supply of components and helps to explain why the 
proportion of overseas production in Japan’s manufacturing industry continues to rise at 
the same time as production in Japan is declining.
Belderbos’s study (1997) of decisions by Japanese electronics MNCs to invest abroad 
suggests that inter-firm linkages are the major determinants of decisions to invest in 
Southeast Asia. This is because the regional core networks established by the major 
electronics firms are vitally important in reducing the barriers that prevent related firms
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from setting up manufacturing plants there. It is worth noting that almost half of Japanese 
FDI is by SMEs, and the main inducements for investment abroad in such cases are the use 
of local labour and local sales, and the need for a production base to export to Japan. 
According to research by Japan’s Economic Planning Agency, SMEs are more sensitive 
than large firms to the cost of labour and the conditions of business infrastructure 
(Economic Research, June 1998). According to research on Japanese SMEs, good 
infrastructure, the degree of industrial agglomeration, and the stability of the government 
are also considered to be very important factors (ibid.). Also the costs of production-related 
factors are still very important for Japanese manufacturers. Despite the pace of economic 
development in China, factory workers’ salaries in Yokohama (Japan) are 32 times the 
level of salaries in Shenzhen (Kuroda, 2001: 115). In addition, in Japan, it is becoming 
more difficult for SMEs to recruit young workers with high levels of motivation or 
challenging minds in production work (ibid.: 236).
One of the major problems facing Japanese firms wanting to set up production sites abroad 
is that of finance. Most Japanese firms obtain their financial resources from banks with 
which they have lasting relationships. In the Japanese system, firms tend to act on the basis 
of long-term business calculations. This affects the financial behaviour of Japanese firms 
abroad. The amount of remittance from the corporate headquarters in Japan is only part of 
the picture. Nakagawa (1997) points out that in 1995 the total remittance from 
headquarters was 83.9% of total finance in China, because local finance for foreign firms 
was difficult. On the other hand, in ASEAN the amount of remittance from corporate 
headquarters in Japan was 43.3%, and in the NIEs it was 53.3% of total finance, in 1995. 
The Japanese subsidiaries in ASEAN and the NIEs actively re-invest and promote 
localisation. This also suggests that in ASEAN and the NIEs the agglomeration of Japanese 
firms is advanced, but in China, because of the difficulties of long-term financing, 
remittances from headquarters are still dominant. Therefore, in the NIEs and ASEAN, the 
total amount of real Japanese FDI is often twice as much as the official financial accounts 
suggest. This high scale of re-investment reflects the strong confidence of Japanese firms 
in the NIEs and ASEAN, where Japanese firms have gained high and stable returns. In 
terms of manufacturing FDI, the electronics industry is especially active in re-investment, 
because in order to respond to rapid technological innovation continuous investment is
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required (Murakami, 1998: 99).
5.3.4 Japanese Electronics FDI
In terms of the expansion of the electronics industry, Japan’s nine leading firms (Hitachi, 
Toshiba, Mitsubishi, Matsushita, Sony, Sharp, Sanyo, NEC and Fujitsu) have actively 
established production bases abroad. By 1999, Matsushita had established 211 foreign 
subsidiaries, and other firms -- Toshiba (95), Mitsubishi (91), Hitachi (106), Sony (84), 
Sharp (51), Sanyo (94), NEC (99), and Fujitsu (75) -- had also set up many foreign 
branches/7 If we include the number of subsidiaries of family firms, the totals increase. 
For example, five Matsushita family firms (Matsushita Communication Industrial, 
Matsushita Electric Works, Matsushita Electronic Components, Matsushita Refrigeration, 
Matsushita-Kotobuki Electronics) had established 79 foreign subsidiaries by 1999. 
According to Fujita and Hisatake (1999), in 1975 these nine companies had a total of 285 
production sites, and the number increased to 689 by 1994. This included an increase in the 
number of domestic factories from 211 to 354, and in the number of foreign factories from 
74 to 335. In East Asia, the number of factories increased from 40 to 163; in North 
America from 7 to 80; and in Europe from 7 to 67. The overseas production of the nine 
companies clearly focuses on East Asia, North America and Europe. In the same period the 
number of research institutes (R&D) increased from 24 to 115 in Japan and from 1 to 32 
abroad (East Asia 0 to 6; the US 1 to 18; Europe 0 to 1 ) (Fujita and Hisatake, 1999).
The increase in overseas production as a result of Japanese FDI has had a major impact on 
the structure of operations of production and the operating profit of Japanese electronics 
firms. By 1994, in colour TV production Sharp’s overseas production ratio accounted for 
86% of total TV production and Sanyo’s overseas production ratio in video cassette players 
was 71% of total production.,x In 1999, 69.1% of Sony’s operating profit, 39.7% of 
Toshiba’s, 25.7% of Sanyo’s, 25.7% of Matsushita’s, and 26.8% of Sharp’s operating profit 
came from abroad. In particular, Matsushita has gained 77.7% of its profit from overseas 
operations in Asia and the south Pacific (based on NKS, 7 July 2000). In 1999, Toshiba 
also gained more than half of its overseas operating profit in Asia (NKS, 7 July 2000).
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5.4 Japanese F D I in Hong Kong and China
5.4.1 Japanese FDI in Hong Kong
For Hong Kong, the US and Japan have been the major sources of inward FDI. In 1974 
inward FDI from the US (49.6%) and Japan (15.4%) accounted for 65% of total inward 
FDI in Hong Kong, and in 1980 it was 62.9% (US 40.2% and Japan 22.7%) (Mok, 1997: 
138). Japanese FDI continued to increase and in 1990 Japanese accumulated FDI for the 
first time exceeded that of the US, accounting for 31.5% of Hong Kong’s total accumulated 
inward FDI (Sakura Sogo Kenkyusho, 1992: 49-50). In terms of industrial sector, the share 
of electronics FDI dominated Hong Kong’s inward FDI in the 1970s (i.e. 34.9% in 1971, 
35.6% in 1974, 26.1% in 1977 and 21.6% in 1980) (Mok, 1997: 135). The share of the US 
and Japanese FDI statistically declined through the 1990s. This was due to a change in the 
pattern of investment in Hong Kong, partly in order to minimise the risk of investment 
accompanying Hong Kong’s reversion to China. In 1999, the British Virgin Islands ($US 
118.6 billion) were the top investor in Hong Kong, mainland China ($US 104.5 billion) 
was second, and Bermuda ($US 40.0 billion) was th ird 11 However, these figures do not 
reflect the actual origins of capital flows. The increase of central American islands’ share 
of Hong Kong’s inward FDI is largely due to the increase of Taiwanese 'roundabout’ FDI 
through these island countries. The presence of foreign firms can be seen in the figures for 
the number of regional headquarters and regional offices in Hong Kong. In 2000, the 
number of US regional headquarters accounted for 24.6% of all regional headquarters in 
Hong Kong, and Japanese headquarters accounted for 14.8%, exceeding the UK (9.4%) 
and mainland China (8%). In terms of the number of regional offices, Japanese regional 
offices accounted for 22.9% of the total in 2000, exceeding the US (16.66%) and mainland 
China (7.4%).
Almost one in ten of the overseas firms headquartered in Hong Kong use it as a site for 
manufacturing production operations, and Japanese firms are the leading foreign investors 
in Hong Kong’s manufacturing sector.40 At the same time, Japanese non-manufacturing 
sectors, including the finance and banking sector (26.7% of total Japanese FDI in Hong 
Kong: 1951-95) and wholesale and retail sectors (25.5% of total Japanese FDI: 1951-95), 
are large investors in Hong Kong. The Japanese banks hold a high proportion of 1 long
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Kong’s borrowing from foreign banks.41 Aided by a supportive business environment, 
Japanese manufacturing FDI in Hong Kong has gained a strong presence, accounting for 
10.1% of total Japanese FDI in Hong Kong between 1951 and 1995.4“ In 1997, the figure 
was 30.9%; in 1998 17.9%; in 1999 13.9% and in 2000 10.5%41 Among Japanese 
manufacturing FDI in Hong Kong, electronics investment is the largest single source, 
accounting for 31.9% of Japanese total manufacturing FDI between 1951 and 1995. By 
1999, all nine leading firms had established subsidiaries in Hong Kong: Matsushita (4), 
NEC (4), Sanyo (4), Sharp (1), Sony (3), Hitachi (4), Toshiba (2), Mitsubishi (3) and 
Fujitsu (2).44 Hong Kong’s advantages of geographical location, strong transportation and 
communication infrastructures, free and open trade, professional administration, a fair 
legal system, and liberal taxation policies have all attracted Japanese electronics FDI. For 
Hong Kong, Japan is the second largest source of imports following China and the third 
largest country for exports. With the rise of electronics investment, electronics products 
have been the major trading commodities between Japan and Hong Kong. In 1999, they 
accounted for 36.5% of Japan’s exports to Hong Kong and 31.7% of Japan's imports from 
Hong Kong (TsQsanshó, 2000).
After Hong Kong’s expansion into Guangdong province in China, many Japanese 
electronics firms have invested in Hong Kong with the purpose of reinvesting in China. 
Some firms use their own subsidiaries in Hong Kong, and others utilise joint-firm 
arrangements with Hong Kong firms. In addition, even without the base in Hong Kong, 
some firms utilise the processing trade networks of the Hong Kong firms with which they 
have equity relations. The number of Japanese FDI projects in China via Hong Kong was 
estimated to have reached at least 132 by 1996, and the number of Japanese FDI projects 
via Taiwan had reached 12 (Toyo Keizai, 1996). Sanyo, for example, has invested in 
Shenzhen through its subsidiaries in Hong Kong; it has established join-venture enterprises 
for a variety of products. It is also estimated that about 80% of Japanese FDI in Hong 
Kong is re-invested in Guangdong (Matsuzaki, 1997: 160). Thus, Hong Kong is used as 
the central ‘gateway’ to China, and its intermediary function for the operation of 
production activities in Guangdong is crucial.
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5.4.2 Japanese FDI in China
Despite geographical proximity, according to official Chinese statistics Japan has lagged 
behind the US in terms of FDI in China Japanese companies have been more prudent 
investors than those of the US in the case of China. The major reasons for this are: 
different financial structures in the two countries, a fear of political instability, a lack of 
knowledge of Chinese business conditions. However, more importantly, Japanese FDI in 
East Asia uses offshore production sites as export platforms rather than direct entry into the 
domestic market. In statistical terms, Japanese FDI in China has not always been measured 
correctly, because much of it has been channeled via subsidiaries in Hong Kong and 
Taiwan (as well as other third countries).
Table 5.5 Japanese FDI in China, 1979-2000
C h in e s e  S ta t is t ic a l D a ta J a p a n e s e  S ta t is t ic a l D a ta
Y ear
N u m b e r  o f  
C o n tra c ts
V a lu e  o f  C o n tra c t 
In v e s tm e n t (S U S  
100 m illio n )
V alu e  o f  U tilis e d  
In v e s tm e n t ($ U S  
100 m illio n )
N u m b e r  o f  
C o n tr a c ts
V alue o f  R e g is te re d  
F D I (S U S  100 
m illio n )
1 9 79-83 5 2 9.5
198 4 138 2 .0 31.1 6 6 i . i
1985 127 4 .7 3 2 118 1.0
1986 9 4 2.1 2 0 8 5 2 .3
1987 113 3.0 2 .2 101 12.3
1988 2 3 7 2.8 5.1 171 2 .9
1989 2 9 4 4 .4 3 .6 1 2 6 4 .3
1990 341 4 .6 5 .0 1 6 5 3 .4
1991 5 9 9 8.1 5 .3 2 4 6 5 .7
1992 1.805 21 7 7.1 4 9 0 1 0 .7
1993 3 ,4 8 8 2 9 .6 13.2 7 0 0 16.9
1994 3 ,0 1 8 4 4 4 2 0 .8 6 3 6 2 5 .6
1995 2 ,9 4 6 7 5 .9 31 .1 7 7 0 4 5  9
1996 1,742 51 .3 3 6 .8 3 6 5 2 6 .0
1997 1 ,402 3 4 .0 4 3 .3 2 5 8 2 0 .0
1998 1,198 2 7 .4 3 4 .0 112 10 .0
1999 1 ,167 2 5 .9 2 9 .7 7 6 7 .4
2 0 0 0 1 ,614 36 .8 2 9 .2 102 10.2
Sources: Zhongguo Dttiwai Jitigji Maoyi Nianjian 1999 2000, 2001; Nicchu Keizai Kyokai (1999) Nicchi7 
Keizai Karyii 199/inen (Japan-China Exchange in 1998), Tokyo: Nicchu Keizai Kyokai; Mitsubishi (2001) 
( hgokii John Hanciohiikku (Information on China), Tokyo Sósosha, and Jetoro ( 'hQgoku Dela lairu 2000
The full scale of Japanese FDI in China emerged in the 1990s (see Table 5.5). There is a 
huge gap between the Japanese and Chinese figures, especially in terms of the number of
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contracts. One possible reason is that in the Japanese figures small amounts of FDI may 
not be counted. Table 5.6 reveals the dispersion of Japanese FDI in East Asia. In 2000, 
China was the top destination. However, Hong Kong and Thailand are still the top 
destinations of Japanese FDI. One of the main characteristics of Japanese FDI in China is 
its concentration in electronics investment. Indeed, Japan's leading electronics firms rushed 
into China in the 1990s (Kaku, 1998: 19-23). Between 1991 and 1996 the share of 
Japanese electronics FDI in China was 19.06% of total Japanese FDI in China (ibid.: 13).
Table 5.6 China's Position in Japanese FDI in East Asia, 1996-2000 (%)
Country 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1998 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0
C h in a 2 1 .6 16.3 16.3 10,5 16.8
In d o n e s ia 2 0 .8 2 0 .7 16.5 12.8 7 .0
H o n g  K o n g 12 8 5 .7 9 .2 13.6 15.8
T h a ila n d 12 1 15.3 21 0 11.4 15.7
S in g a p o re 9 .6 15.0 9 .8 13 4 7.1
M a la y s ia 4 9 6 .5 7 .9 7 3 3 .9
P h ilip p in e s 4 .8 4 .3 5 .8 8 .6 7  7
T a iw an 4  5 3 .7 3 .4 4 0 8 .6
S o u th  K o rea 3 .6 3 .6 4 6 13.7 13.7
O th e rs 5 .3 8 .9 5 .5 4  7 3 .7
S o u r c e :  M i t s u b is h i  ( 1 9 9 9 ,  2 0 0 0  a n d  2 0 0 1  e d i t i o n s )  C h u g o k u  J o h o  H a n d o b u k k u  ( I n f o r m a t i o n  o n  C h in a ) ,  
T o k y o  S o s o s h a
Table 5.7 shows the geographical dispersion of Japanese FDI in China. Until 1990, 
Guangdong was the third largest recipient of Japanese FDI following Liaoning and Beijing. 
In the 1990s, Guangdong fell to fourth position after Shanghai, Liaoning and Jiangsu. This 
suggests that with the sharp increase of Japanese manufacturing FDI in China, Shanghai 
and Jiangsu have become the main targets of Japanese FDI. However, in terms of 
electronics investment, the presence of Guangdong in Japanese FDI is remarkably high. By 
1998, the total number of subsidiaries of these firms in Guangdong was 206, greater than 
the number in Liaoning (123) and Jiangsu (118), and lower only than Shanghai (248) 
(Chugoku Shin.shul.su Kigyo Ichirun 1999). Japanese electronics FDI has a unique 
geographical interest in the Yangtze River Delta area and in Northeast as well as southern 
China. By 1999, Matshushita, for example, had established 36 subsidiaries in China (out of 
a total 211 overseas subsidiaries), Sanyo had established 29 (out of a total 94), Hitachi 26 
(total 106), Toshiba 14 (total 95), Fujitsu 13 (total 75), Mitsubishi 15 (91), Sony 5 (total
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84), Sharp 5 (total 51) and NEC 14 (99). Matsushita is the most advanced Japanese 
electronics firm in terms of investment in China. By 1999 its regional dispersion was as 
follows: Beijing (6), Tianjin (2), Shanghai (4), Hubei (1), Liaoning (3), Jingsu (3), 
Zhejiang (4), Fujian (2), Shandong (3), Henan (1), Guangdong (8). Thus, on the basis of 
the dispersion of subsidiaries, Matsushita has favoured Guangdong. By 2000, Matsushita 
employed 34,447 workers in China (including 280 Japanese staffs) (Kokusai Roeki, 14 
August 2001). The locational strategies of Japanese electronics firms are also based on 
product characteristics. For example, in the case of notebook PC production, by 2001 
Toshiba and Sony had established a production site in Jiangsu for China’s domestic market 
(Mizuhashi, 2001 and NKS, 16 November 2001).
Table 5.7 Japanese FDI in China by Region, 1987-1996 (SUS 10,(KM), %)
¡ 9 8 7 -1 9 9 0 A v e ra g e  S h a re .  % ¡9 9 1 -1 9 9 6 A v e ra g e  S h a re . %
C o a s ta l  T o ta l 1 0 5 ,5 2 7 9 5 .6 1 ,936 ,865 9 2 .9 0
Jian g su 5 .5 3 6 5 .0 3 7 4 .7 7 8 17 9 7
L ia o n in g 2 7 ,7 4 8 25.1 2 9 4 .4 3 0 14 12
S h a n g h a i 7 .8 3 4 7.1 4 5 6 ,4 8 3 2 1 .9 0
G u a n g d o n g 1 3 ,5 3 8 12.3 2 0 4 .7 3 8 9  8 2
S h a n d o n g 7 .7 3 9 7 .0 160 .264 7 6 9
B e ijin g 15.761 14.3 7 9 ,6 3 5 3 .8 2
T ian jin 6 .2 1 2 5 .6 86,641 4  16
Z h e n jia n g 1 ,936 1 8 118.905 5 .7 0
H eb ei 1 .844 1.7 7 0 ,6 6 5 3 .3 9
F u jia n 5 ,0 6 4 4 .6 5 3 .8 3 5 2 .5 8
H a in a n 9 .9 8 4 9 .0 2 6 ,0 5 9 1 .2 5
G u a n g x i 2 ,331 2.1 10,432 0 .5 0
I n la n d  T o ta l 4 .841 4 4 147 ,744 7 .1 0
T o ta l  in  C h in a 110 ,3 6 8 1 00 .0 2 ,0 8 4 ,6 0 5 1 0 0 .0 0
Source Kaku, Shishi (Guo Sizhi) (1998) ‘Nihonkigyo no tai Chu shinshutsu ni tsuite’ (Advance of Japanese 
firms in China), Keizaigaku Nctishi (33).
In the case of Guangdong, Japanese OA equipment and precision makers have played an 
important role in developing industrial agglomeration in electronics industry. Although the 
initial electronics investment was undertaken by Hong Kong firms and then Taiwanese 
firms, the concentration of Japanese OA equipment and precision makers in Guangdong is 
also remarkable.4' The leading camera firms, such as Canon and Ricoh, have moved their 
production sites from the NIEs to China Canon (Zhuhai), Olympus (Shenzhen) and 
Kyocera (Dongguan) produce not only assembly products but the key components of
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cameras. The leading OA equipment firms, such as Seiko Epson (Shenzhen) and Fuji 
Xerox (Shenzhen), also produce printers in Guangdong. Canon (Zhanjiang) produces 
toners and Ricoh (Shenzhen) makes colour printers.
The performance of Japanese electronics firms in China varies. Among the top 500 foreign 
firms in China in 1997, there were 22 Japanese electronics firms. In the case of four 
Japanese subsidiaries, exports accounted for 100% of sales (Seiko Epson in Shenzhen, 
Mitsumi in Tianjin, Ricoh in Shenzhen, and Mabuchi in Dalian). The figure was over 90% 
in the case of another 12 firms. In 1997, three Japanese firms -  Ricoh (OA equipment), 
Sanyo (consumer electronics), and Hitachi (the largest comprehensive manufacturer of 
electrical machinery) -  were listed in the largest ten foreign firms in Shenzhen (Nihon 
Kokusai B5eki Sokushin Kyokai, 1999: 223). As far as China’s domestic market sales are 
concerned, the business performance of Japanese firms has not been very good. The major 
reason is severe competition with local brands, and imported products through smuggling, 
oversupply, falls in price, the difficulties involved in creating sales networks, troubles in 
collecting credit with partner firms, and a gradual business recession since 1993 (Kuroda, 
2001: 41). This has inevitably been reflected in the poor performance of Japanese 
electronics firms, as indicated by the decline in sales of firms that rely on the domestic 
market. Many Japanese investment projects have been withdrawn from China. For 
example, in 2000, 213 Japanese firms closed their subsidiaries in Shanghai (Shin, 2001: 
18). In general, it seems that Japanese firms which use China as an export base have a 
better performance than those that focus on the domestic market (ibid.: 21).
In terms of the type of investment of Japanese electronics firms in Guangdong, Sanyo and 
Matsushita illustrate contrasting patterns. Sanyo uses Hong Kong subsidiaries as the base 
for managing business activities in Guangdong, with a focus on the Shenzhen area. The 
form of Sanyo’s investment is a joint investment with affiliated firms and Nissho Iwai, one 
of the leading Japanese trading companies (Sogo Shoshu). The Matsushita group has 
invested directly in Guangdong by establishing joint firms with local Chinese firms. 
Matsushita procures capital, human resources, and technology experience within its group. 
In Guangdong Matsuhita has established production sites in Guangzhou, Xinhui, Zhuhai 
and Shunde In Shenzhen, Matsushita has only a sales and service firm Thus, in many
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ways, Sanyo’s strategy for investing in Shenzhen (through Hong Kong) has become a 
model for other Japanese latecomers (Seki, 2000: 203).
5.4.2.1 The Role ofSôgô Shôsha
As in the case of Sanyo, Japanese trading companies, known as Sôgô Shôsha, have often 
served as intermediaries for Japanese investors in China. They have more than 100 years 
experience as commission merchants and now comprise the core of the major Japanese 
keirelsu groups (on keirestu, see Section 5.5 in this chapter).46 They have brokered many 
major (not only Japanese) investment projects in China and have also worked with 
investors from other countries of the world (H. Wang, 2001: 96). Between 1979 and 1996, 
23.3% of all Japanese subsidiaries in China were brokered or jointly invested with Sôgô 
Shôsha (Kaku, 1999: 137). The latter have widespread networks in China as a result of 
their long tradition of doing business in that country. Over the years their numerous offices 
and experienced employers have developed many useful guanxi connections with Chinese 
officials (on guanxi, see Chapter 7). This advantage has attracted Japanese firms which did 
not themselves have a good knowledge of local production in China. However, compared 
with other industrial sectors, only a small amount of Japanese electronics FDI has been 
through Sôgô Shôsha. This is because Japanese electronics firms have already established 
their own sales networks (ibid.: 140).
5.5 The Governance of Production Networks
Japanese manufacturers have shown a capability to develop a vertically integrated form of 
governance of their production systems. However, in the case of the electronics industry, 
the traditional approach to organising production networks is being replaced by economies 
of scale and scope, strategic alliances, and the outsourcing of production. This section 
discusses how these changes have affected the reorganisation of Japanese production 
networks.
5.5.1 Keiretsu
Among Japanese companies, M&As (mergers and acquisitions) and TOBs (take-over bids) 
are not very common: about 90% of Japanese FDI is based on the establishment of new
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subsidiary companies (Toy5 Keizai, 2000). According to the UNCTAD, Japan's 
cross-border M&As in 2000 were worth $US 15.5 billion, which was far smaller than the 
respective figure for the US ($US 324.4 billion).47 The governance structures of 
production networks are sensitive to the peculiar features of national institutions and 
markets. One of the main characteristics of Japanese inter-firm relations is described as 
keirelsu, a network which includes a lead firm, affiliates and subsidiaries, sub-contractors, 
suppliers, service providers and other firms participating in cooperative arrangements. The 
six major keirelsu groups are the Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, Fuyo, Sanwa, and lchikan 
groups.48 Firms of these groups centre around a main bank and/or a trading firm, and are 
held together by financial, personal and other types of relations. The lead electronics firms 
belong to these keirelsu-, Toshiba (Mitsui), NEC (Sumitomo), Hitachi (Fuyo, Sanwa, and 
Ichikan), Sharp (Sanwa), Fijitsu (Ichikan), etc. Each lead electronics firms organises its 
own keirelsu. The inter-firm relations of keirelsu in terms of stock relations vary. For 
example, in the case of a subsidiary company, the lead firm holds the power of equity 
control (majority voting rights at the general meeting of stockholders: more than 50% of 
stock). In the case of an affiliated company, the lead firm holds a certain equity share 
(usually more than 10% of stock) and has a strong influence on the management of the 
firms through personnel, capital, technology and business transactions. But a lead firm may 
not hold the power of equity control through stockholding over sub-contractors, suppliers, 
service providers and other firms participating in cooperative arrangements.
The lead firm organises the processes of assembly and the suppliers form the multi-layered 
division of labour among subcontracting firms. The network is oiganised in a centralised 
manner. As most Japanese sub-contractors are small, in general they are supplied parts and 
components from the lead firm, and they can gain the profit through assembly fees (Nikkei 
Business, 6 and 13 August 2001: 27). The Japanese keirelsu relations have enabled firms to 
maintain long-standing partners for the supply of capital goods and components in order to 
minimise risk. The merit of long-standing partnership is that it enables cost reduction by 
cutting adjustment costs, trust-building costs, search costs, negotiation costs, and 
monitoring costs (Kaku, 2000: 60). As local suppliers in ASEAN and China still have 
problems in relation to quality, delivery times, and after service, the subsidiaries of 
Japanese firms rely on intra-firm trade. When Japanese firms began to focus on more
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export-oriented production in ASEAN in the 1980s, this trend of Japanese networks was 
closed to outsiders In order to minimise risk and reduce the time-consuming process of 
building local capabilities through "trial-and-error’, and since Japan is a latecomer in 
international production, it has tended to maintain closed and centralised production 
networks (Ernst and Ravenhill, 2000: 235).
As Kaku (2000) explains, the transfer of such Japanese inter-firm relations in East Asia is 
carried out through joint investment between keiretsu firms (affiliates) and non-joint 
investment by small and medium firms (sub-contractors, suppliers, service providers and 
other firms). First, Japanese FD1 is often conducted through joint investment with keirelsu 
affiliates. The lead firms do not invest alone but invest with the affiliated companies by 
establishing 100%-owned subsidiaries or joint firms with local firms. In East Asia, 
governments often impose the duty on investors to establish joint firms with local firms. 
For example, among 79 Matsushita’s subsidiary firms in ASEAN and China, 40 firms are 
based on joint investment in which more than two of Matsushita's keirei.su firms participate 
(Kaku, 2000: 61). Thus the Beijing Matsushita Color CRT Co. Ltd. was a joint venture 
funded by Matsushita Electric Industrial (25% of equity), Matsushita Communication 
Industrial (25%) and Beijing Huadian (50%) In the case of Flitachi, there are 27 cases out 
of a total of 46 subsidiaries in ASEAN and China which have a form of joint investment by 
Hitachi family firms (ibid.: 61). Furthermore, the form of joint investment by the affiliated 
companies is another characteristic of Japanese electronics investment. The lead and 
affiliated firms often develop complementary relations. For example, Matsushita has used 
the networks and specialities of affiliated companies by establishing joint investment firms, 
and affiliated firms have utilised the networks, market share, sales and technology of the 
parent firms. In addition to these forms, the small and medium firms (sub-contractors) 
without joint capital relations with the parent firms have proceeded with the shift of 
production sites of the parent and affiliated firms. Despite the lack of equity relations, 
cooperative relations between the lead and affiliated firms, and small and medium firms, 
are another feature of Japanese electronics FDI. Here the form of joint investment 
participated in by the keirei.su group (having either equity relations or cooperative relations 
in the Japanese market), which is organised by centralised management, has determined 
the nature of the inter-firm division of labour and inter-firm cooperative relations centred
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on the leading Japanese electronics firms.
5.5.2 The Evolution o f Production Networks
The heavy reliance on intra- and inter-firm networks based on a division of labour for 
sourcing components is now rapidly changing. Centralised and relatively closed production 
networks centred on the lead firm cannot respond to the demands of the market. The 
change of technology from analog to digital highlights several disadvantages of 
conventional intra- and inter-firm relations in the electronics industry. Furthermore, the 
computerisation of electrical and electronics products requires enhanced technological 
cooperation between computer firms and consumer electronics firms. The disadvantage of 
centralised and relatively closed production networks is the inflexibility of arrangements 
with sub-contractors (Ernst and Ravenhill, 2000: 239). The keiretsu and its inter-firm 
relations have developed on the basis of a regional and inter-firm division of labour in 
Japan. With the rise of global competition, this system is likely to present obstacles to 
firms searching for international procurement, greater economies of scale, and a more rapid 
development cycle. Also, the keiretsu has now become too big. For example, the Toshiba 
group consists of 328 group companies, and Fujitsu consists of 517 group companies.4’ 
The introduction of rationalisation and internationalisation to reduce dependence on 
high-cost domestic supply sources is now necessary.
Forming alliances is one of the options to reduce production costs and increase economic 
scale. Since the late 1990s, Japanese electronics firms have started to form alliances with 
foreign firms. For example, NEC and Hitachi decided to establish a joint venture to design 
and develop future generations of computer memory chips (Financial Times: hereafter FT, 
24 June 1999). Forming an alliance is not confined to Japanese firms. The rapid 
development of communication equipment has become a major area for establishing 
cooperative relations. Siemens (Germany) and NEC agreed to establish a joint venture to 
produce cellular phones (FT, 19 November 1999). Qualcomm (US telecommunications 
equipment manufacturer) and Hitachi agreed to establish a joint venture. Alcatel (French 
telecommunication equipment) and Fujitsu agreed to form a joint venture in mobile phone 
communications systems (FT, 3 May 2000). Hitachi and Matsushita plan to establish an 
alliance to develop digital appliances in refrigerators, air conditioners and other industries
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(FT, 22 May 2001). As a result of the Sony-Ericsson alliance in the mobile phone business 
in April 2001, Matsushita and NEC agreed to form an alliance to respond to the new 
generation of mobile phone production in the world market (NKS, 21 August 2001). Thus, 
alliance-formation has had a major impact on the keiretsu system.
Outsourcing and restructuring are other alliance options for cost efficiency. According to 
recent research by Nihon Keizai Shinbun (9 August 2001), almost one-third of Japanese 
manufacturing firms produce by using outsourcing production. Moreover, nearly half of 
leading Japanese manufacturers intend to raise their share of offshore production within 
three years, and 22% intend to cut domestic production. In the electronics industry, the life 
cycle of products has been shortened and prospective market demand is becoming difficult. 
In order to minimise the risk of market changes, the outsourcing of production contributes 
to the flexibility of coordination o f production. In electronics production, a contracting 
manufacturing system has become popular for outsourcing. This includes OEM (original 
equipment manufacturing). Recently EMS (Electronics Manufacturing Service) has 
emerged as a new form of contract manufacturing -- from the development, design and 
procurement of electronics products to production. EMS was developed as a new form of 
production system in the 1990s, mainly by US firms. EMS became well known in Japan 
when Sony sold its two factories (in Miyagi prefecture and Taiwan) to the leading EMS 
firm, Solectron (based in Silicon Valley, US), in 2000. Japanese electronics firms suffer 
from the burden of sustaining inefficient production sites (because of high labour costs) in 
Japan. The leading Japanese electronics firms began to restructure and reduce employment 
in the summer of 2001.511 The Japanese conglomerates now lack the scale or focus to 
compete effectively ( The Economist, 1 September 2001). In particular, as a result of the 
specialisation of Taiwanese electronics firms in PC-related products (through the 
experience of OEM and ODM), Taiwanese firms have emerged as major outsourcing units 
for Japanese PC-related firms, not only in outsourcing production but also in contract 
made-to-order computer chips and production (EMS). Taiwanese firms have strengthened 
their cost competitiveness by shifting their production sites to mainland China. The 
Japanese keiretsu system has been faced with a major challenge from these emerging firms. 
In order to achieve cost-efficient management, NEC, for example, intends to separate its 
semiconductor production factories and transform them into a new EMS firm (NKS, 9
164
August 2001). Thus, though there are variations in response to global competition, 
outsourcing production and the emergence of the EMS production system are replacing (or 
restructuring) the keirel.su system, which has traditionally been based on long-term retail 
relations
5.5.3 Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs)
One of the key features of the Japanese electronics industry is the important role of 
SMEs.31 The reform of the keiretsu system in Japan, and the increasing outsourcing 
production of the lead firm to foreign firms, have raised the question of the relevance of 
conventional inter-firm relations, especially with sub-contractors, which are almost all 
SMEs. For example, in the electronics parts industry alone, there are about 520,000 
Japanese SMEs.32 In the case of the southwest of Tokyo, the SMEs have undertaken 
assembly production by being supplied parts and components from the lead firms. The 
assembly production of Japanese SMEs has relied heavily on the lead firms (i.e. research 
and development, distribution of finished products). Although SMEs undertake the OEM 
production for leading Japanese electronics firms, in the restructuring of the production 
system, SMEs are now faced with a choice: whether to develop offshore production with 
client firms or to focus on the improvement of domestic production. A Japanese battery 
maker decided to set up offshore production in Dongguan because of the request of the 
main client (Toshiba).”
According to recent research (NKS, 23 July 2001 ), as a result of the offshore production of 
the parent firms, almost 40% of SMEs have experienced a decline in orders from those 
firms. The Suwa area (Nagano prefecture) has been a major production site for precision 
and electrical equipment because Seiko-Epson’s and Sankyo’s complex manufacturing 
plants are there. In Suwa the rate of firms undertaking offshore production accounts for 
25% of total firms, which is the highest level for any region in Japan. One quarter of SMEs 
in Suwa have already established offshore production. In the Higashi Osaka area in Osaka, 
which is the home of Matsushita’s and Sanyo’s manufacturing plants, there is a movement 
to increase offshore production by SMEs (NKS, 24 July 2001). While some SMEs are 
trying to undertake offshore production following the parent firms, 74.1% of SMEs focus 
on the improvement of domestic production (NKS, 23 July 2001 ), mainly because they do
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not think that they have an offshore production capability. In order to respond to the 
hollowing out of precision and electrical equipment factories in the Suwa area, the local 
government (Okaya) created an industrial promotion division in the spring of 2000 and 
intends to establish a base for human development and the development of new technology 
(NKS, 23 July 2001).
Thus the governance of production networks in the Japanese electronics industry began to 
evolve quickly in the late 1990s. In particular, the emergence of alliances and outsourcing 
production has given firms an opportunity to have a more innovative and flexible 
production system, but at the same time it requires the revision of conventional inter-firm 
relations, and ultimately this may lead to the break-up of the keiret.su groups. The vertical 
integrated industrial structure of Japanese firms is becoming more disintegrated and market 
dependent. The response to the new situation is varied among the Japanese SMEs. In the 
electronics industry, they have to face the challenge of competition with East Asian 
(especially Taiwanese) firms based on cost, flexible supply and technological up-grading.
5.6 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the pattern of Japanese FDI, its links with ODA, and the 
development of CPNs, including the role of the Japanese government and the forms of 
governance of these networks. It has focused on the processes and tactics of Japanese FDI 
in exploiting East Asian countries as export-base, and varying strategies of key actors (the 
state and firms) in penetrating their interests.
Japanese ODA has been a central, and perhaps the only visible, political and economic tool 
of Japan's national interest in foreign policy. It has undoubtedly contributed much to the 
re-entry of Japanese firms into the East Asian market under the name of economic 
assistance. The norm of the developmental state, based originally on Japan's own success, 
with a high level of state interventionist and strong government discipline of the market 
and of the private sector, was applied to Japanese foreign economic policy. However, with 
the rise of global competition, the sharp economic growth of East Asian countries, and the 
increasing variations in firms’ strategies (from export-oriented to local sales), the Japanese
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traditional approach to ODA as a mechanism of support for the entry of Japanese firms 
into East Asia has heavily declined. New actors (SNGs and NGOs) have also participated 
in Japanese ODA networks. More importantly, Japan’s long term recession in the 1990s 
has raised the question of the effectiveness of Japan’s ‘developmental state’ model.
Japanese foreign policy toward East Asian regionalism dramatically changed in the late 
1990s. Japan’s new foreign economic policy seems to emphasise the role of FTAs. 
However, as this has not yet materialized in practice, its effect on Japanese FDI cannot be 
captured. Furthermore, in the case of the involvement o f the ASEAN+3, Japanese 
ministerial sectionalism and external intervention by the US have made it difficult to create 
a consolidated new strategic role for Japan on the basis of a regional (RTA) mechanism. 
Most importantly, as a result of the spread of Japanese FDI, production networks in East 
Asia, and deepening interdependence, the strategies and interests within Japan are 
incredibly diverse, and this makes it more difficult to apply a single foreign economic 
policy.
Japanese FDI in East Asia has sought to establish offshore production sites on the basis of 
export-oriented strategies. This investment strategy has major implications for the 
development of a distinctive pattern of trade and investment in East Asia. It has 
contributed to the supply of capital and technology as well as managerial know-how, and 
has had a huge impact on the processes of manufacturing activities. In the electronics 
sector, with the supply of Japanese electronics technology and components, East Asian 
countries have succeeded in transforming themselves into electronic products-exporting 
countries. They are thus able to make up for trade deficits with Japan by exporting 
electronics products to the US market. This interdependency among Japan, East Asia and 
the US is a critical feature of the development of cross-border micro-regionalisation.
At the microlevel, Japanese manufacturing FDI has had an impact on industrial integration 
in East Asia through the rationalisation of the production system. While there is no clear 
intention, Japanese FDI has undoubtedly encouraged the opening up of international 
production networks across Japan and East Asia. In trade, except for China and Indonesia, 
East Asian countries tend to have huge trade deficits with Japan, mainly due to the increase
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of manufacturing imports and exports, including electronics, transport, and precision 
machinery, with Japan supplying key components for East Asian production through intra- 
and inter-firm transactions. Also in Japan-China trade the share of Japanese intra- and 
inter-firm trade accounts for the major proportion.
The development of CPNs across East Asia has major implications for the viability of the 
conventional management structures of the Japanese keirei.su in electronics products 
manufacturing. A micro-level analysis of production networks in the electronics industry 
reveals the unique structure of their multi-layered governance arrangements. As long as the 
production networks were confined to Japan, the keirel.su were indeed helpful in sustaining 
Japan's competitive production on the basis of long-term relations. When leading Japanese 
firms went abroad, they tried to organise local mini~keirel.su firms. This is illustrated by the 
experience of the automobile industry in the US and Europe, and the electronics industry 
(case of Matsushita in Taiwan). However, the digitalisation and computerisation of 
consumer electronics has led to the urgent need to achieve quicker development cycles and 
technological upgrading as well as the rationalisation of procurement in the electronics 
industry. The outsourcing of manufacturing and the formation of international alliances 
became popular strategies among Japanese electronics firms in the 1990s.
With the restructuring of production in the electronics industry, the reform of the keirel.su 
system has had a major impact on conventional inter-firm relations. SMEs previously 
formed cooperative relations with the parent firms, but then had to decide whether to 
commence offshore production or focus on the improvement of domestic production. The 
client’s request has a major impact on their decision. This helps us to understand the 
varying impact of changes of the governance of production networks on the shift of 
Japanese electronics firms into East Asia. Such firm-led integration processes present an 
enormous challenge to policy-makers not only in Japan but also in host countries. The 
improvement of the broader political and economic environment is also a crucial factor for 
business activities. Firm-led micro-regionalisation is therefore not confined to the reform 
of business activities (cross-border production networks) but also challenges conventional 
notions of economic governance.
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1 For example, Tsusansho (2000: 40) presents the key processes of industrial agglomeration in Guangdong 
and the involvement of foreign firms (Japanese. Hong Kong, Taiwanese, US, South Korean firms ) and local 
Chinese firms.
2 The figure is from Kohama (1997)
' The researcher's calculation based on the lists from Mitsubishi (2001 edition).
4 http://www.roc taiwan.or.jp/data/fags.html/
5 For example, see the comment by the Finance Minister, Xiang Huangcheng, in January 2001. 
http://www sankei co jp/paper/today/itimen/09iti003.htm/
6 For example, Beijing airport was funded by Japanese ODA and established in 1999 However, the 
management company of Beijing airport was then listed on the Hong Kong stock market
7 It is difficult to see China as a developmental state See Shaun Breslin (1996). Taiwan is also greatly 
effected by its cultural roots See for example, Lam and Clark (1994)
* These are (1) active intervention by the government (often by M1TI); (2) emphasis on a specific industry, 
(3) the promotion of exports, (4) guidance; (5) a selective protectionist policy, (6) the restriction of inward 
FDI; (7) the loose implementation o f the Anti-Monopoly Act, (8) the rationalisation of declining industries, 
led by the government; (9) the approval of cartels, (10) the regulation of the financial market and limited 
implementation of corporate governance, (II) research and development funded by the government, (12) the 
solid management of the macro economy See Porter and Takeuchi (2000: 41).
9 The figure is taken from Yamazawa (2001).
10 These and the following arguments are based on Ehashi (2001).
11 The FTA between Japan and Singapore was agreed in January 2002 
http://www yomiuri.co jp/top/20020113it 13 htm/
12 For theoretical discussions, see Chapter 2.
1' The figure is the researcher's calculation using Yeung (1998: 12)
14 The establishment of the ADF was formally approved in 1973 at the ADB’s (Asian Development Bank’s) 
annual meeting
15 For example, the value of the Japanese yen appreciated by 42.5% against the US dollar between 1970 and 
1978
16 In September 1985, in order to respond to the rise of protectionism and trade friction, the Group of Five 
(meetings of the governors of the central banks and finance ministers from the US, the UK, France, West 
Germany and Japan) agreed to enhance international cooperation, including joint intervention by the financial 
authorities in the foreign exchange market The name of the accord was taken from the Plaza Hotel, where 
this meeting was held
17 Between 1985 and 1987, the NT dollar (Taiwan) appreciated by 28%, and the Korean won also 
appreciated by 17% from 1986 to 1988 See Bernard and Ravenhill (1995: 180)
1 Developed countries grant preferential tariff treatment for imports o f manufactures and 
semi-manufactured products from developing countries See Rutherford (1992)
19 The RMB depreciated by 63% between 1985 and 1990 There was a further 80% depreciation between 
1990 and 1994
211 The figures are taken from Kaku (1999)
21 According to the categories o f MOF’s data, ‘Europe’ refers to all European countries, including Eastern 
Europe.
"  The UK is the largest destination of Japanese FDI Japanese FDI in the UK accounted for 24% of total 
Japanese outward FDI in 1998, 17.6% in 1999 and surprisingly 39 4% in 2000. MOF 
(htt p: //www. mof go j p /fdi/1 c008j 2 htm/)
21 These figures are taken from MOF, http //www mof.go jp/fdi Japanese investment in these countries is 
due to their attraction of the tax-haven According to Toyo Keizai (2000), by 1999, there were 44 Japanese 
firms (most of them are financial and trading firms) in the Cayman Islands.
The figure is the researcher’s calculation using MOFTEC 
(http://www.moftec.gov cn/moftec_cn/tjsj/2000_9-22-15 html
25 The figure is the researcher’s calculation using Koryu No. 572 (1998), and No 626 (2000). However, 
Taiwanese roundabout investments through the central American island countries are also included Thus, in 
practice, the percentage of Japanese FDI in Taiwan’s inward FDI is higher than the statistics suggest 
The figures are from http://www mofat go kr/embassy_htm/asia/japan/
27 http://www investhk gov hk/ENG/FAC/foreign htm
211 The share of the government-related sector was 23 98% in 1997 These figures are taken from Higashi 
Alla eno Shiten, spring special edition (2000).
The figure is the researcher’s calculation based on data from MOF 
These figures are from Tsusansho (2000).
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12 European developed countries here include France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Italy, 
Germany, the UK, Ireland, Denmark, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, 
Iceland and Norway
II Same as above
"  These figures are the researcher's calculation using data from Higashi Ajia eno Shilen, 2000, spring 
special edition
1 These figures are taken from Higashi Ajia eno Shilen 2000, spring special edition
36 Based on the research by Kaburagi Shinji, Noda Hidehiko, and Ikehara Gakushi (2000).
37 The figures are from Toyo Keizai (2000).
,K The figure is from Kim (2001: 142)
39 The figures are taken from http //www investhk gov hk/ENG/FAC/
III Japanese firms accounted for 34% of the total value of Hong Kong's inward manufacturing investment, 
followed by the US (27%) and China (10%) in the mid of 1990s. See Enright, Scott and Dodwell (1997)
31 The average share of Japanese banks in Hong Kong’s borrowing from foreign banks between 1994 and 
1998 was 45%. The figure was calculated by the researcher by using Higashi Ajia eno Shilen, 2000, spring 
special edition
4 These figures are calculated by the researcher using Tobari and Ryu (1996)
43 These figures are calculated by the researcher using the USA Trade Website 
http /Avww usatrade.gov/Website/ccg nsf/CCGurl/CCG-HONG-KONG2002- -006D4D2/
44 These figures are taken from Toy5 Keizai (2000)
43 The following is based on Inagaki (1997)
4,1 The shiisha and (group) relations are as follows: Mitsubishi Corporation (Mitsubishi Group), Mitsui & Co 
(Mitsui Group), Sumitomo Corporation (Sumitomo Group), Marubeni (Fuyo Group), Nissho Iwai (Sanwa), 
and Itochu (lchikan).
4 The figures are taken from http://www unctad org/en/pass/prO 116en htm/
IK The six major groups have been transformed into four big groups (Mistubishi, Mitsui-Sumitomo, Mizuho 
and UFJ).
49 The figures are taken from The Economist (1 September 2001).
311 In the summer of 2001, Toshiba announced that 19,000 jobs would go, Fijitsu would cut 16,000, NEC 
would cut 15,000, Kyocera would cut 10,000, and Oki Electric would cut 2,200 The Economist (1 
September 200: 59).
31 In Japan, small and medium firms are in general defined as firms with capital o f less than 100 million yen 
and with less than 300 full time workers In the case of the retail and service sectors these numbers are 
smaller
: The figure is taken from Kyaria Deberopumento Senta (2001: 137)
"  Interview with the president o f a Japanese electronics firm in Dongguan (13 October 2001)
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CHAPTER 6
CROSS-BORDER PRODUCTION NETWORKS ACROSS THE
TAIWAN STRAIT
Taiwan is a world-class supply source for a variety of electronic hardware products. In 
2000, Taiwan even exceeded Japan in terms of the volume of PC-related exports.' Taiwan 
is the world’s largest producer of computer monitors, motherboards, switching power 
supplies, mouse devices, keyboards, scanners and a variety of add-on cards. Most of these 
products are sold to American, Japanese and European computer firms and are resold 
under their own brand names. Such success raises the question of the role of the 
government and the market. Taiwan is a small island country (with a population of 22 
million in 1999), and most PC-related firms are of small or medium size. These factors 
place limits on resources, knowledge and technologies, but they have not affected the sharp 
growth of Taiwan’s PC-related industry. Of crucial significance are the offshore production 
activities of Taiwanese electronics firms in mainland China, Taiwanese 
government-business relations, the capability of the government in industrial policies, the 
exploitation of the scale and scope of economies, and the development of cross-border 
production networks (CPNs) and international commodity chains (ICCs) linking 
Taiwanese firms with large foreign MNCs.
A negative factor has been the unresolved political tension across the Taiwan Strait. Wang 
(2001a) observes that the formation of economic integration between Taiwan and China 
has been largely due to the role of local government in China and the industrial networks 
of Taiwanese firms. China’s formation of multi-level governance (MLG) is a vitally 
important factor for the offshore production activities of Taiwanese firms. In reality, 
Taiwanese PC-related firms have already created successful forms of CPNs, and the 
Taiwanese business community has emerged as a key actor in the transformation of 
cross-strait relations. This chapter thus focuses on the role of the development of the CPNs 
of Taiwanese PC-related firms, which effectively link Japan and China. The development
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of micro-regionalisation among Guangdong, Taiwan and Japan cannot be understood 
without considering the broader relationship between changes in the political economy of 
individual states and changes in the organisation of production.
Section 6.1 considers the development of the electronics industry in the context of state 
intervention and industrial policy toward the electronics firms in Taiwan. Section 6.2 
examines the development of networking linkages between leading Japanese electronics 
firms and Taiwanese firms, and the shift of Taiwanese electronics firms from commercial 
subcontracting to original engineering manufacturing (OEM) firms. It also seeks to explain 
why the creation o f linkages with Japanese firms has helped to compensate for the limited 
capability of SMEs and indeed the small size of Taiwan itself. Section 6.3 discusses how 
the Taiwanese electronics industry has succeeded in expanding its economic scale and 
scope, especially in undertaking offshore production in mainland China. Section 6.4 
examines the unresolved political challenge and its impact on business conditions across 
the Taiwan Strait. Section 6.5 deals with the evolving forms of governance in production 
networks in Taiwan and across the Taiwan Strait. Section 6.6 summarises the role of 
Taiwanese firms in creating new forms of multi-level networking relations among Japan. 
Taiwan and China.
6.1 The Taiwanese Government and the Electronics Industry
6.1.1 The Political Economy o f the Electronics Industry
The Taiwanese government has contributed to the transfer of managerial resources and to 
the support of technological innovation. In policy terms, Taiwan adopted an open policy as 
early as the 1950s and implemented several preferential policies for inward FDI. The 
post-war roots o f inward FDI in Taiwan date back to the overseas Chinese investment in 
the 1950s. The process started with Taiwan’s adoption of preferential treatment for 
overseas Chinese investment in 1952. In the 1950s and early 1960s, the government was 
enthusiastic in attracting overseas Chinese FDI not only for economic development but 
also to support a political counter-alliance against mainland China. In 1955, Taiwan 
adopted a promotional policy for encouraging foreign investment. However, as 
industrialisation was premature and Taiwan was a largely agricultural economy, FDI was
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still at a low level in the 1950s. In I960, the Taiwanese government introduced aggressive 
policies (Statutes of Encouragement of Investment: SEI) to encourage foreign investment 
by adding several preferential treatments such as exemption from corporate taxation for 
five years. Domestic firms were also allowed to invest and enjoy the same tax and other 
privileges as long as they complied with the regulations. The SEI were revised several 
times for technological upgrading in order to attract inward FD1. In the 1960s the aim was 
to encourage the establishment of exporting industries; in the 1970s the aim was to 
encourage capital-intensive industries; in the 1980s the emphasis was on encouraging 
technology-intensive industries.
The Taiwanese government extended the open policy through the establishment of 
export-processing zones (Jiagong chukouqu). The first such zone was established in 
Gaoxiong (Kao-hsiung) in 1966. This gave foreign firms preferential treatment, including 
tax exemptions This was intended to help achieve Taiwan’s shift from an 
import-substitution to an export-oriented industrialisation strategy, and thus aimed to 
attract FDI, achieve technological upgrading, promote exports, and increase employment 
opportunities. This policy attracted Japanese businesses, which had already started to suffer 
from the rising cost of labour and land, and from stricter regulations on environmental 
pollution. Furthermore, the Japanese yen started to rise in value against the US dollar after 
1971 (the Nixon Shock), and Taiwan began to be seen as an export platform. As Taiwan 
faced continuing diplomatic difficulties (US-China normalisation and departure from the 
UN) in the early 1970s, open economic policies continued. When formal diplomatic 
relations between Japan and Taiwan ended in 1972, semi-govemmental organisations were 
established to maintain practical links In 1973, two export-processing zones were 
established in Taizhong (T’aichung) and Nanzi. The Taiwanese government now sought to 
develop IC (integrated circuit) technology. In 1974, Taiwan approved a budget of $US 10 
million for IC development. In 1977, the government established the first demonstration 
factory for IC.
6.1.2 The Restructuring o f the Manufacturing Sector from the 1980s
In the 1980s, Taiwan’s export-oriented strategies were faced with new challenges. First, the 
persistent trade surplus increased the pressure on the revaluation of the Taiwan dollar
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against the US dollar.2 Secondly, there was intensifying trade friction with the US. The US 
withdrew the Generalised System of Preference (GSP) status from Taiwan in 1988. Taiwan 
thus needed to diversify its export trade away from the US. Thirdly, the increase of labour 
and land costs, as well as the shortage of labour, created domestic pressure for 
liberalisation as a result o f the long process of economic development. Fourthly, the 
ASEAN countries and China (because of their opening up) entered the path of 
export-oriented, light industry-based, labour-intensive industrialisation. Taiwanese 
products then began to lose their competitiveness in the world market. Fifthly, the heavy 
dependence on imported Japanese intermediate goods brought about a structural imbalance 
in Japan-Taiwan trade. Taiwan had to comply with the need to maintain international 
quality standards, and this gave rise to the need for high levels of skill and managerial 
know-how. The rapid growth of science-based technology in developed countries means 
that industrial upgrading required a more liberal policy in terms of FDI (Smith, 2000: 413).
While the Taiwanese government continued to maintain competitiveness in some of the 
labour-intensive industrial sectors in the 1980s, it began to focus on the mechanical, 
information and electronics industries. In 1979, the Science and Technology Development 
Programme sought to raise R&D expenditure and focus on private-sector technology 
development. This was later integrated into the Eighth Four-Year Economic Plan (1982-85) 
and Ten-Year National Science and Technology Development Plan (1986-95). The 
government also established the Xinzhu (Hsin-chu) science industrial park, near Taibei 
(T’ai-pei) in December 1980, with the aim of attracting and developing high-tech industry.
Another fundamental purpose of the Xinzhu industrial park is to capture the spillover from 
the presence of firms supported by the government in terms of training, technology transfer 
and direct cooperation with local firms (Simon, 1994: 211). The heavy dependence on 
government finance of R&D is due to the poor research capabilities of SMEs. For example, 
the pioneer of ‘foundry’ contract-manufacturing, TSMC (Taiwan Seminconductor 
Manufacturing, founded in 1987) and UMC (United Microelectronics Corporation) were 
spin offs from government-funded research projects. The first 1C demonstration factory 
was transformed into the first private 1C firm, UMC, in May 1980. UMC was formed as a 
local joint venture and originally introduced technology from ERSO (the Electronics
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Research Service Organisation, established by the Taiwanese government in 1977) and 
RCA. 25% of its capital came from the government Bank of Communications. It now has 
close cooperative relations with Hitachi. 48.3% of TSMC’s capital came from the 
government’s development fund and 27.5% came from Philips (Mizuhashi, 2001: 92). 
These two firms’ combined production now accounts for more than 60% of the foundry 
market (Kdryü, No. 619, 2000). Thus, the Taiwanese government has been directly 
involved in upgrading industrial structure by funding R&D expenditure and by setting up 
special policies and research projects. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the governmental 
fund accounted for about 50% of the total amount of R&D investment in Taiwan (Asamoto, 
1996: 104). The Taiwanese government has also given incentives to Taiwanese private 
firms and has supported the spillover effect from government-funded research projects. In 
July 1998, another science industrial park, in Tainan (T’ainan), was launched
The Taiwanese government has also provided cross-border networking relations in the 
electronics industry. In 1974, it established the Electronics Technological Advisory 
Committee (TAC) in the US. Its task was to promote relations with US electronics firms. 
The Xinzhu industrial science park was modeled on Silicon Valley in the US and has 
focused on high-technology production, including IC, informational hardware and 
PC-related products. According to Saxenian (2000), another aim of the Xinzhu science 
industrial park was to attract Taiwanese engineers studying in the US (especially in Silicon 
Valley). The Taiwanese researchers who came back were given high-grade houses by the 
government, and an American school was opened for the children of the researchers. The 
Monte Jade Science and Technology Association (MJSTA), established in 1989, has 
contributed greatly to business cooperation, investment and technological transfer by 
promoting exchanges between Taiwanese researchers in Taiwan and San Francisco. While 
the Taiwanese government does not actually fund MJSTA, it has close informal relations 
with the association The number of researchers returning to Taiwan has increased (1990: 
422; 1993: 1,004; 1995: 2,080; 1997: 2,859) (Saxenian, 2000: 331). These researchers 
have also contributed to the establishment o f venture firms. As a result, the increasing 
entry of local firms has led to a fall in the share of foreign firms in the output of PC-related 
products in Taiwan. In 1995, the share fell to 15% (Kawakami, 2000: 64). With this strong 
support, the number of firms in the park increased, reaching 292 in 1999 (Kóryü, No. 634,
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2 0 0 1 ).
Government support is both formal and informal. In 1993, the Taiwanese government 
adopted a promotional law for investment in semiconductor and high-tech-related 
projects.3 According to the Daiwa Research Institute, although Taiwan’s corporate tax is 
officially 25%, in practice only a 2.3% (average) corporate tax was imposed on 133 listed 
Taiwanese electronics firms in the late 1990s (Asuhi Shinhun, 4 November 2000). 
Government policy has provided Taiwanese venture firms with advantageous conditions. 
There is no discrimination against the smaller and medium firms. This neutral policy has 
greatly supported the development o f SMEs in Taiwan. Thus, in the case of the Taiwanese 
electronics industry, by using formal and informal practices the Taiwanese government has 
been a strong supporter of the transformation from labour-intensive to high-tech 
manufacturing. As a result, Taiwanese electronics firms are now a dominant industry 
(Kñryü, No. 632, 2000). Among the 20 top exporters, only three firms are non-electronics 
firms. All these firms have a high exporting rate except for the non-electronics firms. Thus 
strategic policies adopted by the Taiwanese government have provided a strong incentive 
for the transformation from labour-intensive to high-tech manufacturing.
6.2 Japanese FDI in Taiwan
The improvement of technology in offshore production and the gap in labour costs between 
Japan and East Asia have further encouraged Japanese firms to move out of Japan. With 
the improvement of local suppliers in terms of quality, technology, delivery time, and 
after-sales service, Japanese firms have more opportunities to find efficient sourcing 
partners outside Japan. The impact of Taiwan’s link with Japan on the technology 
orientation of the island’s electronics industry has been significant. Also, Taiwan is the 
stepping stone for Japanese firms seeking to operate in mainland China. It is said that 
almost 70% of Japanese affiliates in Taiwan have set up subsidiaries in mainland China 
(Kuroda, 2001: 230).
6.2.1 Japanese Electronics FDI in Taiwan
Japanese FDI projects in Taiwan have been the major source of evolution of the Taiwanese
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computer industry. This is not surprising, since Taiwan responded to the East Asian 
division of labour in production at a relatively early stage and focused on the electronics 
industry. Inward FDI has played an important role in helping Taiwan to join the 
international division of labour and promoting the organisational evolution of production 
networks in Taiwan.
Taiwan has been especially successful in attracting electronics investment from the 
advanced countries, in improving its international competitiveness, and even becoming a 
supplier of FDI to other East Asian countries. The electronics industry in Taiwan has been 
the fastest growing industry since the 1980s. The main export products o f Taiwan have 
come from the electronics sector. In 1999, the export of machinery and electrical 
equipment amounted to 52.8% of all exports (by volume), and among them 
electronics-related products (including personal computers) accounted for 18% of total 
exports (Nitlai Bijinesu Nyusu, No. 74, 2000). Table 6.1 shows Taiwanese firms' share in 
the production of personal computers. In 1999, PC-related firms occupied the top ten 
positions in the ranking of Taiwan’s exports, and the degree of dependence on exports 
among these firms was very high: from 66.16% (Acer) to 100% (TSMC) (Koryu, No. 632, 
2000).
fable 6.1 Taiwan's Share of the World Computer Market, 1996-1999 (Volume of 
Production, %)
-----------------Y ear
P ro d u c t  I te m s  --------- ---^
1 99 6 1 9 9 7 199H 1 9 9 9
N o te b o o k  PC 3 2 3 2 4 0 4 6
M o n ito r 5 4 5 5 5 8 5 9
D e sk to p  C o m p u te r 11 14 17 2 2
M o th e rb o a rd 5 0 5 6 61 7 6
SPS 5 5 6 4 6 6 6 8
C D -R O M 12 23 34 4 6
C ase 6 5 73 75 7 6
S c a n n e r 5 4 71 84 8 9
G ra p h ic  c a rd 31 3 2 31 3 5
K e y b o a rd 61 6 2 65 6 8
M o u se 65 6 3 6 0 6 0
S o u n d  C a rd 41 4 4 4 8 5 7
Source: Köryü, No 619 (15 May 2000)
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First, we need to examine the situation of Taiwanese inward FDI. The amount of FDI 
received by Taiwan in the 1990s was equivalent to about 70% of the total accumulated FDI 
since 1952.4 The share of Taiwanese outward FDI in the 1990s accounted for 95.8% of 
total Taiwanese outward FDI since 1952.5 Thus, it seems that the role of Taiwan as a 
receiver and supplier of FDI was fully activated in the 1990s. Table 6.2 shows that the 
central American Island countries were the largest investors in Taiwan in 1999. They have 
also been the second largest destination of Taiwanese outward FDI after China/’ Thus the 
shares of Japan and the US in total inward FDI are much higher than the statistics suggest. 
The accumulated Japanese FDI between 1952 and 1998 accounted for 22.3% of total 
Taiwanese inward FDI in the same period — just lower than that of the US (23.3%).7 In 
terms of industrial sectors, the share of electronics investment accounted for 25.5% of the 
total inward FDI in Taiwan between 1952 and 1999, and this was equivalent to almost half 
of all manufacturing FDI in Taiwan/4 Turning to Japanese FDI in Taiwan, 68% of that 
investment between 1952 and 1999 was in manufacturing. Japanese electronics FDI is the 
largest single sector, accounting for 27.3% o f total Japanese FDI in Taiwan between 1952 
and 1999 ' Japanese electronics FDI also accounted for 24.5% of Taiwan’s total inward 
electronics FDI between 1952 and 1999. While Japanese FDI is statistically second to the 
US, in terms of technology cooperation agreements Japanese firms have had more than 
twice as many cases of foreign investment (Simon, 2000: 526). Thus, from the point of 
view of technology orientation, the role of Japanese electronics firms is very significant.
Table 6.2 Sources of Inward FDI in Taiwan by Country and Region, 1995-1999 (%)
Country’ and Region 1995 1996 1997 199« 1999
Japan 19.5 22.2 19.9 143 12.1
us 43 6 19 7 10.6 23.2 27 1
Hong Kong 3.4 9.4 3.8 6.8 3 8
Europe 114 8.0 9.4 9.7 10.9
Central American Islands 5.1 16 9 15.4 19.0 28.7
Sources KOryü, No 572 (15 April 1998), No. 619 (15 May 2000) and Kôryü Kyôkai (1999) Taiwan no 
Keizai Delà (The Economic Data on Taiwan), Tokyo: Kôryü Kyôkai.
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Table 6.3 Shareholding Relations between Japanese Electronics Firms and Taiwanese 
Firms
C o m p a n y N a m e  o f  L o c a l B o d y M a jo r  L o c a l B u s in e ss  P a r tn e r  ( a )
S h a r e  o f  L o c a l  
P a r t n e r  (b )
M a ts u s h i ta M a ts u s h ita  E le c tric  (T a iw a n ) In d iv id u a l 4 1 .3
[7 ) P a n a so n ic  C o m p u te i 0
P a n a s o n ic  In d u stria l S a le s 0
P a n a s o n ic  S y stem s  S a le s In d iv id u a l 4 0
P a n a so n ic  T a iw a n  L a b o ra to r ie s 0
T a im a tsu  In d u s tr ia l In d iv id u a l 4 0
T a iw a n  M a ts u s h ita  T e ch n ica l S e rv ic e 0
M its u b is h i C h in a  E le c tric  M fg -
(7 ) C h in a  R v o d e n D a s h c n g h a n g  G ro u p 5 0
E y e  L ig h tin g  T a iw a n - 0
M e lto n ic -
M itsu b ish i E le c tric  T a iw a n - -
P o w e rc h ip  S em ic o n d u c to i U M A X /E lite  G ro u p 7 5 .2
S h ilin  E le c tr ic  &  E n g in e e r in g -
H ita c h i H itach i A sia . - 0
(5) H ita ch i S a le s  C o rp  o f  T a iw a n - 2 4
H ita ch i T e c h n o lo g y A cer 15
K ao h s iu n g  H ita c h i 0
T a iw an  H ita c h i 3 8  5
S a n y o C h en  H o  &  C o . in d iv id u a ls 5 6 .5
(4 ) S a n y o  E lec tric  T a iw a n - 1 .8 4
S a n y o  E le c tro n ic  T a ic h u n g 0
S a n y o  S e m ic o n d u c to r  T a ip e i 0
N E C N E C  E le c tro n ic s  T a iw a n - 0
N E C  T a iw a n - 0
T a iw a n  T e le c o m m u n ic a tio n  In d u stry T a tu n g 5 8  1
S h a r p S h a rp  C o rp S h e n g b a o 5 0
S h a rp  E le c tro n ic  C o m p o n e n t A u ro ra 3 5
S h a rp  E le c tro n ic s 0
T e c h n o lo g y  T a iw an  C o rp 0
S o n y S o n y  V id eo  T a iw a n - 0
T a iw an  E le c tro n ic s  ¿¿T ech n o lo g y 0
F u j i t s u F u jitsu  T a iw a n - 0
F u jitsu  T e le c o m m u n ic a tio n s 0
T o s h ib a T o sh ib a  E le c tro n ic s  T a iw a n In d iv id u a ls 10
Note: (a) a blank does not necessarily mean no local partners, some are not identified, (b) a blank does not 
mean zero for Financing through the market 
Source: Based on Toyo Keizai (2000).
By 1999, nine leading Japanese electronics firms had established foreign subsidiaries in 
Taiwan, including Matsushita (7), Toshiba (1), Mitsubishi (7), Hitachi (5), Sony (2), Sharp
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(3), Sanyo (4), NEC (3) and Fujitsu (2).111 However, if we add the keiretsu firms, the 
numbers are much higher. For example, Toshiba’s family firms, such as Toshiba Ceramics, 
Toshiba Machine, and Toshiba Career, have also set up subsidiaries in Taiwan. Table 6.3 
shows the proportion and relations of Taiwanese shareholders in the capital of Japanese 
subsidiaries in Taiwan: Acer is a 15% shareholder of one of Hitachi’s subsidiaries, Tatung 
is the largest shareholder of Taiwan Telecommunication Industry, a subsidiary of NEC, and 
Shengbao is a major partner of Sharp. These links derive from the cooperative relations 
between Japanese and Taiwanese firms. For example, the Shengbao Company, which is 
one of the leading electrical goods firms in Taiwan, introduced technology from Sharp 
when the company was established in the 1960s, and Sharp is still a 7.28% shareholder of 
its capital.11 Quanta has been able to produce TFT-LCDs by introducing technology from 
Sharp (Mizuhashi, 2001: 194).
In many cases Japanese firms have tried to organise local networks of suppliers and 
subcontractors, thus applying the Japanese keiretsu system. Matsushita Electronic 
Industrial, for example, established Taiwan Matsushita (with 60% equity) in 1962. Since 
then, Taiwan Matsushita has tried locally to develop its own keiretsu system based on sales 
and production networks (Hori, 2000). In the 1980s, the company succeeded in developing 
its own R&D capability and exports network. It expanded its exports to the US market in 
radio cassette recorders, car audios, black and white TVs, etc. when Matsushita (Japan) 
gave up producing because of production costs in Japan Taiwan Matsushita employed 
former engineers at RCA and commenced the manufacture of PC-related products. In the 
mid-1980s, it succeeded in acquiring orders for CRT (cathode ray tube) from IBM, replacing 
previous production by Matsushita through contracts with subsidiaries of IBM in Japan. 
Taiwan Matsushita then started to produce CRT for other computer manufacturers. 
Taiwanese local suppliers and subcontractors were coordinated by Taiwan Matsushita 
through ‘satellite cooperative firm relations’ (Hori, 2000: 175-91). Most of them were 
small firms. Entering into the Japanese sub-contracting system was the first step for their 
business. Taiwan Matsushita provided technological training to upgrade quality and 
develop workers’ skills. While subcontractors handle individual parts of the production 
process, the manufacturer needs to manage the entire process. The Japanese electronics 
firm often distinguishes clearly between products made in Japan (high value-added
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production) and Taiwan (low value added production). For example, Matsushita 
Communication Industrial produces high-grade car audio systems (i.e. TV and navigation) 
in Japan and low-grade car audio products in Taiwan (Seki, 2000: 283). However, this 
distinction can no longer respond to the emergence of new competition, which requires a 
quick development cycle, digitalisation and efficient delivery.
Japan-Taiwan trade relations have been characterised by Taiwan’s huge deficit ($US 21.95 
billion in 2000) (Koryu, No.637, 2001); but Taiwan compensates for this deficit by trading 
with China. As Hong Kong is used for China-Taiwan trade, Taiwan’s trade surplus against 
Hong Kong in 2000 reached $US 29.17 billion (ibid.). For Taiwan, Japan is the largest 
source of imports and the third largest destination for its exports. In 1999, the share of 
electronics goods in Japan’s exports to Taiwan was 24.5%, and the figure for the share of 
electronics goods in Japan’s imports from Taiwan was 23.3% (Tsusansho, 2000). Japan 
exported SUS 7.1 billion of electronics goods to, and imported SUS 3 billion of electronics 
goods from, Taiwan. In PC-related products Taiwan’s presence has increased sharply. In 
2000, Taiwan became the largest source of Japan’s computer imports (21%), exceeding 
those of the US (Koryu, No.637, 2001). In Japan’s notebook imports, the share of Taiwan 
accounted for 78% in volume and 86% in value (ibid.). Taiwan has begun to play an 
important export role in PC-related products and in the supply of components in 
Japan-Taiwan trade.
6.2.2 Production Networks in Taiwan
The development of Taiwan’s electronics industry must be seen in relation to the 
emergence of an East Asian international division of labour and specific production 
networks. The receipt of FDI has undoubtedly helped the process of technological transfer 
to Taiwan from the advanced countries. Taiwan’s electronics industry was initiated in the 
1960s and 1970s, when foreign firms such as RCA, Zenith, Philips, Matsushita, Mitsubishi 
and NEC went to Taiwan to set up wholly owned subsidiaries or local joint ventures for the 
production of electronics goods such as transistor radios, black-and-white television sets, 
calculators, electrical household appliances, and electrical components and parts. Such 
foreign-affiliated production accounted for more than 60% of Taiwan’s electronics exports 
in the 1970s (Chin, 1996: 17). The domestic firms successfully emulated the local
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multinational corporations (MNCs) and the electrical and electronics sector as a whole 
expanded steadily during the 1970s, becoming the biggest single source of Taiwan's 
foreign exchange earnings by the early 1980s. By 1998, the share of Taiwan’s production 
of PC-related products in the world’s total production was very high.12
The PC industry was established in Taiwan on the basis of both OEM and original 
brandname manufacturing (OBM) procurement activities and Taiwan’s own indigenous 
effort. Japanese, US and European computer manufacturers have often approached 
Taiwanese firms for OEM/OBM facilities (Ikegami, 2000: 179). Japanese firms such as 
Fujitsu, Hitachi, NEC, Epson, Alps, Panasonic, Mitsubishi and Toshiba place orders for 
OEM production with Taiwanese firms According to the Japan-Taiwan Interchange 
Association (Koryu Kyokai), in 1998 60% to 70% of Taiwan’s PC-related products were in 
the form of OEM production.13 Almost 40% of OEM orders for PC-related products came 
from the US, 30% from the EU, and 10% from Japan. Among US computer manufacturers, 
Inventec Corporation and Arima Computer Corp produce OEM notebooks for Compaq, 
Acer Inc., Quant Computer Inc. produce for IBM, and Compall Electronics Inc. and Quant 
Computer Inc. produce for Dell (Koryu, No.622, 2000). Acer, which is now the world’s 
sixth largest computer and computer equipment firm, still has contracts with 130 firms to 
produce OEM products.14 60% of its sales come from OEM production (Mizuhashi, 2001: 
186). Trs ie 6.5 shows the OEM/ODM (original development manufacturing) relations with 
Japanese firms. The US and Japan are major trading partners for Taiwan’s PC-related 
production. The role of these two countries, however, is clearly different. Japan is the 
largest source for imports and the US is the largest destination for exports. Finished OEM 
products ordered from Japanese electronics firms are almost all exported to the US (30%), 
Europe (25%), ASEAN (15%) and Taiwan (15%) through their worldwide branches, and 
only 5% are imported into Japan.13
Clearly, concentration on OEM production is a key to the success of the Taiwanese 
electronics industry. For example, Delta Electronics and Compeq Manufacturing 
developed their technologies through IBM’s technological guide in local procurement 
activities, and Acer and Mitac acquired computer technology through OEM production for 
ITT (Mizuhashi, 2001: 101). OEM production has enabled the introduction of technology
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into Taiwan and is indeed very suitable for Taiwanese SMEs that do not have their own 
sales networks. In terms of firm size, 90% of all Taiwanese firms are SMEs. For OEM, the 
assembly technology and design technology are more important, and high-tech assembling 
technology is not required. As a result of improved design technology, Taiwanese firms 
have also increased their OBM role (Takaoka, 1997: 216). In the case of PCs, Taiwan has 
focused on the acquisition of OEM from advanced countries. With the rise of price 
competition in the PC market, Taiwan has been chosen as a major site for the assembly 
production of those countries. In the early 1990s, the orders from Japanese electronics 
firms expanded because of the rise of price competition in PCs. OEM then started to shift 
to ODM, which includes all stages from design to production (Mizuhashi, 2001: 102). This 
is different from Japanese SMEs, which have concentrated on assembling technology and 
have not developed research and development.
Table 6.4 Taiwan’s Main PC-Related OEM Production, 1998 (SUS million, %)
O E M /T o ta l
P ro d u c tio n
R a te  o f  O ffsh o re  
P ro d u c tio n
M a in  C o u n try  fo r  
Im p o rts
M ain  C o u n try  fo r 
E x p o rts
N o te b o o k  PC 8 6 .0 % 0 % J a p a n  (8 0 .2 % ) U S  (5 1 .9 % )
M o n ito r 6 7 .0 % 7 2 % K o re a  (4 5 .9 % ) U S  (4 5 .0 % )
D e sk to p  PC 6 7 .0 % 4 5 % U S  (5 7 .2 % ) Ja p a n  (4 2 .7 % )
M o th e rb o a rd 3 0 .7 % 3 8 % - -
S P S 9 8 .0 % 9 1 % C h in a  (8 9  3 % ) U S  (3 5 .2 % )
C D -R O M 3 0 .8 % 5 3 % J a p a n  (8 0  2 % ) U S  (5 0 .7 % )
C a se 4 2 .0 % 7 5 % J a p a n  (2 3 .4 % ) U S  (3 4 .2 % )
S c a n n e r 4 3 .0 % 3 8 % U S  (3 0  4 % ) U S  (4 4  5 % )
G ra p h ic s  c a rd 3 0 .0 % 6 5 % J a p a n  (2 3 .4 % ) U S  (3 4 .2 % )
K e y b o a rd 7 0 .3 % 9 1 % M a la y s ia  (4 5 .7 % ) U S  (4 5 .7 % )
U P S 7 1 .8 % 2 5 % U S  (5 2 .8 % ) U S  (2 6 .1 % )
M o u se 6 9 .4 % 8 9 % K o re a  (4 5 .9 % ) U S  (4 5 .0 % )
S o u n d  ca rd 5 8 6 % 6 5 % J a p a n  (2 3 .4 % ) U S  (3 4 .2 % )
V id eo  ca rd 4 5 .0 % 18% J a p a n  (2 3 .4 % ) U S  (3 4 .2 % )
T o ta l 6 4 .8 % -
Note: (1) Because of data limitations, imports and exports do not include the offshore OEM production, thus 
only products made in Taiwan are included (2) Under main countries for imports and exports, monitors and 
mice are counted together, and cases, graphics cards, sound cards, and video cards are counted together 
Sources: Koryu, No. 620 (31 May 2000) and No. 622 (30 June 2000)
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labié 6.5 OEM/ODM Relations between Taiwanese Firms and Japanese Firms, 1999
T a iw a n e se  F irm s M a jo r  J a p a n e s e  F irm s  ( in c lu d in g  Ja p a n  B a se d  U S  F irm s )
A cer
Q au n ta  C o m p u te r
In v en tée
C o m p a l
M iT A C
A rim a
FIC
T w inhead
C L E V O
J a p a n  IB M . A k ia
J a p a n  IB M , D e ll C o m p u te r . J a p a n  G a te w ay , A p p le  C o m p u te r  
C o m p a q  C o m p u te r  
F u jitsu , D ell C o m p u te r  
S h a rp
C o m p a q  C o m p u te r  
N E C , M its u b is h i. S o tec h  
N E C , S h a rp  
H ita ch i
Source: Lin, Thomas (Lin Shikô) (2000) Taiwan no Shikunu (A Mechanism of Taiwan), Tokyo: Chukei 
Shuppan, p.107
Table 6.6 Relations between Taiwanese Firms and Foreign Firms in Semiconductor 
Production, 1999
T a iw a n e se  F irm s M a jo r  F o re ig n  F irm s
T S M C  (fo u n d ry )
U M C  (fo u n d ry )  
W in b o n d  ( ID M ) 
M o sc l-V ite lic  (D R A M ) 
M a c ro n ix  ( ID M ) 
V an g u rad  (D R A M )
P h ilip s , F u jitsu  
S 3 .  T rid en t. M S I . L a ttilc c  
T o sh ib a
S ie m e n s . M o to ro la . O ki 
N in te n d o , P h ilip s  
M o to ro la . S h a rp . M a tsu sh ita
Source Lin, Thomas (Lin Shiko) (2000) Taiwan no Shikumi (A Mechanism of Taiwan), Tokyo Chukei 
Shuppan, p 109
Since the late 1990s, EMS (Electronics Manufacturing Services) has emerged as a new 
strategy of Taiwanese PC-related firms. The digitalisation and computerisation of 
consumer electronics products encourages the convergence of computing, communication 
and consumer-related technologies. Furthermore, electronics firms need to achieve a 
shorter development cycle. EMS is a new form of contract manufacturing, from the 
development, design and procurement of electronics products to production. For Taiwanese 
firms, its merit is the more efficient use of mass production. Although in the world sales of 
EMS the US firms dominate the top rankings, Taiwanese firms have begun to undertake 
EMS production. TSMC, the world’s largest chip foundry, produces OEM memory chips 
for Intel, IBM, Motorola, Fujitsu and AMD (Koryu, No.623, 2000). TSMC became 
Taiwan’s fourth largest exporter in 1999. Almost 90% of TSMC’s business activities in 
1998 were contract made-to-order computer chips, called ‘foundry’ (ibid.). Table 6.6
presents the production relations in semiconductors between Taiwanese ‘foundry' and 
DRAM manufacturers and foreign firms. TSMC undertakes ‘foundry’ for Fujitsu and 
Philips, Mosel-Vitelic produces DRAM for OKI, and Vanguard produces DRAM for Sharp 
and Matsushita (Lin Thomas, 2000: 109). With the worldwide increase of outsourcing 
production in the electronics industry, Taiwanese OEM firms are transforming themselves 
into EMS firms: by the end of 2000 about 200 Taiwanese firms claimed that they were 
EMS producers (Koryu, No. 634, 2001).
Through various forms of cooperation (OEM, EMS, or technological cooperation) a 
significant degree of interdependence between Japanese and Taiwanese firms has 
developed The total OEM orders placed by Japanese electronics firms with Taiwanese 
firms in 1996 amounted to SUS2.16 billion; in 1997 $US 2.03 billion; in 1998 SUS2.13 
billion. The development of links has changed the sub-contracting system. For example, 
UMC, which became the third largest foundry producer in the world in 2000, bought a 
Japanese semiconductor firm in December 1998 and even started production activity in 
Japan. It initially introduced technology from the ERSO and RCA, but it also has 
cooperative relations with Hitachi (Koryu, No. 619, 2000). Asuteck Computer Inc. 
(founded in 1990) undertakes OEM production of motherboards for Intel (US), HP(US), 
and Sony (Japan). The key components (i.e. LCDs), however, still depend on imports from 
Sanyo or Hitachi (ibid.). Thus, Taiwanese networking linkages give rise to a unique, 
complex interconnectedness in which the key components of rival firms are used for the 
products of rival makers. The EMS business model has provided further opportunities for 
Taiwanese electronics firms. Japanese and Taiwanese electronics firms have also started to 
co-invest in mainland China, and joint Japanese-Taiwanese firms have emerged. For 
example, Matsushita Electric Works have established joint firms with Compec 
Manufacturing (45% of equity) in Guangzhou. In Kunshan, JVC (Japan) and Unicap 
Electronics Industrial (Taiwan) have set up joint firms (Mizuhashi, 2001: 180).
6.3 Taiwanese FDI in China
Taiwanese firms began to gain a foothold in China in the late 1980s. In 1987, the 
Taiwanese government abolished martial law and lifted the ban on kinship visits to the
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mainland. This allowed Taiwanese business people to see the investment environment in 
mainland China for themselves. The foreign exchange regime was also liberalised to allow 
free capital movement under NTS 5 million. In 1988, business activities in the mainland 
were permitted by the Taiwanese government. In the late 1980s, the revaluation of the 
Taiwanese dollar also encouraged Taiwanese outward FDI. Almost 40% of Taiwanese 
outward FDI between 1952 and 1999 was in manufacturing (Koryu, No. 626, 2000). With 
the growing shortage of labour, the escalation of production costs, and the rise of 
environmental regulation in Taiwan in the 1980s, Taiwanese manufacturing firms were 
forced to relocate their labour-intensive production processes, initially to ASEAN and then 
to China. In particular, electronics FDI has been the major part of Taiwanese outward FDI 
(almost 41% of total Taiwanese outward manufacturing FDI between 1952 and 1999)."'
6.3.1 Taiwanese FDI in ASEAN and China
Taiwanese outward FDI first began to extend to ASEAN in the mid-1980s. Taiwan was the 
original assembly production site for leading electronics firms. It had the advantages of 
labour-intensive manufacturing in the 1970s. However, by the early 1980s Taiwan was 
faced with a rise of production costs (labour, land) and stronger environmental regulations. 
Economic restructuring in the 1980s coincided with political reform and democratization, 
and workers began to mobilise to demand labour rights. Economic liberalisation had a 
spillover effect that induced social groups, including environmentalist and labour 
organisations, to become active (Wang, 2001b: 354). With the increasing importance o f 
rationalisation, economies of scale, and costs of production, Taiwanese firms had to 
expand their production system abroad They started to invest in the ASEAN countries 
from the mid-1980s, and the trend peaked in 1994. Taiwan has now become a large 
investor in ASEAN countries. In Thailand accumulated Taiwanese FDI ($US 9.9 billion 
between 1959 and 1999) is the fourth largest source of total inward FDI following Japan, 
the US and Hong Kong. In Malaysia Taiwanese FDI is the third largest investment (total 
$US 8.6 billion from 1959 to 1999) following that of Japan and the US. In Vietnam Taiwan 
is the second largest investor following Singapore (Koryu, No. 631, 2000).
As ASEAN achieved sharp economic growth between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s, 
the rise of labour and land costs reduced the advantages of offshore production for
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Taiwanese manufacturers. Although, in 1993, the Taiwanese government adopted the 
‘southward policy’ (nanxmg -hengce), which aimed to facilitate Taiwanese investment in 
ASEAN, much Taiwanese investment was then reinvested in China (Kôryü, No. 622, 2000). 
In the late 1990s, China became the largest destination of Taiwanese outward FDI. As 
direct investment is still prohibited between Taiwan and China, the central American island 
countries are now a major destination of Taiwanese outward FDI because they serve as a 
route for ‘roundabout’ investment. Most of them have reinvested in China or in Taiwan.17
Table 6.7 confirms the sharp increase of Taiwanese outward FDI in China. By 2000, 
Taiwanese outward FDI had reached $US 44.06 billion (official figures approved by 
Taiwanese Economic Ministry only, including indirect FDI in China). Mainland China is 
the largest destination of Taiwanese FDI, accounting for almost 38.8% of total Taiwanese 
outward FDI ($US 17.1 billion, between 1952 and 2000). The Central American island 
countries are the second largest destinations, accounting for 20.86% of total Taiwanese 
outward FDI (SUS 9.19 billion, Liangan Jingji Tongji Yuebao, April 2001). Thus it seems 
that the Taiwanese FDI in China accounts for well over 50% of total outward Taiwanese 
FDI This also reveals that this investment has mushroomed in a very short period. The 
accumulated Taiwanese FDI in China between 1991 and 2000 already accounted for about 
39% of total accumulated Taiwanese outward FDI between 1952 and 2000.
Table 6.7 Taiwanese FDI in Mainland China (SUS million, %)
1 9 9 5 1 996 1 9 9 7 1 99 8 1 9 9 9
T o ta l f r o m  1952  
to  2 0 0 0
T otal o u tw a rd  T a iw a n e se  F D I  (A )  (a ) 2 ,7 1 3 .8 3 ,3 9 4 .6 4 .5 0 8 .3 5 ,3 3 0 .9 4 ,5 2 1  8 4 4 .0 5 8 .6
T a iw an ese  F D I in  C h in a  (B ) 1 ,0 9 2 .7 1 ,2 2 9 .2 1 ,6 1 4 .5 2 ,0 3 4 .6 1 ,2 5 2 .8 1 7 .1 0 2 .6 (b )
(B )/(A )  (% ) 4 0 .3 3 6 .2 3 5 .8 3 8 .2 2 7 .7 3 8 .8
Note: (a) Total outward Taiwanese FDI includes indirect FDI in China Because of a change o f the law, the 
data for 1997 often include ex post facto investment items but here exclude the ex post facto investment (b) 
Data for China for the period 1991-2000
Sources: Liangan Jingji Tongji Yuebao (April 2001), Kóryü, No. 572 (15 April 1998) and No. 626 (31 August 
2000).
6.3.2 Taiwanese Electronics FDI in China
The Taiwanese government officially admitted indirect Taiwanese investment in the 
mainland in October 1990 (primarily through Hong Kong, later through the central
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American islands countries). This change is reflected in the statistics. In the 1990s the 
central American island countries became the top destination of Taiwanese outward FDI 
excluding China (officially approved figures) (Kôryü, No.626, 2000). Most of this 
investment is thought to go mainly to China. The major share of Taiwanese FDI in China is 
in manufacturing industry. From 1991 to 1999, the share of Taiwanese manufacturing 
investment in China was equivalent to 91.5% of total Taiwanese FDI in China (ibid.). In 
terms of composition by industrial sector, electronics investment in China is remarkable. 
The accumulated Taiwanese outward electronics investment (between 1991 and 2000) in 
China accounted for 28.04% of total Taiwanese FDI in China (Liangan Jingji Tongji 
Yuehao, April 2001). By 1999, accumulated Taiwanese electronics FDI in China ($US 3.68 
billion) accounted for almost 50% of total Taiwanese outward electronics investment 
(Kôryü, No.622, 2000). The Taiwanese government has imposed restrictions on electronics 
investment in mainland China and has gradually increased the allocation to electronics 
products. In 1990, it permitted investment in calculators, computer keyboards and 
telephones, and in 1991 extended this to computer power supply units. In 1997, the 
liberalisation of the foreign exchange regime was expanded to allow free capital movement 
under NTS 50 million. However, personal computers (except those under 486 CPU), 
DRAM, colour scanners, TFTs and digital cameras are still prohibited.
Despite the remaining restrictions, Taiwanese FDI in China sharply increased throughout 
the 1990s By 1999, the number of Taiwanese firms investing in the mainland was 
estimated to be about 44,000, and the total investment (actual use) from Taiwan reached 
SUS 24 billion, which accounted for 7.8% of total inward FDI in China (Beijing Weekly, 6 
June 2000). Some 250,000 Taiwanese in the mainland run factories and firms, and are 
responsible for about 12% of China’s total exports {Business Week, 12 August 2000). Table
6.8 shows the dispersion of Taiwanese FDI in the mainland by region. From the 
perspective of total Taiwanese FDI from 1991 to 1999, Guangdong (34.6%), Jiangsu 
(17.5%) and Shanghai (14.5%) were the leading areas for inward Taiwanese investment. 
Fujian (10.8%) was in fourth position, a long way behind However, in terms of electrical 
and electronics investment, the share of Guangdong far exceeds that of other regions. By 
1999, the accumulated Taiwanese electronics FDI in China (officially approved as SUS 
3.68 billion) went to Guangdong (49.5%, SUS 1.82 billion ), Jiangsu (14.9%, SUS 550
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million), Shanghai (11.1%, $US 410 million) and Fujian (5.4%, $US 200 million) (Koryu,, 
No. 622, 2000). In terms of the city level, by 1999 Dongguan in Guangdong province had 
received $US 810 million of investment, which is equivalent to 22% of total Taiwanese 
electronics FD1 in China, followed by Shanghai (11.1%, $US 410 million) and Shenzhen 
($US 350 million).18 By 2000, the accumulated Taiwanese electronics FDI in China 
reached $US 5.14 billion, and Dongguan had received $US 1.07 billion Taiwanese FDI 
(20.8% o f the total), followed by Shenzhen ($US 570 million) and Shanghai ($US 560 
million).19
Table 6.8 The Dispersion of Taiwanese FDI in China, Main Provinces, 1991-1999 (SLS 
million, %)
1991 1 9 9 2 1993 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 99 6 1 9 9 7 199S 1 9 9 9
T o ta l f r o m  
1991 to  
1 9 9 9
Total
T a iw an ese
FD I
174.2 2 4 6 .9 3 .1 6 8  4 9 6 2 .2 1 ,0 9 2 .7 1 ,2 2 9 .2 1 ,6 1 4 .5 2 .0 3 4 .6 1 ,2 5 2 .7 1 4 ,4 9 5 .4
G u a n g d o n g 42.1 4 5 .4 33.1 2 4 2 0 .4 2 3 3 3 .5 4 0 .5 3 9 .9 3 4 .6
F u jian 32.1 12 15 10 1 1 1 9 4 .5 7 .4 4 .7 1 0 8
Jian g su 14 14 2 6 .3 4 0 .7 15 .6 24 .3 2 2 .9 2 9 .9 2 5 .9 17.5
S h an g h a i 2 0 .5 1 9 8 18 9 14.1 12.1 14.5
Z h e jia n g 0.1 6 .7 3 .9 6 .5 5 .2 2 .7 5.1 4 .2 6 .3 5 .8
Note: For data between 1991 and 1994, Shanghai is included in Jiangsu 
Sources: Koryu, No. 572 (15 April 1998) and No 626 (31 August 2000).
6.3.3 Taiwanese Electronics Firms in the Pearl River Delta
Taiwanese electronics firms have agglomerated in Guangdong, especially in the Pearl 
River Delta. By 1999, the number o f registered Taiwanese firms in Guangdong was 
estimated to have reached 1 l,000,:tl equivalent to almost one-quarter of the total number 
of Taiwanese firms in the mainland. Dongguan is the leading city in terms of the 
concentration of Taiwanese inward investment. Such concentration in one area and in a 
single sector (electronics) has enabled Taiwanese investors to create some ‘electronic 
cities’ and form a number of special zones (Lin, 1998). By 1999, the number of registered 
Taiwanese firms in Dongguan had reached 3,200, and the number of Taiwanese residents 
in the city was about 40,000 (Asahi Shinbun, 3 February 2000). In Dongguan there were 
some 1,800 IT-related firms, including more than 1,000 Taiwanese firms (ibid.). The level 
of industrial agglomeration in the electronics industry in Dongguan is remarkable, and
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Taiwanese electronics firms occupy a dominant position By the late 1990s, Taiwanese 
firms employed a third of the city’s population (3.5 million) and contributed to 70% of the 
city’s exports (Kdryu, No. 622, 2000). According to the mayor (Asahi Shmhun, 3 February 
2000), in Dongguan 95% of all components of personal computers can be obtained within 
the city. This makes it easier for Taiwanese firms to gain access to local procurement 
activities.
By September 2000, 82 Taiwanese-listed electronics firms owned production sites in 
mainland China (Kôryû, No. 631, 2000). Among 232 subsidiaries of 82 Taiwanese-listed 
electronics firms in China, 134 Taiwanese firms were 100% Taiwanese-owned firms. The 
rate of offshore production in PC-related products, for example, reached nearly 50% in 
1999 (Kôryü, No. 622, 2000). In 1999, China accounted for 70% of the offshore 
production of Taiwanese PC-related products (ibid.). By 2000, among 232 Taiwanese 
subsidiaries, the major location is Dongguan (39 Taiwanese-listed electronics firms’ 
subsidiaries); 29 in Shenzhen, 25 in Shanghai, 17 in Guangzhou, 8 in Zhongshan, 3 Shunde, 
10 in Kunshan, 13 in Suzhou, 11 Beijing, and 3 in Tianjin.'1
Table 6.9 Taiwan’s IT Production in mainland China
P ro d u c t C a te g o ry T o p  F iv e  O v e rs e a s  P ro d u ce rs
D e s k to p  C o m p u te rs
M ita c  (S h u n d e ) , P C  C h ip  G ro u p  (S h e n z h e n ) , A c e r  (Z h o n g s h a n ) , T a tu n g  
(S h a n g h a i) , F IC  (S h e n z h e n )
M a in b o a rd s
P C  C h ip  G ro u p  (S h e n z h e n ) . A su te k  (S u z h o u ) , G ig a -B y te  (D o n g g u a n , 
H u a n g jia n g ) , M ic ro -S ta r  (S h e n z h e n )
S c a n n e rs
S ili tc k  (D o n g g u a n ) , A v is io n  (Q in g x i.  S h a n g h a i. S u z h o u ) . P r im a x  
(D o n g g u a n ) , M u ste k  (D o n g g u a n ) , U m a x  (S u z h o u )
C D -R O M  d riv e s
L ite -O N  IT  (D o n g g u a n ) . B e h a v io r  T e c h  (D o n g g u a n ) , P a n -In te rn a tio n a l 
(D o n g g u a n ) . A c e r  P e r ip h e ra ls  (S u z h o u )
M o n ito rs
T P V  T e ch n o lo g y  (F u z h o u . B e ijin g ) . A c e r  P e r ip h e ra ls  (S u z h o u ) . L itc -O N  
(D o n g g u a n ) . J e a n  (H u a n g jia n g ) , C o m p a l (K u n sh a n )
Note: There is no particular date on this research The original source is Jingji Ribao (24 August 2000)
Source: l.iangan Jingmao, No 112 (10 April 2001)
Dongguan is a major production site for Taiwanese electronics firms. Delta Electronics Inc., 
Primax, Lite-on, GVC, ADI, Chocony, Suyin, and Yashin Industrial have all established 
production sites in Dongguan. Other firms with production in Shenzhen have also set up 
factories in Dongguan, e g. Honhai, Acer, Mitac, FIC (ibid.). In terms of OEM production
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in Dongguan, Honhai set up factories in 1996 in order to produce half-completed PC 
products ordered from Compaq (US). This was a strategic product for Compaq, which 
announced it was producing a $499 PC (Jetoro Sensâ, February 2001). By 2000 Delta 
Electronics Inc., which is a major OEM manufacturer of SPS, had established five 
electronics production sites in Dongguan and employed 21,910 workers (Mizuhashi, 2001: 
156). Lite-On Technology, which is major OEM manufacturer of monitors, manages its 
production in Dongguan. Table 6.9 shows Taiwan’s IT production sites in mainland China. 
It reveals the strong position of Dongguan in Taiwanese electronics production.
6.3.4 The Evolution of Production Networks and the Shift o f Production Sites to the 
Mainland
Taiwanese firms have moved to offshore production in order to maintain comparative 
advantage in the production of PC-related products. The demands of clients seeking to sell 
electronics and informational products in mainland China has encouraged Taiwanese firms 
to shift their production sites (.Jetoro Sensa, July 2001) by establishing a pattern through 
which they receive an order in Taiwan and produce in China. In 1996, the value of 
production o f OEM was $US 2.482 billion; 4.25 billion in 1997; and 6.269 billion in 1998 
(Kôryü, No. 622, 2000). Taiwanese firms now produce almost 70% of all China’s 
PC-related products. As a result of recent expansion, offshore production now accounts for 
more than 50% of total Taiwanese PC-related production. Although the offshore 
production o f notebook PCs is still restricted by the Taiwan authorities, 72% of monitors 
were produced outside Taiwan in 1998. In the same year, 45% of desktop PCs were 
produced outside Taiwan (ibid.). The major offshore production site is now in mainland 
China. As a result, China contributed 29.0% of Taiwan’s PC-related production in 1998 
and 32.2% in 1999 (ibid ).
In 1999, with the increase of Taiwanese offshore production, China became the fifth largest 
exporter o f PC-related products Most of this is attributable to production by Taiwanese 
firms in China. In 1999, Taiwanese firms contributed 72% of China’s production of 
PC-related products (total $US 18.46 billion) and 64% of China's PC-related exports (total 
SUS 11.7 billion).22 Moreover, production by Taiwanese firms in mainland China 
contributes to almost half of the total consumption of PC-related products in China (total
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$US 13.7 billion). For example, in 2000, Taiwanese production of scanners accounted for 
93% of world production, and its share of production in the mainland reached 85%. As a 
result, the production of scanners in China reached 79% of world production in 2000.21 
Following the increase of Taiwanese FD1 in China, cross-strait trade is also developing. In 
1999, total trade was valued at $US 23.5 billion, with Taiwan becoming China’s seventh 
largest trading partner. Taiwan enjoyed a huge trade surplus of $US 15.5 billion against 
China (Guoji Shanghai), 14 January 2000). The major export goods from Taiwan to the 
mainland are electrical and electronics machinery, and in 1998 such exports amounted to 
19.2% of total cross-strait trade (Koryu, No. 594, 1999). This growth is largely attributable 
to the shift of production bases from Taiwan to China
6.4 The Political Economy of the Taiwan Strait
6.4.1 The Asymmetric Relations across the Taiwan Strait
Taiwanese FD1 in China did not emerge until the mid-1980s. The political rivalry between 
Taiwan and China separated the people and society. Indirect trade and investment finally 
began through Hong Kong in the mid-1980s. Taiwan-mainland China relations remain 
unresolved and are characterised as asymmetric relations on the basis of deepening 
economic integration and political hostility. With the introduction of China’s open door 
policy, Taiwan’s economic liberalisation and the change of the international environment 
(Sino-US diplomatic normalisation in 1979, Sino-Japan diplomatic normalisation in 1972), 
the door was opened for economic exchange without resolving fundamental political 
conflicts.
Since then China has continued to call for Taiwanese FDI in the mainland. It has adopted 
several laws and regulations to support Taiwanese businesses. While China called for 
direct contacts by ‘three communications’ (postal service, transportation and commerce) in 
1979, Taiwan insisted on gradualism in further opening up cross-strait economic relations. 
The Executive Yuan approved a revised mainland policy in March 1991 under the 
Guidelines for National Unification (tongyi gangling). This reasserted the ‘One China' 
(yige Zhongguo) principle offered by mainland China, but for the first time defined the 
unification processes in terms of three stages: (1) eliminating hostility and the recognition
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of Taiwan's status as a political entity as well as implementing democracy and the rule of 
law; (2) establishing official communication channels, and direct postal, transport and 
commercial links; (3) the unification, in accordance with the will of the people, of a 
democratic, free, equitable and prosperous China. Taiwan thus clearly rejected the ‘one 
country, two systems’ formula presented in Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (Mainland 
Affairs Council: MAC) in 1994. In July 1999, President Lee Tenghui appealed for the 
recognition of reality and proposed ‘special relations between two countries'.
The Taiwanese government fears a heavy dependence on mainland China for reasons of 
national security. The possibility of political fluctuations in mainland China carries it with 
the risk of a direct impact on Taiwan (e.g. through economic sanctions). The Taiwanese 
government is thus faced with a dilemma from an economic perspective, because the 
mainland is a natural location for Taiwanese business. The ‘southward policy’ in the early 
1990s was a challenge by the Taiwanese government to direct the flow of investment to 
Southeast Asia. This policy reflected a desire to avoid excessive dependence on economic 
ties with mainland China (Yahuda, 1998: 290). It was also driven by economic and 
commercial considerations, and officials from the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Taiwan’s central bank played a crucial role (Chan, 1996: 97). Claiming they were on 
‘vacation’ or an ‘informal visit’, President Lee Tenghui and Chief Executive Yuan Lien 
Chan visited southeast Asia in 1993-4. Taiwan succeeded in setting up high-level contacts 
and semi-governmental offices, and Taiwanese businessmen were able to establish 
networks of trade associations with ASEAN countries. Lee often used the Latin American 
countries as intermediaries, and in September 1997 he attended the Panama Canal 
International Conference. Despite China's opposition, Taiwan has succeeded in expanding 
its informal networks and international political exposure through so-called pragmatic 
diplomacy’ (Ijiri, 1997). Taiwan’s aid diplomacy has also succeeded in establishing 
friendly relations with small developing countries in the Caribbean, the South Pacific and 
Africa (Chan, 1997)
However, the sharp increase of Taiwanese FDI in China in the 1990s gave rise to new 
problems, including trade disputes, issues of document authentication, illegal entry, 
property inheritance, etc. In November 1990, Taiwan established the Strait Exchange
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Foundation (SEF) to negotiate practical problems with the PRC authorities. The PRC soon 
responded by setting up the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS). 
These two associations have an unofficial status, but they make it possible for the two 
governments to communicate indirectly with each other. In April 1993, the leaders of these 
associations, Koo Chenfu and Wang Daohan, had a meeting in Singapore, where they 
agreed to the establishment of regular channels of communication. However, the second 
Koo-Wang talks, scheduled for July 1995, were postponed by the PRC because of Lee 
Tenghui’s visit to the US in May 1995. This time China engaged in missile exercises in the 
Taiwan Strait and tension was raised. The SEF is a non-profit-making private organisation 
whose objective is to promote contacts and exchanges across the Taiwan Strait. On the 
other hand, the ARATS was set up to promote the three direct links across the Taiwan 
Strait, and more importantly, to carry out peaceful unification on the basis of one country, 
two systems’ (Cabestan, 1998: 223). In the face of difficulties created by increasing 
political tension, in October 1998 Koo Chenfu visited the mainland and talked with 
President Jiang Zemin. Nevertheless, since Lee’s declaration of ‘two countries in special 
relations’ in 1999, there has been little progress in cross-strait political relations.
6.4.2 Business and Politics in Taiwan
The real pressure for the revision of Taiwan’s economic policy toward China has come 
from ‘bottom-up’ demands by the Taiwanese business community to ease economic 
restrictions on the three communications (postal, transportation and commercial relations). 
As the Taiwanese economy fell into economic recession in the late 1990s, Taiwanese 
businesses sought better production sites and operations. Taiwan’s economy became less 
and less able to ignore mainland China (Cabestan, 1996: 1273). The slowdown of the US 
economy in 2000 heavily influenced the performance of Taiwanese PC-related firms. 
Business leaders such as Wang Yongqing (Wang Yung-ching), chairman of Taiwan Plastic, 
and Zhang Zhongmou (Chang Chungmou), chairman of TSMC, began to urge the 
relaxation of Lee’s restrictive policy (jieji yongren) (Koryu, No. 634, 2001). The Xinzhu 
science industrial park also faced criticism because of the lack of land, inadequate water 
supply, unstable electricity supply, and heavy traffic.
In August 2001, Taiwan finally decided to change its economic policy toward mainland
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China. This decision was influenced by the change of the Taiwanese business environment. 
In March 2000, Chen Shuipian was elected as the first DDP (Democratic Progressive 
Party) President of Taiwan. However, as the DDP’s political power base is weak (it gained 
only 39% of the vote in the Presidential election in 2000 and below the majority of 
Legislative Yuan seats)24, Chen needs to gain the support of as many groups as possible, 
especially businesses. Although the Taiwanese government still prohibits high-technology 
investment, SMEs have continued to enter China through third countries. The leading firms, 
which have maintained the restrictions, have been frustrated by this unfairness. In August 
2001, the Taiwanese government decided to approve direct investment in China and even 
investment from mainland China in Taiwan. Significantly, this process is led by influential 
Taiwanese business leaders such as Wang Yongqing (Wang Yung-ching) and Zhang 
Zhongmou (Chang Chungmou) (NKS, 27 August 2001). On the Chinese side, leaders in the 
mainland understand their own country's attractiveness, and have concentrated their 
endeavours on Taiwan’s business community, especially Taiwan’s relatively large 
businesses (Leng, 1998: 151). Thus, although high-level political interplay over the Taiwan 
Strait (especially between China and the US) is very important, the deepening economic 
interconnectedness between China and Taiwan is also proving to have a major impact in 
the economic arena, especially in the case of Taiwan. Cross-strait relations increasingly 
embrace the economic dimension.
6.5 The Governance of Production Networks
While the support of the Taiwanese government has greatly helped PC-related firms, the 
creation of networking linkages with large electronics firms has minimised the 
disadvantages of small-sized firms through the acquisition of OEM, ODM and EMS in 
relations with advanced countries. In addition to networking linkages with large firms, 
Taiwanese firms have created unique inter-firm linkages which are different from the 
keiretsu system that dominates Japanese inter-firm relations. Taiwanese firms have also 
introduced a unique, innovative system o f governance of production networks across the 
Taiwan Strait.
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6.5.1 The Inter-Firm Relations of Taiwanese SMEs
In 1996, almost 98% of Taiwanese enterprises were SMEs23. SMEs are constrained by 
their limited resources and capabilities, especially in the case of small countries, where the 
small domestic market restricts the ability to function as a buffer against fluctuations in the 
international market. On the other hand, the great advantage of SMEs is their flexibility. 
Taiwanese SMEs have developed an extreme form of specialisation by engaging in single 
tasks. While the scale of production is small, SMEs are able to avoid the burden of fixed 
capital cost. The rate of owner’s equity is very high (on average about 80%), and SMEs 
have developed their own financial networks without relying on bank loans (Sugioka, 
2001: 37). Another feature is the structure of inter-firm relations on the basis of loose and 
short-term networks. Thus SMEs in Taiwan have developed without strong government 
support In 1993, they accounted for 69% of total employment and 55% of Taiwan’s 
manufactured exports (Ernst, 2000b: 113). In 1996, the number of workers employed by 
SMEs was equivalent to 78.6% of Taiwan’s total employment (Sugioka, 2001: 31).
However, with the rise of a highly competitive business environment, SMEs need to 
develop a variety of linkages in order to survive. Kawakami (1998) focuses on the 
functional side of inter-firm relations in the computer industry. Taiwanese computer firms 
have created an inter-firm division of labour based on functions, production processes, and 
vertical and horizontal divisions. For example, one firm specialises in the design and final 
investigation of finished goods, while other firms, acting as subcontractors, focus on 
production in factories. In terms of the inter-firm division of labour in production processes, 
Taiwanese computer firms often divide those processes into sections and give orders to a 
number o f producers who match the requirements in terms of cost and technology. 
Furthermore, there is a vertical and horizontal system of external ordering: when a firm 
gains a contract that exceeds its production capacity, it asks a competitor firm to undertake 
a part of the production. Although small firms are constrained by the limits of their 
knowledge-creation capacity, Taiwanese firms have developed "knowledge outsourcing' 
through a variety of inter-organisational linkages (OEM, etc ), which has made it possible 
for small firms to compete in globalised high-tech industries (Ernst, 2000c). Thus, the 
development of the Taiwanese electronics industry owes much to its complementary 
inter-firm relations in production and the introduction of advanced technology. While this
196
flexibility in design and production, and cooperation with foreign firms, are the results of a 
division of labour rooted in inter-regional intra- and inter-firm networks, they are also 
supported by a concentration of firms in a certain place, which helps low-cost production.
6.5.2 Business Groups
By 1996, Taiwan had 113 business groups and 1,215 affiliated firms under core firms.26 
While the number of business groups in Taiwan has been the same for 20 years, their 
economic presence has dramatically increased. By 1996, 113 business group employed 
6.4% of the total population in Taiwan but their sales accounted for 44 8% of Taiwan’s 
national GDP27 The electronics industry has come to occupy an increasingly important 
position Other non-electronics firms, such as Formosa Plastic, have already participated in 
the manufacturing of electronics products. The development of Taiwanese inter-firm 
linkages dates back to the government’s shift in economic strategy from the public sector 
to the private sector in the 1950s. The emphasis on the electronics industry in the 1970s 
gave a further stimulus to the formation of business groups. Taiwanese electronics firms 
undertook OEM arrangements and international sub-contracting, and developed linkages 
with the world market. The larger size of firms then became essential to secure economies 
of scale and scope. As the leading MNCs formed local production networks, the core 
Taiwanese firms, including Tatung, MiTAC and Acer, came to rely on loosely affiliated 
domestic suppliers. Taiwanese SMEs in the electronics industry have been integrated into 
business groups. In particular, Taiwanese traditional family-owned firms are under 
considerable pressure to change. Family-owned inter-firm linkages have been thought to be 
helpful in terms of cost and flexibility, but the rise of competitive requirements has begun 
to erode loose networks based on these linkages. The top ten firms today control roughly 
80% of total production (Ernst, 2000b: 119).
Ernst (2000b: 119-123) identifies five distinctive forms of inter-firm linkages in the 
development of Taiwanese firms: informal ‘peer group' networks; hierarchical 
centre-satellite systems; business associations; industrial parks; and variations in the 
business group model. Informal peer group networks comprise classmates (for example 
from elite schools) and former colleagues (foreign affiliates). Taiwanese firms have relied 
heavily on the informal exchange of information since their foundation, and Acer is a good
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example of this reliance. In 1984, a hierarchical centre-satellite system was launched by 
the government to develop vertically integrated production in 1984 similar to the Japanese 
ketretsu system (Ernst, 2000b: 121). The establishment of business associations is also 
encouraged by the government in order to facilitate the exchange of information. Industrial 
science parks have also played an important role in deepening inter-firm relations (see 
Section 6.1 in this chapter). Business groups also organise the holding companies in order 
to respond to the needs of flexible and efficient production.
6.5.3 Geographical Concentration
Another feature of Taiwanese electronics firms is their geographical agglomeration The 
majority of PC-related firms are located between Taipei and Xinzhu. The central place is 
the Xinzhu science industrial park. In 1997, out of 230 firms, the number of integrated 
circuit-related firms was 86, the number of computer-related firms was 45, and the number 
of telecommunication-related firms was 36 (Gekkan Ajia, February 1998). In 1996, about 
77% of Taiwanese electronics components firms were located between Taipei and Xinzhu 
(Kawakami, 2001: 78). For the PC-industry, the procurement of components at low cost is 
vital. Geographical proximity among components suppliers helps to provide an efficient 
division of labour in PC-related production. Thus, networking is the most critical feature of 
Taiwanese inter-firm linkages and is evolving and being reorganised in relation to the 
various forms of governmental support and external influences.
6.5.4 The Governance o f  Production Networks across the Taiwan Strait
Taiwanese investors see China as a production base centred on the electrical and 
electronics industry. In particular, this investment has been stimulated by the rapid growth 
of the use of personal computers across the world. Japanese, US and European computer 
manufacturers often approach Taiwanese firms for OEM and ODM as well as EMS 
production. Through the expansion of Taiwanese FDI in China, Taiwanese inter-firm 
relations have also moved to the mainland and production networks have been created 
across the Taiwan Strait.
6.5.4.1 The Forms and Strategy o f  Investment
According to the Chung-Hua Economic Research Institute (Teipei), initially (early in the
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1990s) the average level of Taiwanese FDI in China was about $US 1 million. It then 
continued to increase, and in the late 1990s it averaged $US 2.12 million per project 
(Kdryu, No. 632, 2000). In terms of the forms of investment, one study suggests that the 
100%-Taiwanese owned firm was dominant This is because Taiwanese firms found that 
when they invested in China through joint ventures or co-operative operation enterprises, 
they often encountered managerial problems on the Chinese side Thus, the 
100%-Taiwanese owned firm was the best way to avoid this problem (Kdryu, No. 575, 
1998). Indeed, according to research by the Chung-Hua Economic Research Institute, in 
1992 the 100%-Taiwanese owned firms accounted for about 40% of Taiwanese firms in 
China, and this increased to more than 50% in 1995 (Kdryu, No. 632, 2000). In addition, 
Taiwanese firms were able to gain local information without joint local partners, and 
sought to keep control of the production technology (ibid.) Because of unresolved political 
tensions, Taiwanese FDI in China is generally ’roundabout’ investment. For example, Key 
Systems Corp (founded in 1983) has established 100%-owned subsidiaries in the Cayman 
Islands (Cayman Genius Holding) and the Virgin Islands (Virgin Island Key Inc ).
6.5.4.2 A Model o f  the International Division o f  I ¿¡hour between Taiwan and China
Table 6.10 Model of the Division of Labour Across the Taiwan Strait (%)
1995
Research
1999
Research
(1) Components Production by Parent Firm (Taiwan). Assembling (China) 25 9 11.8
(2) Component Production by Subsidiaries (China). Assembling (Taiwan) 29.9 9.5
(3) Production on Both Sides but Valued Added Production in Taiwan 67.0 33.1
(4) Production on Both Sides but Value Added Production in China 7.2 1.0
(5) Production on Both Sides. Products are the Same. 33.0 30.1
(6) Production on Both Sides. Products are Completely Different 17.5 10.6
Firms in Sample 140 960
Note The research in 1995 was done by Gao Xijun group, and that in 1999 was done by the Ministry of 
Economy (Taiwan).
Source: Kdryu, No 632 (30 November 2000).
The rate of Taiwan's offshore production in PC-related products reached nearly 50% in 
1999 (Kdryu, No. 622, 2000). In the same year, China accounted for 70% of the offshore 
production of Taiwanese informational products (Kdryu, No. 622, 2000). Taiwanese firms 
have invested in mainland China mainly because of the low cost of labour. According to
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the Economics Ministry in Taiwan, 74% of Taiwanese firms in the mainland are involved 
in labour-intensive production (Taiwan Tsushin, 16 March 2000). Table 6.10 shows a 
model of the international division of labour between Taiwan and China. It shows that the 
division of parts and products assembly between Taiwan and China has declined, i.e. 
vertical integration has declined as horizontal integration has increased.
6.5.4.3 Finance
Taiwanese direct investment in mainland China is still restricted by the Taiwanese 
government. Taiwanese firms thus need to invest through third countries which have 
investment protection treaties with China. Hence, they use their holding companies and 
subsidiaries established in places such as Hong Kong, Singapore and the Central American 
island countries. Most of these are paper companies'. Besides formal transaction 
processes, there are some illegal channels and gray markets for financing Taiwanese firms 
in China. For example, illegal financial firms in Hong Kong deal with Taiwanese 
remittance to their subsidiaries in the Pearl River Delta by using higher exchange rates than 
the official rates (Kdryu, No. 575, 1998). Taiwanese firms in China also have other options 
for their finance: the use of the stock market (investment by individuals, firms and 
government) and loans (long-term and short-term, corporate bond). Once Taiwanese 
investment enters China, it rarely returns to Taiwan. Due to the heavy restrictions by the 
Chinese government on taking foreign currency out of China, only 0.6% of total Taiwanese 
investment in China has returned to Taiwan (NKS, 27 August 2001). Given such 
restrictions, Taiwanese firms try not to hold RMBs for a long time. When they import 
goods, they often require payment in advance.
6.5.4.4 Technology
Production technology in Taiwanese firms in mainland China owes much to the parent 
firms in Taiwan, especially the latter’s provision of technology 2* However, one of the 
crucial changes is the increasing level of R&D in mainland China. Some Taiwanese firms 
now prefer to employ researchers in mainland China rather than in Taiwan. Acquiring 
OEM is another channel for the introduction of technology for Taiwanese firms in 
mainland China Similarly, Taiwanese firms have undertaken foundry’ production in 
exchange for the provision of technology from the client firms (Kdryu, No. 632, 2000).
200
6.5.4.5 Local Procurement
Local procurement activities provide useful information on the degree of localisation of 
Taiwanese firms in mainland China and the degree of exchange of materials and 
components for production processes. These firms are still dependent on the supply of 
materials and parts from the parent firms in Taiwan (Table 6.11). However, the share of 
procurement by non-Taiwanese firms in mainland China is steadily increasing. In the 
procurement of materials, the share of non-Taiwanese firms is higher than that of 
Taiwanese firms in China. In the case of the supply of parts, non-Taiwanese firms have 
steadily increased local procurement for Taiwanese firms in China. However, Taiwanese 
firms in the mainland still depend to a certain degree on the supply of materials and 
components through imports from third countries.
Table 6.11 The Procurem ent of Taiwanese Firms in China, 1995-1998
Procurement Route
1995 1996 1997 1998
Research Research Research Research
Materials (Number of Firms) 719 967 752 826
Taiwan 52.5 50.3 49.0 44 1
Taiwanese Firms in Mainland China 17.2 17.6 16.6 19.4
Non-Taiwanese Firms in Mainland China 18.2 19.5 21.7 23.2
Import from Other Country 12.1 126 12.7 13.3
Components and Parts (Number of Firms) 546 537 550 605
Taiwan 56.3 53.0 52.9 47.5
Taiwanese Firms in Mainland China 18.2 18 6 199 23.3
Non-Taiwanese Firms in Mainland China 18 8 205 19.2 21.7
Import from Other Country 68 7.9 80 7.5
Source: Koryu, No. 632 (30 November 2000).
6.5.4.6 The Dispersion o f  Production Sites
Thus far, Taiwanese electronics investment has been concentrated in Guangdong, 
especially Dongguan. In the late 1990s, the Suzhou and Shanghai areas emerged as major 
destinations for Taiwanese investment in China. According to data from the Taiwanese 
Economics Ministry, between January and March 2001 Taiwanese FD1 in Jiangsu reached 
55.14% of total Taiwanese FDI in mainland China, thus exceeding the investment in 
Guangdong (30.3%) (Xianggang Wenhuihao, 29 May 2001). The major Taiwanese 
electronics firms have already established notebook PC production sites in Shanghai 
(Quanta and Inventec), Suzhou (FIC and ASUSTtec) and Kunshan (Compal) (see Table
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6.9). In Kunshan, Delta Electronics and Arima have also established notebook PC 
production (Sinorama, July 2001). Though the production of notebook PCs in mainland 
China is not yet legally permitted, Taiwan’s earthquake (September 1999) affected the 
supply of electronic parts and components.
Secondly, China’s further opening of the domestic market as a result of WTO membership 
(in 2001) will induce foreign investment targeting the domestic market After China joins 
the WTO, the restriction on foreign firms’ domestic sales will be abandoned (Dajingmao, 
October 2001). For OEM production, the movement of foreign firms is vitally important. 
For example, Toshiba’s launch of notebook PC production in Shanghai in 2000 greatly 
affected the shift of Taiwanese electronics firms (Mizuhashi, 2001: 158). Also, as Sony 
plans notebook PC production in Jiangsu by early 2002, Taiwanese electronics firms will 
further concentrate notebook PC production in the Yangtze River Delta. In order to receive 
OEM orders from the world’s leading electronics firms, these firms cannot ignore the trend 
of investment in China by other electronics firms. In the case of notebook PC production, 
there is already concentration in the Yangtze River Delta, but in Dongguan there is still no 
production site. In addition, due to local requirements (at least 60% of components must be 
purchased in mainland China), a Taiwanese head office cannot take an order from a local 
production site (e g. Motorola in Tianjin), but Taiwanese subsidiaries (e g. in Kunshan) can 
take this order as local firms (Sinorama, July 2000). The number of Taiwanese firms in 
Suzhou has already reached almost 2,000 (Zhongguo Qiyejiu, No. 10, 2001). The key 
features of Taiwanese FDI in the Yangtze River Delta may be summarised as: (1) its large 
scale of FDI; (2) its tendency to follow the group firms, and (3) 100%-owned investment 
(Saka, 2001: 12). Taiwanese firms realise that Dongguan is more suitable for SMEs and 
sales for abroad on the basis of processing arrangements (Xianggang Wenhuthao, 29 May 
2001). Thus, the Yangtze River Delta is seen as suitable for different strategies and is likely 
to be the site of a new agglomeration of the electronics industry
The shift of Taiwanese electronics firms is also illuminated by research on the investment 
environment in China conducted by the Taiwanese Electrical and Electronics 
Manufacturing Association (TEEMA) in early 2001. This research focused on the 
significance of the natural environment, infrastructure, public facilities, the social
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environment, and the legal environment. In terms of the degree of satisfaction of 
Taiwanese investors, Dongguan is ranked as worse than other areas (including the Yangtze 
River Delta, Shanghai, the Bo Hai area, Shenzhen and the southeast coastal area) 
(Zhongguo Qiyejia, No. 10, 2001). The worsening of the investment environment in 
Dongguan (because of poor security and extensive corruption) is encouraging a further 
shift of Taiwanese firms to the north. The reputation for openness and flexibility associated 
with the Dongguan government has been replaced by the image of greedy local 
government officials (G. Yeung, 2001a: 213).
6.6 Conclusion
This chapter has sought to demonstrate the role of Taiwanese firms in the development of 
CPNs in relation to the links with Japan and China. The spread of networking linkages in 
the electronics industry is carried out through the various strategic interactions between 
different levels of political and economic activity. The growth of such linkages across 
Japan, Taiwan and Guangdong is closely linked to the emergence of a system of CPNs, 
with hierarchical arrangements giving way in many areas to non-hierarchical, intra-and 
inter-firm networks, and local and interpersonal networks of governance. In the economic 
domain, Taiwan is responding to the emergence of China’s MLG.
This chapter has highlighted five major factors involved in the development of networking 
linkages and the innovation of PC-related production centred on Taiwanese electronics 
firms: the domestic political economy, the role of Japanese FD1, Taiwanese FD1 in China, 
the political economy of the Taiwan Strait, and the governance of production networks 
across the Taiwan Strait. First, from the viewpoint of the Taiwanese government, it is 
extremely important to overcome the disadvantage of being a small country. The 
government has given extensive support to the electronics industry, which is not confined 
to the actual territory of Taiwan. The national development plan for the electronics industry, 
including the establishment of the Xinzhu science-industrial park, was a critical turning 
point for the Taiwanese electronics industry.
Japanese electronics firms, as external providers of capital and technology, have helped to
promote the shift of Taiwanese firms from low-valued added production to high value- 
added production. Taiwan was originally the production site for the US and Japanese firms. 
In the case of the relationship with Japanese firms, Taiwan shifted from a 
commodity-export role to a commercial-subcontracting role for the keiretsu, using 
imported components from Japan. Then it began to play an export-platform role, using 
Japanese FD1. It has also become a major components supplier. Entering the business 
networks of Japanese firms was a crucial first step for Taiwanese firms. The development 
of inter-firm relations between Taiwanese PC-related firms and advanced countries since 
the 1980s has led to more opportunities to introduce and upgrade technology. The 
acquisition of OEM orders from advanced countries has further helped to enhance the 
technological transfer of Taiwanese PC-related firms. Following the increase of OEM 
production, firms have become more capable of producing contract-made-to-order memory 
chips (i.e. EMS) for electronics products. Firms are now transforming themselves into 
EMS firms. Taiwan has thus begun to play an important export role for PC-related 
products as well as acting as a components supplier.
Taiwan has now emerged as the major investor in China, ordering the assembly of 
manufactured goods. It has extended its activities across the Taiwan Strait in order to meet 
the demands of low-cost production. The role of Taiwan as a recipient o f Japanese FDI and 
a supplier of investment to China is crucial for the further development of production 
networks across Japan, Taiwan and China. The flexible Taiwanese inter-firm division of 
labour is extended to the international division of labour using production sites in China. 
Taiwanese manufacturing investors tend to concentrate in one area with a single sector, and 
have developed special production zones. However, expansion to China cannot avoid the 
issue of cross-strait relations, which politically remain unresolved. Taiwanese industrial 
policy, focusing on the development of the electronics industry based on the domestic 
sphere, needs to take into account these cross-border political considerations. For the 
Taiwanese government, economic development is a key political issue. Given the weak 
power base of Chen’s cabinet, the government can no longer restrain the voice o f business 
communities and indeed has started incrementally to move towards a further opening of 
the Taiwan Strait.
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As Taiwanese firms are generally small or medium-sized, they have developed 
complementary inter-firm relations. Like the Japanese keirelsu, Taiwanese firms have also 
organised business groups. However, for the small firms, geographical concentration is 
very important. In terms of production networks across the Taiwan Strait, there is still 
much concern about the continuing political uncertainty. Nevertheless, Taiwanese firms 
have developed a distinctive form of production network in order to minimise risk. This 
can be seen in the common forms of investment, the international division of labour, and 
arrangements for finance, technology and local procurement Although Taiwanese firms 
maintain their roots in Taiwan, they are steadily promoting the localisation of their 
subsidiaries in mainland China. Taiwanese electronics FDI has been going to the Yangtze 
River Delta in anticipation of China’s WTO membership. Dongguan is already being used 
for export sales, and the Yangtze River Delta has emerged as a potential base for targeting 
China's domestic market. Thus, the development of Taiwanese CPNs has clearly 
responded to the development of MLG in China.
1 Koryu, No. 638 (31 March 2001).
2 As a result of the Plaza Agreement in 1985, the Taiwanese dollar (NT) was revalued against the US dollar 
The exchange rate against the US dollar went up from almost 40 NT per US dollar in 1985 to 25.2 NT (at its 
peak) in 1992 This damaged the foundation of the export base, especially in labour-intensive products 
manufactured in Taiwan
3 More than 200 million (NT dollars) of investment enjoyed various kinds of preferential treatment
I The figure is taken from Ikegami (2000).
3 The figure is from Ikegami (2000)
6 Koryii, No 572 (15 April 1998) and No. 626 (31 August 2000).
7 The figures are calculated by the researcher using Taiwan no Keizai Dela (The Economic Data on Taiwan)
8 The figure is the researcher's calculation based on Koryii, No. 572 (15 April 1998) and No. 626 (31 August 
2000)
9 The figure is the researcher’s calculation based on Koryu (various issues)
10 The figures are from Toyo Keizai (2000).
II Koryu, No. 576 (June 15 1998).
12 For example, in 1998, the share of world notebook PC production (in volume) by Taiwanese firms was 
40%. In monitors, it was 58% and in motherboards it was 61% See Koryu, No. 619 (15 May 2000).
13 The research targeted information hardware products which have a high rate of OEM, including notebook 
PCs, monitors, desktop PCs, motherboards, SPS, CD-ROMs, cases, scanners, graphic cards, keyboards, UPS, 
mice, sound cards, and video cards See Koryu, No. 619(15 May 2000).
14 Shu En (Zhu Yan) (2000: 517). Acer had contracts with Apple, Canon, Mitsubishi, Fujitsu, Hitachi and TI 
in 1996 See also Takaoka (1997: 213).
16 The figure is from Koryu, No. 622 (30 June 2000)
16 The figure is from Koryii, No 626 (31 August 2000).
17 In 1998, Taiwanese outward FDI in the central American island countries was valued at $US 1,838 43 
million and inward FDI from these countries in Taiwan was $US 711 47 million The figures are taken from 
Lin Thomas (2000: 89)
18 These figures are taken from Kdryii, No. 622 (30 June 2000).
19 The figure is taken from Mizuhashi (2001. 152).
2(1 The figure is from Daiichi Kangyo Bank (DKB), http /Avww dkb co jp/houjin/report/china/200003/
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However, most Taiwanese firms are small and medium firms, and many do not register officially with the 
authorities Thus, the real number is undoubtedly much higher than this figure
21 These figures are calculated by the researcher by using Ktiryu, No 631 (15 November 2000)
22 The figure is calculated by the researcher using Kriryit, No. 626 (31 August 2000).
23 The figure is taken from Shu En (Zhu Yan) (2001 173).
21 At the Legislative Election in December 2001, the DDP gained 87 seats among 225 total seats (NKS 2 
December 2001).
25 In the case of Taiwan, small and medium firms are defined as firms with capital of less than 60 million 
NT dollars and less than 200 workers
26 The figure is from Shu (Zhu) (2000: 488)
27 The figure is from Shu (Zhu) (2000: 488).
28 According to the research done by the Chung-Hua Economic Research Institute, more than 90% of 
Taiwanese firms in China are supplied technology by their parent firms in Taiwan See Koryu, No 632 (30 
November 2000)
206
CHAPTER 7
THE OPERATION AND STRUCTURE OF CROSS-BORDER 
PRODUCTION NETWORKS AMONG GUANGDONG, TAIWAN AND
JAPAN
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part investigates the intricate pattern and 
processes of cross-border production networks (CPNs) among Guangdong, Taiwan and 
Japan. Section 7.1 discusses the processes of Hong Kong manufacturing firms’ shift into 
Guangdong, which became the basic model of cross-border production. Section 7.2 
presents the role of local governments' 'para-diplomatic’ activity, focusing on the 
provincial level (Guangdong) and the sub-provincial level (Dongguan). Section 7.3 
examines the operation and structure of cross-border networks, including the role of guanxi 
and intermediary organisations between the Dongguan government and foreign firms. The 
second part of the chapter focuses on the impact of micro-regionalisation on the Chinese 
economy. Section 7.4 analyses the growth of the Chinese electronics industry and its 
impact on East Asian industrial structure. Section 7.5 considers whether this 
micro-regionalisation has promoted China’s national economic integration. Section 7.6 
summarises the chapter's main arguments.
7.1 Hong Kong and the Pearl River Delta
It is essential to discuss the role of Hong Kong in the process of micro-regionalisation 
among Guangdong, Taiwan and Japan Hong Kong occupies a critical position in relation 
to the Taiwan Strait. Economic contacts between China and Taiwan since the late 1980s 
would not have developed without the role of Hong Kong. Hong Kong’s reversion to 
Chinese sovereignty in 1997 was also a crucial turning point for the relationship between 
mainland China and Taiwan. However, as long as political hostility between China and 
Taiwan remains unresolved, and direct trade, postal and shipping links are impossible 
between Taiwan and China, Hong Kong has been, and will continue to be, an important
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channel for trade and investment between Taiwan and China (Lin, 2000).
Hong Kong has played a major role in the creation of cross-border economic relations with 
Guangdong. Hong Kong was the catalyst which drew Guangdong’s economy into the 
global economy after 1979 (Johnson, 2001: 217). Hong Kong’s presence in Guangdong’s 
inward FDI is very high. Between 1979 and 1997, FDI from Hong Kong (actual use), 
although including different origins, reached $US 58 billion, accounting for 72% of 
Guangdong’s total inward FDI ($US 81 billion).1 Hong Kong is also the largest export 
destination of Guangdong. In 2000, Guangdong’s exports to Hong Kong accounted for 
34.3% of total its exports (Zhongguo Duiwai Jingji Maoyi Nianjiun 2001).
The expansion of the Hong Kong electronics industry has had a notable effect on 
Guangdong’s production structure. The electronics industry is the second largest 
manufacturing industry after the clothing industry in Hong Kong’s domestic exports.2 
Hong Kong’s economic development was achieved through an export-oriented strategy in 
garments/textiles and the electronics industry between the 1950s and 1980s. With the shift 
of Hong Kong manufacturing industry into China, Hong Kong’s exports are now 
dominated by re-exports of products from mainland China (88.5% in 2000) (Hong Kong 
( ensus). This is the result of Hong Kong’s manufacturing industry movement out of Hong 
Kong in search of lower-cost land and labour. Hong Kong manufacturing firms own and 
manage an extensive network of activities in the Pearl River Delta of China. This 
transformation has enabled them to grow far beyond the size that would have been possible 
in Hong Kong alone. Made in Hong Kong has declined but Made by Hong Kong has grown 
in importance (Berger and Lester, 1997).
7.1.1 Hong Kong's Expansion into Guangdong
Throughout the 1970s, Hong Kong’s exports of domestic goods accounted for more than 
70% of total exports, and the level of re-exports was insignificant. The major exports of 
domestic goods were manufactured goods, which accounted for 95% of total exports of 
domestic goods. Although garments and textiles remained the most important export items, 
electronics goods, watches and clocks were also significant. In the mid-1970s, in addition 
to the acceptance of legal immigration, Hong Kong used a ‘touch base' policy* to regulate
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immigration from the mainland, and this flexible policy offered low-cost labour for Hong 
Kong businesses. However, the Hong Kong government had to provide houses for new 
immigrants, and unskilled immigrants were increasingly seen as a liability for the social 
welfare system (Sung, 1998: 5). Following restrictions on immigration in 1980, Hong 
Kong manufacturers began to experience labour shortages, rising costs of labour and land, 
and higher environmental costs, and they consequently lost their price competitiveness in 
the international market. In the 1980s, although the Plaza Agreement4 strengthened Hong 
Kong’s competitiveness (because of the depreciation of the Hong Kong dollar), it then 
became difficult to meet the increased demand for Hong Kong products. The overheating 
of the economy further increased the costs o f land and labour.
The introduction o f an open door policy in Guangdong in the late 1970s provided new 
opportunities for Hong Kong business. It allowed the entry of foreign firms and the 
creation of joint ventures with favourable taxes and other incentives. During the pre-reform 
period, the Pearl River Delta was an important source of foodstuffs and water supply as 
well as legal and illegal immigration, thereby supporting Hong Kong’s labour-intensive 
manufacturing. The establishment of Shenzhen’s SEZ, adjacent to Hong Kong, provided 
abundant land and inexpensive labour, together with flexible policies on employment, 
border and custom controls, and improved infrastructure. With the enhancement of the 
investment environment in the Delta, the full-scale advance of Hong Kong manufacturing 
firms across the border began in the late 1980s. These firms responded quickly to the 
emergence of a new lifeline — Mike fish finding the water’ (Ash, 2000).
The most popular form of industrial linkage between Hong Kong and Guangdong can be 
seen in the spread of processing-trade arrangements (PTAs). From 1979 to 1995, Hong 
Kong investors signed 23,605 cooperative production contracts with Guangdong, with an 
actual use of capital of $US 14 billion (Sit, 1998: 896). The shift of Hong Kong 
manufacturing to the Pearl River Delta initially focused on labour-intensive production 
processes (shoes, sports goods, toys and travel goods, etc.), but later spread to value-added 
products (electrical and electronic goods, telecommunications, etc.). In the 1990s, product 
development operations, some managerial functions and even financial departments moved 
across the border. Many Hong Kong manufacturing firms now leave only management.
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sales and procurement functions in Hong Kong. The processing trade based on re-exports 
from the mainland accounted for 87.6% of total re-exports of mainland products in 1998 
(Maruya, 2000. 140). These arrangements have brought about a highly profitable pattern 
for Hong Kong firms except those in the textile industry. The rate of local procurement for 
plastic, toys, electronics goods and watches was over 50% in the late 1990s (Maruya, 
2000: 140). The low cost of labour and land in China was a major incentive for the shift of 
Hong Kong manufacturing. According to research by JETRO, the monthly salary of 
factory workers in Shenzhen in 2000 was less than one tenth of that in Hong Kong (Jetoro 
Sensa, April 2001), and the price of factory land in Shenzhen was almost one eighth of that 
in Hong Kong.'
7.1.2 The Front-Shop, Back-Factory Model
The basic model of Hong Kong’s extension of manufacturing activities in Guangdong is 
the division of labour corresponding to the so-called ‘front-shop, back-factory’ system (see 
Figure 7.1). According to this model, the headquarters in Hong Kong and the local branch 
plant in Guangdong establish an intra-firm division of labour. Front-shop activities focus 
on tertiary activities and the back-factory concentrates on production
While Figure 7.1 illustrates the intra-firm division of labour, it is also important to examine 
inter-firm relations in Hong Kong-Guangdong linkages (see Maruya, 2000). The basic 
pattern is illustrated in Figure 7.2. Firm A (manufacturer) and Firm B (parts supplier) 
establish their own headquarter offices in Hong Kong, focusing on sales, parts supply, and 
financing, and their local branches focus on production in Guangdong. The inter-firm 
division of labour thus reduces the need for transactions between separate Hong Kong 
headquarter offices. While bills and payments are exchanged between the two headquarter 
offices in Hong Kong, parts supply is carried out between the local branches in Guangdong 
through the bonded zone (called Zhuunchang). Bonded zones -  the first of which was 
established in Shanghai in September 1990 — provide exemption from tariffs on imports in 
order to encourage production by foreign firms. By 1997, five bonded zones (two in 
Shenzhen, one in each of Guangzhou, Zhuhai and Shantou) had been established in 
Guangdong. In the case of a developing country, there is often a problem of inter-firm 
settlement system (payment system), and the foreign exchange system raises the cost of
production. Bonded zones allow foreign firms to act as agents for imports and exports, and 
help to reduce the transaction cost.
Figure 7.1 The Hong Kong-Pearl River Delta Cross-Border Manufacturing Model
Source Sit, Victor F.S (1998), ‘Hong Kong's “Transferred” Industrialization and Industrial Geography', 
Asian Survey, Vol.38, No 9, September, p.899
Industrial expansion in the Pearl River Delta thus owes much to Hong Kong’s developed 
expertise, its large pool of capital, skilled labour, and management personnel, and its 
access to equipment, technology and overseas markets, as well as various domestic factors 
including investment from the mainland, a benign host government policy and the 
improvement of infrastructure (Sit, 1998: 899). The intra- and inter-firm divisions of 
labour in the context of Hong Kong-Guangdong relations have been greatly improved. 
This has further attracted inward FDI into Hong Kong from Japan, the US and Taiwan, 
which have sought to exploit the advantages of Hong Kong-Guangdong links. In turn, this 
trend has resulted in further industrial agglomeration in the Pearl River Delta
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Figure 7.2 The Cross-Border In te r-F irm  D ivis ion o f Labour
(Hong Kong)
Source: Maruya, Toyojiro (2000) ‘Chugoku Kanan no sangyo shuseki to Ajia no kokusai bungyo’ (The 
Industrial agglomeration in Southern China and the rearrangement of the Asian international division of 
labour), in T Maruya ed Ajia Kokusai Hungyo Saihen to (iaikoku Chokusetsu Toshi no Yakuwari 
(Rearrangement of the Asian International Division of Labour and the Role of FDI), Chiba (Japan) Ajia 
Keizai Kenkyusho, p 149
7.1.3 The Characteristics of Production Networks in Hong Kong
Like Taiwanese manufacturing firms, the majority of Hong Kong manufacturing 
companies are family-based SMEs producing consumer electronics for OEM. More than 
90% of Hong Kong manufacturing firms employ less than 100 workers, and furthermore 
the small firms (less than 20 workers) account for 80% of Hong Kong manufacturing firms 
(Sawada, 1999: 112). Hong Kong manufacturing firms have disadvantages in terms of 
capital and scale-sensitive components production. Also, research on Hong Kong 
manufacturing entrepreneurs reveals that more than 60% of small and medium 
entrepreneurs cannot speak English, and Cantonese is their daily business language (ibid. 
112).
Hong Kong electronics firms predominantly serve OEM production. According to Reif and
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Sodini (1997), the electrical goods industry in Hong Kong falls into two major categories: 
(1) electronic end-products, including sound producing and recording products and audio 
equipment in general, communication equipment, electronic watches and clocks, etc.; (2) 
electronics components, including batteries, printed circuit boards, liquid crystal display 
and different types of semiconductor device components. The Hong Kong electronics 
industry imports most of its key components, packaging and integrating technologies, and 
components sourced elsewhere into new products (Enright et al., 1997: 155). Japan is the 
main source for key components for the Hong Kong electronics industry.
7.1.4 Hong Kong’s Government and the Electronics Industry
The Hong Kong government has been able to provide a supportive environment for many 
types of business activities. The emergence of a Cold War structure in East Asia restricted 
Hong Kong’s economic relations with mainland China. Hong Kong adopted an 
export-oriented strategy by introducing foreign investment. In the 1960s, because of its 
inadequate social welfare system, Hong Kong was faced with social instability 
(culminating in rioting in 1967). The colonial government then established several 
government-funded enterprises to improve housing and infrastructure, especially 
transportation, including airport and port facilities. One key feature of Hong Kong’s 
governance is that public services are maintained by government-funded private 
enterprises. The Hong Kong government has also intervened extensively in tax policies 
with a simple and low corporate tax (Enright et al., 1997: 32). It has also made an effort to 
maintain a balanced budget. There is no restraint on exchange and on capital transfer 
abroad. There are few protectionist barriers in the trade sector and the procedure for 
imports is simple.
The Hong Kong government has supported the development of the electronics industry 
through programmes for human resources and development, technology, productivity and 
quality, business infrastructure and export promotion. It has set up various 
quasi-govemmental supporting institutions such as the Vocational Training Council (VTC), 
the Hong Kong Productivity Council (HKPC), and the Hong Kong Industry and 
Technology Council Corporation (ITCC). According to Wai (1999), the ITCC offers a 
technology-based business incubation programme that provides support to establish firms,
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and a technology transfer programme that encourages interactions between business and 
technology. The Hong Kong Investment Promotion Division (HKID) also promotes 
investment from foreign countries. These bodies are managed by a committee which 
includes members from management and labour, academics, and professionals as well as 
relevant government departments (Wai, 1999: 187). However, contrary to the case of 
Taiwan, Hong Kong’s governmental support programmes have been targeted to include 
other industrial sectors. The growth of Hong Kong’s electronics industry required the 
development of cooperative relations with advanced countries. Hong Kong actively 
established foreign representative offices for the promotion of trade and investment. By 
1996, Hong Kong had established ten branches of the Hong Kong Economic and Trade 
Office, and the Hong Kong Industrial Promotion Unit had established seven foreign offices 
(Amako et.al., 1999).
7.2 The Role of Local Government
7.2.1 The Political Economy of Guangdong and the Electronics Industry 
Guangdong has succeeded in attracting inward FD1 since China’s adoption of the open 
door policy in the late 1970s. The Guangdong government has adopted an export-oriented 
strategy and targeted the electronics industry as a priority industry. Following the formal 
decision to select the electronics industry as a core part of the national economy at the 14th 
NPC, in 1991 the Guangdong government launched an industrial policy based on advanced 
science and technology (especially through promotion of the electronics industry). 
Guangdong aims to reach the level of the East Asian NIEs by 2010 (Kantonsho Keikaku 
linkai, 1995). The electronics industry, however, needs a huge injection of finance, 
especially for R&D. The Guangdong government has therefore adopted various support 
programmes. The Guangdong Technology and Policy Bureau aims to support the 
introduction of technology and to coordinate the expansion of industrial scale. Under this 
bureau, the Industrial Technology Finance Firm undertakes to manage firms by holding a 
certain stock share o f firms and supporting them financially. The Guangdong government 
has also adopted protectionist measures, including (1) tax exemption for any firms that 
invest in R&D; (2) the blocking of imports using the same ICs until the quality of products 
in Guangdong achieves the international standard; (3) the exemption from import
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procedures for key components for machinery as long as they are made in Guangdong. In 
addition, the Guangdong government has organised an electronics industry expert group 
for economics and technology (ibid.: 134).
7.2.2 Guangdong’s Foreign Economic Diplomacy
In the 1980s, the Guangdong government increased contacts with foreign investors through 
trade seminars, trade fairs, economic cooperation seminars, technological cooperative 
meetings, etc. Since the late 1980s, the government has sharply increased the number of 
formal contacts through meetings with foreign investors by sending delegations abroad. 
For example, in 1988 an economic delegation led by the Vice Governor visited Japan. By 
1998, 14 such economic delegations had been sent abroad by the Guangdong government/’ 
The purpose of using such economic delegations has also expanded — from attracting 
foreign investment to the export promotion of Guangdong-made products. For example, in 
June 2001 a Guangdong Trade Mission (led by the Governor and 130 Guangdong firms) 
visited Africa to promote electronics goods (NKS, 29 July 2001). In terms of contacts with 
Japanese business groups, the Japan-Guangdong Economic Association and the 
Guangzhou-Japanese Chamber of Commerce have often arranged Japanese business 
delegations to visit Guangdong. Through such trade and investment promotional activities, 
the contacts between Guangdong and Taiwan have been also strengthened. For example, in 
1992 the Guangdong Governor met with a former Taiwanese economic minister in 
Guangzhou. Guangdong’s practices in foreign economic activities may be called 
multi-layered diplomacy’ (see Chapter 2).
To some extent, the pattern of internationalisation at different levels of government reflects 
the political strategy of local governments. To take one example, the Guangdong provincial 
government and Guangzhou (capital of Guangdong) have sister city relations with different 
prefectures in Japan. Guangdong's provincial government has a sister relationship with 
Flyogo prefecture (one of SNGs in Japan) in the west of Japan (agreed in 1983) At the 
sub-provincial level in China, Guangzhou, however, has a sister city relation with Fukuoka 
city (agreed in 1979) in Fukuoka prefecture, located on Kyushu. Zhongshan and Shantou 
have sister city relations with Osaka's cities (Moriguchi, agreed in 1988, and Kishiwada, 
agreed in 1990). Foshan has a sister relationship with Itami (in Hyogo prefecture, agreed in
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1985). At the level of sub-municipal (township) level government, though Dongguan city 
government does not have a sister relation with any city in Japan, Wangniudun (a 
sub-municipal government of Dongguan) has a sister relation with a town in Kagoshima 
prefecture (southern part of Kyushu) in Japan 7 These relations reflect the historical and 
present economic relations between these regions. Osaka has the second largest population 
of foreigners in Japan (registered base). Hyogo has the fifth largest population of 
foreigners. In both areas the Chinese population is the second largest group of foreigners. 
Furthermore, there are no direct links between Guangzhou and the eastern part of Japan 
(including Tokyo), but Osaka has direct flight links with Guangzhou. At present, 
Guangdong’s sister relations in Japan extend to four different Japanese prefectures. It 
seems that there is little evidence o f political coordination between the provincial and 
sub-provincial governments over such relations. For the purpose of strengthening 
economic relations, Dongguan is now seeking to establish sister city relations with a 
Japanese city*
In Guangdong the extensive use of foreign capital adds up to a massive amount of external 
resources and also brings with it governmental power to circumvent some of the control 
measures imposed by the upper levels of governments. With increasing discretionary 
power, Guangdong has been able to facilitate flexible transactions among foreign firms in 
order to pursue its own development goals. Both national and provincial policies are 
continuously being made and remade through practices of MLG. In particular, economic 
development needs the improvement of social infrastructure as a whole. In this respect, 
Guangdong still has problems in terms of its inadequate legal system, energy supply, 
education level, transportation network, communication system, and financial market. 
Inward electronics FDI from advanced countries is regarded as a strong promotional 
measure in order to reinforce Guangdong’s economic power base.
7.2.3 Local Corporatism in Dongguan
The proactive role of the Dongguan city government has been very important. Despite two 
decades of economic reform, the government still has a strong influence on the 
management of firms. It has invested heavily in social infrastructure (motorway networks, 
electricity supplies, telecommunications, and the enrichment of human capital endowment.
216
e.g. through school education). In addition, there is a highly cooperative relationship 
between the local government and investors. For example, communication with Hong 
Kong investors has been greatly strengthened and the Dongguan city government has 
tailored the social infrastructure to meet their needs (G. Yeung, 2001a). The opening up of 
the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Zhuhai superhighway1 in the Pearl River Delta in 1994 
improved Dongguan’s accessibility dramatically. From Hong Kong international airport, it 
takes only three hours to get to Dongguan by direct bus service (run by a Taiwanese firm) 
with 27 departures a day. Also, Yeung suggests that in addition to government policy 
factors, other factors such as sub-contracting, local sourcing, Chinese 'cronyism’, and 
personal networks have had a major effect on the decision-making of Hong Kong investors 
(G. Yeung, 2001a).
Dongguan has benefited from Shenzhen’s political and economic conditions. In the 1990s, 
Shenzhen sought to upgrade toward high-value added industry and promoted a shift of 
assembling production outside the SEZs. Hong Kong and Taiwan firms needed to move 
out because they focused on labour-intensive and relatively low-value added light industry 
While Shenzhen has secondary border controls (for the SEZ) and official restrictions 
directly controlled by Beijing, outside Shenzhen local governments are more flexible 
business negotiators and partners. In Dongguan it is easy to employ labour from inland 
areas. In terms of the cost of labour, in 1998, the average annual wage in Dongguan was 
11,187 RMB, while that of Shenzhen was 18,130 RMB (Koryu, No. 622, 2000). An 
abundant supply of migrant workers (reaching a total of two million in 2000 in Dongguan, 
and a total of 20 million in Guangdong as a whole) makes it possible to respond to the 
needs of the growing number of labour-intensive firms This contract labour force is 
supplied through job centres in Sichuan and Hunan provinces (ibid ). Additionally, many 
of these workers are willing to do overtime work for extra money and undertake intensive 
job training. The majority of migrant workers are young women and many of them send 
their wages to their parents in order to help them build houses. Most of them return home 
after a few years work, and this helps foreign firms in terms o f flexibility and low labour 
costs On the other hand, enormous improvements in living standards have changed the 
behaviour of local people (registered residents). They have had little incentive to take 
lower-paid jobs. G. Yeung (2001a: 212) highlights two increasingly dangerous phenomena
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— ‘voluntary unemployment’ and 'voluntary drop-out from secondary school' — which 
severely constrain human capital in Dongguan
Dongguan’s Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Bureau (DFTEC) functions as an 
intermediary organisation between local government and foreign firms. It approves the 
projects planned by foreign firms and manages their business. The dynamism of local 
corporatism is seen, for example, in the establishment of ‘service days’, where the 
representatives of bureaux (customs, fire, commerce etc.) meet with foreign investors to 
discuss the latter’s problems. The lack of an effective channel for complaints has been a 
major factor leading to a heavy reliance on personal connections between foreign investors 
and local government. The lack of such a channel means that there is scope for 
low-ranking officials to accept bribes to the detriment of Dongguan’s image. This 
innovative service started in September 2001 under the auspices of the DFTEC.
Investors still face a mountain of paper work and procedures at different bureaux in order 
to gain approval for starting a new business. The interpretation of documents related to 
foreign businesses is typically dispersed among different bureaux (Nikkei Business, 15 
October 2001). While this situation continues, there is a steady growth of competition 
among local governments to attract foreign investors. According to an interview with the 
Vice Mayor (Xianggang Wenhuibuo, 29 May 2001), after China’s entry to the WTO it is 
inevitable that Taiwanese firms will seek even more strongly to target China’s domestic 
market, and in this respect the Dongguan government is already paying close attention to 
the situation in the Yangtze River Delta. Taiwanese investors have appraised Kunshan’s 
investment environment as offering excellent quality of service and highly efficient 
administration. For example, the Kunshan Party Chief and the Mayor allow investors 
24-hours pier day access to their mobile phones. If foreign firms wish to meet with the Vice 
Mayor, within two hours the appointment date and time will be decided (Dajingmuo, 
No. 10, 2001: 46). In Kunshan, the second Taiwanese school in mainland China (after 
Dongguan) is to be established (Saka, 2001: 12). The introduction of service days’ to 
improve Dongguan’s investment environment has already resulted in the enhanced 
exchange of information across bureaux, and to some extent this now compensates for the 
fact that personnel exchanges among different bureaux are rare 10 On the basis of this
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evidence, there is no doubt that the increasing competition among local governments has 
helped to improve the efficiency of local governments.11
The Dongguan city government has organised the 3C EXPO (Trade Fair for Computers, 
Communication and Consumer Electronic Products, co-organised with the Dongguan 
Taiwanese Business Association) annually since 1999 in order to attract foreign investment 
(especially in the electronics industry). At the first EXPO (in October 1999), 
approximately 500 firms attended and three-quarters of them were Taiwanese firms.12 
According to the Dongguan Mayor (interview in Xianggang Wenhuibao, 12 October 2001), 
at the first EXPO investment contracts worth $US 550 million and trade contracts worth 
$US 160 million were agreed. At the second EXPO held in October 2000, the value of 
investment contracts was $US 554 million and that of trade contracts was $US 715 million. 
The Dongguan government has sought to make this EXPO a representative international 
PC exhibition. The number of participant firms and units has increased sharply. At the third 
3C EXPO held in October 2001, the 1,200 allocated spaces were already filled by August 
(Nanjang Ribao, 12 October 2001).
Another policy initiative by Dongguan for developing the electronics industry is the 
establishment of a technology and development park. 11 In 2000, the Dongguan 
government decided to invest $US 240 million in this project. The aim is to support 
engineering, research and development in electronics. Currently in Dongguan there is only 
one science and technology college (with almost 2,000 students). Despite an abundant 
supply of migrant labour, the Dongguan government faces a lack of qualified engineers 
and a difficulty with grading up technology.
7.3 Foreign Firms and Dongguan’s Local Government
As a result of economic decentralisation, increased economic autonomy, and the 
emergence of MLG, local bureaucratic entrepreneurs in China have become the most 
important agents for foreign investors. These entrepreneurs have economic resources, 
political authority and social connections. The development of CPNs in China would not 
have materialised without a highly localised, cooperative business environment. While
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other foreign firms in China have to deal with red tape in Beijing, smaller Taiwanese 
investors have been allowed to negotiate directly with local decision makers (Hsing, 1998: 
128). Economic decentralisation itself has brought about a new institutional context and 
provided new opportunities for transnational capital flows at local levels in China. The 
partnership between overseas Chinese (mainly Hong Kong and Taiwanese investors) and 
local Chinese bureaucratic entrepreneurs is also personalised through guanxi (ibid. : 128).
7.3.1 Guanxi and Its Efficiency
Besides the formal localised processes of cooperation, the informal dimension is also 
critical. Guanxi is based on the operation of interpersonal relationships through 
pre-existing links among classmates, graduates, people from the same place, relatives, and 
superiors or subordinates in the same workplace. This shared identification supports the 
development of trust (xm ), which is one of the foremost dimensions of human relations. 
For Taiwanese businesses, cultural and linguistic affinity undoubtedly helps to develop 
guanxi with local Chinese bureaucratic entrepreneurs. Though guanxi does not correspond 
with formal organisational borders, its influence in Chinese society ranges widely across 
political and economic activities.
In the case of investment in China, guanxi often plays a decisive role in business 
performance due to China’s weak legal environment. H. Wang (2001: 106-7) cites the 
example o f a Hong Kong investor in Shenzhen who failed because he did not have the 
necessary guanxi relations. But he subsequently did succeed when he moved to the place 
where he had studied in his youth: he was able to build on his guanxi relations with former 
classmates and colleagues. This story suggests that guanxi often serves as a key source of 
information (e.g. concerning changes of government regulation), a protection against 
government intervention (e g. licenses, extra fees, taxation), a conflict resolution channel 
and the basis of a joint business partnership. Guanxi has a systematic and positive effect on 
the profitability, asset turnover and domestic sales growth of both Chinese domestic firms 
and foreign-invested firms (Luo and Chen, 1997). Firms with good connections with 
Chinese officials can often exploit the loopholes in China’s weak legal system to secure 
profitable business opportunities (H. Wang, 2001: 104). Overseas Chinese investors are 
often able to obtain favourable investment conditions through local officials’ flexible
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interpretation of the regulations. In the case of the Taiwanese, this guanxi practice is not 
very different from their home business conditions: loose control by government of small 
firms, and negotiable policy implementation (Hsing, 1998: 134-5). Thus, guanxi networks 
have been interwoven with the rent-seeking economic structure, and work as a convenient 
tool for Taiwanese investors to work out a cooperative protocol with local partners under 
specific policy conditions (Wu, 2001 ).
One of the most important instruments for the successful operation of guanxi is gift 
exchange. Although it is not unique to Chinese culture, gift exchange practice is embedded 
in ongoing personal relations. Although mutual benefit is the ultimate principle of gift 
exchange, in practice it operates as a means of buying privileges and gaining special 
treatment for business. As the boundary between the public and pnvate domains is 
increasingly ambiguous, giving gifts to Chinese officials in public institutions in exchange 
for favours overlaps with offering favours to officials in order to maintain special relations. 
The strategy of Chinese local officials vis-à-vis the higher levels of authority is popularly 
called looking for holes’ (Hsing, 1998: 133). This is practically demonstrated by the 
flexible interpretation and implementation of the regulations imposed by higher-level 
governments. Top-down policies are often faced with countervailing responses by 
low-level authorities: ‘policies from the top, counterstrategies at the bottom’ (shungyou 
zhengce xiayou Juice) (Ibid : 133).
To the extent that it maintains the balance between senders and receivers on the basis of 
mutual trust, the efficiency of gift exchange and guanxi provides valuable help to investors. 
However, the regularised practice of gift exchange also has countervailing affects on 
production networks The advantages of cultural and linguistic affinity also give rise to 
opportunities for corruption. For example, one Taiwanese firm has faced an extra burden 
for giving money to Chinese customs officials on a regular basis in order to gain smooth 
custom procedures (Kôryü, No. 637, 2001 ). (iuanxi may serve even to facilitate patently 
illegal activities which benefit foreign investors. Thus, informal practice does not 
necessarily help in achieving favours from investors; indeed it may actually damage 
China’s long-term business conditions. Nevertheless, the business partnership or alliance 
between local Chinese bureaucratic entrepreneurs and overseas Chinese investors plays a
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key role in creating various forms of governance which minimise the role of central 
government.
7.3.2 Taiwanese Business Associations
The local cooperative relations between Taiwanese investors and local Chinese 
bureaucratic entrepreneurs are evident in the work of the Taiwanese Business Associations 
(TBAs). The TBAs are officially approved associations which encourage Taiwanese FD1 in 
China. By 2000, there were 51 TBAs in China and 14 of them were located in Guangdong 
(Koryu, No. 622, 2000). TBAs have played a crucial role in promoting Taiwanese business 
interests in mainland China. The major activities of the TBAs are (1) negotiating with the 
relevant authorities and the collection o f information; (2) dealing with various problems 
faced by Taiwanese residents; and (3) supporting the establishment of an inter-firm 
network (Nagase, 1999). The development of local networks, including local authorities 
and businesses, has undoubtedly been vital in attracting further Taiwanese investment. In 
the case of Dongguan, city government officials (through the office of the Vice Mayor, the 
Chief of the tax authority, and the Chairman of the foreign trade and economy committee) 
have participated in the Dongguan TBA in an honorary capacity (Nagase, 1999: 28). In 
addition, officials from Dongguan’s labour bureau, telecommunications bureau, public 
security office, and the communication police have been engaged in an advisory role.
A good example of cooperative relations is the establishment by the Taiwanese business 
community of the first Taiwanese school (based on the Taiwanese method of education) for 
children of Taiwanese investors in Dongguan in September 2000. This school is funded by 
the Taiwanese government (Ministry o f Education). Also the TBA’s women’s group (with 
about 300 members) played a major role in its establishment14. The General Secretary of 
the Dongguan TBA has approved the role of local cadres in providing a supportive 
business environment, e g. through land and tax incentives (Sinorama, February 2000: 83). 
According to a former chairman of the Dongguan TBA, the city government’s cooperative 
behaviour is due to the increasing profit made by Taiwanese FD1 in Dongguan Both local 
authorities and Taiwanese businesses have avoided talking about political issues and have 
concentrated on the future development of Dongguan and the role of Taiwanese investment 
The Dongguan TBA is said to be the most successful among 51 Taiwanese TBAs in
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China.13 It also acts as a negotiator with businesses’ home government in Taiwan. For 
example, it persuaded the Taiwanese government to improve medical services for 
Taiwanese businesses in mainland China by establishing a new hospital and facilitating 
medical insurance facilities (Lianhebao, 6 July 2001). Thus, Dongguan’s experience 
implies that the MLG system, which is articulated by economic decentralisation, has 
undoubtedly improved the business environment.
7.3.3 Japanese Firms and Chinese Local Government
Just as the local Taiwanese Business Association (TBA) has played a crucial role in 
promoting Taiwanese business interests in Dongguan, the Tokan (Dongguan)-Japan 
Consulting Support Service Co., Ltd. (TJCSS) has helped to attract Japanese investors. The 
researcher visited the TJCSS in Dongguan in October 2001 and obtained information about 
its activities. The TJCSS was co-founded by the Dongguan Foreign Trade and Economic 
Committee (DFTEC) and Dongguan's Japanese office based in Tokyo. The Tokyo office 
was established in 1997 to serve as an agent for the Dongguan government in attracting 
Japanese firms seeking Chinese business opportunities. Advisers to the Japanese office 
include Dongguan's Vice Mayor, the Chief of Customs, the Chief of the Commercial and 
Industrial Bureau, the Chief of the Tax Office, and the head of each sub-municipal district 
within Dongguan The TJCSS thus incorporates offices in Tokyo and Dongguan, and is 
strongly supported by the Dongguan city government.
The major activities of the TJCSS are (1) acting for Japanese investors in establishing 
firms in Dongguan; (2) acting as a communication channel with the Dongguan city 
government and sub-municipal governments; (3) dealing with various problems that arise 
after new firms are established; (4) providing business information and introducing 
potential business partners; and (5) responding to requests for qualified staff and training 
provision.16 The development of local networks, including local authorities and businesses, 
has certainly played an important role in attracting further Japanese investment. In the case 
of Dongguan, the TJCSS acts as an agent for the city government in carrying out a wide 
range of promotional activities. These include sending missions to Japan's trade 
associations, giving lectures in Japan, inviting Japanese business delegations, and 
providing information to the Japanese mass media 17 TJCSS is also incorporated with
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Dongguan's developmental strategy. Now the TJCSS is promoting the Yinghua Industrial 
Park in Hongmei Town, which is ranked as the sub-municipal district with the lowest 
exports and FDI (Dongguanshi Waishartf’ Touzi Qiye j i  Quanbu Gongye Zihao Huibian, 
2000). Thus the city government is playing an active role in supporting the development of 
foreign economic relations. The Yinghua Industrial Park, allocated to Japanese investors, is 
located next to the Taiying Industrial Park, which is designed for Taiwanese investors 
The organisation of the TJCSS is based on a membership system: member firms pay 
15,000 HK dollars per month A good example of cooperative relations through the TJCSS 
involves the question of customs procedures. Japanese investors in Dongguan find these 
procedures extremely troublesome. So when the TJCSS receives the complaints from 
Japanese firms it gives a call to related offices and to urge a solution for the problem1'
Dongguan’s case shows that the MLG system has helped to improve the city’s physical 
infrastructure and business environment, especially through the development of local 
co-operative networks What needs to be stressed is that there is an increasing involvement 
of firms and networks of firms in governance arrangements. This involves the blurring of 
the boundary between public and private agencies, the spread of non-hierarchical inter-firm 
networks and their corporate governance arrangements, and growing links between these 
business networks and the multi-layered state.
7.3.4 Multiple Local Networks and Sub-Municipal Government
The above examples of the TBAs (Taiwanese) and the Japanese TJCSS demonstrate the 
interactions between the political and socio-economic spheres in the case of one particular 
municipality. It is at this sub-municipal level that the key network relationships have 
developed. There are 32 sub-municipal districts (townships) in Dongguan. Seven 
sub-municipal level governments attended the second Dongguan international 3C EXPO in 
2000 in order to find business partners (Jetoro Senso, February 2001). This trade fair 
provides excellent opportunities to find business partners for both foreign investors and 
local governments. The researcher visited the third 3C EXPO in October 2001 in order to 
investigate the foreign economic activities of the sub-municipal (township) levels of 
government. A total of 30 sub-municipal governments participated and exhibited their 
investment facilities and preferential policies to potential foreign investors 2" The
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preferential policies on offer varied among the sub-municipal governments. For example, 
Tanxia Town offered taxation policy: export goods of foreign firms in the town are 
exempted from VAT, and imports of assembled products for external processing, and 
exports enterprises and their processing fees are both exempt from VAT and exercise tax. 
In income tax policy, Tanxia offers ‘a two exemptions and three reductions’ policy: from 
the first profitable year firms are exempt from income tax in the following two years 
(two-year exemptions) and enjoy a 50% reduction in income tax in the next three years 
(three-year reductions).21 Other sub-municipal governments (e g. Zhangmutou) offered 
one Guangdong-Flong Kong direct drive-through licence for one private car if investment 
exceeds 1.5 million US dollars. Furthermore, those businesses engaged in processing trade 
arrangements (PTAs) over the scale of 1 million US dollar exchanges per year are entitled 
to apply for one or more direct Guangdong-Hong Kong drive-through licences 22
Changan, located southwest of Dongguan (as a border township with Shenzhen), is the 
most successful sub-municipal government. It is Dongguan’s leading township in many 
foreign economic activities. For example, by 2000, there were 1,650 foreign firms in 
Changan, 556 Taiwanese firms and 58 Japanese firms, and exports by foreign firms were 
valued at $US 990 million.22 Changan’s registered population is 34,000 but about 600,000 
of the temporary residents stay there for work (Xianggang Wenhuibao, 12 October 2001). 
Each of Dongguan's sub-municipal districts has its own foreign affairs office which 
undertakes promotional activities to attract foreign investment In the case of Changan, a 
new Foreign Entrepreneurs and Investment Association has been established. This holds 
meetings at least three times pier year with representatives of foreign investors and customs 
and local government officials. The chairman of the Association, Wang Zhimin, is also the 
chief of the Foreign Economic Affairs Office of Changan and is also presently Vice Mayor 
(Xianggang Wenhuibao, 12 October 2001). In February 1997, Li Peng (Chairman of the 
National People’s Congress) visited Changan, and in January and June 1996 Zhu Rongji 
(Premier) visited the township. Since 1990, Changan has been awarded the 'township star’.
Humen, located in the south east of Dongguan (next to Changan), is also a very successful 
township (it is the second largest exporter after Changan). Its government organises 
‘service days’ twice per month so that foreign firms can resolve the many problems they
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face concerning export procedures, land applications, import and export applications, 
access to water and electricity supply, the investment environment, etc. (Dajingmao, No. 
10, 2001: 45). Shijie, located in the northern part of Dungguan, and Qingxi, in the south 
east, have been especially successful in the production of PC-related products In Shijie, 
for example, there are 180 foreign electronics firms (out of a total of 310 electronics firms). 
Both Shijie and Qingxi districts are worldwide production sites in electronics (Jeloro Sen.su, 
February 2001). Shijie is the world’s largest production site for PC power-supply units, 
computer keyboards and transformers, and is the second largest site in the world for the 
production of scanners and mice24 The key success factor for the sub-municipal areas is 
the ability to attract foreign electronics firms In Shilong town, a township government 
funded firm offers a 24 hour emergency call service in the Japanese language for Japanese 
firms facing problems, eg. involving customs issues or industrial accidents (NKS, 28 
December 2001). It also runs a Japanese language school to supply workers to Japanese 
firms in Shilong town. In general, the sub-municipal areas are able to take initiatives 
without first getting the formal approval of the central government. (G. Yeung, 2001b: 
118-134). The differential degree of development among sub-municipal levels in 
Dongguan implies that there is intensive competition to attract inward investment Indeed, 
32 sub-municipal districts (townships) in Dongguan complete with each other to attract 
foreign firms, and the dumping’ of factory land for foreign firms is becoming more 
common.21
As the sub-municipal levels of government (townships) have actively created networking 
links with foreign firms, these networks have in turn attracted a multiplicity of foreign 
investors. The major firms have sought to develop good relations with the central 
government in Beijing. However, as a result of the decentralisation o f economic pxiwer, 
governmental bureaux are not always able to control subordinate enterprises. Now it is 
very important for firms to maintain good relations with local governments at all levels. 
This dimension has become an increasingly impiortant feature of the formation of 
interactive relations between MLG and CPNs.
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7.4 The Chinese Electronics In d u s try
The tremendous inflow of electronics FDI and its geographical concentration have had a 
major impact on the pattern and processes of development of the Chinese electronics 
industry. This section discusses this impact and also the implications for East Asia’s 
industrial structure.
7.4.1 Chinese Electronics Firms
China's electronics industry has developed steadily as a result of economic reform. In 1998, 
electronics industrial output accounted for 6.9% of China’s total GDP.2<’ The electronics 
industry is now the second largest manufacturing industry after the clothing industry in 
China’s exports.27 China is also the leading production base for the world’s electronics 
industry: 38.3% of DVD players, 12.9% of mobile phones, 23.2% of VTRs, 24.6% of 
colour TVs, and 11.9% of desktop personal computers are produced in China (NKS, 27 
July 2001). By 1999, China had achieved 58% of the world production of cameras, 46% 
for watches, 50% for air conditioning, and 58% for telephones (Shukim Daiyamondo, 3 
November 2001). China’s PC-related exports ($US 11 billion) accounted for 4.4% of 
China's total exports in 2000 and ranked as the largest single item in terms of exports.“K
In the domestic market, Chinese electronics firms have also grown rapidly: PC-related 
products accounted for 17.8% of total electronics industrial output in 1998.2'7 Table 7.1 
shows the share of the domestic consumer electronics market by firms. Except for mobile 
phones, Chinese local electronics firms have already acquired a dominant position in the 
domestic market. For example, in the colour TV market, the share of Japanese electronics 
firms has declined sharply and Chinese local firms have emerged as the top firms. Japanese 
firms are now faced with severe competition by local Chinese firms.
Legend (a Beijing-based state-owned enterprise) had nearly a 30% share of domestic 
desktop PC sales and 21% share of notebook PC sales (both figures were top ranking in the 
first half year of 2001).30 Also, in 2000 local brands accounted for almost 80% of desktop 
sales and foreign brands for less than 20% of China’s domestic sales (Mizuhashi, 2001: 
172). Legend was established by 11 members of the Chinese Science Academy in 1984,
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and 64% of its equity is still held by the Academy. However, such intervention by the state 
is now rare. Firms have the responsibility for personnel management, finance and general 
management (Kuroda, 2001: 31; Nakagawa, 2001: 158). In the case of the production of 
notebook PCs (a total of 419,000 units), in 2000 Legend accounted for 22% of China’s 
total production (IBM was second with 18%, and Toshiba was almost same as IBM with 
18%) (Mizuhashi, 2001: 169). The major factories of Legend are in Beijing (Zhongguan) 
and Guangdong (Huizhou) (Kuroda, 2001: 60). Legend now plans to produce notebook 
PCs in Shanghai. It has developed cooperative relations with major foreign firms such as 
AST, HP, Apple, Intel, Toshiba, Canon, Heiz and Motorola (Nakagawa, 2001: 157). 
Although its share of notebook PC production in China is ranked first, the products are 
almost all a result of OEM production by the Taiwanese firms FIC and Mitac (ZAo«ggwo 
Qiyejia, No. 10, 2001 and Jet oro Sema, June 2001: 28). Legend has used technological 
guidance from FIC and has established cooperation with Chunghwa Picture Tubes and 
Hannstar Display for the production of LCDs (Mizuhashi, 2001: 172).
Table 7.1 The Share of the Chinese Domestic Electronics Market by Firms (% of 
Domestic Sales)
1 2 3
Refrigerators Haier 32.9 Kerong 11.8 Xinfei 8.5
Colour TVs Changhong 18.7 Konka 18.5 TCL 10.0
Air conditioners Haier 18.7 Midea 13.8 Gree 12.8
Washing machines Haier 23.6 Xiaotiane 22.4 Rongshida 7.5
Microwaves Galanz 67.1 LG (Korea) 12.1 Masushita 5.3
VCDs/DVDs Shinco 17.7 Bubugao 12.9 Wanlida 8.2
Mobile phones Motorola 30.1 Nokia 28.7 Ericson 21.6
PCs Legend 20.1 Changcheng 3.6 TCL 3.6
Note: The research was originally carried out in February 2000.
Source: Kuroda, Atsuo (2001 ) MeiJo mChama (Made in China), Tokyo Töyö Keizai Shinpösha, p 46
Other firms, such as Founder (established in 1985), which is a model of cooperative 
relations between academia (Beijing University) and industry, also use Intel’s CPU and 
Taiwanese firms’ products through the OEM system. Founder uses Taiwanese electronics 
firms in Guangdong for parts procurement (Jetoro Sensei, June 2001: 28). Changcheng (a 
Beijing-based state-owned enterprise, founded in 1986) has learned the management of 
production and technology through OEM production for IBM IBM computers produced 
by Changcheng are also exported to south east Asia. The rate of brandname on these
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computers is almost 1:2 (Changcheng and IBM brand) (Nakagawa, 2001: 163). Thus, even 
in state-owned firms the improvement of management has progressed, and these firms 
typically use various types of foreign firm in order to achieve growth. Although in 
Guangdong there is a limited university spin-off effect, there are many private ventures and 
township and village enterprises (TVEs), established by entrepreneurs who previously 
worked for foreign firms (Tsusansho, 2000: 39).
Competition in the Chinese domestic market is becoming increasingly severe. Chinese 
electronics firms have already undertaken offshore production in order to expand their 
markets. For example, Konka has established production sites in Mexico and India. 
Changhong has increased its share of colour TVs in the Indonesian domestic market 
through local production. TCL (a Huizhou-based firm established in 1980) started to 
produce colour TVs in Vietnam in 1996 and sharply increased its domestic sales (Kuroda, 
2001: 70-71). Haier has established ten offshore production sites. It started to produce 
small refrigerators in the US in 2000 and already holds a 30% share of the US market 
(Kuroda, 2001: 71). It aims to advance in the Japanese market and has agreed with Sanyo 
to establish a joint venture in Osaka in Japan (NKS, 9 January 2002). Galanz (based in 
Shude, founded in 1978) holds a very high share of microwave production (nearly 70%) in 
China, and produces more than 30% of the world’s total production of microwaves. It now 
seeks to become the world’s largest production factory for microwaves. Its key strategy for 
growth is the collection of OEM contracts from foreign firms. It now has more than 200 
OEM contracts, and 55% of products are exported to the world market (Nikkei Business, 15 
October 2001).
Despite their success, Chinese local firms have not yet become dominant in every product 
in the electronics industry. For example, in the case of IC production (contrary to the 
consumer electronics market), Chinese electronics firms have only a modest presence. In 
1998, among the top ten firms for 1C sales in China, there were eight foreign firms The 
Chinese electronics industry still depends largely on imports for IC supply. However, the 
development of Chinese electronics firms has greatly contributed to the spread of CPNs 
and to deepening links with foreign firms.
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7.4.2 China's Increasing Economic Presence
Chinese electronics firms have increased their presence in the electronics industry in East 
Asia Between 1996 and 1999, China’s output of electronics products exceeded that of 
South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, and was second only to that of Japan (Kuroda, 2001: 
194). In 2000, China’s share of PCs exports to East Asia accounted for 8.4% of total PC 
exports to East Asia (.Jetoro Sensa, June 2000: 27).
China’s increasing economic presence in the electronics industry has affected the position 
of its trade partners. For China and ASEAN, the US market has been the major destination 
for their exports. The US is the largest export destination for China, the Philippines, 
Thailand and Malaysia, and the second largest destination for Indonesia Table 7.2 shows 
the changing shares of US total imports. The shares of Mexico and China in US imports 
have steadily increased. On the other hand, in the late 1990s, Japan’s share of US imports 
shrank, and the share of the ASEAN 4 decreased. Japan’s decline is the result of its shift to 
offshore production abroad. Japanese electronics firms have used ASEAN as an export 
base for the US. In statistical terms, ASEAN’s competitiveness has been increasingly 
challenged by China
Table 7. 2 The Shares of Countries and Regions in US Total Imports, 1995-2000 (%)
1995 1997 1999 2000
Canada 19.6 19.2 19.4 19.0
Mexico 8.3 9.9 10.7 11.2
EU 15 17.7 18.1 19.1 18.1
Japan 16.6 14.0 12.8 12.0
China 6.1 7.2 8.0 8.2
ASEAN 4 5.8 5.8 5.6 5.4
Taiwan 3.9 3.8 3.4 3.3
South Korea 3.3 2.7 3.0 3.3
Source: Kuroda. Atsuo (2001) Meido in Chaîna (Made in China), Tokyo: Toyô K eizai Shinposha. p. 211
China's strong competitiveness is also evident in the increase of Chinese electronics 
products in Japan. For example, according to Asahi Shinhun (Asahi.Com, 24 November 
2001), DVD players were once produced mainly in Japan (between 1996 and 1998). With 
the shift of offshore production to China, the imports of DVD players from China have
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rapidly increased since 1999. The number of units for imports jumped from 190,000 
(1999) to 600,000 (2000) and by July 2001 it had reached a total of 1.33 million. This 
resulted in a sharp fall of the price of DVDs in the Japanese market: from about 100,000 
yen in 1996 to almost 20,000 or 30,000 yen in 2001 This has inevitably led to deflationary 
pressure in the Japanese market.
7.5 Micro-Regionalisation and China's National Economic Integration
Micro-regionalisation across Guangdong, Taiwan and Japan is the result of various factors 
including China’s adoption of economic reform, the impact of Japanese and Taiwanese 
FDI, the position of Hong Kong, and the rise of local corporate networks. It has been 
further encouraged by the transformation of China’s economic governance from a 
command system to a more market-oriented framework. This restructuring has induced an 
enormous inflow of FDI and accelerated China’s economic reintegration with the world 
economy. It has had a huge impact on Chinese economic spatiality and the process of 
national economic integration. The emergence of unpredicted outcomes of that economic 
spatiality has presented a direct challenge to the central control capability over regional 
planning. It is thus vitally important to consider whether (and, if so, how) the patterns of 
micro-regionalisation across Guangdong, Taiwan and Japan have contributed to China’s 
national economic integration.
There are no official data on inter-provincial trade, but we can use data for cargo 
transportation, purchases and wholesale transactions to assess the degree of inter-regional 
relations in China. In the 1980s, inter-provincial trade assumed three main forms: centrally 
planned trade, provincially planned trade, and free trade Among these, centrally planned 
trade was dominant until the mid-1980s (Zhou, 1996: 130-31), but then there was a 
significant impact of inward FDI on inter-regional trade.
According to Kumar (1994), who has researched the flow of China's domestic trade in 
terms of provincial domestic imports and exports and total retail sales, there has been a 
significant increase in the foreign trade ratio compared with the ratio for inter-provincial 
trade in Guangdong (15.7% in 1980 and 67.4% in 1992). This suggests that the domestic
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investment flows from other provinces are becoming less significant than foreign trade.
Inter-regional trade is also dependent on transportation infrastructures such as roads, 
waterways and railways. By using inter-provincial freight flows, several regional linkages 
can be identified The share of railway transportation of freight has declined as road 
networks have been improved. In 1980, railway transportation accounted for 47.5% of total 
transportation of freight (distance base) and 20.4% of total weight cargo. By 1999, the 
share of railway freight had decreased to 31.3% of total transportation freight (distance 
base) and to 12.7% of total weight cargo (Mitsubishi, 2000). This is almost certainly a 
reflection of the changing pattern of inter-provincial freight flows. Table 7.3 shows the 
volume of railway freight between provinces Despite the plan for a south coastal region 
comprising Guangdong and Fujian” , inter-provincial trade between the two provinces was 
very small. Hunan is the most important trade partner for Guangdong. On the other hand, 
for Fujian, Zhejiang is the most important trade partner In terms of the Fujian-Guangdong 
link, Fujian’s share of total railway freight from Guangdong has declined since the late 
1980s.”  Thus, from the viewpoint of flows of freight, the development of economic links 
with Hong Kong and Taiwan has not had much effect on economic integration between 
Fujian and Guangdong. Of course, domestic factors also need to be considered in relation 
to China’s national economic integration, but this is beyond the scope o f the present 
chapter.,4
Table 7.3 Railway Transport of Freight between Provinces, 1998 (Volume of 
Cargo, %)
T o
F ro m
G u a n g d o n g F u jia n S h an g h a i B e ijin g H u n an S ic h u a n Z h e jia n g J ia n g su
G u a n g d o n g 2 3 .1 1 % 0 .2 7 % 2 .2 2 % 2 .6 1 % 1 2 .6 8 % 4 .9 0 % 2 .7 2 % 2 .2 2 %
F u jia n 0 .6 5 % 4 8 .9 9 % 2 .2 8 % 1 .4 6 % 4 .4 7 % 0 .5 1 % 1 0 .2 0 % 3 .8 3 %
S h a n g h a i 3 .9 1 % 3 .5 6 % 8 .0 7 % 4 .3 4 % 4 .1 7 % 5 .5 6 % 8 4 2 % 4 .8 6 %
B e ijin g 1 9 9 % 0 .3 5 % 0 .9 0 % 3 1 .1 4 % 1 .0 9 % 2 .0 7 % 1 .4 4 % 2 .1 5 %
H u n a n 2 8 .3 9 % 2 .5 6 % 1.1 1 % 0 .3 6 % 3 5  8 2 % 1 .2 7 % 2 .2 6 % 1 .2 0 %
S ic h u a n 2 .6 7 % 0 ,3 9 % 0 .9 1 % 0 .6 5 % 1 2 8 % 5 5 .5 5 % 1 .0 0 % 2 0 8 %
Z h e jia n g 2 .7 2 % 3 .0 7 % 9 .1 5 % 0 .9 8 % 6 .9 5 % 2 .1 4 % 3 6 .4 4 % 1 .5 6 %
Jia n g su 4 .1 1 % 2 .5 0 % 9 .0 7 % 0 .7 4 % 1 .0 5 % 2 0 0 % 6 .5 1 % 3 4 .1 9 %
Note The figures are based on the researcher’s calculations Data are taken from figures for inter-provincial 
rail freight (by volume).
Source Zhongguo .liaotong Nianjian IW V
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One of the most plausible explanations of such a striking phenomenon is that both 
Guangdong and Fujian provinces are more closely integrated with Hong Kong and Taiwan 
than with each other. According to Y. Wang (2000), the degree of outward economic 
orientation affects the developmental pattern of the provincial economy. For example, in 
1995, while the degree of China’s average outward economic orientation was 21.2%, that 
of Guangdong was already 85.9% and that of Fujian was 35.8% ,5 Undoubtedly, 
Guangdong is more internationalised in economic terms than the rest of China On the 
other hand, inter-provincial relations between Guangdong and Fujian are far less integrated 
than the relations with Hong Kong and Taiwan. This reveals that the pattern of 
Guangdong’s economic development is influenced more by the circumstances of 
cross-border relations than by inter-provincial relations.
Indeed, despite the central economic planning of an economic cooperative region between 
Guangdong and Fujian, inter-regional trade between the two has declined since the late 
1980s This highlights the complex patterns of China’s governance structure and questions 
the capability of new regulatory functions initiated by the centre, and, even more 
importantly, the role of the Party-state system in regional economic development.
7.6 Conclusion
The pattern of development of production networks among Guangdong, Taiwan and Japan 
underlines the crucial role of strategic networking linkages between Chinese local 
authorities and foreign firms. Hong Kong firms are pioneers in creating innovative form of 
CPNs. Guangdong’s innovative policies (especially its internationalisation strategy) were 
formulated as a result of the loosening of central state control, and this has enabled Hong 
Kong firms to construct a profitable cross-border production system. Guangdong's 
para-diplomatic activities have added to the complexity of the economic and political 
domains in China.
Of equal importance is the way in which sub-provincial and sub-municipal units (e.g. 
Dongguan and its sub-units) have become dynamic entrepreneurial agents and helped to 
achieve a regional transformation Chinese SNGs -  representing the local state are
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significant economic actors that do much to create a successful business environment, as is 
illustrated by Dongguan’s success in attracting Hong Kong, Taiwanese and Japanese 
investment. This process involves both the city government and the sub-units (townships) 
within Dongguan forming close channels of communication and cooperation with foreign 
investors, often based on the advantages gained by close personal and social connections 
(giuinxi).
The TBA and the TJCSS in Dongguan play key roles as intermediaries between the city 
and foreign firms, especially in improving connections and facilitating the exchange of 
information. Furthermore, as a result of increasing competition, sub-municipal 
governments (townships) in Dongguan have become directly involved in attracting foreign 
investment. Thus the structure and operation of networking linkages in Dongguan have 
assumed increasingly complex and multiple forms.
This chapter has also investigated the impact o f cross-border economic relations on the 
Chinese electronics industry and the country’s national integration process Despite its 
technological dependency on advanced countries, the Chinese electronics industry has 
already emerged as a key international player which links domestic and international 
production networks. The Chinese domestic market has become much more competitive. 
The deepening of various production networks with foreign firms has greatly assisted local 
Chinese electronics firms, which have increasingly undertaken exports and offshore 
production China’s sharp growth has also dramatically changed the East Asian industrial 
structure. In particular, through the impact of industrial agglomeration and the low cost of 
labour, China is partly replacing the role of ASEAN as an export base.
On the other hand, in terms of its domestic influence, micro-regionalisation does not 
necessarily strengthen the national economic integration process. Despite the central 
economic planning of cooperation between Guangdong and Fujian, inter-regional trade 
between these provinces has actually declined since the late 1980s.36 This has presented a 
major challenge to the Chinese authorities in relation to the evolution of economic 
governance. The future development of CPNs across Guangdong, Taiwan and Japan will 
be built in large measure upon the further development of cooperation between China’s
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evolving MLG (especially at local authorities) and CPNs promoted by foreign investors.
1 The figure is taken from Luo (2001)
2 In 1995, Hong Kong’s electronics industry accounted for 28 7% of Hong Kong’s domestic exports (Enright, 
et al., 1997: 154).
3 Refugees who managed to have contact with a family member or friend without capture were defined as 
those 'having touched base’ in Hong Kong, they were then allowed to stay Hong Kong did not cut off the 
flow of refugees completely because of the continuing need for cheap labour (Sung, 1998: 4).
4 In September 1985, in order to respond to the rise of protectionism and trade friction, the Group of Five 
(meetings of the governors of the central banks and finance ministers from the US, the UK, France, West 
Germany and Japan) agreed to enhance international cooperation, including joint intervention by the financial 
authorities in the foreign exchange market
5 From the investor’s viewpoint, the exchange rate with the RMB is also an important factor For example, in 
the case of Japanese investors in China, between 1989 and 1999 the RMB dropped almost one-third against 
the Japanese yen Hence, the continuous rise of the cost of labour and land in China has to some extent been 
countered by the weakening exchange rate
8 The figure is calculated by the researcher based on Guangdong Duiwai Jingji Maoyiweiyuanhui (1999).
7 Mitsubishi (2001).
8 Interview with officials at the Foreign Affairs and Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau of Dongguan City (13 
October 2001)
9 This road was built by the BOT (build, operate, transfer) arrangement funded by Hopewell Holdings Ltd 
(Hong Kong)
10 Interview with officials at Dongguans Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Bureau (12 October 
2001) .
11 Comment by Dongguan's Vice Mayor in NKS, 14 November 2001
12 The figure is taken from http ://www worldtimes co jp/special/china-taiwan/ta000512 htm/
13 This is pointed out in Shen and Mitsuibussan Senryaku Kenkyusho (2001 149).
14 http://www worldtimes co jp/special/china-taiwan/ta0000516 htm/
15 Comments are from http://wwwmelma com/mag/42/mOOOOl142/a00000064 html/
16 Leaflet ( lokan-Japan Consulting Support Service Co., I .Id) and
http://www2.tky 3web.ne jp/ tokan/www/contents/Jimusho html/
17 Interview with the Project Director of TJSCC (12 October 2001)
18 Hongmei Town's Investment Guide and Map, provided at the 3C EXPO in Dongguan in October 2001
19 Interview with the Project Director o f TJSCC (12 October 2001)
211 The number is the researcher’s calculation at a visit to the 3C EXPO in Dongguan in October 2001
21 Tanxia’s booth at the 3C EXPO in Dongguan (13 October 2001)
22 Zhangmutou Investment Guide, provided at the 3C EXPO in Dongguan in October 2001
23 These figures are taken from Xianggang Wenhuibao, 12 October 2001
24 Investment Guide ofShijie, provided at the 3C EXPO in Dongguan in October 2001
25 Comments by Lin Shan Vice mayor (Shilong town) in NKS, 28 December 2001
26 The figure is taken from Onishi (2001: 119).
27 In 1999, 15 86% % of China’s exports consisted of telecommunication and electronics products Clothing 
and textile exports accounted for 26 86% of China’s total exports See Higashi A jia eno Shiten (2001), spring 
special edition
28 The figure is taken from Kuroda (2001: 68).
29 The figure is taken from Onishi (2001: 123).
30 The figure is taken from Shukan Datyamondo, 3 November 2001
31 The figure is taken from Moriya (2001: 201)
32 After Deng’s 'tour of the south’ in 1992, regional economic planning was revised The plan for 'Seven 
Greater Economic Regions’ proposed that Guangdong and Fujian should form a south coastal economic 
region
33 Fujian's proportion of total railway freight from Guangdong was 0 42% in 1986, it peaked at 0 55% in 
1988 and declined continuously in the 1990s In 1994 it was 0 32% and in 1999 it dropped to only 0.19%
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34 Wang (2001) points out that market fragmentation in China is caused by regional friction and 
confrontation as well as by close relations between local governments and firms
36 The outward economic orientation is measured as: commodity export value/GDPx 100. Y Wang (2000 
150).
36 According to the data for inter-provincial railway freight (volume of cargo Zhongguo Jiaotong Nianjian, 
various years), Fujian’s share of total railway freight from Guangdong has declined In 1986, it was 0 42% 
and it peaked at 0.55% in 1988 It then began to fall -  to 0.32% in 1994 and 0.19% in 1999
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CHAPTERS
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
This study has sought to explore and explain the key components and characteristics of the 
emergence of cross-border micro-regionalisation among Guangdong (in southern China), 
Taiwan and Japan with particular reference to the role of networks of governance linking 
Chinese sub-national governments (SNGs) and foreign firms. The electronics industry has 
been taken as a specific illustrative case study of these trends.
The study has been underpinned by three specific research questions:
1. How should we define and characterise the key components of 
micro-regionalisation among Guangdong, Taiwan and Japan9
2. What kinds of policy environment and what actors in the host and home countries 
are needed to support cross-border economic relations?
3. How do networks of multi-level governance (MLG) operate to facilitate 
m icro-regional i sation?
These three questions have been approached through the combination of four specific 
research studies (see Section 1.4.2.4 and Table 1.1): the Chinese domestic context (related 
to research questions 1 and 2 and elaborated in Chapter 4), the international (Japanese) 
context) (related to research questions 1 and 2 and elaborated in Chapter 5), the regional, 
cross-Taiwan Strait context (related to research questions 1 and 2 and elaborated in Chapter 
6), and the development of cross-border SNG networks (related to research question 3 and 
elaborated in Chapter 7 with particular reference to a case study of Dongguan and the 
electronics industry).
In this concluding chapter the main research findings will first be summarised in relation to 
each of the three research questions, drawing on the analysis in the relevant chapters
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containing the case-study analyses (Sections 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3). Then the implications of the 
study and its findings for the theoretical understanding of micro-regionalisation will be 
discussed (Section 8.4). Section 8.5 focuses on the implications of the study for the future 
development of the Chinese policy agenda. The limitations of the research are considered 
in Section 8.6, and some key areas of research which deserve to be developed further in the 
future are discussed in Section 8.7. Finally, Section 8 8 summarises the contribution of the 
study to the academic analysis of micro-regionalisation in East Asia, and highlights the 
ways in which the study fills important gaps in the literature and provides a basis for 
further theoretical and empirical investigation.
8.1 How Should We Define and Characterise the Key Components of 
Micro-Regionalisation among Guangdong, Taiwan and Japan? (Research Question 1)
The theoretical discussions in Chapters 2 and 3 provided the foundations of our initial 
exploration of the concept of micro-regionalisation. In the case of micro-regionalisation 
among Guangdong, Taiwan and Japan, the empirical evidence presented in Chapters 4, 5 
and 6 (the first three case studies) provides us with a basis for further specifying the main 
defining characteristics, allowing of course for the fact that this particular case of 
micro-regionalisation is bound to have some unique features as well as features which may 
more generally present themselves in processes of micro-regionalisation across the world.
In Chapter 2, the theoretical analysis was presented to furnish an overall framework, rooted 
in a ‘network’ perspective of cross-border economic governance. H. Yeung’s (2000) 
approach, with its emphasis on the internationalisation of production systems across 
national boundaries through the locational strategies of multinational corporations (MNCs), 
was taken as a useful starting-point, particularly in its notion that the interplay between 
home country governance and host country governance at the regional scale contributes to 
the rescaling of political economy beneath the level of the state and creates conditions in 
which new network relations among the state, SNGs, firms and intermediate 
non-governmental associations can develop. Sub-national, cross-border interactions linking 
multiple levels of government and also the multiple levels of productive activity of MNCs 
form the basis for the emergence of what we have called micro-regions in distinction to the
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larger-scale state-led sub-regions and supra-regions (macro-regional blocs) of the world. 
The emergence of micro-regions reflects the patterns of the new international division of 
labour (NIDL) based on the geographical mobility of firms seeking to invest in areas which 
offer access to low-cost labour and other efficiencies in order to maximise their potential 
within international commodity chains and cross-border production networks. The result is 
the formation of areas of industrial agglomeration, illustrated in the present study by the 
example of the Pearl River Delta area of the Guangdong province of southern China, with 
its special attractions for the electronics industry In helping to encourage, shape and 
regulate the process of agglomeration, the role of SNGs -  which in China means the 
provincial and sub-provincial (city and township) levels of government -  is crucially 
important.
Chapter 3 examined China’s distinct pattern of micro-regional integration with the world 
economy under the impact of globalisation and régionalisation with particular reference to 
the centrality of processing trade arrangement (PTAs) in Guangdong. China’s gradual 
move away from highly centralised political authoritarianism and a closed economy to a 
more decentralised political system with an 'Open Door’ to international trade and 
investment was a vitally important precondition for the development of micro-regional 
integration across the area of Southern China, Taiwan and Japan. But the central state in 
China could not by itself foster such remarkable economic dynamism: from the start this 
relied on the emergence of MLG and cross-border networks linking SNGs (especially at 
the city level) and MNCs. This trend in turn was further stimulated by the continuing rapid 
industrialisation of the East Asian region, involving the international, cross-border 
movement of factors of production and massive levels of FD1 into southern China, 
including both direct and indirect investment from Japan and Taiwan.
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 focused respectively on the Chinese domestic context (with particular 
reference to industrial agglomeration in Guangdong), the role and impact of Japanese 
foreign direct investment, and the structure and operation of cross-border production 
networks across the Taiwan Strait. On the basis of these analyses, we can summarise the 
key components of micro-regionalisation among Guangdong, Taiwan and Japan as 
follows:
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(1) The opening up o f new political and economic spaces in Guangdong as a result o f  
China’s domestic reform movement (including a transformation o f state structures), and  
the emergence o f a fluid and flexible system o f  MLG incorporating both horizontal 
relations among units rather than vertical relations. This system is still emerging and is 
doing so within a political system that is still heavily controlled by the ruling Communist 
Party, but party officials have relinquished some considerable autonomy to SNGs and 
economic entrepreneurs, although this restructuring of party governance remains highly 
controversial. The reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has been a major part of this 
transformation. In the case of Guangdong, provincial and sub-provincial leaders have 
made a determined effort to exercise entrepreneurial leadership and attract foreign firms to 
invest, and to gain concessions from the central government, e.g. in terms of the 
establishment of economic zones of various kinds offering inducements to foreign firms 
(Chapter 4).
(2) The strategic decisions by Japanese firms, especially in electronics, to invest in 
southern China. Japanese FDI has contributed greatly to the rebuilding of economic links 
between Japan and East Asia at the micro level, and a major part of this pattern is the 
growth of offshore production in the electronics industry, increasingly focused since the 
late 1980s on southern China. A triangular pattern of mutually dependent trade relations 
among Japan, East Asia and the United States has emerged (see Section 5.3.1), with 
southern China forming a major nexus of production for export within this triangle. Much 
of this production is ‘exported’ back to Japan and to the US market. In the electronics 
industry, Japan’s nine leading firms have all established production bases abroad, many of 
them in southern China For many Japanese firms, Hong Kong has been an especially 
important gateway to mainland China itself, in particular to Guangdong. In order to 
facilitate these cross-border movements, Japanese electronics firms have consolidated their 
inter-firm relations within the keirelsu networks (dominated by lead firms), but have also 
developed new more flexible, horizontal governance arrangements for the production 
process. This includes an expansion of the role of small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) in electronics production (Chapter 5). The changing position of Japanese firms in 
vertical international commodity chains and horizontal cross-border production networks
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has encouraged them to engage in direct networking relations with Chinese SNGs.
(3) The expansion o f  cross-strait production networks between southern China and Taiwan. 
Taiwanese firms (many of them SMEs) have in recent years (because of the changing 
political climate between Taiwan and the mainland) taken advantage of close geographical 
proximity and shared cultural, linguistic and social values to become major investors in 
southern China, especially in the electronics industry. The positive encouragement of the 
Taiwanese government in developing an electronics production capability and harnessing 
the skills of SMEs has played a decisive part in this process. At the same time, Taiwan has 
been receptive -  through its own Open Door policy — to inward investment into Taiwan, 
much of it from Japan, and this has created a complex indirect route for Japanese 
investment into southern China. Japanese FDI has indeed been the major source of 
evolution of the Taiwanese computer industry. More recently, Taiwan has attracted 
large-scale investment from firms in advanced Western countries. Taiwan's role -  like that 
of Japan -  must be understood within the broader context of the new East Asian 
international division o f labour and the determination o f Taiwanese firms to retain their 
competitive advantage, especially in the production of PC-related products. A large amount 
of Taiwanese investment in China is ‘roundabout’ investment, e g. through the central 
American island countries, because this circumvents the regulatory obstacles (still imposed 
by Taiwan’s government) to many forms of direct investment (Chapter 6). The changing 
position of Taiwanese firms in vertical international commodity chains and horizontal 
cross-border production networks has encouraged them to engage in direct networking 
relations with Chinese SNGs. This process has been facilitated by guanxi connections and 
the social networks among the cross-Strait Chinese business community.
8.2 What Kinds of Policy Environment and What Actors in the Home and Host 
Countries Are Needed to Support Cross-Border Economic Relations? (Research 
Question 2)
The initial discussions in Chapters 2 and 3 revealed that existing theories of 
micro-regionalisation and studies of China’s integration in the world economy have paid 
only superficial attention to the specific requirements of effective cross-border economic
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relations in terms of key environmental factors and the role of specific actors. One main 
purpose of the studies presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 was to investigate these 
requirements in more detail with specific reference to the example of the electronics 
industry
The model of micro-regionalisation presented in Chapter 2 (Figure 2.2) can be refined on 
the basis of this study’s findings, as shown in Figure 8.1. Micro-regionalisation among 
Guangdong, Taiwan and Japan is the outcome of various strategic interactions deriving 
from domestic economic governance and the evolution of cross-border economic relations 
in response to the rise of global competition. The major actors are Chinese local 
(sub-national) governments, foreign firms (Taiwanese and Japanese), and intermediate 
business associations linking governments and firms. The home governance system of 
firms (in Taiwan and Japan) and the host governance facilities encouraged by the Chinese 
central government have transformed the local institutional setting. Global competition in 
the electronics industry is most visible at the regional scale (centred on Dongguan), where 
specific industrial infrastructures and political and economic conditions shape patterns of 
cross-border interaction. The role of Chinese SNGs in attracting foreign investment is 
decisive (a combination of formal para-diplomacy and informal social connections). The 
coordinating role of the SNGs in the local institutional setting of the host country is critical 
for stimulating micro-regionalisation. Micro-regionalisation among Guangdong, Taiwan 
and Japan is thus the result of the complex and uneven interplay of several strategic actors 
(the state, local governments and firms) and of several organisational variables (such as 
commodity chains, network linkages, production networks, guunxi networks and 
organisational learning and conventional social factors). This micro-regionaiisation is not 
geographically self-contained but is sustained very much by certain crucial externalities 
(especially the supply of capital, technology and labour) and outside markets (especially 
those of the US and the EU).
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Figure 8.1 Micro-Régionalisation: The Network Dynamics of Sub-National 
Government and Multinational Corporations
Source: The researcher
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Host Country Governance: China
The strategic role of the state can be seen in the domestic and international domain. The 
three governments (China, Taiwan and Japan) have implemented different foreign 
economic policies. The effective implementation of government policies (domestic and 
foreign) is one of the reasons why micro-regionalisation among Guangdong, Taiwan and 
Japan has been able to develop so rapidly. China’s efforts to create an attractive business 
environment are seen in the domestic and international arenas. Post-Mao China has 
abolished its relative isolationism and has actively sought to strengthen its diplomatic ties 
and economic relations with the world. The effective foreign investment policy of Chinese 
governments has contributed greatly to the rapid internationalisation of China. Since the 
1980s China has established diplomatic relations with East Asian countries and has 
participated in various regional and world organizations. China is now a member of the 
WTO and is taking initiatives to enhance regional cooperation (i.e. with the ASEAN) 
(Chapter 3). On the one hand, China has implemented an ambitious domestic economic 
reform programme and experienced a tremendous transformation during the past two 
decades. The rescaling of political economy of China (in particular in terms of central-local 
relations) in this period has very important implications for understanding the success and 
failure of creating conditions to attract foreign investment. The key reform process has 
been the decentralisation of many decisions in economic management to local government 
(Chapter 4).
The Rise o f Sub-National Governments
Because of the way in which micro-regionalisation is perceived in China, the domestic 
adaptation of Chinese politics and the change of foreign economic policy are very 
important. At the provincial level, Guangdong has promoted its own internationalisation 
strategies through para-diplomatic activities. Strong leadership in the implementation of 
economic reform has helped to support Guangdong’s open economy. At the sub-provincial 
level, the Dongguan city government has promoted proactive dynamic developmental 
strategies. Moreover, beneath the city level, sub-municipalities (townships) have also 
launched ambitious strategies for attracting FDI. Thus, the central government was an 
initial promoter and provider of the Open Door Policy, but local governments have been 
key practitioners within this policy framework. Chinese local governments are not only 
devices for the implementation of national policies within national territorial boundaries;
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they are also key entrepreneurial economic agents interacting with other economic actors 
across borders. Domestic political adjustment can be seen in the redefinition of central and 
local relations and the emergence of a fluid system of MLG. The changing role of local 
governments in China has thus reflected the interplay between their responsibilities as 
agents of the central government and their interest in promoting regional economic 
development
Home Country Governance: Japan
The role of the Japanese government in the development of micro-regionalisation is not 
entirely clear because of the emerging variations in response by different levels of 
government and the continuing impact of ministerial fragmentation on foreign economic 
policy. There have also been different initiatives in the domestic and international arenas. 
Although MITI’s (now MET1: Keisanshb) developmental state’ concept and the flying 
geese’ model were at first able to explain the path of development of East Asia and Japan's 
role as a leader of development, they can no longer accommodate the rapid shift of 
Japanese production sites in China. Although state intervention has helped Japan's 
electronics industry, there can be no doubt that Japan’s ‘developmental state’ model needs 
to be revised. Japan has not succeeded in producing a new export industry to follow the 
electronics industry. Indeed, the Japanese electronics industry may be the last example of 
Japan’s successful home country governance led by cooperation between the government 
and business.
In the international domain, initially Japanese ODA undoubtedly helped Japanese firms’ 
re-entry into East Asia. Under the impact of economic recession, Japan has not developed 
an alternative concept of its economic role in East Asia. Although the FTA concept 
emerged as the new basis of Japan’s regional policy toward East Asia in the late 1990s, this 
initiative has also been hindered by Japan’s domestic political situation. In the late 1990s 
the FTA principle was finally endorsed, but this was by now entirely a reactive move 
intended to avoid domestic problems. Thus, the role of the Japanese central government in 
micro-regionalisation across Guangdong, Taiwan and Japan can be seen as the indirect 
effect of Japan's engagement in East Asian regional cooperation and the development of 
bilateral relations with China. At the same time, the role of Japanese SNGs has become
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much more important as part of the multi-layered diplomatic processes. Though the growth 
of micro-regionalisation has been dominated by firm-led industrial integration processes 
across borders, this has had a profound effect on local economies in Japan. Japanese local 
governments have therefore had to respond to changes of production, in particular the shift 
to offshore production led by Japanese electronics firms. Thus, Japan’s home country 
governance is fragmented and less consolidated in coordinating the relationship between 
firms and the different levels of government in the rise of global competition.
Home Country Governance: Taiwan
Taiwan’s home country-governance environment has played a major role in promoting 
micro-regionalisation For Taiwan, given the small size of its territory and economy, 
economic relations with mainland China are crucially important. The Taiwanese 
government has been a strong supporter of the Taiwanese electronics industry in an effort 
to overcome the limitations imposed by Taiwan’s limited size. Its government-funded 
research projects have resulted in the birth of many electronics firms. Also, through 
OEM/ODM/EMS production networks with foreign firms, Taiwanese electronics firms 
have become world-class electronics producers. The government has implemented 
innovative FDI policies to attract advanced technologies, and has made a determined effort 
to upgrade technology. However, the Taiwanese government has failed to improve political 
relations with mainland China. Moreover, the majority of Taiwanese SMEs have not had 
any government support, and most of them have independently (often secretly) set up 
offshore production sites in mainland China. Ironically, the fact that these Taiwanese SMEs 
do not expect support from the government has directly encouraged the agglomeration of 
Taiwanese firms. Thus, the Taiwanese government has tacitly encouraged the development 
of cross-border production networks across the Taiwan Strait
The Strategies o f  MNCs: Japanese Electronics Firms
Foreign firms have played a vital role in developing an export-oriented 
manufacturing-based economy in the Pearl River Delta in Guangdong. They have 
inevitably been influenced by the specific characteristics of their home (i.e. national) 
system of production and innovation.
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Japanese manufacturing FDI in East Asia varies according to the specific approach of each 
firm. However, empirical evidence suggests that most Japanese manufacturing FDI in East 
Asia is on the basis of export-oriented strategies which use offshore production for export 
to the US, EU and Japanese markets. This approach originally derives from the successful 
experience of Japanese export-oriented strategies. Japan's centralised and relatively closed 
production system, based on the keiretsu, has provided a distinct form of Japanese 
production networks. The investment strategy based on the keirelsu system has major 
implications for the development of a characteristically Japanese pattern of trade and 
investment in East Asia. In the electronics sector, with the supply of Japanese electronics 
technology and components, East Asian countries have successfully transformed 
themselves into electronic products-exporting economies. Thus, in the 1990s, when 
Japanese FDI started to enter China, it was natural that the initial priority was to set up 
offshore production targeting sales in third countries (especially Japan, the US and the EU). 
Japanese locational strategies in China derive from such exporting considerations, and thus 
the coastal area was chosen for its geographical advantages for exports. In particular, the 
preferential treatment offered by Guangdong succeeded in attracting a high level of 
Japanese investment.
With the restructuring of production in the electronics industry, the reform of the keiretsu 
system has had a dramatic impact on Japanese SMEs. They are now faced with the revision 
of conventional inter-firm relations with Japanese lead firms. This movement has caused 
the emergence of variations of production networks by Japanese firms. The business 
performance of Japanese firms in China encompasses both export-oriented strategies and 
domestic sales. Exporting from offshore production sites in China has been more beneficial 
than domestic sales for Japanese firms. Thus, because of lower labour costs, improved 
quality of production as well as industrial agglomeration, many Japanese manufacturing 
firms (including many SMEs) have further targeted China as an export base for third 
countries. Undoubtedly, the continuous expansion of offshore production by Japanese 
manufacturing firms in China will continue to develop production networks between Japan 
and China.
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The Strategies ofMNCs: Taiwanese Firms
Taiwanese firms have effectively linked Guangdong, Taiwan and Japan by responding to 
China’s Open Door Policy and creating cross-border production networks (CPNs). The 
pattern of development of networking linkages across Guangdong, Taiwan and Japan is 
conducted through various strategic interactions between different levels of political and 
economic activity. The strategies of Japanese firms (using Taiwan as an export base) and of 
Taiwanese firms (seeking to gain technology with no sales networks) have complemented 
each other. Taiwanese firms have thus succeeded in undertaking OEM production from 
Japanese lead firms. Japanese electronics firms have developed various production 
networks with Taiwanese firms (through OEM/ODM/EMS). As a result of the increase of 
OEM production, Taiwanese electronics finns have become more capable of producing 
contract-made-to-order memory chips (EMS).
Taiwanese firms have emerged as the major investors in the mainland, ordenng the 
assembly of manufactured goods. They have extended their activities across the Taiwan 
Strait despite the continuing political antagonism between China and Taiwan. Taiwanese 
firms enjoy a range of preferential treatments provided by Chinese local governments. The 
highly flexible Taiwanese inter-firm division of labour, which tends to concentrate in one 
area, is extended to the international division of labour using production sites in China. 
Industrial agglomeration in the electronics industry in Dongguan largely derives from the 
concentration of Taiwanese firms.
Building Network Relations between Foreign Firms and SNGs
Building network relations between foreign firms and SNGs is an essential -  but 
previously under researched -  part of micro-regionalisation. Economic reform in China has 
been carried out under rigid budgetary limits. The self-responsibility of local governments 
has meant that they have had to assume a more entrepreneurial role in the economic sphere 
(Chapter 4). The economic restructuring of the state sector has contributed to the rise of 
local economic elites (often Party cadres) and local entrepreneurs in local government. The 
Chinese SNGs are increasingly in control of their own resources and firms and depend less 
on financial support from central government. Thus, foreign firms have become especially 
important sources of local economic dynamism.
248
For foreign firms, good relations with Chinese SNGs are vital in terms of gaining 
favourable business conditions (i.e. regulations and licenses). The local government elites 
have played a highly significant role in protecting foreign firms because their economic 
interests are the same as those of foreign firms. In the case of Guangdong, the local 
government-fund firms often undertake processing and assembly production under contract 
with foreign firms. Many foreign firms have established joint ventures with Chinese local 
government-funded firms (EJVs and CJVs). As far as the mutual benefits between foreign 
firms and Chinese SNGs are concerned, the local institutional setting plays a tremendously 
important role in circumventing regulations imposed by the central government.
8.3 How Do Networks of Multi-Level Governance (MLG) Operate to Facilitate 
Micro-Kegionalisation? (Research Question 3)
Chapter 7 presented a detailed case study of the development of cross-border sub-national 
government networks among Guangdong, Taiwan and Japan with particular reference to 
the example of the city of Dongguan (in the province of Guangdong) and its emerging 
relations with Japanese and Taiwanese electronics firms. The emergence of economies of 
agglomeration in Dongguan illustrates the successful growth of a 'region’ through the 
combination of political, economic and technological spatialities, coming together within 
an emergent system of multi-level governance.
Our research shows that various strategic actors are involved in the development of local 
networks in Dongguan. In terms o f different levels of Chinese sub-national government, 
the provincial level (Guangdong), the city level (Dongguan) and the sub-municipal level 
(districts/townships) all play important roles This is illustrated in Chapter 7 by the specific 
case of the electronics industry. In this sector, the Guangdong provincial government has 
worked hard to develop an active foreign economic diplomacy, and has introduced a 
number of measures to create an attractive host environment for foreign firms. At the city 
level, Dongguan has taken advantage of the increased scope for autonomy in economic 
development matters, including both domestic improvements (such as physical 
infrastructure), the flexible regulation of labour costs, and relations with potential investors, 
including foreign firms. It has benefited in this respect from the advantages offered by the
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city’s geographical location (between Guangzhou and Shenzhen, and close to Hong Kong) 
and its access to an abundant supply o f low-cost immigrant labour. At the sub-municipal 
level, there is considerable scope for Dongguan’s 32 districts/townships to attract foreign 
investors by offering a range of incentives and by cultivating successful networking 
arrangements with foreign firms. Changan, Humen, Shijie and Qingxi have been the most 
successful sub-municipalities in terms o f attracting inward investment. This is undoubtedly 
because they have adopted a proactive, entrepreneurial style of leadership in their relations 
with foreign firms.
The importance of guanxi as a basis for the development of relations between local 
governments and firms is also a key issue. Figures 8.1 and 8.2 offer the opportunity to 
compare the strategic processes of micro-regionalisation through the development of 
cross-border networks and the inter-related dynamics of local networks. G. Yeung (2001a) 
concludes that Dongguan's economic, social and environmental endowments owe much to 
the privileged treatment offered through guanxi network relations The Dongguan 
government is a provider of regulation, law and physical infrastructure for the business 
environment, and also offers firms attractive investment concessions This has been to the 
advantage of Dongguan, because as its economy has grown there has also been a growth of 
revenue through taxation.
Although Yeung’s study distinguishes foreign firms with guanxi from those without guanxi, 
this research reveals that guanxi relations are not an unchanging entity; rather through 
business practices these relations are constantly reshaped and created. Thus, in the business 
practices of Japanese and Taiwanese firms in Dongguan, the intermediaries (the Taiwanese 
Business Association [TBA] and the Tokan-Japan Consulting Support Service [TJCCS]) 
have played a critical role These intermediaries support foreign firms in negotiating with 
local governments, the exchange of information, and the protection of firms. For example, 
the expansion of the production sites of Taiwanese firms to China inevitably highlights 
political factors. However, practical interactions in the micro-regionalisation process are 
almost entirely carried out by local governments in China on the basis of the autonomy 
they have been granted within the merging system of MLG. These intermediaries help to 
make up for the lack of political relations by creating guanxi relations between firms and
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local officials. Also, the sub-municipal levels of government have developed their own 
strategies for attracting foreign firms. In particular, they have developed networking 
relations with foreign investors through various channels such as trade fairs (e.g. the 3C 
EXPO) and other informal contacts. Dongguan’s local network is also linked to the inland 
area, which provides an abundant source of migrant labour. In turn, the remittance from the 
migrant workers in Dongguan accounts for a very important part of the local economy (e g. 
in house-building).
Figure 8.2 The Variety of Dongguan's Local Networks
Source: The researcher’s elaboration of G Yeung’s model
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The system of MLG studied in the case of Dongguan and the electronics industry involves 
three vertical levels (four, if we include the central government) and 32 horizontal 
divisions of the city of Dongguan. Obviously, this raises the question of overall control and 
co-ordination of emerging, unplanned governance arrangements. There is increasing 
competition among territorial units (cities and sub-municipalities) to attract foreign 
investment. The provincial government of Guangdong and the central government both 
seek to establish economic areas and zones for privileged treatment. Dongguan has 
benefited because it is at the heart of the Pearl River Delta, which has been targeted by 
both the centre and the provincial levels of government as an economic priority area. 
Dongguan is one of several ‘open economic areas’ within the Pearl River Delta, and the 
city government has been able to select areas within its own boundaries for economic 
development purposes. Undoubtedly, there is a growing need for more effective 
coordination of these trends and of the various types of areas designated for economic 
development, because without such coordination the consequence will be an extremely 
uneven pattern of internationalisation (with its accompanying social problems) among and 
within China’s provinces. This in turn will hinder the overall integration of China with the 
world economy.
8.4 Theoretical Implications for the Study of IVlicro-Regionalisation
This thesis demonstrates the usefulness of inter-disciplinary investigation to gain an 
understanding of the development of micro-regionalisation. In particular, the analysis of 
micro-regional isation has drawn on three theoretical constructions which, when taken 
together, offer a systematic framework for theorising the micro-regionalisation process. 
These concepts are: multi-level governance (MLG), international commodity chains 
(ICCs), and cross-border production networks (CPNs).
Mutli-Level Governance in East Asia
Changes in cross-border economic relations among Guangdong, Taiwan and Japan have 
been greatly facilitated by the emergence o f fluid MLG. This case also serves to 
demonstrate the analytical value of the concept of MLG beyond the example of EU 
governance The pattern of China’s micro-regional integration with the world economy is
252
closely linked to the emergence of a system of MLG, with hierarchical arrangements 
giving way in many areas to non-hierarchical, local co-operative and intra- and inter-firm 
networks of governance. The MLG approach thus helps us to understand the increasingly 
complex relations between the fluidity of domestic governance and the development of 
production networks.
Most importantly, the transition to MLG is a highly political process that is both stimulated 
and constrained by power relations. Although the centre is the initial promoter and 
provider of reform processes, the forms of governance are being continuously reproduced 
and reshaped according to the practices of the key participant actors (the centre, localities 
and firms). The result is an increasing fluidity, complexity and diffusion of authority that 
does not fit neatly into the formal territorial patterns of China’s ‘official’ political and 
administrative structure.
The processes of MLG at the micro-regional level are shown to be the result of both a 
deepening economic interdependence and the restructuring of the state. The state, SNGs 
and firms are the primary strategic agents of MLG in micro-regionalisation. It is essential 
therefore to design new roles for SNGs in the field of international economic activity, to 
equip SNGs with the necessary capabilities and resources, and to formulate a more flexible 
interpretation of territoriality and sovereignty. This study shows that in the case of the 
re-articulation of China into the global economy, the domestic adjustment of networks of 
governance and the learning processes for MLG are being carried out by both the Chinese 
central and sub-national authorities. However, the pace of the spread of de facto 
régionalisation, as revealed by the case of the electronics industry, is extraordinarily fast, 
and the ambiguous allocation of authority among central, provincial and sub-provincial 
governments remains a major obstacle to efficiency. The problems of corruption, 
smuggling and widening regional economic disparities reveal very clearly the basic 
structural defects and limitations of state-led institutionalisation and economic reform from 
above. MLG in China is indeed premature in terms of its underdeveloped accountability, 
transparency, legitimation and institutionalisation. It is therefore important to acknowledge 
the increasing role of the SNGs and to activate the sub-national level to strengthen the 
institutional support of the central authority and the international community
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International Commodity ( 'hams
Perspectives drawn from the international division of labour approach and international 
commodity chains (ICCs) analysis help us to understand the de facto processes of 
régionalisation inducing industrial transformation. Industrial agglomeration in Guangdong 
is the result of the interplay of several economic variables. The foundation of industrial 
agglomeration is transplanted from outside, from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Japan. The ICCs 
approach highlights the deepening relations between industrial change and the external 
economic effectiveness of intra- and inter-firm relations, and the way in which the cities in 
the Pearl River Delta in Guangdong have become closely linked to Taiwan and Japan as 
well as to the broader global economy. The Japanese electronics industry has expanded its 
production sites in East Asia in order to overcome cost competition in production. In order 
to reduce the transaction costs, local procurement is critical and this induces the 
agglomeration of the suppliers of parts and components. Taiwan is the pivotal production 
site that cuts across the borders among China, Taiwan and Japan. Japanese electronics 
firms use the flexibility of Taiwanese firms. But Japanese firms also use Taiwan as their 
operation centre in China. According to research by the Nomura Institute, 76.7% of 
Japanese firms that have established subsidiaries in Taiwan perform a supply and guidance 
role in China (Gekkan Ajiu, July 1998).
Taiwan was the original the production site for Japanese manufacturing firms. In this 
context, it is especially important to understand the roles of East Asian NIEs (Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea) in relation to commodity chains, in particular through 
their links with Japan. East Asian NIEs have undertaken a number of key roles: (1) a 
commodity-export role; (2) a commercial-subcontracting role, using imported components 
from Japan; (3) an export-platform role, using Japanese FDI; (4) a components supplier 
role, acquiring OEM (original equipment manufacturing) from Japanese manufacturers; 
and (5) an independent exporter role, using original brandnames (Gereffi, 1992: 106). In 
the case of Taiwan, it shifted from a commodity export role to a 
commercial-subcontracting role, using imported components from Japan. Then, it began to 
play an export platform role, using Japanese FDI. It has also become a components 
supplier, acquiring the OEM for the firms in advanced countries. OEM production has 
helped technological transfer from the advanced countries. Taiwan has now emerged as the
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major investor in Guangdong through ordering the assembly of manufactured goods. 
Taiwan has extended commodity chains across the Taiwan Strait in order to meet the 
demand of low-cost production. The role of Taiwan as a recipient of Japanese FDI and a 
supplier of investment to China is crucial for the further development of Guangdong’s 
industrial agglomeration. The highly flexible Taiwanese inter-firm division of labour is 
replacing the conventional mechanism of the international division of labour based on 
national economies. In this respect, Gereffi (1996) correctly predicted the pattern and 
change of the relations between the NIEs and Japan. However, in the case of electronics 
industry, Taiwanese electronics firms have not yet achieved, or have strategically decided 
not to undertake, original brandname manufacturing (OBM). The major Taiwanese 
electronics firms still undertake OEM production and now the major production form is 
becoming the EMS type of production system, which also contracts manufacturing with 
the lead firms.
This study has sought to determine how far and in what ways the ICCs approach can 
explain the pattern of micro-regionalisation across Guangdong, Taiwan and Japan. 
According to Gereffi’s assumptions, Guangdong’s key roles with Taiwan and Japan are: 
(1) a commodity-export role; (2) a commercial-subcontracting role, using imported 
components from Taiwan and Japan; (3) an export-platform role, using Japanese and 
Taiwanese FDI; (4) a components supplier role, acquiring OEM (original equipment 
manufacturing) from Japanese and Taiwanese manufacturers; and (5) an independent 
exporter role, using original brandnames (OBM). Gereffi’s assumption of the shift of 
commodity chains is correct up to and including stage (4). But Guangdong has not 
achieved the stage (5) role, nor is it likely to in the near future, given the present 
inadequacies of its education and training provision, which have led to a critical shortage 
of engineers, especially in the electronics sector, and other skilled workers.
However, we can identify the role of Guangdong and Chinese firms from the perspective 
of ICCs. Chinese firms can use Guangdong’s industrial agglomeration in the electronics 
industry, mainly in a commercial-subcontracting role, using imported components from 
Taiwan and Japan. As they have expanded the sales share of the domestic market and 
increased exports, they have gradually upgraded to the export platform role and the
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components supplier role. Clearly Guangdong has not yet achieved an independent 
exporter role. In some cases (e g. Konka), OEM production has become an important part 
of the Chinese electronics industry However, in PC-related OEM production, Taiwanese 
electronics firms are dominant and supply OEM products not only to foreign firms but to 
Chinese electronics firms. Thus, the role of Guangdong as a components supplier and 
OEM production site remains somewhat ambiguous, and the effectiveness of the ICCs 
approach based on regional linkages needs to be supplemented by a more detailed analysis 
of firms’ production networks.
Cross-Border Product ion Networks
In most industries there is usually a specialisation of activities, with each individual 
organisation being linked to, and playing its role in, the wider production and distribution 
system. With the rapid development of liberalisation, deregulation, information technology, 
and communication in the 1990s, the pace of the globalisation of production networks 
accelerated. These networks encompass the inter- and intra- firm relationships through 
which the firms organise the entire range of their business activities.
The concept of cross-border production networks (CPNs) highlights the fact that the 
strategies of each firm vary and the characteristics of the home environment affect the 
pattern of CPNs. Hong Kong firms’ ‘front-shop, back-factory’ (intra- and inter- firm 
relations) model across Guangdong and Hong Kong has become the foundation of the 
CPNs between these two areas. With flexible interpretation and the support of local 
government, the increasing profit of Hong Kong manufacturing in the Pearl River Delta 
has quickly attracted foreign, especially Taiwanese, manufacturers.
Our analysis of the CPNs of Japanese electronics firms reveals considerable variation 
among those firms’ strategies and the influence of the home governance. In the Japanese 
electronics production system, the keiretsu and the sub-contracting role of SMEs based on 
long-term relations have played an important role in sustaining competitive advantage. The 
appreciation of the Japanese yen since the late 1980s has had a profound effect on this 
closed and centralised system. Japanese electronics firms have tried to develop a 
mini-keiretsu system in East Asia. In the NIEs and ASEAN, these strategies o f Japanese
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manufacturing firms are common because of the lack of local suppliers of parts and 
components. Japanese manufacturing FDI is often undertaken together with group 
companies. However, they now face the new challenge of massive change in the 
technology of electronics and consequent changing demands in the consumer markets. This 
industrial- technological upgrading has greatly accelerated competition in order to achieve 
quicker development cycles and technological upgrading as well as the rationalisation of 
procurement in the electronics industry. The outsourcing of manufacturing and the 
formation of international alliances became popular strategies among Japanese electronics 
firms in the 1990s. This inevitably involved the revision of inter-firm relations. This 
perspective helps us to understand the emerging variation in the impact of changes of 
governance in production networks on the shift of Japanese electronics firm into East Asia.
The CPN model also highlights the networking linkages of Taiwanese electronics firms. 
Taiwan is a small country faced with unresolved political tension across the Taiwan Strait. 
Due to the proliferation of SMEs, Taiwanese firms have developed close inter-firm 
relations. The complementary inter-firm division of labour can be seen to correspond to the 
producer-driven, international, regional and hierarchical division of labour Many 
Taiwanese SMEs link up with foreign firms in different ways (in sub-contracting, OEM, 
EMS, etc ). Taiwanese inter-firm relations are thus moving to the mainland while 
maintaining the structures of networks in Taiwan. Much of the offshore production of 
Taiwanese PC-related products is concentrated in south China (Dongguan). Taiwanese 
companies are integrated in a large number of different national production systems. 
Taiwanese SMEs, however, can respond to market change quickly. This is very different 
from Japanese SMEs, which have served as parts and components suppliers for the lead 
firms.
Although there is a limited university spin-off effect in Guangdong, there are many private 
ventures and TVEs, set up by entrepreneurs who previously had work experience with 
foreign firms. To maintain the new product information and quality of technology for 
assembling, it is important for local firms to link up with foreign firms and obtain OEM 
orders from advanced countries. This enables firms to further attract local firms which are 
willing to participate in electronics production. Thus, with the rise of global competition,
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industrial agglomeration in Guangdong has become the leading production site for the 
electronics industry in China. The dramatic growth of China’s electronics products is 
bound to the spread of CPNs across Guangdong, Taiwan and Japan.
Theorising Micro-Regionalisaiion
One of the main aims of this study is to refine and extend the theorisation of 
micro-regional isation in order to enhance IPE perspectives on processes of régionalisation 
and globalisation. Micro-regionalisation is a world-wide phenomenon that is emerging in 
more geographical areas than ever before as a manifestation of fundamental changes in 
cross-border economic and political relations.1 The study of IPE presumes that states, 
multinational corporations and other powerful actors attempt to use their power to 
influence the nature of international relations. One of the major themes in the study of IPE 
is the persistent clash between the increasing interdependence of the international economy 
and the desire of individual states to maintain their economic independence and political 
autonomy. Thus many political economists acknowledge the need for some minimal rules 
or institutions to govern and regulate economic activities among states. Although the 
departure from the state-centric approach toward more pluralistic approaches, taking into 
account the role of SNGs, NGOs and MNCs in the processes of international economic 
governance, is evident, there are still no comprehensive theories of micro-regionalisation 
in IPE. In the present study, micro-regionalisation has been conceptualised in terms of 
networks of governance in order to provide a sufficient explanation of the interactions 
among the different types of institutions, organisations and movements across national 
boundaries. This approach permits us to explore more deeply the development of the 
interpenetrative relationships involved in cross-border governance in terms of both 
economic behaviour and political representation.
To begin with, the distinction between regionalism based on deliberate, purposive state-led 
projects and régionalisation promoted largely by market-driven processes is important if 
we are to understand the various processes involved in restructuring of a regional order. 
Régionalisation and globalisation must also be distinguished from internationalisation, 
which refers to a process of intensifying connections between national domains. As a result 
of internationalisation, states may come to have deep effects on each other, but they remain
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distinct separate territorial spaces. Although the micro-regionalisation approach accepts the 
continued existence of nation-states and the importance of different political and economic 
systems among states, the processes of micro-regionalisation do not always depend 
primarily on state actors or on state-to-state relations.
It is important in any theory o f micro-regionalisation not to concentrate simply on the 
relations within the micro-region. We also need to assess the roles of external actors and 
their interactive dynamism. This approach reflects the logic of the market system to expand 
geographically and of the processes of restructuring a regional political and economic 
space at the sub-national level. IPE scholars often focus exclusively on the international 
political and economic system without considering the domestic political economy. It has 
become obvious that the roles of domestic economies in the international affairs and of the 
external actors in the domestic arena have become significant determinants of both 
domestic and international affairs. In such transformational processes, the various state and 
non-state actors are struggling over the redefinition of identity, profit and power. Different 
levels of state and non-state actors have different levels of capability to shape and respond 
to globalisation. As we have seen in the present study, micro-regionalisation among 
Guangdong, Taiwan and Japan highlights the result of an integrated system of global 
production and trade (international division of labour, international commodity chains, and 
cross-border production networks), supported by new forms of investment and financing, 
and promoted by specific local government policies. One consequence of this new pattern 
of multi-layered governance is the creation of more participatory forms of international 
political economy. This represents a shift from the concept of order based on a largely 
state-centred and international-domestic divided territorial basis to the new shared 
responsibility between political and economic dimensions. In analytical terms, an 
understanding of the relationships of these actors both across national boundaries and 
within individual states is especially important. The major engine of change behind this 
linkage is the interactive multiple dynamism over intense industrial competition among 
firms and among local governments. The reliance on one level of analysis (i.e. 
state-to-state relations, or the state versus MNCs) or on vertical domestic 
inter-governmental relations can explain only a part of the picture. As this study shows, 
Chinese local governments do not necessarily stand in opposition to the centre in a
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zero-sum relationship, but they form direct transborder links with firms and have enhanced 
their capability to bypass the central government.
The theorisation of micro-regionalisation also helps to explain how micro-regionalisation 
is socially constructed, i.e. how social relations become relatively delinked from territorial 
geography (deterritorialisation). The socially integrated analysis of régionalisation is 
discussed in Section 2.7. The New Regionalism Approach/Theory (NRAT) examines three 
levels of analysis: (1) the structure of the world system as a whole; (2) the level of 
inter-regional relations; and (3) the internal pattern of the single region. Further elaboration 
is suggested by the development of global social theory, which suggests that the concept of 
‘regionness’ embraces five elements: regional area, regional complex, regional society, 
regional community and region-state. Micro-regionalisation involves processes of social 
construction through the interactions among the different levels of régionalisation This is 
an example of the declining influence of territory on our social life with the emergence of 
multiple and complex political and economic interactions across borders. Thus, as this 
thesis has sought to show, the theorisation of micro-regionalisation can fruitfully be based 
on a combined analysis of the processes of social political and economic strategies within 
and across national boundaries.
Undoubtedly, theorising micro-regionalisation calls for a more pragmatic approach towards 
on-going active region-building processes based on political and economic factors. The 
formation of cross-border governance builds up the thickness of regularised practices and 
rules across national boundaries. This effort to create new political and economic spaces at 
the sub-national level requires us to take into account the importance of cities and regions 
in the study of IPE. Cities and regions have become significant arenas in which a variety of 
political and economic interventions occur. Practically, the theorisation of 
micro-regionalisation addresses the features of multi-level governance, cross-border 
production networks and international commodity chains, which together facilitate an 
in-depth analysis of emerging patterns of multi-layered interactive governance in the world 
economy. This is an aspect of IPE that has previously received little attention. This neglect 
is, however, especially important in the case of the régionalisation processes in East Asia, 
where state territoriality, government legitimacy and supra-state governance still involve
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much uncertainty. In East Asia there is a very fluid and variable pattern of decision-making 
involving both quasi-public and quasi-private actors, especially in the area of foreign 
economic management. This thesis complements the conventional theories of 
régionalisation and globalisation, based on paradigms of state territoriality, institutional 
development, the international-domestic divide, and the state-market dichotomy, by raising 
the issues of the dynamics of multi-layered interpenetrative pattern of régionalisation and 
linkages both within and across national boundaries. Thus, theorising micro-regionalisation 
based on three approaches (multi-level governance, international commodity chains, and 
cross-border production networks) adds a valuable critical perspective to contemporary 
IPE analysis.
8.5 Implications for China's Future Policy Agenda
Japanese and Taiwanese FDI has been a powerful catalyst in the development of 
cross-border economic relations among Guangdong, Taiwan and Japan, and this has had a 
major impact on the local economic environment, including human capital endowment, 
social and physical infrastructure, local technology, local industrial structure, and even the 
local political system. Without foreign investment, industrial agglomeration in Guangdong 
would not have been possible. At the same time, China’s domestic reform process was a 
crucial factor, resulting in the increase o f Dongguan’s economic power over management. 
The inflow of capital into Dongguan was very rapid and did not allow enough time for 
local leaders to create consolidated regional developmental strategies. Dongguan's 
flexibility is outstanding (through guanxi networks); however, the abundant inflow of 
capital and the continuous supply of migrant workers from the inland area have delayed the 
systematic and careful consideration of how an effective and sustainable regional economic 
structure should be built. Certainly, without Dongguan’s indigenous developmental 
strategies (stressing the key roles of education, local ventures and technological upgrading), 
it will not be possible for Dongguan to transform itself into a high value-added electronics 
production site. The danger for Dongguan is that production networks are being 
reproduced and innovated according to MNCs’ changing strategies in the face of global 
competition. Japanese and Taiwanese firms themselves keep revising their production 
strategies in response to fluctuations in the global market. What this case study suggests is
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that there are several key issues that need to be addressed by Chinese policy-makers in the 
future.
The Policy Agenda
The phenomenon of micro-regionalisation among Guangdong, Taiwan and Japan has been 
understudied and is much less familiar than the so-called ‘Greater China’ perspective The 
three China’s economic relations are undoubtedly developing, but the real integration 
cannot be captured by the model of a group of regions. On the other hand, there is a danger 
in ‘reducing’ the study of régionalisation to the dynamics of economic and technological 
space. The role of government, political institutions, political processes, and political 
culture in shaping, limiting and encouraging new forms of regional activity is also of vital 
importance. The three sets of bilateral relations (China, Taiwan and Japan) are all 
politically sensitive, and bilateral perspectives (stressing relations between the central 
governments) are still dominant for policy makers. What is needed is a greater 
acknowledgement by the leaders of the importance of regional linkages beyond these 
bilateral relations, and of the effort needed to co-ordinate support for these linkages. Most 
importantly, new structures of MLG are required to link the central governments, SNGs 
and MNCs across borders. China-Taiwan-Japan relations have entered a new phase of 
linkages through the organisation of production and the regional division of labour. SNGs 
are assuming more and more direct responsibility for maintaining business conditions. But 
MLG in China needs to be more firmly anchored in relation to the development of CPNs in 
East Asia.
Cross-Strait Relations
Despite continuing political conflicts across the Taiwan Strait, one part of China and 
Taiwan are now deeply integrated On the Chinese side, with the rise of competition among 
local governments in attracting foreign investments, foreign firms are able to enjoy better 
concessions and preferential treatment. Dongguan’s innovative local networks are 
successful examples of cross-border economic governance at the micro level. Local 
governments and firms act to create networks of cross-border economic governance in line 
with their own strategies for economic development. In general, effective economic 
contacts between China and Taiwan are strictly limited to the micro-regional level While
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the priority of the national government of China is the unification with Taiwan, the 
regional and business initiatives may affect the development of a political framework 
between China and Taiwan. This is a good example of how micro-regional integration is 
linked to the relationship between the national levels of political interactions. Although 
micro-regionalisation itself has played a minor role in cross-strait political relations, 
Taiwanese business communities are emerging as key actors in leading the change of 
Taiwan’s foreign policy toward China. Thus, the cross-strait relations economic agenda has 
increasingly become linked to the global business environment. As long as mutual 
economic benefits from these relations are regarded as essential for national economic 
development, it is unthinkable to take any further political action which will break down 
micro-regionalisation. On the other hand, any future political instability in China, e.g. 
within the ruling party, could have a detrimental effect on business confidence
Sino-Japanese Relations
Since the end of the Second World War, economic interactions have been the key to the 
development of Sino-Japanese relations. This economic interdependence has been shaped 
by political factors, especially the changing ideological and governmental outlook of 
China’s ruling Communist Party (CCP). Today, there is a high level of mutual economic 
interdependence between the two countries. With the sharp increase of Japanese FDI and 
the shift of production sites into China, PTAs have become a major factor linking the two 
countries. Almost one quarter of the materials and components for China's PTAs are 
imported from Japan. For China, Japan is a key source for the further development of 
micro-regional integration with the world. For Japan, China is the crucial link in ensuring 
the survival of the Japanese manufacturing industry in the face of ever-intense global 
competition.
From an East Asian regional economic perspective, Japan has been a major economic 
power and China is emerging as a latecomer with both political and economic ambitions in 
the East Asia region. Despite their deepening interdependence with each other, we need to 
pay attention to the power struggle over the leadership role in East Asia, which greatly 
affects the processes of development of East Asian regional cooperation. China and Japan, 
as political rivals, have both moved to formulate East Asian economic cooperation on their
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own terms. The main problem here is that regional cooperation is regarded as a politically 
constructed process based on the central government. However, economic contacts and 
interaction have already existed and developed at a micro level, and mechanisms of 
economic exchange have already been put in place. The national economic perspectives on 
Sino-Japanese economic relations are still too strong in decision-makers’ minds in both 
countries. What is needed is to understand the real economic contacts and interactions 
carried out at further disaggregated levels.
A Divided ('hina? (Guangdong s Relations with Other Regions)
This study highlights the inter-relationship between the degree of foreign investment and 
regional differentiation in China The gap between the rich and poor is increasing. The 
involvement of foreign firms in local political space may point to China’s eventual 
disintegration. Certainly, the impact of micro-regionalisation among Guangdong, Taiwan 
and Japan has not yet contributed to China’s national economic integration. Rather, it is 
continuing to pull Guangdong, in particular the Pearl River Delta, towards the outside 
world. However, the processes of micro-regionalisation is sustained by deepening links 
with neighbouring provinces such as a huge supply o f labour force. Although there are 
interesting debates concerning the possibility of a federal China emerging in the future, a 
formal federal system might not be capable of accommodating the fluid and asymmetrical 
nature of the processes of China’s micro-regional integration, which depend on the wider 
processes of regional and global processes. The emergence of MLG in economic space in 
China suggests that there is already a kind of embryonic federalism in existence. The main 
issue at present is the lack of synchronisation between the relations of economic 
governance and the formal political framework.
8.6 Limitations of the Present Research
Though this study furnishes data concerning the structures, functions and operations of 
cross-border micro-regional networks of governance among Guangdong, Taiwan and Japan, 
it has obvious limitations. First, the study examines only one single sector (the electronics 
industry) and there is no cross-sector comparison. The pattern and processes of 
micro-regional networking in other sectors may be different.
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Secondly, the area analysed in this study is one specific geographical area (Guangdong and 
Dongguan) in China. Considering the huge regional differentiation in economic 
development in China, the cases of successful MLG in Guangdong and Dongguan may be 
exceptional.
Thirdly, the périodisation of the study (focusing on the 1990s) also restricts the 
generalisation of the research findings. For instance, the period of China’s entry into the 
WTO (2001) is excluded. Moreover, the field research was conduced within very limited 
time constraints It is difficult to judge whether the experience of the 1990s in Dongguan 
will be a prologue to the full-scale reintegration of China with the world economy or only a 
temporary and contingent phenomenon affecting a specific geographical area.
Fourthly, the MLG approach concentrates on China’s domestic system. Japan and Taiwan 
have different forms of MLG. Finally, as the FTA projects promoted by the state have not 
yet reached maturity in East Asia, the consequences of future interactions between 
régionalisation projects and the ‘lower’ level of micro-regionalisation are still uncertain
8.7 Future Research Directions
This study must be seen as an initial, limited study which needs to be expanded further in 
the future. In order to complement the findings of this study, further cross-sector and 
cross-locational research is especially important. China and Taiwan are now members of 
the WTO. China has also moved towards the establishment of a FTA with ASEAN, and 
Japan has moved towards a FTA with Singapore. The local governments in China, Taiwan 
and Japan have also emerged as more autonomous economic actors than ever before. 
Moreover, the continuous evolution of production systems and the increasing scale of the 
economy will continue to shape the pattern of micro-regional networking relations. From 
the viewpoint of MLG, the entry of China and Taiwan to the WTO has far-reaching 
implications for the strategies of actors involved in micro-regionalisation. The interactions 
among central governments, local governments, and firms have become more complex. 
These changing patterns need to be continually monitored and analysed. As explained in
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Chapter 6, the concentration of Japanese and Taiwanese electronics firms in the Yangtze 
River Delta can now be observed. This has major implications in terms o f China’s entry 
into the WTO. Thus, the expansion of the research to include developments in the Yangtze 
River Delta would provide further opportunities to test the validity and applicability of the 
analytical framework (MLG, ICCs and CPNs) utilised in the present study. This would also 
strengthen the comparative understanding of the processes of micro-regionalisation in the 
same country.
8.8 Summary of the Research Contribution
This thesis is a study of the dynamics of micro-regionalisation among Guangdong, Taiwan 
and Japan from an international political economy perspective. It is the first study to 
integrate an analysis of economic and political-governmental factors in the development of 
this particular case of micro-regionalisation, and in so doing the thesis adds an important 
empirical study to the literature and also contributes to the development of a theoretical 
framework of micro-regionalisation utilising a combination of approaches: multi-level 
governance, international commodity chains, and cross-border production networks. It 
adds a new dimension to existing studies of political and economic change in China, and in 
particular shows how an awareness of political economy spatiality can add to the 
understanding of the changing roles of different levels of government, especially the 
sub-national levels. The study highlights the growing importance for micro-regionalisation 
of the network relations among SNGs, firms and intermediate associations. Finally, the 
study illuminates the particularly interesting case of the development of the electronics 
sector in Guangdong (and especially Dongguan), and shows how that development has 
been shaped by a combination of domestic and foreign influences stemming from 
globalisation and régionalisation. The processes of micro-regionalisation are closely linked 
to the wider processes of régionalisation and globalisation. In this respect, this case study 
also furnishes an empirical example of China’s broader micro-regional integration with the 
world economy
1 For example, Breslin and Hook (2002).
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APPENDIX: THE CASE OF SANYO’S BUSINESS ACTIVITIES
Sanyo (established in 1950 and based in Osaka) is one of the pioneers of international 
production. Sales in the settlement accounts for the year ending March 2000 amounted to 
1,952 billion yen (Japan Company Handbook, 2000). In the early 1970s, Sanyo developed 
the ‘one-third’ strategy for manufacturing capacity: one-third domestic manufacturing for 
the domestic market; one-third domestic manufacturing for foreign markets, and one-third 
foreign manufacturing. Sanyo focused its international production and sourcing on East 
Asia in the second half of the 1970s, much earlier than other Japanese rivals (Ernst, 2000a: 
92).
Table A. 1 shows the location of Sanyo’s subsidiaries in the NIEs and ASEAN 4, and 
indicates the firm’s locational and production strategy in East Asia. Sanyo has established a 
semiconductor factory in each country apart from Malaysia and Indonesia. The production 
of semiconductors is in the hands of 100% Sanyo-owned firms, which is different from the 
types of subsidiaries undertaking relatively low-tech production (e.g. air conditioning). 
Table A. 2 indicates the reinvestment of subsidiaries and the role of the regional hub centres 
of Hong Kong and Singapore. Sanyo Semiconductors (Hong Kong) and Sanyo Asia 
(Singapore) have been involved in reinvestment in other East Asian countries. Sanyo Asia, 
for example, is a single investor in nine other Sanyo production sites (especially in the 
ASEAN 4). In the 1960s and 1970s, this expansion focused on the NIEs, and in the 1980s 
and 1990s Sanyo Asia set up subsidiaries in ASEAN.
Sanyo is also a pioneer in operations in China. By 1999, the company had established 29 
subsidiaries in China (see Table A.3). Sanyo’s geographical concentration in Liaoning (9) 
and Guangdong (14) is remarkable. Guangdong is a focus for high-tech electronics 
products, and Dalian is used for the production of home and business electrical appliances. 
Holding companies have been established in Beijing and Guangdong Sanyo initially 
invested in Guangdong, and in the 1990s it concentrated on Guangdong and Dalian. In 
terms of the forms of investment, Sanyo favours 100%-owned firms in high-tech 
production. Table A.4 also reveals the pattern of Sanyo’s expansion in China by presenting 
the shares of reinvestment. It identifies four cases of reinvestment by Sanyo Electric China
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(Beijing), Sanyo Electric Hong Kong, Huaqing Sanyo Electronics, and Guangdong 
Huaqing. Sanyo also undertakes reinvestment in Sanyo’s subsidiaries in China. Tables A 3 
and A 4 also illuminate Sanyo’s chronological strategy in China. Sanyo’s FDI in China was 
concentrated in the mid-1990s: 24 projects out of 29 were set up between 1993 and 1997.
Table A.l Sanyo’s East Asian Operations
C o u n t r y N a m e  o f  L o c a l B o d y M a jo r  B u s iness  o r  P ro d u c tio n
S a n y o  s  S h a re  o j  
L o c a l B o d y  
(% )(a )
K o r e a K o re a  S a n y o  E le c tric . A u d io s 4 9
(4 ) K o re a  T T V T R s , C D -R O M s 9 1 .9 9
K o re a  T oky  o  E le c tro n ic C D -re la te d  p r o d u c ts 9 9  04
K o re a  T o k y o  S ilic o n S e m ic o n d u c to rs 100
T a iw a n C h e n  H o  &  C o . T a p e - re c o rd e rs 4 3 .5
(4 ) S a n y o  E le c t r ic  T a iw a n A ir  c o n d itio n e rs ,  r e f r ig e ra to r s 4 6 5 7
S a n y o  E le c tro n ic  T a ic h u n g S e m ic o n d u c to rs 100
S a n y o  S e m ic o n d u c to r  T a ip e i S a le s  o f  s e m ic o n d u c to rs 100
H o n g  K o n g S a n y o  E le c tr ic  H K R eg io n a l o p e ra t io n  c e n tr e 100(b)
(4 ) S a n y o  E n e rg y  H K B a t te r ie s 100
T o tto ri S a n y o  E le c tr ic S e m ic o n d u c to rs 100
S a n y o  S e m ic o n d u c to r S a le s  o f  s e m ic o n d u c to rs 100
S in g a p o r e
(1 0 )
S a n y o  A ir  c o n d itio n e rs  M a n u fa c tu r in g A ir  c o n d i t io n e r s 92 .31
S a n y o  A ir  c o n d itio n e rs . A ir  c o n d i t io n e r s 5 0
S a n y o  A sia . C o lo u r  T V s 9 9 9
S a n y o  C o m p re ss o r  S in g a p o re . C o m p re s s o r s 9 0
S a n y o  D e n s o  In d u s tr ie s B o x e s  fo r  a i r  c o n d i t io n e r s 8 6 .6 7
S a m  o  E nergy  C o rp B a t te r ie s 9 8 .5 7
S a n y o  In d u s tr ie s M ic ro w a v e s 9 5 .6 2
S a n y o  S e m ic o n d u c to r S e m ic o n d u c to rs 100
S a n y o  M a la y s ia S a le s 24 .5
T h a i la n d S a n y o  S e m ic o n d u c to r S e m ic o n d u c to rs 100
(2 ) S a n y o  U n iv e rs a l E le c tr ic  P u b lic R e fr ig e ra to rs . C o lo u r  T V s 3 0 .2
M a la y s ia F M S  A u d io C a r  A u d io s 6 6 .7
S a n y o  E le c t r ic C a r  S te re o s . M o b ile  p h o n e s 100
Sany o  S a le s  a n d  S e rv ic e . A ir  c o n d itio n e rs ,  c o lo u r  T V s 2 7 .7
P h i l i p p in e s S a n y o  S e m ic o n d u c to r  M a n u fa c tu r in g S e m ic o n d u c to rs
(2 ) S a n y o  P h il ip p in e s R e f r ig e ra to rs 35
In d o n e s ia P T  S a n y o  C o m p re s s o r C o m p re s s o r s 9 0
(5 ) P T . S a n y o  E le c t ro n ic s C o lo u r  T V s 82
P T  S a n y o  E n erg y B a t te r ie s 9 0
P .T  S a n y o  In d u s tr ie s A ir  c o n d i t io n e r s 55
P.T. S a n y o  J a v a  C o m p re s s o r V T R s, T u n e rs 6 5 .9
Note: (a) includes affiliates and subsidiaries (b) includes some unspecified shareholder
Source Based on Toyo Keizai (2000) Kmgai Sinshulsu Kigyò Sóran 2000 (Outlook of Japanese Firms
Aborad 2000), Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha
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Table A.2 Reinvestment o f Sanyo’s Subsidiaries in East Asia
N a m e  o f  L o c a l B o d y
S a n y o s  
S h are  o f  
L o c a l B o d y  
(% )
S h a re  o f  S a n y o  s  E a s t A s ia n  
S u b s id ia r ie s
Year o f  
E o u n d a tio n
K o rea  S a n y o  E lectric . 4 9 0 1985
K o re a  TT 9 1 .9 9 0 1977
K o rea  T o k y o  E lectronic! 9 9 .0 4 0 1972
K o rea  T o k y o  S ilico n 100 0 1973
C h e n  H o  &  C o. 4 3 .5 S a n y o  E le c tric  T a iw a n  ( 1 4 .0 9 % ) 1990
S a n y o  E le c tr ic  T a iw an 4 6 .5 7 0 1964
S a n y o  E le c tro n ic  T a ich u n g 100 0 1976
S a n y o  S e m ic o n d u c to r  Taipei 100 S a n y o  S e m ic o n d u c to r  H K  (1 0 0 % ) 1982
S a n y o  E le c tric  H K l(K) 0 1960
S a n y o  E nergy  H K 100 S an y o  E le c t r ic  H K  (5 % ) 1989
T otto ri S a n y o  E lec tric 100 S an y o  E le c t r ic  HK  (3 2 % ) 1990
S an y o  S e m ic o n d u c to r 100 0 1974
S a n y o  A ir  C o n d it io n e rs  M a n u fa c tu r in g 9 2 .31 S an y o  A s ia  (9 2 .3 1 % ) 1986
S an y o  A ir  co n d itio n e rs 5 0 S a n y o  A s ia  (5 0 % ) 1984
S a n y o  A sia 9 9  9 0 1973
S a n y o  C o m p re sso r  S in g a p o re 9 0 S a n y o  A s ia  (9 0 % ) 1988
S an y o  D e n s o  In d u s tr ie s 8 6  6 7 0 1987
S a n y o  E nergy  C o rp 9 8  5 7 S an y o  A s ia  (9 8 .5 7 % ) 1990
S a n y o  In d u s tr ie s 9 5 .6 2 S a n y o  A s ia  (9 5 .6 2 % ) 1967
S an y o  S e m ic o n d u c to r 1 0 0 S an y o  S e m ic o n d u c to r  H K  (1 0 0 % ) 1987
S a n y o  M a la y sia 2 4 .5 0 1961
S an y o  S e m ic o n d u c to r 1 0 0 S a n y o  S e m ic o n d u c to r  H K (3 0 .9 1 % ) 1992
S an y o  U n iv e rs a l E lec tric 3 0 .2 0 1969
F M S  A u d io 6 6  7 0 1992
S a n y o  E lec tric 1 0 0 0 1986
S an y o  S a le s  a n d  S e rv ic e 2 7 .7 S a n y o  A sia  (2 5 % ) 1977
S an y o  S e m ic o n d u c to r  M - 1 996
S a n y o  P h ilip p in es 3 5 0 1971
P.T. S a n y o  C o m p re sso r 9 0 S a n y o  A s ia  (9 0 % ) 1994
P.T. S a n y o  E lec tro n ic s 8 2 S a n y o  A sia  (8 2 % ) 1 996
P.T. S a n y o  Energy 9 0 S an y o  E n e rg y  (S in g a p o re )  (9 0 % ) 1992
P.T. S a n y o  In d u s tr ie s 5 5 0 1970
P.T S an y o  J a v a  C o m p re sso r 6 5 .9 S a n y o  A s ia  (6 5 .9 % ) 1987
Source Based on Töyö Keizai (2000) Kaigai Sinshutsu Kìgyti Stirali 2000 (Outlook of Japanese Firms 
Aborad 2000), Tokyo Töyö Keizai Shinpösha
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I'able^A.3 Sanyo’s O perations in  C hina
S a n y o s
P r o v in c e s N a m e  o f  L o c a l  B o d y M a jo r  B u s in e ss  o r  P ro d u c tio n
S h a re  o f  
L o c a l B o d y
(% X a>
B e i j in g
S a n y o  E le c tr ic  C h in a H o ld in g  co m p a n s
T ia n j in T ia n jin  S a n y o  T e le c o m m u n ic a tio n  E q u ip m e n t C o rd e le s s  p h o n e -
S h a n g h a i S h a n g h a i S a n y o  B u b u g a o  C le a n in g C le an in g 7 1 .43
L i a o n in g
(9 )
D a lia n  S a n y o  A ir  c o n d itio n e r A ir  c o n d itio n e i
D a lia n  H o n jo  C h em ica l C h e m ic a ls 3 0
D a lia n  S a n y o  H o m e  A p p lia n c e H o m e  a p p lia n c e 5 5
D a lia n  S a n y o  C o ld -C h a in S how  ca ses
D a lia n  S a m  o  C o m p re ss o r C o m p re ss o r
D a lia n  S a n y o  F o o d  S y s te m s F o o d  a p p l ia n c e
D a lia n  S a n y o  R e fr ig e ra tio n R efrig e ra to i
D a lia n  S p in d le  C o o lin g  T o w e rs S p in d le  C o o lin g  T o w ers 5
S h e n y a n g  S a n y o  A ir  c o n d itio n e r A ir  c o n d itio n e r
J i a n g s u S a n y o  E le c t r ic  H o m e  A p p lia n c e s C le a n e r . M o to r 8 0
S u z h o u  S a n y o  E le c tro -M e c h a n ic a l C a r  e le c tr ic a l  g o o d s 5 0
A n h u i H e fe i S a n y o  W a sh in g  M a c h in e W a sh in g  M a c h in e
G u a n g d o n g D o n g g u a n  H u a q in g  S a n y o  P la s tic  In je c tio n P la s tic  fo r  a u d io  v isu a ls 75
(1 4 ) D o n g g u a n  H u a q in g  S a n y o  E le c tro n ic s C o lo u r  T V s 75
D o n g g u a n  H u a q in g  S a n y o  M o to r M ic ro m o to r 85
G u a n g d o n g  S a n y o  K c lo n  R e fr ig e ra to r F re e z e rs
G u a n g d o n g  H u aq in g  S a n y o  G ro u p H o ld in g  C o m p a n y
G u a n g d o n g  S a n y o  A ir  C o n d it io n e rs  S y s te m  
M a n u fa c tu r in g
A ir  c o n d itio n e r 5 0
H u a q in g  S a n y o  E le c tro n ic s V T R 5 0
S a n y o  E le c tr ic  S h e k o u M ic ro m o to r 100
S a n y o  S e m ic o n d u c to r  S h e k o u S e m ic o n d u c to r 100
S h e n z h e n  H u a q in g  S a n y o  T ech n o lo g y D e s ig n  fo r  a u d io  v isu a ls
S h e n z h e n  S a n y o  H u a q in g  E nergy B a tte rs -
S h e n z h e n  S a n y o  H u a q in g  O p tic a l T ech n o lo g y C D -R O M 6 0
T e so n ic -T o tto r i S a n y o  E le c tr ic F a c s im ile 7 0
T o t to r i  Sany o  E le c tr ic  S h e n z h e n L E D 100
Note: (a) includes affiliates and subsidiaries
Source Based on Toyo Keizai (2000) Kaigai Sinshutsu Kigyo Soran 2000 (Outlook of Japanese Firms 
Aborad 2000), Tokyo. Toy5 Keizai Shinposha
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Table A .4 Reinvestment o f  Sanyo’s Subsidiaries in C hina
N a m e  o f  L o c a l  B o d y
S a n y o s  
S hare  o f  
L o c a l B o d y  
(% )
S h a re  o f  S a nyo  s C h in a  s 
S u b s id ia r ie s
D a te  o f  
F o u n d a t io n
S a n y o  E lec tric  C h in a - 1995
T ian jin  S a n y o  T e le c o m m u n ic a tio n  E q u ip m e n t 1995
S h a n g h a i S a n y o  B u b u g ao  C le a n in g 7 1 .43 1 996
D a lia n  S a n y o  A ir  c o n d itio n e r 1995
D a lia n  H o n jo  C h e m ic a l 3 0 1 994
D alian  S a n y o  H o m e  A p p lia n c e 55 S a n y o  E lec tric  C h in a  (1 0 % ) 1 9 9 6
D a l ia n  S a n y o  C o ld -C h a in - 1 995
D a l ia n  S a n y o  C o m p re ss o r 1995
D a l ia n  S a n y o  F o o d  S y s te m s 1 9 9 7
D a l ia n  S a m o  R e frig e ra tio n 1 993
D alian  S p in d le  C o o lin g  T o w e rs 5 1 9 %
S h e n y a n g  S a n y o  A irc o n d itio n e r - 1 994
S a n y o  E le c t r ic  H o m e  A p p lia n c e s 80 S a n y o  E lec tric  C h in a  ( 17% ) 1 9 %
S u /.h o u  S a n y o  E lec tro -M cc h an ic a i 50 S a n y o  E lec tric  C h in a  (1 0 % ) 199 4
H efe i S a n y o  W ash ing  M a c h in e - 1 994
D o n g g u a n  H u a q in g  S a n y o  P las tic  In je c tio n 75
G u a n g d o n g  H u a q in g  S a n y o  
(1 0 % )
H u aq in g  S a n y o  E le c tro n ic s  
(4 0 % )
1995
D o n g g u a n  H u a q in g  S an y o  E le c tro n ic s 75
G u a n g d o n g  H u a q in g  S a n y o  
(1 0 % )
H u aq in g  S any o  E le c tro n ic s  
(4 0 % )
1995
D o n g g u a n  H u a q in g  S a n y o  M o to r 85
G u a n g d o n g  H u a q in g  S a n y o  
(1 0 % )
199 5
G u a n g d o n g  S a n y o  K elo n  R e fr ig e ra to r 199 7
G a u n d o n g  H u a q in g  S an y o  G ro u p - 1 9 %
G u a n g d o n g  S a n y o  A i r  C o n d itio n e rs  Sy s te m  
M a n u fa c tu rin g
5 0
S a n y o  E lec tric  (H o n g  K o n g )
(5 0 % )
198 4
H u a q in g  S an y o  E le c tro n ic s 5 0 S a n y o  E le c tric  (H K )  (5 0 % ) 198 4
S a n y o  E le c tn c  S h e k o u 100 S a n y o  E lec tric  (H K )  (1 0 0 % ) 198 3
S a n y o  S e m ic o n d u c to r  S h e k o u  
S h e n z h e n  H u a q in g  S an y o  T e chno logy
100
S an y o  S e m ic o n d u c to r  H K  
(1 0 0 % )
1985
1 9 %
S h e n z h e n  S a n y o  H u aq in g  E nergy 1995
S h e n z h e n  S a n y o  H u a q in g  O p tic a l T e chno logy 6 0 S an y o  E le c tr ic  H K  (1 5 % ) 1993
T c so n ic -T o tto r i S a n y o  E le c tr ic 70 S a n y o  E le c tric  C h in a  (1 0 % ) 1 9 %
T o tto ri S a n y o  E lec tric  S h e n z h e n 100 S an y o  E le c tn c  H K  (5 0 % ) 198 4
Source Based on Toyö Keizai (2000) Kaigai Sinshulsu Kigyö Söran 2000 (Outlook of Japanese Firms 
Aborad 2000), Tokyo: Töyö Keizai Shinpösha
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